Battle for Arnhem.... (2 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

Although the Allies were confident they had broken German resistance, they faced serious problems:

SHAEF could not logistically support offensive action by Monty and Patton, whatever the political fallout.



V2s were falling on London.



After five years of war the British were short of manpower.



Tank production in the Ruhr had increased despite strategic bombing.



The Russians were fast approaching Berlin.



The Western Allies were already stretched, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Canadian Army along the coast, 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] British Army through Belgium, the US Armies to the west and the paratroops were his only strategic reserve.

 

[panda1gen]

Troops had to cover ever wider frontages as they advanced, now some 250 miles further away from their supply bases.





Trucks were now needed to move supplies to keep armour moving rather than carry infantry.



In consequence, German ad hoc defences were more likely to halt advances and resistance was stiffening everywhere.

 

[panda1gen]

There were still the Westwall defences,



the hell of the Hurtgen forest,



mobilisation of large Volksturm forces



and the Ardennes Offensive yet to come.

 

[panda1gen]

On 4 September, Montgomery's 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Canadian Army troops captured the massive port of Antwerp virtually intact. However, Antwerp was miles inland and the Scheld Estuary leading to it was still under German control.



Some argued that the capture of Le Havre and Antwerp made the original plan of clearing French ports further south unnecessary.

Antwerp could have been opened sooner by the Canadians, if they had advanced to do this immediately, but Eisenhower and Montgomery persisted with the original plans to capture many of the French ports.



The failure to open the ports in Antwerp has been called "one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war".

 

[panda1gen]

The "Great Mistake" also included not cutting off the German 15[SUP]th[/SUP] Army of 80,000 men.




They were then trapped on the coast west of Antwerp, but were then evacuated north over the Scheldt Estuary with all their equipment.




They then moved east along the Beveland Peninsula, to unexpectedly join the battles for the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen sectors.




Other important Channel Ports, e.g. Dunkirk, remained in German hands until May 1945.

 

[panda1gen]

Major efforts to reopen the French railroad network were started, and by the end of August, 18,000 men, including 5,000 prisoners of war, were engaged in railway construction.


After many delays, the first trainload of supplies reached the U.S. Third Army depot at Le Mans on 17 August. But these efforts were far too late to have any effect on the battles taking place after Cobra and the breakout into France.

Meanwhile, the Germans were able to use the railways on internal lines of communication - albeit with troops tied up on AA duty.

 

[panda1gen]

Instead, all supplies for the armies had to be carried forward by truck, and there were simply not enough trucks for this effort.


Advancing divisions of the U.S. 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units.


The 21st Army Group stripped two of its divisions of their transport, and four British truck companies were lent to the Americans.

 

[panda1gen]

Organization of the Red Ball Express did much to lessen the impact of the transport shortage but this ad hoc operation could not solve the problem. As the Allied pursuit across France and Belgium continued, distances increased beyond the range of a single truck, requiring fuel to be brought forward in those trucks to refuel the logistics further from the ports.


Fuel consumption soared. Soon it took five gallons of fuel to deliver one gallon to the front. Fuel pipelines were constructed to shorten the supply lines, but were too time-consuming to build to be of much short-term use.




By 28 August the Communications Zone could no longer guarantee fuel deliveries, and both the U.S. First and Third Armies reported less than a day's supply on hand.Furthermore, the stripping of the armies of their own transport had the effect of seriously slowing their own manoeuvrability.




On 30 August, drastic steps were taken to suspend imports entirely; 21st Army Group would draw on its reserves in Normandy until the ports of Dieppe and Boulogne could be opened.



Offensive operations slowed to a standstill, allowing the German forces their first respite in weeks.

 

[panda1gen]

By 22 August, the German position was desperate.

All German forces west of the Allied lines were dead or in captivity. Estimates by different historians were that the remnants of 14–15 divisions were caught in the pocket with 80,000 to 100,000 troops trapped, of whom 10,000 to 15,000 were killed and 50,000 were captured. There are wider estimates of escaped Germans of between 20,000 and 50,000 although some thought it was as high as 100,000.




