mikemiller1955
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Why do you think the British forces lost so many of the early battles at the onset of the FIW and throughout it even while having numerical superiority in most battles...
Overconfident, Inept, Stubborn or just unlucky... (1 Viewer)
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mikemiller1955
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Throughout the early years of the French Indian Wars...beginning in 1755...the British seemed to suffer one huge lose after another...finally winning a long, expensive hard fought and costly war...
but not just huge loses...these were humiliating disasters...crippling defeats...military confidence nightmares...
you almost wonder how they had enough resources, men and money to finish the job...I know the battle for control of the Americas put the country in huge debt...
in most cases...even with superior troop numbers and weaponry...they still suffered these humiliating defeats...
for the first 3 years...the outnumbered French routinely defeated the British in one battle after another...
two battles really stand out as going wayward...Monongahela and Ticonderoga...
was the whole endeavor mismanaged...almost bankrupting England trying to keep a stronghold on America which they eventually lost...
I think this victory just boiled down to who had the most manpower and resources they could expend...they were just more committed and willing than France to keep this land...
but not just huge loses...these were humiliating disasters...crippling defeats...military confidence nightmares...
you almost wonder how they had enough resources, men and money to finish the job...I know the battle for control of the Americas put the country in huge debt...
in most cases...even with superior troop numbers and weaponry...they still suffered these humiliating defeats...
for the first 3 years...the outnumbered French routinely defeated the British in one battle after another...
two battles really stand out as going wayward...Monongahela and Ticonderoga...
was the whole endeavor mismanaged...almost bankrupting England trying to keep a stronghold on America which they eventually lost...
I think this victory just boiled down to who had the most manpower and resources they could expend...they were just more committed and willing than France to keep this land...
marco55
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That's a real hard one Mike.I think it's all of the above.
Seriously I think the French colonial forces and their indian allies had tactical superioty and also the French had the advantage of their interior lines with all the waterways they controlled.I think the British turned it around when they had brought over some excellent officers like Howe and Wolfe.
Mark
Seriously I think the French colonial forces and their indian allies had tactical superioty and also the French had the advantage of their interior lines with all the waterways they controlled.I think the British turned it around when they had brought over some excellent officers like Howe and Wolfe.Mark
mikemiller1955
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there are so many excuses....
was it attributed to the adherence of European battle tactics...a "proper gentleman's army"...a "civilized" battle...siege tactics...line firing tactics or the lack of acceptance of Indian warfare more suitable for these forest covered terrains...
was it their inept arrogant leadership...the older...stubborn...less experienced officers that were less willing to change from theri traditional ways...
maybe it was the British army policy of purchasing promotions by soldiers to officers rank... that put these inept leaders in charge...by the way...Montcalm's father bought him a captaincy in the French army...
were the French smarter or better fighters...
was Montcalm under rated...
were the Indians the edge...
was it the equipment...
at Monongahela...an inept, old, overconfident, stubborn Braddock with superior forces bungled the capture of Fort Duquense...a battle which if he had won...may have ended the French encroachment on territories outside of Canada...thus never having a French Indian War...
refusing advice of scouts, Indians and other officers...even with vastly far superior numbers...Braddock led his men to a massacre...
at Ticonderoga...Abercrombie... an elderly man raised to high command through political influence lacking military experience or ability...who had purchased a major's commission to enter the army...was ill suited to command this expedition...he accepted advice that was bad and made poor decisions...also with far superior numbers led his troops to a humiliating disaster...
I can't understand how the English were so tacticly dominated at so many battles by inferior numbers...I really feel if the French had more manpower and resources back then...we might be speaking French today...
was it attributed to the adherence of European battle tactics...a "proper gentleman's army"...a "civilized" battle...siege tactics...line firing tactics or the lack of acceptance of Indian warfare more suitable for these forest covered terrains...
was it their inept arrogant leadership...the older...stubborn...less experienced officers that were less willing to change from theri traditional ways...
maybe it was the British army policy of purchasing promotions by soldiers to officers rank... that put these inept leaders in charge...by the way...Montcalm's father bought him a captaincy in the French army...
were the French smarter or better fighters...
was Montcalm under rated...
were the Indians the edge...
was it the equipment...
at Monongahela...an inept, old, overconfident, stubborn Braddock with superior forces bungled the capture of Fort Duquense...a battle which if he had won...may have ended the French encroachment on territories outside of Canada...thus never having a French Indian War...
refusing advice of scouts, Indians and other officers...even with vastly far superior numbers...Braddock led his men to a massacre...
at Ticonderoga...Abercrombie... an elderly man raised to high command through political influence lacking military experience or ability...who had purchased a major's commission to enter the army...was ill suited to command this expedition...he accepted advice that was bad and made poor decisions...also with far superior numbers led his troops to a humiliating disaster...
