Confederate Army Morale (1 Viewer)

[Peter Reuss]

I'm in the midst of reading the Life of Johnny Reb by Bell I Wiley.

He has some very interesting things to say about the morale of the Confederate Army.

I have always thought of the CSA army as a high spirited bunch, banding together to fight off the invader.

Wiley points to the enormous number of people who purchased proxies (in 1863 Bragg estimated it was 150,000, Seddon estimated 50,000) and the number of men number of men who were unauthorized abscences (estimates by the Asst Secretary of War at 50,000 to 100,000 in July of 1863) to push home his point that morale was low once the initial exuberance of war wore off.

Obviously later war desertion happened as morale (and the possibility of winning the war) disintigrated. Wiley uses a lot of anecdotal evidence that even very early in the war desertion and low morale was a serious problem.

Wiley infers that one of the major reasons the CSA lost the was was that the men who should have been in the army were AWOL - even by the middle of the war.

I'd never thought of the morale of the CSA soldier in this way. Is Wiley pushing the envelope (the book is a reprint from 1943, so it's not current revisionism)? Do we simply glorify Johnny Reb and attribute superhuman feats to him? Is the truth in the middle somewhere?

 

[Mascleo]

I'm in the midst of reading the Life of Johnny Reb by Bell I Wiley.

He has some very interesting things to say about the morale of the Confederate Army.

I have always thought of the CSA army as a high spirited bunch, banding together to fight off the invader.

Wiley points to the enormous number of people who purchased proxies (in 1863 Bragg estimated it was 150,000, Seddon estimated 50,000) and the number of men number of men who were unauthorized abscences (estimates by the Asst Secretary of War at 50,000 to 100,000 in July of 1863) to push home his point that morale was low once the initial exuberance of war wore off.

Obviously later war desertion happened as morale (and the possibility of winning the war) disintigrated. Wiley uses a lot of anecdotal evidence that even very early in the war desertion and low morale was a serious problem.

Wiley infers that one of the major reasons the CSA lost the was was that the men who should have been in the army were AWOL - even by the middle of the war.

I'd never thought of the morale of the CSA soldier in this way. Is Wiley pushing the envelope (the book is a reprint from 1943, so it's not current revisionism)? Do we simply glorify Johnny Reb and attribute superhuman feats to him? Is the truth in the middle somewhere?

Actually, a good book on the subject was written prior to Wiley's, Desertions during the Civil War by Ella Lonn.
She did document the large amount of desertions that occurred by Confederate forces early during the war and late in the war. It was found that units from different states had higher desertion rates at different times. As an example, in 1964 many Virginia units had super low desertion rates while those from Georgia were very high. The reason is that Sherman invaded Georgia at the time and many men left to take care of their families and homes. While in Virginia, the threat of a Northern invasion kept them in the Army.

I think the desertion rate is deceptive. The Civil War times were different then things are now. Many soldiers left the army during planting season to help out their families and returned later. Such short term AWOLs were not a sign of low morale, but of a sign of the times.

I think a better gauge of the Sothern’s morale can be seen in how they acted in combat. There are many incidents when Confederate troops held out against Union troops even while vastly outnumbered, which was usually the case. Their units (and also Union troops) conducted charges against fortified positions and continued them even while being inflicted with massive causalities (such as Pickett's Charge and Fort Wagner). These incidents were obvious not conducted by troops with low morale. You cannot look at the morale of the Civil War with a modern point of view.

Ken

 

[UKReb]

Our image of Johnny Reb as a bedraggled soul, dressed in rags, homemade blanket roll, bare-footed, filthy and starving but fighting for the Southern cause to the bitter end have endured through countless books and films. However, desertions within the Confederate army was a serious problem that has not been covered in any depth by Civil War historians.

Both books mentioned by Peter and Ken were written in 1943 and 1928 respectively and were very restricted with the limitations of sources at the time albeit that Confederate manpower statistics are notoriously unreliable. A recent study undertaken by a civil war round table having perused available records have come up with the following figures:-

1,016,437 men/boys enlisted in the CSA
53,654 were killed in action
21,615 died of their wounds
59,768 were victims of disease
174,223 men surrendered
Recorded desertions over the 4 years of war 104,856.

Now if you do the maths over 500,000 who made their mark to fight for the South are unaccounted for and I have no doubt we will never know what happened to these but the desertion figures roughly align with Wiley's and if you analyse other known facts of the war by chronology you can start to put flesh on them.

In 1861 desertion was not a serious problem most recruits were fired up with the great adventure and believed one of them was worth at least 3 Billy Yanks. They also believed that when signing up for "90 days" that there was a social contract, although unwritten but accepted as fact, that the Confederate government would care and protect their homes and families while they were away.
As April'61 became December'61 "homesickness" began to gnaw at the family soldier. The CSA were very tolerant of men taking "French leave" especially during the non-combative winter period and it was accepted as returning to the unit solved the problem.