It has been said by some that the British, Canadian and Polish Armies were ineffective against the German forces around Caen, from D-Day onward and slow to close the Falaise pocket from the North side.

I am not sure that it is fully appreciated that the few short miles of front around Caen had the greatest and most powerful accumulation of German armoured forces ever seen in WW2 and that this armoured might was whittled away and bled white over the two months after D-Day.

Any side that broke cover and attacked, especially across open ground, was decimated, but the Allied losses were replenished.

 

[panda1gen]

First US Army (VIII, VII, XIX and V Corps) broke out facing the LXXXIV Corps and II Parachute Corps in the very difficult defensive terrain of the bocage. By the time they reached Arromanches and more open country, US 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Army under General Patton was active (from 1[SUP]st[/SUP] August 1944).

Patton advanced swiftly to a position at the southern side of the Falaise Pocket at Argentan covering 60 miles in only 2 weeks. They were stretched so thinly that Bradley was concerned that further advance would end up with the trapped German divisions smashing right through any blocking force.

“Although Patton might have spun a line across the narrow neck, I doubted his ability to hold it. Nineteen German divisions were now stampeding to escape the trap. Meanwhile, with four divisions George was already blocking three principal escape routes through Alencon, Sees and Argentan. Had he stretched that line to include Falaise, he would have extended his roadblock a distance of 40 miles (64 km). The enemy could not only have broken through, but he might have trampled Patton's position in the onrush. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise”.

— Omar Bradley





Meanwhile, the British, Canadian and Polish troops of Second Army (XXX, I and VIII British and XII Canadian Corps), faced Wehrmacht LXXXVI Corps, XLVII Panzer Corps as well as ISS and IISS Panzer Corps.

Here the ground was much more open, but this meant that German tank, anti-tank and 88mm Flak guns (of which there were many) were much more likely to have good fields of fire against armour that could be destroyed 1-2km away. By night attack and daytime assault under smoke screens, some of these defensive advantages were overcome.





In the northern sector of the Falaise Pocket, even after the prolonged losses over two months after D-Day, German losses still included 344 tanks, self-propelled guns and other light armoured vehicles, as well as 2,447 soft skinned vehicles and 252 guns abandoned or destroyed.

In the fighting around Hill 262, where the Polish armour closed the gap, German losses totalled 2,000 men killed, 5,000 taken prisoner and 55 tanks, 44 guns and 152 other armoured vehicles destroyed.

 

[panda1gen]

By way of an example, the 12th SS-Panzer Division lost 94 percent of its armour, nearly all of its artillery and 70 percent of its vehicles. With close to 20,000 men and 150 tanks before the Normandy campaign, after Falaise it was reduced to 300 men and 10 tanks. Although elements of several German formations had managed to escape to the east, even these had left behind most of their equipment.

After the battle, Allied investigators estimated that the Germans lost around 500 tanks and assault guns in the pocket, and that little of the extricated equipment survived the retreat across the Seine.

If the situation was bad for the Germans in the West, it was even worse in the East, where Operation Bagration from 22 June to 19 August resulted in the near-total destruction of Army Group Centre. This loss was around a quarter of Eastern Front strength and comparable to those at Stalingrad. Exact German losses are unclear, but around 400,000 overall casualties is accepted. Soviet losses were also substantial, with 180,040 killed and missing, 590,848 wounded and sick, together with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.

The German losses could not be replaced, whereas the Soviets losses could. Army Groups North and South were further weakened, as units were diverted to fill gaps in the central sector where Army Group Centre used to be. Both Army Groups had to withdraw under pressure from later Soviet offensives in their sectors. The end of Operation Bagration coincided with the destruction of many of the strongest units of the German Army engaged in the Falaise Pocket.

Supply problems also slowed the Soviet advance, which ground to a halt after advancing hundreds of miles into Poland. However, the Germans were able to transfer armoured units from Italy, where they could afford to give ground, to resist the Soviets at Warsaw.

