Battle for Arnhem.... (2 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

There was a meeting, well described in other books, at which the two men argued. Hackett was senior in service as a brigadier, but Major-General Urquhart had left instructions that Hicks, older and with longer infantry experience than Hackett, was to take priority in command over the cavalryman Hackett in the unlikely event of both Urquhart and Brigadier Lathbury, the obvious successor, becoming casualties. Unfortunately, neither Hicks nor Hackett had been informed of Urquhart's wishes. Hard words were exchanged, although Hackett did not directly challenge the position of Hicks in command of the division. He extracted a clearer idea of the situation and then departed.

Basically, instead of directing his brigade on to the northern part of Arnhem, he was to proceed on a step-by-step basis, first of all capturing that Koepel high ground and then approaching Arnhem on the left flank of what remained of the 1st Parachute Brigade, which had just ended its Monday battle, but still had some effective strength left for another effort.

So, if the 4th Parachute Brigade could get up to the Koepel area quickly, there might still be the opportunity to mount a two-brigade attack into Arnhem towards the bridge.




There was one more matter. Hackett had earlier asked Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie if he could have one of the Airlanding Brigade battalions to replace his detached 11th Battalion, with the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers clearly in mind.

This battalion was already in the process of moving towards its predetermined 'phase two' position in the original plan. This was in the same direction as the 4th Parachute Brigade advance, but not as far.




Hicks, probably reluctantly, told Hackett that he could take the KOSB under command, but that the battalion also had to continue to perform its role of protecting LZ-L near its next position for the arrival of the third-lift gliders, a condition which considerably reduced Hackett's ability to employ the battalion in his brigade's advance. The KOSB would remain unaware of the change until the next morning.




It was 1.30 a.m. on the Tuesday when Brigadier Hackett returned to his headquarters.




Five and a half miles away in Arnhem, the 1st and 3rd Battalions and the South Staffords, with the 11th Battalion coming up later, were about to mount their last attack.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The Evening Moves

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Richard des Voeux's 156 Battalion had left its rendezvous point on the dropping zone at about 5.0 p.m. on Monday. One platoon had to be left behind to guard prisoners and protect wounded ....




.... it was never able to rejoin the battalion and after several days of intermittent action finished up with two men dead, one evading capture and the remainder prisoners, fourteen of them wounded. It was a good example of how airborne units could dissipate their strength in random ways.

The unit transport which had come in by glider was met at Wolfheze, and the battalion then pushed on alongside the railway, past the place where the Reconnaissance Squadron jeeps had been ambushed twenty-four hours earlier.







Brigadier Hackett had ordered the battalion to halt at dusk, reorganize and then push on 'before first light'. Lieutenant-Colonel des Voeux interpreted these orders liberally. Meeting little or no opposition, he kept his leading company going long after dusk until it reached a point just short of the junction of the track and the Dreijenseweg, less than a mile from the Koepel high ground.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The leading platoon, No. 10 Platoon of C Company, was fired upon here and pinned down. The company commander, Major Geoffrey Powell, called up one of his other platoon commanders, Lieutenant Brian Willcock, and ordered him to take No. 9 Platoon on a left flanking move to determine whether there was a German flank around which the company could progress. But there was no flank here, and this platoon also came under fire.




Major Powell's view that the German position was too strongly held for a night attack was confirmed when des Voeux came up. C Company was ordered to disengage, return down the track for a mile and remain there for the night.




What neither officer knew was that the Germans ahead were part of the main outer blocking line, the Sperrlinie Spindler, composed of first-class troops of the 9th SS Panzer Division, which was spread right across the 4th Parachute Brigade's proposed line of advance. The time was about midnight.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The remainder of the brigade was spread out along nearly three miles of that track by the railway, all the way back to the 4th Parachute Squadron, which was the brigade's rearguard. The 10th Battalion had been able to leave the dropping zone when most of the casualties of the parachute drop were evacuated. The battalion was now near the Hotel Buunderkamp, where Brigadier Hackett and his staff were preparing and issuing orders for the 'tidy battle' he hoped his brigade would be fighting the next day.

The brigade's fatal casualties for the day and night numbered approximately seventy-six men - mostly on the fly-in and around the dropping zone.

Well forward of most of the 4th Parachute Brigade were the King's Own Scottish Borderers, carrying on with their own plan to secure the high ground near Johannahoeve Farm, overlooking LZL.




Lieutenant-Colonel Payton-Reid had co-ordinated his moves with Brigadier Hackett, and his battalion was advancing in the area between the railway and the Amsterdamseweg.




