Dan Sickles; hero or goat? (1 Viewer)

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Having spent the weekend in Gettysburg attending a toy soldier show there, I had time to get out onto the battlefield and my father and I had a great time. We hired a guide to take us out onto the field and I wanted to spend the majority of our time on the Union left, specifically the "Sickles Salient" as it is called.

As the tour unfolded and I had a good chance to view the ground Sickles chose (Devils Den, Houcks Ridge, the edge of the wheafield, the peach orchard, the edge of the Emmitsburg road from the Sherfy house down to the Klingle house), I started to wonder what the issue was with that ground.

If you stood in the Peach Orchard, you have a clear view of the Confederate lines to your left and to your center and you are on the high ground. Same deal with Devils Den and Houcks Ridge; it overlooks the Confederate lines. When Hood and McLaws attacked Sickles line, they were in open ground and were exposed to Union cannon and musket fire. In my opinion, much of the steam of the attack was taken out of it in Devils Den, on Houcks Ridge, in the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road. By the time the Confederates attacked Little Round Top and got down to the area around the Trostle Farm, they were spent.

Had Sickles sat back and waited for the Confederates to attack his original line starting at Little Round Top and running along the right towards Trostle Farm, the Confederates would have been attacking downhill and would have had a full head of steam coming towards his lines.

I am curious what some of you think of this; was he in a better position along Cemetary Ridge starting at Little Round Top, or was he better served moving forward to the high ground in Devils Den, Houcks Ridge, the upper part of the wheatfield, the peach orchard and the Emmitsburg Road?
 
My recollection on this is that Sickles chose ground that was more defensible for himself, but put the rest of the union army in a bind. He created a salient without any prior notice and Meade was stuck with it when the rebs advanced. It could have been a disaster, but having the interior lines the union could move troops to the point of crisis as necessary.
 
Having spent the weekend in Gettysburg attending a toy soldier show there, I had time to get out onto the battlefield and my father and I had a great time. We hired a guide to take us out onto the field and I wanted to spend the majority of our time on the Union left, specifically the "Sickles Salient" as it is called.

As the tour unfolded and I had a good chance to view the ground Sickles chose (Devils Den, Houcks Ridge, the edge of the wheafield, the peach orchard, the edge of the Emmitsburg road from the Sherfy house down to the Klingle house), I started to wonder what the issue was with that ground.

If you stood in the Peach Orchard, you have a clear view of the Confederate lines to your left and to your center and you are on the high ground. Same deal with Devils Den and Houcks Ridge; it overlooks the Confederate lines. When Hood and McLaws attacked Sickles line, they were in open ground and were exposed to Union cannon and musket fire. In my opinion, much of the steam of the attack was taken out of it in Devils Den, on Houcks Ridge, in the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road. By the time the Confederates attacked Little Round Top and got down to the area around the Trostle Farm, they were spent.

Had Sickles sat back and waited for the Confederates to attack his original line starting at Little Round Top and running along the right towards Trostle Farm, the Confederates would have been attacking downhill and would have had a full head of steam coming towards his lines.

I am curious what some of you think of this; was he in a better position along Cemetary Ridge starting at Little Round Top, or was he better served moving forward to the high ground in Devils Den, Houcks Ridge, the upper part of the wheatfield, the peach orchard and the Emmitsburg Road?

Basically, Sickles movement played havoc with the Confederates battle plan. In hindsight, as against the book Sickles move was, it worked for all the reasons you stated. The big issue was in him not telling anyone and leaving his flanks uncovered. Had Meade not found out and sent reinforcements to close the gaps, history might be a lot harder on Sickles, for the Unions loss at Gettysberg..Michael
 
George, this is a really interesting question. Back around 1990 (give or take), I posed this exact same question in a ACW neighborhood meeting that included many friends (historians, including Brian Pohanka, who was there to discuss the AZW, and history bookdealers). In other words, some very educated people. You would have thought I shot Lincoln! Apparently, Sickles move out of line was on a par with the worst military errors ever committed. I, too, had walked the field at GB and could understand Sickles wanting to move to higher ground where he could see what was occurring. His sin apparently was the timing, ie. walking into the Confederate offensive (and the small matter of disobeying orders). I was glad when the discussion was moved to the AZW. Talk about stirring up a hornet's nest. -- Al
 
I guess that was what I saw too; he had a much clearer line of sight which allowed him to see McLaws Division attacking from his left and along his center. Had he been further back, McLaws division would have rolled down onto his position with a full head of steam. By the time Barksdale got to the Trostle farm, his men were spent and were cut to pieces by Bigelow's 9th Massachusetts battery.

