“Age of Reason” 18th Century: AWI, SYW, etc… (1 Viewer)

[swalterh]

The Prussian Army was the single most import governmental institution throughout the history of the Kingdom of Prussia. Due to Prussia’s relatively meager size, in both land and population, the Prussian Kings and their citizens depended upon the strength of the Army for their very existence. This overwhelming need for a strong and effective Army led to the adoption of a very rigid military tradition by the entire population. This led to a common foreign conception that, where some states have an army, the Prussian Army has a state.

 

[swalterh]

In 1740, Friedrich II ascended the throne and wasted no time in putting all of his father’s military reforms to good use by embarking on a period of military conquest. Having been on the throne not even a year, he launched an invasion of the Austrian Empire’s territory of Silesia. This aggressive action brought about two Silesian Wars between the two kingdoms and would prove to be the first meaningful test for the Prussian Army.

During a brief respite in the fighting, Friedrich conducted Europe's first-ever battle-scale maneuvers, the Herbstübung or Fall Exercise, in 1743. This gave his officers invaluable peacetime experience in directing large-scale bodies of troops. Prussia and Austria would eventually campaign in the region for five years until Friedrich was able to deliver the knockout blow at the Battle of Hohenfriedberg in 1745. The subsequent peace allowed Prussia to nominally absorb the territory of Silesia.

 

[swalterh]

Lately I’ve been receiving some repeated inquiries about why the United States failed to commit itself sooner to certain conflicts (i.e. WWI & WWII). The reasons for this are many and would require extensive commentary on numerous instances in American history in order to fully explain. Hopefully the information in this series of posts will help to shed some light on the origins of America’s reluctance to commit the country to foreign struggles (i.e. American Isolationism). For this purpose I will cite some passages from President George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796) that he recited after completing two consecutive terms as the nation’s first President.

 

[swalterh]

37 Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

38 Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

 

[swalterh]

40 It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

41 Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

I believe it pertinent to note that due in large part to the precedent laid forth by this address, the United States did not enter into any permanent alliance with a foreign nation until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949).

 

[swalterh]

William Howe, is there a more controversial commander in the 18th Century? His masterful execution of the oblique order at New York and the Brandywine can be considered nothing less than instances of pure tactical genius. And yet, for whatever reason, he never could deliver the knock blow that would have crippled Washington’s Continental Army.

It seemed as though Howe was more interested in the high society life of New York City & Philadelphia than he was in conducting combat operations. In the end, I think he suffered from a severe case overconfidence and lack of will to fully defeat his colonial brethren. His decision not to assault the Dorchester Heights during the Siege of Boston can be seen as a failure to seize the initiative from a weaker opponent. Likewise, in the winter of 1776-77, his dispositions that left Col. Rall and the other outposts so vulnerably exposed and that eventually resulted in the defeats at Trenton and Princeton shows that he held his adversary in utter contempt.

Another of Howe’s questionable decisions during this conflict came when he decided to embark his own force for operations against the Rebel capital in Philadelphia. In so doing, he abandoned General John Burgoyne to operate alone against the Northern Army in upstate New York. This mistake resulted in the eventual surrender of Burgoyne’s Army at Saratoga.

Despite his shortcomings, Sir William still deserves to be remembered as a fine professional soldier who was fully capable of handling large bodies of troops in the field. But, similarly to George McClellan during the ACW, he didn’t have the killer instinct that would have enabled him to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion.

 

[jazzeum]

40 It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

41 Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

I believe it pertinent to note that due in large part to the precedent laid forth by this address, the United States did not enter into any permanent alliance with a foreign nation until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949).

I'm not sure what you mean by "permanent alliance." Does that exclude treaties. For example, during the Civil War, we signed a treaty with Britain whereby they could board US ships to search for slaves.

 

[swalterh]

I'm not sure what you mean by "permanent alliance." Does that exclude treaties. For example, during the Civil War, we signed a treaty with Britain whereby they could board US ships to search for slaves.

Brad,

These aren't my words. This phrase comes directly from Washington's farewell address. By the end of Washington’s second term, there was heated discussion amongst his cabinet members between forging closer ties with England or France. Hamilton (Sec. Treasury & Closet Monarchist) wanted to cultivate a closer relationship with England because he thought this would bring greater financial opportunities to the fledgling US economy. Jefferson (Sec. of State) headed up the influence sphere that was more in favor of continuing to support a strong relationship with France.

As we know from events that occurred in Europe during this time period, the relationship between England and France was becoming more and more strained. The situation eventually exploded into the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (events that were powerful enough in scope to impact the entire world and the United States (War of 1812) despite our best intentions of remaining neutral).

I think that this portion of the Farewell Address was Washington's way of encouraging his cabinet members (who would inevitably be picking up the proverbial torch as far as policy making) to choose a middle ground and avoid supporting one European power over the other.

And yes, this would exclude formal treaties and trade agreements that did not commit US military forces to the defense or occupation of foreign countries during times of peace. The NATO agreement was the first such agreement between the US and foreign governments.

Shane