B and C Companies were ahead, each making for spot heights marked on their maps. Major Michael Forman's B Company, advancing past Johannahoeve Farm, ran into the outlying German defences at 4.0 a.m.




He reacted in exactly the same way as 156 Battalion had a few hours earlier - a platoon flanking attack meeting further opposition, followed by a decision to pull back and wait for a new effort to be made in the morning. The scene was now set for the last possible attempt to penetrate the German defences and move a sizeable force of airborne men into Arnhem through this new sector.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

156 Parachute Battalion - the Dreijenseweg Action

Dawn of Tuesday 19 September found the 4th Parachute Brigade with a clear objective - the seizure of the high ground at Koepel - and 156 Battalion ready to recommence its advance as the brigade's leading unit. Lieutenant-Colonel des Voeux had been ordered to direct his attack on some intermediate high ground close to a group of buildings named 'Lichtenbeek' on maps. From there the battalion could strike south towards the brigade's objective at Koepel.

It was just over a mile from 156 Battalion's overnight position to Lichtenbeek, and only half a mile from there to Koepel, but it was still a further one and three-quarter miles to the place in Arnhem where the 1st Parachute Brigade was at that time making its last attempt to get through to the bridge.




Barring the way to 156 Battalion's advance was that strong German defence line along the Dreijenseweg. If the reader ever visits this area, the defensive qualities of that line will be immediately obvious. Along part of the eastern side of the road there is a bank up to ten feet high, and beyond that the ground rises even further through a wooded area.




The German defence comprised armoured cars, half-tracks, self-propelled guns and well-armed infantry.

The vehicles cruised up and down the road ...






.... or were deployed in the trees.

 

[panda1gen]

XXX Corps were still trying to push on ....

 

[Louis Badolato]

Great photos, Kevin!

 

[panda1gen]

Great photos, Kevin!

Thanks Louis, glad you like them.

I have mentioned this before but .....




Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-2_rocket


V-2 Rocket

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia​
Type​	Single-stage ballistic missile
Place of origin​	Nazi Germany
Service history​
In service​	1944–1952
Used by​	Wehrmacht SS Post-war: United Kingdom United States Soviet Union
Production history​
Designer​	Peenemünde Army Research Center
Manufacturer​	Mittelwerk GmbH
Unit cost​	January 1944: 100,000 RM March 1945: 50,000 RM[1]
Produced​	16 March 1942 – 1945 (Nazi) Some assembled post-war
	No. Built: Over 3,000
Specifications​
Mass​	12,500 kg (27,600 lb)
Length​	14 m (45 ft 11 in)
Diameter​	1.65 m (5 ft 5 in)
Wingspan​	3.56 m (11 ft 8 in)
Warhead​	1,000 kg (2,200 lb); Amatol (explosive weight: 910 kg)
Detonation mechanism​	Impact
​
Propellant​	3,810 kg (8,400 lb) 75% Ethanol 25% water 4,910 kg (10,820 lb) liquid oxygen
Operational range​	320 km (200 mi)
Flight altitude​	88 km (55 mi) maximum altitude on long-range trajectory 206 km (128 mi) maximum altitude if launched vertically
Maximum speed ​	Maximum: 5,760 km/h (3,580 mph) At impact: 2,880 km/h (1,790 mph)
Guidance system​	Gyroscopes to determine direction Electronic course correction autopilot Müller-type pendulous gyroscopic accelerometer for engine cutoff on most production rockets[2][3]: 225
Launch platform​	Mobile (Meillerwagen)

The V2 (German: Vergeltungswaffe 2, lit. 'Vengeance Weapon 2'), with the technical name Aggregat-4 (A4), was the world's first long-range[4] guided ballistic missile.

The missile, powered by a liquid-propellant rocket engine, was developed during the Second World War in Nazi Germany as a "vengeance weapon" and assigned to attack Allied cities as retaliation for the Allied bombings of German cities.

The V2 rocket also became the first artificial object to travel into space by crossing the Kármán line (edge of space) with the vertical launch of MW 18014 on 20 June 1944.[5]

Research of military use of long-range rockets began when the graduate studies of Wernher von Braun were noticed by the German Army. A series of prototypes culminated in the A4, which went to war as the V2.