I guess the other issue was the salient formed was hit on three sides by Semmes and Kershaw on it's left, Wofford and Barksdale on it's center and Wilcox and Lang on it's right, so in the end, you had two Confederate divisions (McLaws and Anderson) attacking one Corps (Sickles 3rd).

And what a superb job the parks department has done clearing out trees and resetting fencing and stone walls too, the battlefield looks incredible at this point..............
 
George agree with Lancer-a very interesting question. I have been studying this battle for more years than I care to remember and changing my opinion on the various scenarios just as many times.

With the Sickles performance I suppose the irony of it is if Meade and Sickles had worked in tandem-ie if the line taken by Third Corps had also been shared with the Fifth and command stuctures resolved with fallback plans established-Longstreet's Rebs would have been hard pressed to achieve any of their goals. But given the personalities involved co-ordinated teamwork was virtually impossible. Highlighted by Sickle's post battle statement that he had been perfectly within his rights to order his corps forward, because no one ordered him not to :eek:

Sickles lone action could have nigh destroyed the Army of the Potomac on that second day. The Union army had already suffered severe casualties with the fighting on the first day seriously damaging the First and Eleventh Corps. The combat on July 2nd marked the beginning of the end for the Third which would never recover from it's losses. Sickles command suffered a casualty rate approaching 30 percent.

The Confederate toll was on a par with the Union figures at slightly more than 30% in Longstreet's Corps and Richard Anderson's division experiencing closer to 40%.
And here lies my eternal puzzlement: At days end on the 2nd the Confederate gains were largely illusory-the artillery platform provided by the peach orchard offered no significant advantages for Porter Alexander's cannons, and the foothold gained by Johnson's men on Culp Hill held more possibilities in the imagination than in reality.
Yet it was on this basis that prompted Lee to renew his offensive and commit his army to one more effort on July 3rd.

Reb
 
George, you really hit the mark about the current condition of the battlefield. Park Service has done a fantastic job restoring the 1863 look. Anyone who has not visited GB in the last couple of years is going to be stunned by the appearence of the "new" battlefield. For example, the entire vista from Little Round Top has changed for the better. It is well worth the visit just to see the results of all the work. -- Al
 
Reb,
Thanks for your comments, appreciated as always. I am with you in that the gains the Confederates made on the second day were never really taken advantage of. Barksdales men made it all the way to the Trostle farm, which is quite a distance, you have to see the ground they covered to really appreciate how far they went.

The other thing you have to really see to appreciate is how huge the battlefield on the first day was. Unlike the field on the second day, you really cannot see from one end of it to the other, it is just huge in scope. The 1st and 11th Corps had to cover an incredible amount of ground, from the Herbst woods on the far left to Blocker's knoll on the far right, Hill and Ewell shattered the line forcing the retreat through the town and onto Cemetery Hill, East Cemetery Hill, Culps Hill, etc.

I think many of you would have enjoyed this show I attended, it was sponsored by the Artists Preservation Group, a non profit organization that restores historical artifacts. This year, their project was to restore the battle flag of the 5th Alabama, part of Pettigrews brigade which stormed the angle on the third day. The flag was captured in the assault and was in the hands originally of Joshua Chamberlain.

As part of the event, Picketts Charge was walked by many of the show attendees on Sunday and when the angle was reached, the flag was unfurled, not a dry eye in the house.

Reb, have you ever been to Gettsyburg? With now three shows held per year there, perhaps you can come over one of these times and combine teh show with the battlefield tour, that would be terrific...............
 

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