- Joined
- Feb 2, 2011
- Messages
- 2,093
JJDESIGNS NEWS UPDATE 26TH AUGUST 2024
THE ANGLO ZULU WAR
THE BATTLE OF GINGINDHLOVU, 2nd APRIL 1879.
The Battle of Gingindhlovu was fought on 2nd April 1879 between a British relief column sent to break the siege at Eshowe, and a Zulu impi of king Cetshwayo.
The British soldier would refer to it as the Battle of “GIN GIN I LOVE YOU”.
Charles Pearson had led No.1 column of the British invasion force across the Tugela River to establish an advanced base at Eshowe. Having set up a base at a deserted Norwegian mission station, the British found themselves besieged.
A relief column was organized by Lord Chelmsford and departed Fort Tenedos on 29th March to relieve the garrison.
Chelmsford’s relief force comprised 3,390 Europeans, and 2,280 Africans.
ZULU STRATEGY
The Zulu strategy, faced with the inevitable British invasion of Zululand, King Cetshweyo was determined to inflict a decisive defeat on the invaders.
Knowing the British possessed overwhelming firepower, he argued against the traditional Zulu massed frontal attack, preferring the use of siege tactics.
He believed that once trapped, or starved into submission, the invaders would be forced to withdraw to Natal, rather than face a humiliating defeat on the battlefield.
He therefore instructed his generals to by-pass the invading columns and isolate them from their supply lines.
This tactic proved highly effective against the 1st Column which the Zulus successfully besieged at Eshowe.
It was also almost successful against the 4th Column at Kambula, until the approaching Zulu army was goaded by Col. Buller into a premature attack on the well prepared British position.
The Zulu king was also a shrewd diplomat. Cetshweyo knew that once the British invasion force was trapped he could seriously embarrass Britain internationally and force her invading army commanders to sue for peace.
Unfortunately, his own field commanders were autonomous and were either unable or unwilling to follow the King’s orders.
BRITISH STRATEGY
Due to the rocky terrain of Zululand and the ponderous progress of ox drawn supply wagons, the British invasion force would be very slow moving. Ordinarily, such serious transport deficiencies would have been a serious handicap, but Chelmsford turned this slow progress to his tactical advantage.
Lord Chelmsford ensured his men spent much time laagering and entrenching their camp at the end of each day, and kept ammunition boxes open and at the ready.
A measured advance towards the Zulu capital of Ulundi permitted both adequate reconnaissance of uncharted Zululand and allowed the progressive destruction of Zulu crops and villages as his invasion force advanced, actions calculated to provoke the Zulus into attacking his prepared squares or entrenched positions.
The standard battle tactic employed by the British in South Africa was a combination of good reconnaissance followed by ruthless skirmishing. In rough country, both the infantry and cavalry would advance to meet the enemy, the infantry breaking up any established groups and the cavalry harassing them in flight. If the Zulus appeared in any number, the British were trained to form a square or entrench their position, thus drawing the Zulus into the range of their overwhelming firepower.
Well aimed rifle volley fire, supported by rockets, artillery and later in the campaign, Gatling guns, would in Chelmsford’s view, ensure the invincibility of the invasion force.
Once a Zulu attack on such a well defended position faltered, the cavalry would leave the protection of the entrenched position to harass and rout the attackers.
THE MARK V AMMUNITION BOX
The disastrous British defeat at Isandlwana is often attributed to a failure of ammunition distribution.
This has been blamed on the unwillingness of quaretermasters to issue rounds without due paperwork, and to the difficulties of opening the ammunition boxes themselves, which were supposedly bound tight with copper bands, and even to a lack of screwdrivers with which to do so.
The ammunition itself was stored in the Mark V Ammunition box, which was a stout wooden box, lined with tin, and held together with two copper bands.
These boxes were obviously designed to take rough treatment, especially on campaign.