Beginning in September 1944, more than 3,000 V2s were launched by the Wehrmacht against Allied targets, first London and later Antwerp and Liège. According to a 2011 BBC documentary,[6] the attacks from V-2s resulted in the deaths of an estimated 9,000 civilians and military personnel, while a further 12,000 labourers and concentration camp prisoners died as a result of their forced participation in the production of the weapons.[7]

The rockets travelled at supersonic speeds, impacted without audible warning, and proved unstoppable. No effective defense existed.

Teams from the Allied forces - the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union - raced to seize major German manufacturing facilities, procure the Germans' missile technology, and capture the V-2s' launching sites.

Von Braun and more than 100 core R&D V-2 personnel surrendered to the Americans, and many of the original V-2 team transferred their work to the Redstone Arsenal, where they were relocated as part of Operation Paperclip. The US also captured enough V-2 hardware to build approximately 80 of the missiles.

The Soviets gained possession of the V-2 manufacturing facilities after the war, re-established V-2 production, and moved it to the Soviet Union.

 

[panda1gen]

Development history

During the late 1920s, a young Wernher von Braun bought a copy of Hermann Oberth's book, Die Rakete zu den Planetenräumen (The Rocket into Interplanetary Spaces). In 1928 a Raketenrummel or "Rocket Rumble" fad in the popular media was initiated by Fritz von Opel and Max Valier, a collaborator of Oberth, by experimenting with rockets, including public demonstrations of manned rocket cars and rocket planes.

The “Rocket Rumble” was highly influential on von Braun as a teenage space enthusiast. He was so enthusiastic after seeing one of the public Opel-RAK rocket car demonstrations, that he constructed and launched his own homemade toy rocket car on a crowded sidewalk and was later taken in for questioning by the local police, until released to his father for disciplinary action.[8]

Starting in 1930, von Braun attended the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg (now Technische Universität Berlin), where he assisted Oberth in liquid-fueled rocket motor tests. Von Braun was working on his doctorate when the Nazi Party gained power in Germany.

An artillery captain, Walter Dornberger, arranged an Ordnance Department research grant for von Braun, who from then on worked next to Dornberger's existing solid-fuel rocket test site at Kummersdorf. Von Braun's thesis, Construction, Theoretical, and Experimental Solution to the Problem of the Liquid Propellant Rocket (dated 16 April 1934), was kept classified by the German Army and was not published until 1960.[9] By the end of 1934, his group had successfully launched two rockets that reached heights of 2.2 and 3.5 km (1.4 and 2.2 mi).

At the time, many Germans were interested in American physicist Robert H. Goddard's research. Before 1939, German engineers and scientists occasionally contacted Goddard directly with technical questions. Von Braun used Goddard's plans from various journals and incorporated them into the building of the Aggregate (A) series of rockets, named for the German word for mechanism or mechanical system.[10]

After successes at Kummersdorf with the first two Aggregate series rockets, Braun and Walter Riedel began thinking of a much larger rocket in the summer of 1936,[11] based on a projected 25,000 kg (55,000 lb) thrust engine. In addition, Dornberger specified the military requirements needed to include a 1-ton payload, a range of 172 miles with a dispersion of 2 or 3 miles, and transportable using road vehicles.[12]: 50–51 

After the A-4 project was postponed due to unfavorable aerodynamic stability testing of the A-3 in July 1936,[13][14] Braun specified the A-4 performance in 1937,[15] and, after an "extensive" series of test firings of the A-5 scale test model,[16] using a motor redesigned from the troublesome A-3 by Walter Thiel,[16] A-4 design and construction was ordered c. 1938–39.[17]

During 28–30 September 1939, Der Tag der Weisheit (English: The Day of Wisdom) conference met at Peenemünde to initiate the funding of university research to solve rocket problems.[11]: 40 

By late 1941, the Army Research Center at Peenemünde possessed the technologies essential to the success of the A-4. The four main technologies for the A-4 were large liquid-fuel rocket engines, supersonic aerodynamics, gyroscopic guidance and rudders in jet control.[3]

At the time, Adolf Hitler was not particularly impressed by the V-2; he opined that it was merely an artillery shell with a longer range and much higher cost.[18]

During early September 1943, Braun promised the Long-Range Bombardment Commission[3]: 224  that the A-4 development was "practically complete / concluded",[14]: 135  but even by the middle of 1944, a complete A-4 parts list was still unavailable.[3]: 224 

Hitler was sufficiently impressed by the enthusiasm of its developers, and needed a "wonder weapon" to maintain German morale,[18] so he authorized its deployment in large numbers.[19]

The V-2s were constructed at the Mittelwerk site by prisoners from Mittelbau-Dora, a concentration camp where 20,000 prisoners died.[20][21][page needed][22]

In 1943, the Austrian resistance group including Heinrich Maier managed to send exact drawings of the V-2 rocket to the American Office of Strategic Services. Location sketches of V-rocket manufacturing facilities, such as those in Peenemünde, were also sent to the Allied general staff in order to enable Allied bombers to perform airstrikes. This information was particularly important for Operation Crossbow and Operation Hydra, both preliminary missions for Operation Overlord. The group was gradually captured by the Gestapo and most of the members were executed. [23][24][25][26][27]

During tests the rocket was painted in a characteristic black-and-white chessboard pattern, which aided in determining if the rocket was spinning around its longitudinal axis.




