Napoleon in Russia (1 Viewer)

[Saber]

With the upcoming release of the K&C Russians, plumeless I know, I found myself pondering one of those wonderful "what if" scenarios.

If Napoleon doesn't bleed his army at Borodino and simply retires back towards his supply base in the west what happens next? Having destroyed a fair amount of their own country, what is the Russians next move if Napoleon doesn't take the bait?

With an intact French army on its doorstep, or quite likely in its house, is Prussia able to shake off French dominance and throw their strength to the allied cause? Perhaps someone with a more detailed knowledge of Englands internal affairs at the time could comment on the British ability to continue financing the Allied cause into 1816/1817. As difficult a time as the allies had acheiving victory over a decimated French army in 1813/1814, it seems quite possible that the Napoleonic Wars might have easily had another outcome.

Three cheers for the Russians!!! Or as your preference, Curse the Russians!!!

Saber

 

[OzDigger]

Or should that be, Curse the "plumeless" Russians!

 

[Capitolron]

Saber

Interesting thought - if Napoleon had waited until the Spring and then invaded Russian - would have been a different story!

Plume or no Plume - I am glad to get other Nations in the mix with the Napoleonic Range. I mean how many dead and dying British Troops can a guy buy for his dioramas ???

Ron

 

[maloyalo]

Your starting point would have to be a bit more defined, as in specifically stopped on what date.

If you mean they stopped right before Borodino, and fell back to regroup (or similiar) I do not believe it would not have meant much difference.

The main French led forces (center and left wing) had already lost at least50% of their strength, the Russian army was uncowed, strenghthening, and their will to fight increasing. I think the Austrians and Prussians would abandon France inevitably. Probably at Napoleon's first real reverse, they would pull back, at least, and eventually join alliance with Russia.

If you have the french stop earlier, say at Vitbsk, or Smolensk, the chance of changed outcome slightly increases. I say only slightly, because due to impossibility for adequate supply, and the exhausted state of the mens health (most had marched like 400-800 miles before they even crossed the Russian border) and the harsh Russian climate the men were dropping like flies from day one. They had incredible losses (150,000 men ?) within the first month with no major battle.

That army was very likely doomed, I believe, no matter where they stopped.

 

[Saber]

You are correct, I should have more clearly defined "stopped". Lets say before Smolensk or even in Poland to rest and refit for a Spring campaign as Ron suggested. Perhaps he just waits outside Warsaw for the Russians to make the first move?

If Napoleon alters course in Russia could he have preserved enough of his army to maintain his throne. IMHO Napoleons throne was always dependent on two things.

1) Englands willingness to continue to prosecute the war
2) Napoleons willingness to make concessions to restore at least some balance of power.

As regards to the first it seems to me unlikely that England was ready to throw in the towel. With Wellingtons success in Spain it seems unlikely they would accomodate such a revolutionary regime in such a dominate position. Any Brits out there agree/disagree?

As for the second? Who knows. I guess the fact he pressed on to Moscow gives us the historical answer. But what if the Napoleon of 1815, who offered peace on what in 1812 would have been very generous terms, had showed a little earlier? I guess exile can teach a little humility.

I agree with you Ron, I'm glad to see some other nations showing up! Where are the Bavarians and Saxons? Oh yea, just a plug for a figure of my personel favorite, Marshall Davout.

 

[fishead19690]

Napoleon never intended on staying in russia for long. He had hoped that just the site of the enormous army he had assembled on the russian frontier would bring tsar, Alexander to reconsider his postion and return to the Continetal system wich was a blockcade of british imported goods to ruin the british econemy wich was VERY!!! unpopular and even unpopular with many french also as this block a lot of needed goods and smuggling in france and the rest of europe became a profitable bussiness.
Napoleon hoped to form a bond with Alexander and share control of main land europe with him but this friendship soured. At one point Napoleon was to marry into the tsars family but did not marry the tsars sister but married into the austrian royal family instead. This may had added to the problem also.