1862 was the critical year for the Confederacy-The Conscription Act drafted men between 18-35 for 3 years service-inflation-war profiteering-bloody battles such as Antietam with Lee's first invasion of the north and as Ken stated the loss of Territory was a major factor of desertions. The Rebs homes started to disappear behind Union lines.

With the Union armies advancing across Southern territory and the loss of Vicksburg and the defeat at Gettysburg all in 1863 the dam breaks and desertion reaches epic proportions with whole regiments including their officers just walking home.

By 1864 the South has lost the war, more and more men see this and respond by deserting and going home-often behind enemy lines. This is a real loss of manpower the South could not afford to lose but the Confederate government were unable to implant policies that could stop it and the quote of "rich man's war-poor man's fight" was now prevelant amongst the Southern soldiers.

In armies recruited by conscription desertions occured every day but the wholesale desertion that took place from '63-65 within the Confederate army was caused primarily by "Homefront" problems which led to the loss of will on the battlefield. This was simply down to the gross mismanagement of the commissariat and a proper effort to mobilise the subsistence of the Confederacy. The Reb soldier was always bordering on starvation himself and would normally have to wait for up to six months before he was paid but now he was constantly hearing of destitution at home and became utterly distressed with the suffering of his family and was plied with the temptation to go to their protection and relief.
This was exacerbated by a few of the Southern states, Tennessee in particular was extremely active in enticing men to leave the service of the CSA to come home and sit out the war and passed legislation that catching deserters is decreed as a national issue and that the state cannot participate. Those men going home to occupied states were free of military service by swearing the oath to the Union and by 1864 Grant exempted Confederate deserters and draft dodgers from Union conscription laws.

The Reb soldier had little conception of the gravity of the offense, for such men desertion bore no stigma but it nevertheless contributed greatly to the Confederate defeats in the last couple of years of the war and by the time of Appomattox Lee's army was no more than a few loyal die-hards who had decided to follow Marse Robert to the death.

Reb

 

[Louis Badolato]

I've frankly never understood the whole portrayal of Confederate Soldiers as superhuman and undefeatable in a fair fight. From what I have read about the war and the surrounding time period two things seem perfectly evident: (1) the Southern Soldiers, from a more rural or frontier environment, were far more comfortable with guns and better shots, and (2) they were infinitely better led (at least along the east coast) until mid to late 1863.

Accordingly, as far better led troops much more comfortable with firearms, they really never fought a fair fight with Union Troops in the East until probably Gettysburg - they always had a strategic, tactical and skill advantage over their Northern counterparts that more than counterbalanced the North's advantage in numbers and equipment. Frankly it was comparable to the French advantage in shear numbers and both quantity and quality of equipment in 1939-1940 - the outnumbered German troops used their better leadership and greater experience earned in Spain, Poland, etc. to crush the poorly led and inexperienced Allied forces during the fall of France.

However, later in the Civil War, when the leadership and experience factors balanced out, the Northern troops gave as good an account of themselves. I think that good leadership, tactics, experience and training are far more important to the success of any army than ethnicity or point of origin of the soldiers.

 

[UKReb]

I've frankly never understood the whole portrayal of Confederate Soldiers as superhuman and undefeatable in a fair fight. From what I have read about the war and the surrounding time period two things seem perfectly evident: (1) the Southern Soldiers, from a more rural or frontier environment, were far more comfortable with guns and better shots, and (2) they were infinitely better led (at least along the east coast) until mid to late 1863.

Accordingly, as far better led troops much more comfortable with firearms, they really never fought a fair fight with Union Troops in the East until probably Gettysburg - they always had a strategic, tactical and skill advantage over their Northern counterparts that more than counterbalanced the North's advantage in numbers and equipment. Frankly it was comparable to the French advantage in shear numbers and both quantity and quality of equipment in 1939-1940 - the outnumbered German troops used their better leadership and greater experience earned in Spain, Poland, etc. to crush the poorly led and inexperienced Allied forces during the fall of France.

However, later in the Civil War, when the leadership and experience factors balanced out, the Northern troops gave as good an account of themselves. I think that good leadership, tactics, experience and training are far more important to the success of any army than ethnicity or point of origin of the soldiers.

Agree and although the Army of the Potomac were unable to achieve a decisive win in Virginia until the closing weeks of the war their counterparts in the Western theater such as The Army of Tennessee went from victory to victory and the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio chalked up some impressive wins as well.
There is no doubt that success or failure was down to the quality of the Union senior leadership whereas the rank and file fought with determination and courage in almost every engagement.

Whilst on the subject of the Union Army it is worth remembering that it was not only the CSA that suffered the blight of desertions. Union desertions were well over 200,000, Hooker estimated in 1863 that 85000 officers and men had deserted from the AoP-while it was stated in December 1862 that no less than 180,000 soldiers listed on the Union muster rolls were absent with or without leave.