Access to the rounds was via a sliding wooden panel in the centre of the box, which was held in place by just one screw. In an emergency it could be opened by giving the edge of the panel a hefty clout, which had the effect of splintering the wood around the screw.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY
Despite the disaster of the Crimean War, which had been caused in part by insufficient supplies, there was still no established system of transport within the British Army in 1879. Lord Chelmsford’s invasion force amounted to an estimated total of 16,000 fighting men, 985 wagons, 60 mule carts, over 10,000 oxen, 870 horses and 450 mules.
The overall aim of the invasion was a relatively simple task when compared with the task of supplying this force with food and water for men and animals alike.
There were extensive stockpiles of tins of bully beef, 200lb bags of locally grown corn (mealies), and wooden crates of tough army biscuits.
Sufficient tentage, consisting of Bell tents, had to be transported (1 for every 8 men and named after their inventor, not the bell shape), together with mobile bakeries, engineering equipment, ammunition and medical supplies.
The list of supplies was endless and included much valuable equipment soon to fall into Zulu hands, items such as axes, blankets, kettles, lanterns, shovels, tools, lifting jacks, stretchers, ropes, and waterproof sheets.
The stores also had to include such incidentals as sufficient supplies of grease for the men’s boots, and spare flannel shirts. It was calculated by Chelmsford’s staff that the total weight of these stores would amount to nearly two thousand tonnes.
The task of organizing the supplies for the whole invasion force, fell to the existing Commissary General Strickland, and his staff of less than twenty fit officers and men.
These officers were to be supplemented by regular commissariat officers sent from the UK. These were inexperienced and were highly vulnerable to a variety of fraudulent deals.
Having assembled sufficient stores, establishing an effective transport system was the next problem. All assembled stores had to be scaled down according to the size and purpose of the unit.
The scale of transport was also meticulously prepared down to company level so that each company was mobile yet totally self sufficient, which was a huge logistical undertaking.
The overall responsibility for transport fell on the appointed Transport Officer, one per invading column, assisted by a sub conductor for every ten wagons.
By the time of the invasion, Chelmsford had achieved an almost impossible task. He had assembled sufficient supplies and transport to sustain his campaign.
GINGINDHLOVU ZULU WAR SUPPLY WAGON, 3“ x 7 ½” x 2 1/4“ total length including Ox shaft 11“, total height including rear tent 4”.
There was a limited number of army general service wagons available, but they were not ideal, since their narrow carriage, intended for European roads made them unstable in southern Africa.
The solution was to purchase local transport, often at highly inflated prices.
These wagons were large and heavy, sometimes tented, often with a half tent covering the rear portion only.
These required between 16 and 18 oxen apiece to pull them, and to keep the oxen healthy, they needed 16 hours each day for rest and grazing, which reduced their traveling potential to about 10 miles per day. On trackless country, roads seamed by dongas or turned into a quagmire by sudden rain, it was much less.
The shortage of transport remained a major headache throughout the war, and it is impossible to ignore the extent to which it dominated Chelmsford’s strategy.
There will be 5 different supply wagons to help create the Laager. These should be available in the middle of 2025.
The second invasion moved at such a methodical pace so that forts could be erected to guard the staging post. In battle the wagons formed the surest means of defense, the laager. This was based on the Boer practice of circling wagons for protection in hostile country at the end of a day’s trek.
In 1879 especially after Isandlwana, transport wagons were drawn into one or more linked square laagers, which were usually entrenched.
GINGINDHLOVU LAAGER ENTRENCHMENT, STRAIGHT 6 ¼” x 2 1/8” x 1 3/8”
The usual method was to dig a trench several paces beyond the wagon line, piling the earth up inside to form a parapet.
The troops would then sleep between the parapet and the wagons at night, and man the parapet at times of alarm.
GINGINDHLOVU LAAGER ENTRENCHMENT, CORNER 6 ¼” x 6 ¼” x 1 3/8”
4 Corners and 12 straight entrenchment pieces will be enough for a display with an internal display of 8 supply wagons. This will take up an area of 31 ¼” x 31 ¼”.
The Laager Entrenchments should be available early in 2025.
MORE UPDATES ON THE BATTLE OF “GIN GIN I LOVE YOU” WILL FOLLOW ON MONDAY 16th SEPTEMBER.