Operation Bagration was one of the largest Allied operations of WWII with 2.3 million troops engaged, three Axis armies eliminated, and vast amounts of Soviet territory recaptured, a devastating blow for Germany.

​The deteriorating situation was a major factor in the 20 July bomb plot by some army officers to assassinate Hitler. Although this was foiled, Hitler increasingly distrusted the Army, giving more support to the more fervent Nazi supporters including the Waffen SS, by now several divisions strong.







On 16 September 1944, the day before Market Garden, he initiated planning for a bold thrust through the Ardennes, aimed to capture Antwerp (to deny supply) and split the Allies. If he could knock the Western Allies out with such a blow he could then turn all his forces East. 'Watch on the Rhine' (Wacht am Rheim), was a defensive named plan to fool Allied intelligence.

 

[villagehorse]

Wow you have gone to a lot of effort here Kevin with the rolling dialogue, but you hit the right amount of balance with interesting facts, makes for good reading coupled with appropriate photos. Well done. Robin.

 

[Louis Badolato]

As always Kevin, the blend of incredible photos and interesting text makes this a must see diodrama! Thank you for a fun read!

 

[Warrior]

Wow you have gone to a lot of effort here Kevin with the rolling dialogue, but you hit the right amount of balance with interesting facts, makes for good reading coupled with appropriate photos. Well done. Robin.

Agreed; thanks so much Kevin for all the research into the actual facts and the great displays to go along with it, a pleasure to both view and read, well done.

 

[panda1gen]

Wow you have gone to a lot of effort here Kevin with the rolling dialogue, but you hit the right amount of balance with interesting facts, makes for good reading coupled with appropriate photos. Well done. Robin.

As always Kevin, the blend of incredible photos and interesting text makes this a must see diodrama! Thank you for a fun read!

Agreed; thanks so much Kevin for all the research into the actual facts and the great displays to go along with it, a pleasure to both view and read, well done.

It is an especial pleasure when feedback like this is given, especially from you guys, with what you do. Thank you very much. This is what I intended to do 12 years ago but ho hum. On with the story.

Eisenhower only assumed complete control of the conduct of the campaign on 1 September 1944. In truth, Monty’s plan for Operation Overlord had been a complete success (Louis, I know that you agree with me really:wink2. Now however, the supply problems discussed above were severely limiting him, due to the speed of the advance.



The extent of the advance also meant that Ike had no immediate plan or strategy, although all his generals were not slow to put their plans forward. It was a very political role, as Monty’s narrow front would not be acceptable to the US public if it meant Patton was stopped, hence the ‘broad front’ approach, which only made the supply situation worse. His other problem was poor evaluation of the German position, even ‘careful’ intelligence officers predicted imminent, complete collapse.



In the Comet planning, there was clear and accurate information from the Dutch Resistance, supported by ariel photography, that the shattered remnants of II SS Panzer Corps was refitting north of Arnhem and that some SS cadre and training units may be relocating from the Amsterdam area to the excellent barracks at Nijmegen.




The Dutch SOE intelligence networks were effectively infiltrated by the Gestapo, so British intelligence was apparently wary of the resistance reports. The US had not been burnt this way so placed more value on, what turned out to be, accurate information.


However, nobody at SHAEF seemed too bothered by reports of ‘a broken panzer’ and some ‘ad hoc’ units, of around divisional strength in total. The Allied Supreme HQ still felt the German collapse was nigh. (Even after Market Garden, SHAEF would still be completely surprised by the Ardennes offensive.)

 

[panda1gen]

By 7[SUP]th[/SUP] September, Monty left a meeting with Ike with the agreed use of 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne Army and believing he had total priority for logistics. On 10[SUP]th[/SUP] September the plan for Market Garden was passed to the Commander of British 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Army, Miles Dempsey.



There was to be a 100 mile thrust, ‘Garden’, to the Zuider Zee, which it was hoped would cut off hundreds of thousands of Germans. The route to the North German Plain and encirclement of the Ruhr industrial region would be open.




Bradley was stunned at the boldness of Monty’s plan, he was also quoted as saying it was the most imaginative of the war.