The original German designation of the rocket was "V2",[7][40] unhyphenated – exactly as used for any Third Reich-era "second prototype" example of an RLM-registered German aircraft design – but U.S. publications such as Life magazine were using the hyphenated form "V-2" as early as December 1944.[41]

 

[panda1gen]

Technical details

The A4 used a 75% ethanol/25% water mixture (B-Stoff) for fuel and liquid oxygen (LOX) (A-Stoff) for oxidizer.[28] The water reduced the flame temperature, acted as a coolant by turning to steam and augmented the thrust, tended to produce a smoother burn, and reduced thermal stress.[29]

Rudolf Hermann's supersonic wind tunnel was used to measure the A4's aerodynamic characteristics and center of pressure, using a model of the A4 within a 40 square centimeter chamber. Measurements were made using a Mach 1.86 blowdown nozzle on 8 August 1940. Tests at Mach numbers 1.56 and 2.5 were made after 24 September 1940.[30]: 76–78 

At launch the A4 propelled itself for up to 65 seconds on its own power, and a program motor held the inclination at the specified angle until engine shutdown, after which the rocket continued on a ballistic free-fall trajectory. The rocket reached a height of 80 km (50 mi) or 264,000 ft after shutting off the engine.[31]

The fuel and oxidizer pumps were driven by a steam turbine, fueled by decomposition of concentrated hydrogen peroxide (T-Stoff) facilitated by a sodium permanganate (Z-Stoff) catalyst. Both the alcohol and oxygen tanks were an aluminum-magnesium alloy.[1]

The turbopump, rotating at 4,000 rpm, forced the fuel mixture and oxygen into the combustion chamber at 125 liters (33 US gallons) per second, where they were ignited by a spinning electrical igniter.

The engine produced 8 tons of thrust during the preliminary stage whilst the fuel was gravity-fed, before increasing to 25 tons as the turbopump pressurised the fuel, lifting the 13.5 ton rocket.

Combustion gases exited the chamber at 2,820 °C (5,100 °F), and a speed of 2,000 m (6,600 ft) per second. The oxygen to fuel mixture was 1.0:0.85 at 25 tons of thrust; as ambient pressure decreased with flight altitude, thrust increased to 29 tons. [12][32][33]

The turbopump assembly contained two centrifugal pumps, one for the fuel mixture, and one for the oxygen. The turbine was connected directly by a shaft to the alcohol pump and through a flexible joint and shaft to the oxygen pump.[34] The turbopump delivered 55 kg (121 lb) of alcohol and 68 kg (150 lb) of liquid oxygen per second to a combustion chamber at 1.5 MPa (218 psi).[30]

Dr. Thiel's 25 ton rocket motor design relied on pump feeding, as opposed to earlier pressure-fed designs. The motor used centrifugal injection, and used both regenerative cooling and film cooling. Film cooling admitted alcohol into the combustion chamber and exhaust nozzle under slight pressure through four rings of small perforations.

The mushroom-shaped injection head was removed from the combustion chamber to a mixing chamber, the combustion chamber was made more spherical while being shortened from 6 to 1-foot in length, and the connection to the nozzle was made cone shaped. The resultant 1.5 ton chamber operated at a combustion pressure of 1.52 MPa (220 psi).

Thiel's 1.5 ton chamber was then scaled up to a 4.5 ton motor by arranging three injection heads above the combustion chamber. By 1939, eighteen injection heads in two concentric circles at the head of the 3 mm (0.12 in) thick sheet-steel chamber, were used to make the 25 ton motor.[12]: 52–55 [30]

The warhead was a source of trouble. The explosive used was amatol 60/40 detonated by an electric contact fuze. Amatol had the advantage of stability, and the warhead was protected by a thick layer of glass wool, but even so it could still explode during the re-entry phase. The warhead weighed 975 kilograms (2,150 lb) and contained 910 kilograms (2,010 lb) of explosive. The warhead's explosive percentage by weight was 93%, a very high portion compared to other types of munitions.