I can't understand how the English were so tacticly dominated at so many battles by inferior numbers...I really feel if the French had more manpower and resources back then...we might be speaking French today...
mikemiller1955
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I would be interested in knowing the total size of both forces...I'm sure the British armies, militias, colonials and native supporters far outnumbered the French/Indian coalition...
I think the French adapted quicker...forgetting the European rules of field engagement and accepting the terrain as an ally much better than the British did...
Things turned for the British in 1758, as they began to make peace with important Indian allies and, under the direction of Pitt began adapting their war strategies to fit the territory and landscape of the American frontier.
The British had a further stroke of good fortune when the French were abandoned by many of their Indian allies.
Exhausted by years of battle, outnumbered and outgunned by the British, the French collapsed during the years 1758-59, climaxing with a massive defeat at Quebec in September 1759.
I think the French adapted quicker...forgetting the European rules of field engagement and accepting the terrain as an ally much better than the British did...
Things turned for the British in 1758, as they began to make peace with important Indian allies and, under the direction of Pitt began adapting their war strategies to fit the territory and landscape of the American frontier.
The British had a further stroke of good fortune when the French were abandoned by many of their Indian allies.
Exhausted by years of battle, outnumbered and outgunned by the British, the French collapsed during the years 1758-59, climaxing with a massive defeat at Quebec in September 1759.
marco55
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I think you answered your own questions Mike.I was amazed how much better the canadien militia was than the American.I had always thought that our militia was always the best until I got interested in the FIW.I have been reading about the Creek and Seminole wars fought by Andrew Jackson and I'll tell you one thing the militia and volunteers of that time were superior in every way to the militia of the FIW.Those Tennessee and Kentucky mounted riflemen were no joke.
Mark
Mark
Combat
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British arrogance in dealing with the Indians and the willingness of the French-Canadians to adopt tactics better suited for battles in the wilderness allowed the French to be successful in the short term. But these couldn't overcome the strategic disadvantages in the longer term. In general, the most significant factors for British success included the much larger English population in N. America and control of the sea. It was nearly impossible for the French to match the manpower available to the Brits. The inability or unwillingness to provide substantial reinforcements over the course of the war and corruptness among French officials in Canada were decisive.
mikemiller1955
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Mark...
I believe that's true...
but why was the French militia better than the Colonial militia...
were they trained better or was it their leadership...
why did France enjoy so many early victories with inferior numbers...
the confidence of the British government must have been shattered by the Braddock and Abercrombie dismal failures...the ratio of Brits to French at Monongahela was 3 to 1....while at Carillion the ratio of Brits to French was almost 5 to 1...the confidence of expected success was crushed in devastating routs in both cases...
I have never studied Montcalm...but from what little I have read...I think he was a vastly under rated leader...the conflicts he was involved in...I think he was the superior tactician...
he was either lucky at Carillion, a genius or was pitted against a fool...
the only black mark I see was his reluctance or inability to protect the evacuating troops from Fort William Henry...
I really believe Britain had the wrong people in the wrong spot to lead their armies in the early years...especially in the case of Monongahela and Carillion...
Mike,
The reasons given by Combat are the true reasons why the French lost in North America. But in the early days, the organization of the British Army had it's influence as well. You can think of the Britsh Army as largely structured to benefit the officers, and not necessarily organized to be the best possible fighting force.
In the FIW, the 44th and 47th regiments were derived from the Irish Establishment of the British Army. The Irish Establishment was headquartered in Dublin and was pseudo-independent from Whitehall and the London Establishment.
Due to a series of laws, the Irish Estblishment allowed for about a 12,000 - 15,000 rank and file soldiers. But because of the wording of the law establishing the Irish Establishment, it wasn't allowed to go below that set minimum strength -- as such it wasn't subject to deep Treasury Department cuts mandated by London. The Irish, and not the English, paid for the Irish Establishment.
Now a really important aspect ---- the rules governing the Irish Establishment mandated company size at 30 rank and file. So the typical Irish Regiment was only 350 Men. This units had the appropriate number of officers and NCOs for a normal british regiment, but half the rank and file privates. This system was a great way for the British Army to stash away experienced officers and NCOs. But there was a considerable downside --- the NCOs and the officers were use to commanding, training and controlling platoons and companies that were only half the size as opposed to a war footing. Instead of their normal 30 man platoon/companies, when in a war zone, the company size ballooned to 70 men with no addtional officers or NCOs. Until everyone was seasoned, this made control of the companies difficult under battle conditions.
When called up to serve in North America, the 44th and 47th were order to leave from Ireland with 500 men each. The normal 350 from the own regiment, plus about 15 - 20 more men from each of the other regiments in Ireland were sent to the 44th and 47th from the other regiments stationed in Ireland.