Napoleon had planed on crossing the border fighting one big quick battle kicking the tsar back into line and then leaving but as we all know this did not happen.
I believe he could have stayed as long as reaching mosscow and still been allright if he would have left after the burning of the city. It was his waiting around in mosscow for so long for the tsar to come to terms that ran his clock out of time.
If he had started back on his supply lines he would have built his strength back up a bit even though the army had dwindled down quite a bit by this time he could have resupplied his armies and picked up all the garrisons left behind on these supply lines and consolidated his army and went into winter quaters around smolensk or fell back even father.
If you look at how fast he had thrown together a new army for the 1813 campaign I believe he would have been fine had he stoped at this point.

I think Napoleon should have gone after the real problem and put an end to his spanish ulcer before worrying about russia and just put an end to the very unpopular continetal system and came to the political table with britain and came to some kind of compromised piece with britain.

 

[Saber]

Ulcer! Great description. Yes, that was the elephant in the room. With the possible exception of Suchet none of his Marshalls had much success in Spain. Perhaps also Massena of whom Wellington was said to say "When Massena was opposed to me I never slept comfortably". Wars like that sap the morale of the army and the public will to continue fighting.

Napoleons campaigns of 1813/1814 were actually some of his best "post-Austerlitz" battles. Too bad the allies actually ended up listening to Bernadotte. Who would have thought that Marshall Davout's old friend from Auerstadt would be the Emperors undoing. Say, doesn't Bernadotte's family still sit on the throne of Sweden, ceremonially at least? How Ironic.

 

[maloyalo]

I still maintain that Napoleon had little/no chance at success no matter how he prosecuted the Russian campaign.

He laid the foundation of his collaspe, in the years leading up to the campaign by annexing large areas of German, Dutch and Italian territiories into France. These included all of Holland, The German Hansa states and Oldenberg. His establishment of French satelite states aside (Confederation of the Rhine, Spain, Italy, Duchy of Warsaw) once he added previously soverign states into France itself, Europe would never be at peace until he was driven back to Frances previous borders and they were restored.

His position in Moscow, Smolensk or even Poland was a false one. He could not maintain forces there with the supply resources at his disposal, particularly with so many of his troops as disaffected allies or having even poorer resources. As one example, the 9000 strong Wurttemburg contingent was already down to 1500 by Smolensk, if I remember right. His army there would melt away faster then he could reinforce it. Napoleon, besides being incapable of adherring to prudent advice, even his own, I suspect also knew he had only so much time to operate. This as much as anything else may have been why he would not give up the chase and went 500 miles into Russia.

 

[Saber]

I tend to agree with your later points in regards to the satelite states etc. Napoleons inability to see the reality of his political position undid him. He might have been able to maintain some of France's newly aquired conquest but that would have depended upon his own willingness to see the untenable position he had left his adversaries in and therefore make substantial concessions to "buy his throne". IMHO this posibility, however remote it may have been, evaporated once he lauched his Russian campaign.

I do not beleive he ever again had the chance to negotiate from a position of strength. It seems many leaders throughout history fail to grasp the political landscape before them and adjust their military objectives accordingly. I've never been able to conclude what his long term objectives ever were? Territorial conquest, revolutionary zeal, stooges and family on puppet thrones, wealth & power? All seem to have been a purpose at one time or another in his career. But I agree 100% with your point that he left his opponents little choice but to wage war to preserve their own interest. It seems the "war with everybody" strategy seldom produces the results desired.

 

[maloyalo]

I do not beleive he ever again had the chance to negotiate from a position of strength. It seems many leaders throughout history fail to grasp the political landscape before them and adjust their military objectives accordingly. I've never been able to conclude what his long term objectives ever were? Territorial conquest, revolutionary zeal, stooges and family on puppet thrones, wealth & power? All seem to have been a purpose at one time or another in his career. But I agree 100% with your point that he left his opponents little choice but to wage war to preserve their own interest. It seems the "war with everybody" strategy seldom produces the results desired.

You describe the political environment better then I can. Its a very interesting point about his goals an objectives. I could not define them. One aspect of his personality might have been a lack of rigidity. He almost seems to fly by the seat of his pants, but coupled with a very fast working mind, was able to run circles around his adversaries, for a while. But he also seems the kind that is never done, and can never stop messing with things in response to whatever arouses his emotions. He, in his last years often spoke about longing for a pastoral peaceful retirement, but he was not the kind to ever do it (for more then a few months) I think.