A protective layer of glass wool was also used for the fuel tanks to prevent the A-4 from forming ice, a problem which plagued other early ballistic missiles such as the balloon tank-design SM-65 Atlas which entered US service in 1959. The tanks held 4,173 kilograms (9,200 lb) of ethyl alcohol and 5,553 kilograms (12,242 lb) of oxygen.[35]

The V-2 was guided by four external rudders on the tail fins, and four internal graphite vanes in the jet stream at the exit of the motor. These 8 control surfaces were controlled by Helmut Hölzer's analog computer, the Mischgerät, via electrical-hydraulic servomotors, based on electrical signals from the gyros.

The Siemens Vertikant LEV-3 guidance system consisted of two free gyroscopes (a horizontal for pitch and a vertical with two degrees of freedom for yaw and roll) for lateral stabilization, coupled with a PIGA accelerometer, or the Walter Wolman radio control system, to control engine cutoff at a specified velocity.

Other gyroscopic systems used in the A-4 included Kreiselgeräte's SG-66 and SG-70. The V-2 was launched from a pre-surveyed location, so the distance and azimuth to the target were known. Fin 1 of the missile was aligned to the target azimuth.[36][30]: 81–82 

Some later V-2s used "guide beams", radio signals transmitted from the ground, as an added input to the Mischgerät analog computer to keep the missile on course in azimuth.[37]

The flying distance was controlled by the timing of the engine cut-off, Brennschluss, ground-controlled by a Doppler system or by different types of on-board integrating accelerometers.

Thus, range was a function of engine burn time, which ended when a specific velocity was achieved.[32][12]: 203–204 [33] Just before engine cutoff, thrust was reduced to eight tons, in an effort to avoid any water hammer problems a rapid cutoff could cause.[29]

Dr. Friedrich Kirchstein of Siemens of Berlin developed the V-2 radio control for motor cutoff (German: Brennschluss).[14]: 28, 124 

For velocity measurement, Professor Wolman of Dresden created an alternative of his Doppler[38]: 18  tracking system in 1940–41, which used a ground signal transponded by the A-4 to measure the velocity of the missile.[3]: 103 

By 9 February 1942, Peenemünde engineer Gerd deBeek had documented the radio interference area of a V-2 as 10,000 metres (33,000 feet) around the "Firing Point",[39] and the first successful A-4 flight on 3 October 1942 used radio control to command motor cutoff.[13]: 12 

Although Hitler commented on 22 September 1943 that "It is a great load off our minds that we have dispensed with the radio guiding-beam; now no opening remains for the British to interfere technically with the missile in flight",[14]: 138  about 20% of the operational V-2 launches were beam-guided.[13]: 12 [12]: 232 

The Operation Pinguin V-2 offensive began on 8 September 1944, when Lehr- und Versuchsbatterie No. 444[38]: 51–2  (English: 'Training and Testing Battery 444') launched a single rocket guided by a radio beam directed at Paris.[39]: 47 

Wreckage of combat V-2s occasionally contained the transponder for velocity and fuel cutoff.[11]: 259–260

 

[panda1gen]

Testing

The first successful test flight was on 3 October 1942, reaching an altitude of 84.5 kilometres (52.5 miles).[3] On that day, Walter Dornberger declared in a meeting at Peenemünde: This third day of October, 1942, is the first of a new era in transportation, that of space travel...[13]17

Two test launches were recovered by the Allies: the Bäckebo rocket, the remnants of which landed in Sweden on 13 June 1944, and one recovered by the Polish resistance on 30 May 1944[42] from the Blizna V-2 missile launch site and transported to the UK during Operation Most III.

The highest altitude reached during the war was 174.6 kilometres (108.5 miles) (20 June 1944).[3]

Test launches of V-2 rockets were made at Peenemünde, Blizna and Tuchola Forest,[12]: 211  and after the war, at Cuxhaven by the British, White Sands Proving Grounds and Cape Canaveral by the U.S., and Kapustin Yar by the USSR.