Reb

 

[theBaron]

I think we need to consider how easy or difficult desertion was at any given period, as well. In the Revolutionary War, many Continentals went home (even when their enlistments weren't up), and earlier in the 18th century, armies were plagued by desertion. The Prussian army instituted measures designed to reduce the number of desertions, and indeed, made it difficult, but never eliminated it. The other armies of the time also suffered this.

I think when we get to the late 19th century, armies and the societies that raised them both have instituted measures to reduce desertion to negligible numbers, and it isn't until an army or its state, or both, reach an existential crisis, that men who no longer want to fight can desert with larger chances of success.

This is a generalization, of course, and recognizing that there will be examples where, in a crisis, a state was able to hold down desertions (think Germany in the late winter/early spring '45, when flying SS squads or fanatical Army officers shot anyone suspected of deserting), but eventually, the supports collapsed, and there was no reason not to flee.

Prost!
Brad

 

[Peter Reuss]

I'd always been under the impression that desertion was an offence worthy of a firing squad. Obviously that wasn't the case in the CSA?

 

[jazzeum]

While I was at the Doctor's office yesterday (regarding my car accident from early July, which is another story), I was reading the beginning chapter of James McPherson's "For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War," and he noted that not only desertion but skulking, backsliding (whatever you want to call it) was also a big problem for both sides, as I'm sure it's a problem in most wars. There were just men who when the action got heavy decided to beat a hasty retreat, not get involved in the action or avoided that possibility at all by getting themselves in non-combatant positions.

 

[Spitfrnd]

I'd always been under the impression that desertion was an offence worthy of a firing squad. Obviously that wasn't the case in the CSA?

That is always the official policy but seldom enforced by most Armies. By the accounts I have seen, the Union had more deserters than the South but very few were shot. In fact, there were numerous efforts to re-enlist these men with offers of pardons that continued even after the war ended. For the South, it was even more common to look the other way, especially for those that left temporarily to deal with harvests and other family matters. Those who took loyalty oaths to the Union were sometimes killed by their peers.

It seems getting accurate numbers on desertions is quite hard and the totals probably include those who "temporarily" took Union oaths to obtain release from POW camps.

Those really interested in Confederate desertion might want to check out "More D*mning Than Slaughter" By Mark A. Weitz.

 

[Warrior]

"I think a better gauge of the Sothern’s morale can be seen in how they acted in combat. There are many incidents when Confederate troops held out against Union troops even while vastly outnumbered, which was usually the case. Their units (and also Union troops) conducted charges against fortified positions and continued them even while being inflicted with massive causalities (such as Pickett's Charge and Fort Wagner)."

Interesting that you mention Picketts Charge in your post regarding how the Confederates acted in combat; "Their units conducted charges against fortified positions and continued them even while being inflicted with massive casualties".................

There were 12,000 Confederates that took part in Picketts Charge, 4,500 of which were recorded as casualties. Of these about 2/3rds were captured, mostly along the Emmitsburg road, ie, they never made it to the angle, only about 200 Confederates actually made it that far. An entire brigade on the extreme left of the Confederate lines turned back during the artillery bombardment. Most of the dead Confederates died beyond the Emmitsburg road, when small arms fire ripped through their ranks.

While I will fully admit it took stones of steel to make it as far as the Emmitsburg road, the attack ran out of steam at that point, with about 25% of the attackers feeling it was better to live to fight another day, thus surrendering. Who knows what would have happened had 2,000 Confederates gotten to the angle instead of 200...........

 

[Peter Reuss]

I think a better gauge of the Sothern’s morale can be seen in how they acted in combat. There are many incidents when Confederate troops held out against Union troops even while vastly outnumbered, which was usually the case. Their units (and also Union troops) conducted charges against fortified positions and continued them even while being inflicted with massive causalities (such as Pickett's Charge and Fort Wagner). These incidents were obvious not conducted by troops with low morale. You cannot look at the morale of the Civil War with a modern point of view.

Ken

It could be argued, I suppose, that the soldiers who stayed on had the fighting spirit but that large numbers of people did not have that morale and thus deserted.

So while the troops fought admirably, the only troops fighting were the ones who hadn't already run off. Of course, there would have to be sufficient numbers of these to make a stand on a battlefield, but could it be possible that if morale were higher more men would have been on the field to begin with (thus making them less outnumbered)?

 

[Spitfrnd]

...
So while the troops fought admirably, the only troops fighting were the ones who hadn't already run off. Of course, there would have to be sufficient numbers of these to make a stand on a battlefield, but could it be possible that if morale were higher more men would have been on the field to begin with (thus making them less outnumbered)?

I don't think that argument holds together. The estimated peak sizes of the two armies was roughly in line with their relative populations. The Southern states only had about 6,000,000 people in 1960 versus nearly 19,000,000 for the North. There is much debate about how large the armies were but somewhere in the range of 500,000 to 700,000 for the South and 1,800,000 to 2,200,000 for the North. Also a much larger portion of the Southern armies were volunteers. It wasn't morale that made the difference in numbers.