 

[Saber]

It does seem the very traits that served him so well in battle might have proved his ultimate downfall. Not so unusual I guess. I tend to think his Ego would have got in his own way regardless. Never shall I forgive the Emperor for the backhanded treatment of my man, the Iron Marshall, Louis N. Davout!

LONG LIVE THE VICTOR OF AUERSTADT not JENA/AUERSTADT!

 

[maloyalo]

Marshall Davout. Napoleon of course, gets much of the print and credit for the accomplishments of the french army, but it really was an entire generation of remarkable soldiers and officers. In part it was the unique situation and the opportunity afforded and in part it was (to napoleon's credit) the strange leadership style of 'Le Petit Corporal. But for a little while a remarkable channel was open for the most talented military men to advance, regardless of backround and birth.

Davout was certainly one of the very best. He's in that group that did such remarkable things, it is hard for me to rate them, like Ney and Soult and some others that might have been great had 'fate been a little more discriminating'.

It has been said you can tell Napoleon's estimation of his generals skills by the size of the Corps he entrusted to them. A typical early line-up might have been: Soult 40,000, Davoust 38,000, Ney 12,400. (But watch out for that Ney, for he might turn up anywhere!). Davout's Corps in Russia was the largest, (something like 60-80,000 at the start ?) and said to rival the Guard in efficiency. But it was worn to dust along with Murat's cavalry, chasing the Russians for 1000 kilometers.

But it is hard to find a battle as finely done as Auerstadt, in that era, besides Napoleon at his best.

 

[Capitolron]

Great Conversation - I have really enjoyed reading all of it.

In general my thoughts of what I have study with NAPOLEON (my main man ) is that he was driven to destroy entire Armies as his way of conquest.

He had the mind - and in early 19th Century Europe understanding of tactics - a Nation with out a Major Fighting Force would yield to the victor. Many had done so in earlier campaigns - Russia was different on their turf.

I still hold to the belife that the entire French Army could have been saved and even made stronger if they had retired for the winter. Supplies were not a problem if they had held in Poland after Borodino. This would have Napoleon time to make Alexander think hard about what he was doing. Everything would have stopped on all sides anyway - because everyone else would have wintered their troops as well.

The threat of Prussia and Austria coming together in defense of Russia would have been a tough task. These Nation Armies did not work well together and especially as a unified fighting force. What you could have saw - if this did occur - is Napoleon using his Waterloo Strategy earlier and more effective. Divide and Conquer each in short order.

Anyway - fun "what ifs" great discussing this stuff.

Ron

 

[Saber]

There is an interesting article in this months BBC History magazine regarding Britains "worst" year. Surprisingly, the author selected 1812 as the worst year! He cited civil unrest, unpopular wars, and revolutionary unrest abroad as his reasons. Apparently Prime Minister Spencer Perceval was assassinated in the House of Commons lobby, just one of many events mentioned in the article. I don't remember reading about that or if I did it didn't registar for some reason. It did bring me back to the one issue I still turn about in my mind, how close was England to throwing in the towell in 1812. I really don't know much about internal British politics of this period save for the standard fare but this article (admittingly short) paints a pretty bleak picture. By comparison the Battle of Britain/Blitz didn't even make the top 5.

It sure seems like Ron's man Napoleon might have been closer to success than we might think!

BTW, the magazine also reviewed a book about Napoleon by Lt. Gen Jonathon Riley. I've ordered a copy of the book and will post comments on the books thread once I've finished it. Must have something to read while I'm waiting for the Black Watch to arrive.

 

[maloyalo]

The political environment of that time, is my weak point! But I will return to that. Back to the front. Smolensk.

That magician Napoleon pulls off one of the greatest disappearing acts in history.

He crosses the Neiman with about 300,000 men in his central army group in late June. By Smolensk (early august?) he has about 150,000. He has not fought any major battles, only skirmishes and affairs, that account for maybe 8,000 battlefield casualties.