Various design issues were identified and solved during V-2 development and testing:

• To reduce tank pressure and weight, rapid flow turbopumps were used to increase pressure.[3]: 35 
• A short and lighter combustion chamber without burn-through was developed by using centrifugal injection nozzles, a mixing compartment, and a converging nozzle to the throat for homogeneous combustion.[13]: 51 
• Film cooling was used to prevent burn-through at the nozzle throat.[13]: 52 
• Relay contacts were made more durable to withstand vibration and prevent thrust cut-off just after lift-off.[13]: 52 
• Ensuring that the fuel pipes had tension-free curves reduced the likelihood of explosions at 1,200–1,800 m (4,000–6,000 ft).[13]: 215, 217 
• Fins were shaped with clearance to prevent damage as the exhaust jet expanded with altitude.[13]: 56, 118 
• To control trajectory at liftoff and supersonic speeds, heat-resistant graphite vanes were used as rudders in the exhaust jet.[13]: 35, 58 

Air burst problem

Through mid-March 1944, only four of the 26 successful Blizna launches had satisfactorily reached the Sarnaki target area[39]: 112, 221–222, 282  due to in-flight breakup (Luftzerleger) on re-entry into the atmosphere.[43]: 100 

(As mentioned above, one rocket was collected by the Polish Home Army, with parts of it transported to London for tests.)

Initially, the German developers suspected excessive alcohol tank pressure, but by April 1944, after five months of test firings, the cause was still not determined. Major-General Rossmann, the Army Weapons Office department chief, recommended stationing observers in the target area – c. May/June, Dornberger and von Braun set up a camp at the centre of the Poland target zone.[44]

After moving to the Heidekraut,[11]: 172–173  SS Mortar Battery 500 of the 836th Artillery Battalion (Motorized) was ordered[39]: 47  on 30 August[38] to begin test launches of eighty 'sleeved' rockets.[14]: 281 

Testing confirmed that the so-called 'tin trousers' – a tube designed to strengthen the forward end of the rocket cladding – reduced the likelihood of air bursts.[43]: 100 [12]: 188–198

 

[panda1gen]

Production

On 27 March 1942, Dornberger proposed production plans and the building of a launching site on the Channel coast. In December, Speer ordered Major Thom and Dr. Steinhoff to reconnoitre the site near Watten. Assembly rooms were established at Peenemünde and in the Friedrichshafen facilities of Zeppelin Works. In 1943, a third factory, Raxwerke, was added.[12]: 71–72, 84 




On 22 December 1942, Hitler signed the order for mass production, when Albert Speer assumed final technical data would be ready by July 1943. However, many issues still remained to be solved even by the autumn of 1943.[45]

On 8 January 1943, Dornberger and von Braun met with Speer. Speer stated, "As head of the Todt organisation I will take it on myself to start at once with the building of the launching site on the Channel coast," and established an A-4 production committee under Degenkolb.[12]: 72–77 

On 26 May 1943, the Long-Range Bombardment Commission, chaired by AEG director Petersen, met at Peenemünde to review the V-1 and V-2 automatic long-range weapons. In attendance were Speer, Air Marshal Erhard Milch, Admiral Karl Dönitz, Col. General Friedrich Fromm, and Karl Saur. Both weapons had reached the final stage of development, and the commission decided to recommend to Hitler that both weapons be mass-produced. As Dornberger observed, "The disadvantages of the one would be compensated by the other's advantages."[12]: 83–84, 87–92 

Period of production​	Production ​
Up to 15 September 1944	1,900​
15 September to 29 October 1944	900​
29 October to 24 November 1944	600​
24 November to 15 January 1945	1,100​
15 January to 15 February 1945	700​
Total ​	5200 ​

On 7 July 1943, Major General Dornberger, von Braun, and Dr. Steinhof briefed Hitler in his Wolf's Lair. Also in attendance were Speer, Wilhelm Keitel, and Alfred Jodl. The briefing included von Braun narrating a movie showing the successful launch on 3 October 1942, with scale models of the Channel coast firing bunker, and supporting vehicles, including the Meillerwagen.

Hitler then gave Peenemünde top priority in the German armaments program stating, "Why was it I could not believe in the success of your work? if we had had these rockets in 1939 we should never have had this war..." Hitler also wanted a second launch bunker built.[12]: 93–105 




Saur planned to build 2,000 rockets per month, between the existing three factories and the Nordhausen Mittelwerk factory being built. However, alcohol production was dependent upon the potato harvest.[12]: 97, 102–105 

A production line was nearly ready at Peenemünde when the RAF Operation Hydra attack occurred. The main targets of the attack included the test stands, the development works, the Pre-Production Works, the settlement where the scientists and technicians lived, the Trassenheide camp, and the harbor sector.

According to Dornberger, "Serious damage to the works, contrary to first impressions, was surprisingly small." Work resumed after a delay of four to six weeks, and because of camouflage to mimic complete destruction, there were no more raids during the next nine months.