 

[panda1gen]

The plan’s success was predicated on there being a thin crust of defences that could be pierced quickly, to relieve the paras. This initial penetration was in practice achieved.






The assessment of the possible German reaction to such an offensive was undertaken by a Supreme HQ that failed to expect the escape of a good proportion of the 80,000 strong German 15[SUP]th[/SUP] Army,



or that ad hoc formations would be able to form effective Kampfgruppe as quickly as they did.

 

[panda1gen]

General Brereton now commanded 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne Army. There were two parts to his command. The first was the ground forces. For operation ‘Market’, ‘Boy’ Browning commanded the Airborne Corps of 1[SUP]st [/SUP]British, 82nd and 101[SUP]st[/SUP] US Airborne. This was to be dropped on key bridges over rivers and canals, on an axis of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem.

However, perhaps understandably given his air force background, Brereton gave priority of input to the second component of his command, the air forces. In the planning for Market Garden he made some important and far reaching decisions.

The first decision was for a daylight drop, to avoid the scatter of the D-Day night drops. This allowed the concentration the para commanders wanted so was not especially contentious.

The Allies did not have enough transports to take everyone in one drop, especially those allocated to 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne. In fact less than half the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne Army troops available could be transported in the first wave. Nor were there enough ground crew to turn the transports around quickly. The result was a second decision, at the recommendation of the air forces, of one drop per day, which meant drops spread over three days instead of one. Even this assumed that the weather would hold, by no means a ‘given’ for NW Europe.



This meant that only half of the first lift would be available to capture objectives, as landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ) would need to be defended for subsequent drops. This decision proved to be crucial.



Thirdly, as in Normandy, the airmen warned of heavy losses from flak, so DZs were chosen with this in mind. This would be especially important they argued, as a daylight drop would be made. These DZs were some distance from the targets, especially for Arnhem bridge, which was several miles away.

 

[panda1gen]

Fourthly, both Urquhart (1[SUP]st[/SUP]) and Gavin (82[SUP]nd[/SUP]) argued for glider ‘coup de mains’ at Arnhem and Nijmegen respectively (as per Pegasus Bridge on D-Day) – both were refused by the airmen.





The 101[SUP]st[/SUP] were also refused a coup de main at Eindhoven, due to the air force concern with flak at the Phillips electronic factory and the City’s airfield. Maxwell Taylor also wanted a concentrated drop after the chaos on D-Day, so the 502 and 506 Parachute Regiments were dropped together North of Eindhoven near Best and only the 501[SUP]st[/SUP] were to be dropped separately near Veghel.

 

[panda1gen]

By its’ very nature the plan was complex with many dependent parts. Whilst the major river bridges at Arnhem and Nijmegen are especially remembered, there were in practice several other waterways to cross. All these needed to be quickly bridged and all the various military and logistical factors must have fallen into place.


There were not enough ground crews to turn all the transports around quickly enough, so the drops were spread over three days

This meant the decisions discussed above and many subsequent decisions would be factors in the subsequent outcome of the operation. At one point Browning threatened to resign over Brereton’s disregard for ground elements in an earlier operation, so was in no position to gain greater influence over this plan by threatening to do so now. He did make the remark to Monty about maybe going 'a bridge too far', however.

And then, General Sosabowski asked, “What about the Germans?”

General Sosabowski

Many junior British officers did not count arguing with Montgomery or his plan as favourable career moves, whatever their doubts. One quipped to a colleague that there would be a certain cross for him, Victoria or wooden.

The speed of the Allied advance meant that incredibly short planning times, only about one week for British 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Army for example, were essential to hit the Germans whilst they were still reeling. This also meant that weakness in the planning was an obvious risk and why it has been briefly discussed here. There are no doubts that mistakes and poor judgement calls were made. However, it is perhaps easy to view complex matters in a biased manner when looking through a ‘retrospectoscope’.

It could certainly be argued for example that the press at the time (and subsequent famous movies perhaps) may have done this. There were also politics, national rivalry and a search for scapegoats at play perhaps?