Where did those other 140,000 missing men go ? Or perhaps more to the point: were they really gone gone, as in dead or deserted; or just straggling on a massive scale, or detached and eventually rejoined the army ?

From what I have read so far, I think they are in fact gone. A large portion perished from fatigue, exposure, malnutrition and disease. They fell out and never fell back in. Some portion deserted. Some did rejoin there regiments eventually. My best WAG right now is it was something like 65% died, 25% deserted 10% rejoined the regiments.

For a long time I tried to actually track each individual regiment & its strength and history during the campaign. I left the work eventually, but learned quite a bit about all the components. I am speaking btw on the central group where most of the french and lesser allies were. The two flanking forces, the Austrians & Prussians had a different role, advanced not very far, and retreated more or less intact.

Militarily I would say, it was impossible for Napoleon to maintain a campaign of 1 year, 2 years or any ammount of years against Russia. With the leader, the army and the people united in opposition to Napoleon, Russia would not give up and the further back they were pushed the further forward Napoleon must be. He could not maintain his army in Russia or Poland even, nor could he remain on that front himself indefinately. He had not the means to supply it, and could not afford the losses in manpower for an extended time. Even Germany, 135 years later, and with modern transport and supply vehicles including aircraft, could not supply their forces for very long.

That is btw with a stable political situation and no enemies in his rear (besides Spain/England). It was not a stable situation and he did have enemies in his rear, bidding their time, waiting for the wind to change. What nerve he had advancing into the heart of Russia leaving his flanks guarded by his recently defeated adverseries!

 

[Capitolron]

Maloyalo

I am sorry - but, I totally disagree.

If Napoleon had held his ground and not advance deeper into Russia - he would have been able to winter his troops and supply them very well.

Remember - Poland was friendly turf for the Revolution and especially freedom from Russia. No Spain here.

And with winter coming - no Nation at that time would advance to attack for a campaign against him. Time actually could have lead to another peace treaty with Russia and taken them out of the game. This would have allowed Napoleon to establish a foundation of his Empire in Europe and position himself better for the big Battle to come with Britian. IMHO.

Ron

 

[fishead19690]

Maloyalo, most of the missing troops you not able to seem to acount for that seemed to have disapeared to you were left as garrissons in various towns and cities along the way to provide a rear gaurd and protect the vital lines of comunications along the very long way the grand army had traveled.

Yes i,m sure there were many desertions and deaths and sick and wounded lost along the way also but a very large number were left as garrison troops.
I,m sure many of the desertions were from the various foriegn troops he had with him as I,m pretty sure troopers like take for instance the spanish and potugesse troopers he had with him were not to thrilled about being there.

These rear gaurd troops sure helped out on the long winter retreat as they were in towns and garrisions they had food and shelter and weren,t as burnt out as the troopers who had marched all the way from Mosscow, these troopers were fresh and could be placed in the rear gaurd with marshall Ney when they were picked back up along the way and replace the burnt out troops of the rear gaurd.

You should get your self a copy of the Memoirs of sergeant Bourgogne 1812-1813 and you get a real feel of the suffering of what these men went through in the retreat from Russia. Its an incredible diary of the suffering these men went through in one of the coldest winters in history and these men had little or nothing to eat and most had no shelter. They survived on horse flesh if they could get it before the horses turned rock hard wich happened in record time and they fought amongst themselfs for what little shelter they could find and those who could find none would not survive the night.
Russian prisoners turned to eating each other as they had starved or froze to death.
The futher the troops were to the rear of the retreat the worst they suffered as the troops that had passed before them had taken what little was available for them. Add to this the fact that they were followed and attacked by russian troops and cosacks the whole way also when these men were half frozen to death and frost bitten that there fingers and feet were falling off and if you had fallen of fatigue you were robbed and striped naked and you,ll start to get an idea of how bad the retreat was.
A lot of men went mad along the way. Get the book its a really great read!!! Even if your not into the napoleonic wars its an incredible story of human surival.

 

[fishead19690]

Maloyalo

I am sorry - but, I totally disagree.

If Napoleon had held his ground and not advance deeper into Russia - he would have been able to winter his troops and supply them very well.

Remember - Poland was friendly turf for the Revolution and especially freedom from Russia. No Spain here.