The raid resulted in 735 lives lost, with heavy losses at Trassenheide, while 178 were killed in the settlement, including Dr. Thiel, his family, and Chief Engineer Walther.[12]: 139–152 

The Germans eventually moved production to the underground Mittelwerk in the Kohnstein where 5,200 V-2 rockets were built with the use of forced labour.[46]

A V-2 launched from Test Stand VII in summer 1943.



For a description of the V-2 launch equipment and procedure, see Meillerwagen.

After the Operation Crossbow bombing, initial plans for launching from the massive underground Watten, Wizernes and Sottevast bunkers or from fixed pads such as near the Château du Molay[47] were dismissed in favour of mobile launching.

Eight main storage dumps were planned and four had been completed by July 1944 (the one at Mery-sur-Oise was begun during August 1943 and completed by February 1944).[48]

The missile could be launched practically anywhere, roads running through forests being a particular favourite. The system was so mobile and small that only one Meillerwagen was ever caught in action by Allied aircraft, during the Operation Bodenplatte attack on 1 January 1945[49] near Lochem by a USAAF 4th Fighter Group aircraft, although Raymond Baxter described flying over a site during a launch and his wingman firing at the missile without hitting it.

It was estimated that a sustained rate of 350 V-2s could be launched per week, with 100 per day at maximum effort, given sufficient supply of the rockets.[50]

 

[panda1gen]

Operational history

The LXV Armeekorps z.b.V. formed during the last days of November 1943 in France commanded by General der Artillerie z.V. Erich Heinemann was responsible for the operational use of V-2.[52]




Three launch battalions were formed in late 1943, Artillerie Abteilung 836 (Mot.), Grossborn, Artillerie Abteilung 485 (Mot.), Naugard, and Artillerie Abteilung 962 (Mot.).

Combat operations commenced in Sept. 1944, when training Batterie 444 deployed. On 2 September 1944, the SS Werfer-Abteilung 500 was formed, and by October, the SS under the command of SS Lt. Gen Hans Kammler, took operational control of all units.

He formed Gruppe Süd with Art. Abt. 836, Merzig, and Gruppe Nord with Art. Abt. 485 and Batterie 444, Burgsteinfurt and The Hague.[53]

After Hitler's 29 August 1944 declaration to begin V-2 attacks as soon as possible, the offensive began on 7 September 1944 when two were launched at Paris (which the Allies had liberated less than two weeks earlier), but both crashed soon after launch.

On 8 September a single rocket was launched at Paris, which caused modest damage near Porte d'Italie.[11]: 218, 220, 467 

Two more launches by the 485th followed, including one from The Hague against London on the same day at 6:43 pm.[14]: 285  – the first landed at Staveley Road, Chiswick, killing 63-year-old Mrs. Ada Harrison, three-year-old Rosemary Clarke, and Sapper Bernard Browning on leave from the Royal Engineers,[15]: 11  and one hit Epping with no casualties.



Home guard at a V2 'bomb site'.


The British government, concerned about spreading panic or giving away vital intelligence to German forces, initially attempted to conceal the cause of the explosions by making no official announcement, and euphemistically blaming them on defective gas mains.[54]

The public did not believe this explanation and therefore began referring to the V-2s as "flying gas mains".[55] The Germans themselves finally announced the V-2 on 8 November 1944 and only then, on 10 November 1944, did Winston Churchill inform Parliament, and the world, that England had been under rocket attack "for the last few weeks".[56]

In September 1944, control of the V-2 mission was transferred to the Waffen-SS and Division z.V.[57][58]

Positions of the German launch units changed a number of times. For example, Artillerie Init 444 arrived in the southwest Netherlands (in Zeeland) in September 1944.

From a field near the village of Serooskerke, five V-2s were launched on 15 and 16 September, with one more successful and one failed launch on the 18th. That same date, a transport carrying a missile took a wrong turn and ended up in Serooskerke itself, giving a villager the opportunity to surreptitiously take some photographs of the weapon; these were smuggled to London by the Dutch Resistance.[59]

After that the unit moved to the woods near Rijs, Gaasterland in the northwest Netherlands, to ensure that the technology was not captured by the Allies. From Gaasterland V-2s were launched against Ipswich and Norwich from 25 September (London being out of range).

Because of their inaccuracy, these V-2s did not hit their target cities. Soon after that only London and Antwerp remained as designated targets as ordered by Adolf Hitler himself, Antwerp being targeted in the period of 12 to 20 October, after which time the unit moved to The Hague.