Best wishes,
john jenkins
THE ANGLO ZULU WAR
THE BATTLE OF GINGINDHLOVU, 2nd APRIL 1879.
The Battle of Gingindhlovu was fought on 2nd April 1879 between a British relief column sent to break the siege at Eshowe, and a Zulu impi of king Cetshwayo.
The British soldier would refer to it as the Battle of “GIN GIN I LOVE YOU”.
Charles Pearson had led No.1 column of the British invasion force across the Tugela River to establish an advanced base at Eshowe. Having set up a base at a deserted Norwegian mission station, the British found themselves besieged.
A relief column was organized by Lord Chelmsford and departed Fort Tenedos on 29th March to relieve the garrison.
Chelmsford’s relief force comprised 3,390 Europeans, and 2,280 Africans.
ZULU STRATEGY
The Zulu strategy, faced with the inevitable British invasion of Zululand, King Cetshweyo was determined to inflict a decisive defeat on the invaders.
Knowing the British possessed overwhelming firepower, he argued against the traditional Zulu massed frontal attack, preferring the use of siege tactics.
He believed that once trapped, or starved into submission, the invaders would be forced to withdraw to Natal, rather than face a humiliating defeat on the battlefield.
He therefore instructed his generals to by-pass the invading columns and isolate them from their supply lines.
This tactic proved highly effective against the 1st Column which the Zulus successfully besieged at Eshowe.
It was also almost successful against the 4th Column at Kambula, until the approaching Zulu army was goaded by Col. Buller into a premature attack on the well prepared British position.
The Zulu king was also a shrewd diplomat. Cetshweyo knew that once the British invasion force was trapped he could seriously embarrass Britain internationally and force her invading army commanders to sue for peace.
Unfortunately, his own field commanders were autonomous and were either unable or unwilling to follow the King’s orders.
BRITISH STRATEGY
Due to the rocky terrain of Zululand and the ponderous progress of ox drawn supply wagons, the British invasion force would be very slow moving. Ordinarily, such serious transport deficiencies would have been a serious handicap, but Chelmsford turned this slow progress to his tactical advantage.
Lord Chelmsford ensured his men spent much time laagering and entrenching their camp at the end of each day, and kept ammunition boxes open and at the ready.
A measured advance towards the Zulu capital of Ulundi permitted both adequate reconnaissance of uncharted Zululand and allowed the progressive destruction of Zulu crops and villages as his invasion force advanced, actions calculated to provoke the Zulus into attacking his prepared squares or entrenched positions.
The standard battle tactic employed by the British in South Africa was a combination of good reconnaissance followed by ruthless skirmishing. In rough country, both the infantry and cavalry would advance to meet the enemy, the infantry breaking up any established groups and the cavalry harassing them in flight. If the Zulus appeared in any number, the British were trained to form a square or entrench their position, thus drawing the Zulus into the range of their overwhelming firepower.
Well aimed rifle volley fire, supported by rockets, artillery and later in the campaign, Gatling guns, would in Chelmsford’s view, ensure the invincibility of the invasion force.
Once a Zulu attack on such a well defended position faltered, the cavalry would leave the protection of the entrenched position to harass and rout the attackers.
THE MARK V AMMUNITION BOX
The disastrous British defeat at Isandlwana is often attributed to a failure of ammunition distribution.
This has been blamed on the unwillingness of quaretermasters to issue rounds without due paperwork, and to the difficulties of opening the ammunition boxes themselves, which were supposedly bound tight with copper bands, and even to a lack of screwdrivers with which to do so.
The ammunition itself was stored in the Mark V Ammunition box, which was a stout wooden box, lined with tin, and held together with two copper bands.
These boxes were obviously designed to take rough treatment, especially on campaign.
Access to the rounds was via a sliding wooden panel in the centre of the box, which was held in place by just one screw. In an emergency it could be opened by giving the edge of the panel a hefty clout, which had the effect of splintering the wood around the screw.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY
Despite the disaster of the Crimean War, which had been caused in part by insufficient supplies, there was still no established system of transport within the British Army in 1879. Lord Chelmsford’s invasion force amounted to an estimated total of 16,000 fighting men, 985 wagons, 60 mule carts, over 10,000 oxen, 870 horses and 450 mules.