And with winter coming - no Nation at that time would advance to attack for a campaign against him. Time actually could have lead to another peace treaty with Russia and taken them out of the game. This would have allowed Napoleon to establish a foundation of his Empire in Europe and position himself better for the big Battle to come with Britian. IMHO.

Ron

Ron Napoleon would have had to have fallen back on his supply lines quite a bit to have spent the winter and restarted a fresh campaign in the spring. Most of mosscow was burnt down by crimanals who the russians released from prisons with instructions to burn the city and there just wasn,t enough to supply the army there to spend a winter there and mosscow was way to far to supply.
He should never have stayed as long in that city as he did waiting and hoping for peace terms with Alexander wich never came???? If he had turned around and fallen back AT LEAST as far as Slomensk and wintered there this horrible distruction of his army would never have happened.

Come spring time he could have brought up more fresh new troops and built his army back up to strenth again if he wished to resume the attack but we,ll never know. I think his efforts would have been better spent if he had marched his grand army west into spain and drove Wellington into the sea with Nelsons bones. Napoleon was the only one who seamed to be able to handle the war in Spain and had a perfect battle record with the little time he had spent there it would have been great to have seen what he would have done against wellington there, or even if Davout had been placed in charge of the spanish ulcer?????

 

[Saber]

Great point about Napoleon in Spain! He did do quite well there but left the job unfinished(underestimated his opponents?). As to the garrison troops along his line of march also valid, however it may not have been so easy as it seems. Davout in 1813 held the Hamburg area with French Allied() troops along with, I beleive, around 3 or so French divisions? He was never able to fully cooperate with Napoleons operations as his "Allies" were unreliable and partison/allied activity in his area used up his French troops which were meant to support other objectives. That said, he did hold Hamburg!

IMHO, the key was Englands ability to continue fighting. In fact Davouts presence in the Hamburg TO was suppossed to cut off English support, both material and financial, for the Allied cause flowing through the Baltic ports to her continental allies.

I usually don't "what if" tactical battles/campaigns as the outcomes are so wildly unpredictable. It usually assumes your opponent would do nothing different if you change your own course of actions and that is seldom the case.

I tend to think, again opinion, that nothing short of open rebellion in England would have caused her to quit the war. She might have reached a peace accord (think 1803) but a doubt it would have been anything but a period of rest and refit. Any Brits out there agree/disagree?

 

[maloyalo]

Good posts all!

fishead19690, I do have that book. It is a great eyewitness account. What was he again ? A ex- Flanker Chasseur ? Some troops were deposited along the way as you say, but hardly any yet when they reached Smolensk. Actually those left as garrisons from the central army group was not very large. Maybe only 5-10 thousand total, along the entire route to Moscow. We do know which units and where for the most part. The large numbers you refer to, did exsist but came from the later arriving reinforcement corps, like Victor's and Loison's.

Capitolron, I agree that if Napoleon had not marched into Russia, or just a little way, he might have remained in Poland, or fallen back to the German border. Poland was friendly. But it was also poor and most of what it had to give was already given. The combo of bad roads, poor country, little food would have continued to deplete the army.

But more troops would come up as you say, and in the next spring he would be exactly in the same position he was the previous year, with no additional advantage, and the Russian Army stronger and still likely going to use scorched earth tactics. Napoleon would be poorer though. Maintaining an army in the field is extremely expensive. Maintaining an army as big as Napoleon's, with the attrition rate so high, and so far from France, would be bankrupting.

Saber, the point you make on Britain, is sinking in a bit. I am not sure how much Britain subsidized Russia, at that time. Armies need cash. But Alexander, does seem to have become a anti-napoleon power in his own right by this time. Hard to pinpoint, but it appears he had determined not to make peace with an expansionist Napoleon (by around 1810 ?). He was beguiled once, but Napoleon's true self had been revealed over time. He would, it is said ,come to see himself as having a savior of Europe type role. I think only Austria still actually wavered. England, Spain, Prussia and now Russia were all determined and vengefull enemies of the French. Only the Kingdom of Italy and the Rhine area small states were peaceful. Good duty for a soldier then and good duty still.