For example, a V-2 struck Teniers Square, Antwerp, Belgium, on 27 November 1944. A British military convoy was passing through the square at the time; 126 people (including 26 Allied soldiers) were killed.[51]

Whitechapel, London, was hit by the penultimate V-2 to strike the city on 27 March 1945; the rocket killed 134 people. The final V-2 to fall on London killed one person at Orpington later that same day.[60]

 

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Targets

During the succeeding months about 3,172 V-2 rockets were fired at the following targets:[61]

• Belgium, 1,664: Antwerp (1,610), Liège (27), Hasselt (13), Tournai (9), Mons (3), Diest (2)
• United Kingdom, 1,402: London (1,358), Norwich (43),[14]: 289  Ipswich (1)
• France, 76: Lille (25), Paris (22), Tourcoing (19), Arras (6), Cambrai (4)
• Netherlands, 19: Maastricht (19)
• Germany, 11: Remagen (Ludendorff Bridge) (11)

Antwerp, Belgium was a target for a large number of V-weapon attacks from October 1944 through to the virtual end of the war in March 1945, leaving 1,736 dead and 4,500 injured in greater Antwerp. Thousands of buildings were damaged or destroyed as the city was struck by 590 direct hits. The largest loss of life by a single rocket attack during the war came on 16 December 1944, when the roof of the crowded Cine Rex was struck, leaving 567 dead and 291 injured.[62][63]



Royal Navy unit guards V2 'bomb site' in Antwerp - a vital Port for the Allies.


An estimated 2,754 civilians were killed in London by V-2 attacks with another 6,523 injured,[64] which is two people killed per V-2 rocket. The death toll in London did not meet the Nazis' full expectations, during early usage, as they had not yet perfected the accuracy of the V-2, with many rockets being misdirected and exploding harmlessly.

Accuracy increased during the war, particularly for batteries where the Leitstrahl (radio guide beam) system was used.[65] Missile strikes that did hit targets could cause large numbers of deaths; 160 were killed and 108 seriously injured in one explosion at 12:26 pm on 25 November 1944, at a Woolworth's department store in New Cross, south-east London.[66]

British intelligence also helped impede the effectiveness of the Nazi weapon, sending false reports via their Double-Cross System implying that the rockets were over-shooting their London target by 10 to 20 miles (16 to 32 km). This tactic worked; more than half of the V-2s aimed at London landed short of the London Civil Defence Region.[67]: 459  Most landed on less-heavily populated areas in Kent due to erroneous recalibration.

For the remainder of the war, British intelligence maintained the ruse by repeatedly sending bogus reports implying that these failed rockets were striking the British capital with heavy loss of life.[68]

Possible use during Operation Bodenplatte

At least one V-2 missile on a mobile Meillerwagen launch trailer was observed being elevated to launch position by a USAAF 4th Fighter Group pilot defending against the massive New Year's Day 1945 Operation Bodenplatte strike by the Luftwaffe over the northern German attack route near the town of Lochem on 1 January 1945. Possibly, from the potential sighting of the American fighter by the missile's launch crew, the rocket was quickly lowered from a near launch-ready 85° elevation to 30°.[69]

Tactical use on German target

After the US Army captured the Ludendorff Bridge during the Battle of Remagen on 7 March 1945, the Germans were desperate to destroy it. On 17 March 1945, they fired eleven V-2 missiles at the bridge, their first use against a tactical target and the only time they were fired on a German target during the war.[70]

They could not employ the more accurate Leitstrahl device because it was oriented towards Antwerp and could not be easily adjusted for another target. Fired from near Hellendoorn, the Netherlands, one of the missiles landed as far away as Cologne, 40 miles (64 km) to the north, while one missed the bridge by only 500 to 800 yards (460 to 730 m). They also struck the town of Remagen, destroying a number of buildings and killing at least six American soldiers.[71]

Final use

The final two rockets exploded on 27 March 1945. One of these was the last V-2 to kill a British civilian and the final civilian casualty of the war on British soil: Ivy Millichamp, aged 34, killed in her home in Kynaston Road, Orpington in Kent.[72][73]

A scientific reconstruction performed in 2010 demonstrated that the V-2 creates a crater 20 metres (66 feet) wide and 8 metres (26 feet) deep, ejecting approximately 3,000 tons of material into the air.[68]

The painting of the operational V-2s was mostly a ragged-edged pattern with several variations, but at the end of the war a plain olive green rocket was also used.

 

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