Although the 44th and 47th received 150 addtional men from the other regiments in Ireland, there was another huge downside. These men were in all likelihood the worst, most drunkard and troublesome soldiers in all of Ireland --- total bottom of the barrel. Understandably, each regiment took the opportunity to get rid of their worst and most troublesome soldiers and pawn them off on the 44th and 47th soldiers.
Once they reached North America, the 44th and 47th then recruited colonials to fill their ranks to the subscribed 750-800 soldiers. So if you look at what each regiment had in terms of the rank and file for the Monogahlea Campaign = 300 privates from their own normal Irish establishment + 150 very marginal soldiers from the other elements of the Irish establishment + 250-300 newly recruited colonials who absolutely abhored and resented British Army Discipline and the British Class Structure. Not a good mix.
In some of the papers related to Monogahela, you can see that both Braddock and his staffed recognized that they were more than very short in terms of experienced NCOs. Although they were at their full compliment of NCOs, they realized that it was only about 50% of that was actually needed to manage the troops.
Think of the quality of the troops that Braddock left in the rear with Dunbar. Outside of the 140 Grenadiers left with Dunbar, Dunbar must have had a core of truly unseasoned/undisciplined soldiers. No wonder he went back to Philadephia and winter quaters in July.
The reasons given by Combat are the true reasons why the French lost in North America. But in the early days, the organization of the British Army had it's influence as well. You can think of the Britsh Army as largely structured to benefit the officers, and not necessarily organized to be the best possible fighting force.
In the FIW, the 44th and 47th regiments were derived from the Irish Establishment of the British Army. The Irish Establishment was headquartered in Dublin and was pseudo-independent from Whitehall and the London Establishment.
Due to a series of laws, the Irish Estblishment allowed for about a 12,000 - 15,000 rank and file soldiers. But because of the wording of the law establishing the Irish Establishment, it wasn't allowed to go below that set minimum strength -- as such it wasn't subject to deep Treasury Department cuts mandated by London. The Irish, and not the English, paid for the Irish Establishment.
Now a really important aspect ---- the rules governing the Irish Establishment mandated company size at 30 rank and file. So the typical Irish Regiment was only 350 Men. This units had the appropriate number of officers and NCOs for a normal british regiment, but half the rank and file privates. This system was a great way for the British Army to stash away experienced officers and NCOs. But there was a considerable downside --- the NCOs and the officers were use to commanding, training and controlling platoons and companies that were only half the size as opposed to a war footing. Instead of their normal 30 man platoon/companies, when in a war zone, the company size ballooned to 70 men with no addtional officers or NCOs. Until everyone was seasoned, this made control of the companies difficult under battle conditions.
When called up to serve in North America, the 44th and 47th were order to leave from Ireland with 500 men each. The normal 350 from the own regiment, plus about 15 - 20 more men from each of the other regiments in Ireland were sent to the 44th and 47th from the other regiments stationed in Ireland.
Although the 44th and 47th received 150 addtional men from the other regiments in Ireland, there was another huge downside. These men were in all likelihood the worst, most drunkard and troublesome soldiers in all of Ireland --- total bottom of the barrel. Understandably, each regiment took the opportunity to get rid of their worst and most troublesome soldiers and pawn them off on the 44th and 47th soldiers.
Once they reached North America, the 44th and 47th then recruited colonials to fill their ranks to the subscribed 750-800 soldiers. So if you look at what each regiment had in terms of the rank and file for the Monogahlea Campaign = 300 privates from their own normal Irish establishment + 150 very marginal soldiers from the other elements of the Irish establishment + 250-300 newly recruited colonials who absolutely abhored and resented British Army Discipline and the British Class Structure. Not a good mix.
In some of the papers related to Monogahela, you can see that both Braddock and his staffed recognized that they were more than very short in terms of experienced NCOs. Although they were at their full compliment of NCOs, they realized that it was only about 50% of that was actually needed to manage the troops.
Think of the quality of the troops that Braddock left in the rear with Dunbar. Outside of the 140 Grenadiers left with Dunbar, Dunbar must have had a core of truly unseasoned/undisciplined soldiers. No wonder he went back to Philadephia and winter quaters in July.
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Montcalm was good, but he did panic at Quebec when Wolfe managed to ascend up the heights to gain the plateau (Plain of Abraham). He should not have offered battle when he did. At the very least, he should waited until he could deployed his full artillery.
Considering the time of year, late September, I would have been probably best for Montcalm to simply "hunkered" down in Quebec and let the Canadian/Winter beat back the British while allowing the Canadians skirmishers and his flying columns the freedom to harass whatever encampment the british could establish on the Plains of Abraham.