The overall aim of the invasion was a relatively simple task when compared with the task of supplying this force with food and water for men and animals alike.
There were extensive stockpiles of tins of bully beef, 200lb bags of locally grown corn (mealies), and wooden crates of tough army biscuits.
Sufficient tentage, consisting of Bell tents, had to be transported (1 for every 8 men and named after their inventor, not the bell shape), together with mobile bakeries, engineering equipment, ammunition and medical supplies.
The list of supplies was endless and included much valuable equipment soon to fall into Zulu hands, items such as axes, blankets, kettles, lanterns, shovels, tools, lifting jacks, stretchers, ropes, and waterproof sheets.
The stores also had to include such incidentals as sufficient supplies of grease for the men’s boots, and spare flannel shirts. It was calculated by Chelmsford’s staff that the total weight of these stores would amount to nearly two thousand tonnes.
The task of organizing the supplies for the whole invasion force, fell to the existing Commissary General Strickland, and his staff of less than twenty fit officers and men.
These officers were to be supplemented by regular commissariat officers sent from the UK. These were inexperienced and were highly vulnerable to a variety of fraudulent deals.
Having assembled sufficient stores, establishing an effective transport system was the next problem. All assembled stores had to be scaled down according to the size and purpose of the unit.
The scale of transport was also meticulously prepared down to company level so that each company was mobile yet totally self sufficient, which was a huge logistical undertaking.
The overall responsibility for transport fell on the appointed Transport Officer, one per invading column, assisted by a sub conductor for every ten wagons.
By the time of the invasion, Chelmsford had achieved an almost impossible task. He had assembled sufficient supplies and transport to sustain his campaign.
GINGINDHLOVU ZULU WAR SUPPLY WAGON, 3“ x 7 ½” x 2 1/4“ total length including Ox shaft 11“, total height including rear tent 4”.
There was a limited number of army general service wagons available, but they were not ideal, since their narrow carriage, intended for European roads made them unstable in southern Africa.
The solution was to purchase local transport, often at highly inflated prices.
These wagons were large and heavy, sometimes tented, often with a half tent covering the rear portion only.
These required between 16 and 18 oxen apiece to pull them, and to keep the oxen healthy, they needed 16 hours each day for rest and grazing, which reduced their traveling potential to about 10 miles per day. On trackless country, roads seamed by dongas or turned into a quagmire by sudden rain, it was much less.
The shortage of transport remained a major headache throughout the war, and it is impossible to ignore the extent to which it dominated Chelmsford’s strategy.
There will be 5 different supply wagons to help create the Laager. These should be available in the middle of 2025.
The second invasion moved at such a methodical pace so that forts could be erected to guard the staging post. In battle the wagons formed the surest means of defense, the laager. This was based on the Boer practice of circling wagons for protection in hostile country at the end of a day’s trek.
In 1879 especially after Isandlwana, transport wagons were drawn into one or more linked square laagers, which were usually entrenched.
GINGINDHLOVU LAAGER ENTRENCHMENT, STRAIGHT 6 ¼” x 2 1/8” x 1 3/8”
The usual method was to dig a trench several paces beyond the wagon line, piling the earth up inside to form a parapet.
The troops would then sleep between the parapet and the wagons at night, and man the parapet at times of alarm.
GINGINDHLOVU LAAGER ENTRENCHMENT, CORNER 6 ¼” x 6 ¼” x 1 3/8”
4 Corners and 12 straight entrenchment pieces will be enough for a display with an internal display of 8 supply wagons. This will take up an area of 31 ¼” x 31 ¼”.
The Laager Entrenchments should be available early in 2025.
MORE UPDATES ON THE BATTLE OF “GIN GIN I LOVE YOU” WILL FOLLOW ON MONDAY 16th SEPTEMBER.
Best wishes,
john jenkins