Considering the time of year, late September, I would have been probably best for Montcalm to simply "hunkered" down in Quebec and let the Canadian/Winter beat back the British while allowing the Canadians skirmishers and his flying columns the freedom to harass whatever encampment the british could establish on the Plains of Abraham.
mikemiller1955
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I agree with Doug about the significant factors in the British ultimately winning the war...
that was inevitable...
they could replenish supplies and soldiers and were willing to commit financially to a victory...
nowdays...in present warfare...
the first objective is to control the air...once the air is controlled you are in the driver's seat...
once the air is controlled...with the air support your strategic battle options are increased...
to control the seas in 1755 was comparable to ruling the air in modern warfare...
Britain as an island always had a strong navy presence...by ruling the seas they limited France's support and supply to the Americas...
I also agree that the Colonial population was overwhelming for whatever the French/Indian coalitions could muster in fighters...
it was inevitable that whoever ruled the supply of bringing forces would win this war...
if the French could not get supplies and manpower to America...they would eventually crumble...
however...
these early loses to inferior numbers were almost like the "perfect storm"...so many things you could point your finger at...
it seems like you have your choice of several reasons for these unlikely loses...
inept officers...unwarranted advancement to high command positions through compensation, arrogance, old style traditional European fighting, poor reconnaissance, stubborn command that would not accept advice from natives, poor soldiers, better opponents...
basically it just seemed like the French were a better army...more acclimated to this style of fighting...
I read somewhere that the psychological advantage the Indians had over the British army was significant...
that the soldiers and militia were scared to death of the stories of savage brutality...
the more I read about this...the more I become convinced that the officers for the early British army were ill chosen...
the policy of buying a rank is just wrong in so many ways...
again...Montalcm was bought a captaincy by his father...but he paid his dues before being put in command of the French army...
Abercrombie at Carillion was best recognized for his logistical skills and organization...not actual fighting...
that was inevitable...
they could replenish supplies and soldiers and were willing to commit financially to a victory...
nowdays...in present warfare...
the first objective is to control the air...once the air is controlled you are in the driver's seat...
once the air is controlled...with the air support your strategic battle options are increased...
to control the seas in 1755 was comparable to ruling the air in modern warfare...
Britain as an island always had a strong navy presence...by ruling the seas they limited France's support and supply to the Americas...
I also agree that the Colonial population was overwhelming for whatever the French/Indian coalitions could muster in fighters...
it was inevitable that whoever ruled the supply of bringing forces would win this war...
if the French could not get supplies and manpower to America...they would eventually crumble...
however...
these early loses to inferior numbers were almost like the "perfect storm"...so many things you could point your finger at...
it seems like you have your choice of several reasons for these unlikely loses...
inept officers...unwarranted advancement to high command positions through compensation, arrogance, old style traditional European fighting, poor reconnaissance, stubborn command that would not accept advice from natives, poor soldiers, better opponents...
basically it just seemed like the French were a better army...more acclimated to this style of fighting...
I read somewhere that the psychological advantage the Indians had over the British army was significant...
that the soldiers and militia were scared to death of the stories of savage brutality...
the more I read about this...the more I become convinced that the officers for the early British army were ill chosen...
the policy of buying a rank is just wrong in so many ways...
again...Montalcm was bought a captaincy by his father...but he paid his dues before being put in command of the French army...
Abercrombie at Carillion was best recognized for his logistical skills and organization...not actual fighting...
Combat
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Luck played a role in some of the French victories. The death of Howe seems to have shaken the entire British command at Ticonderoga. A multitude of mistakes by the Brits and high risk gambles by the French. I was trying to think of another battle where the defenders left a fort in the face of a superior enemy and confronted them out in the open and won. At Monongahela, one of things that is rarely mentioned is the profound fear of the Indians. The Brits heard many stories, mostly true, about the fate of the wounded and prisoners. The panic that resulted was due in some part to that fear. Almost the exact situation was faced at Bushy Run years later with very different results.
mikemiller1955
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I had read something similar to this before...
hehehe...yea...I bet the accounts of Braddock's expedition was mandatory required reading for officers of the British army...as the story's strategy was most assuredly passed down among the Indians...
mikemiller1955
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You had told me this before...this just pushes me more in the direction that makes me think that the entire America campaign was poorly run...
churchmouse1
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I think luck played a much bigger part in the early French victories. Montcalm was not the best soldier in the long run to send to Canada. He poo-pooed the ability of the Canadiens and their Indian allies, as well as the Governor-General's experience at woodland warfare. This lead to a complete distrust between the military and the civilian administration which provisioned it. Montcalm was young, vain, and pompous, much like Wolfe. And really, it was Montcalm who wanted to fight set-piece, European-style battles so he could gain glory. Unfortunately, by that time, Amherst had Louisbourg, and no more supplies could get to New France.
Dave
Dave