Battle for Arnhem.... (4 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

Meanwhile, 2 Devon and 1 Dorset of 231B, were to follow up immediately behind the IG and clear the ground for 1000yds on either side of the road. Cromwells of C Sqn 15/19 Hussars would support. The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Devons had hardly started their attack before the IG tanks were burning ahead as they were ambushed. They then enjoyed a grandstand view of the subsequent air attacks.



The 2 IC commanded B and D companies on the left, the Co commanded A and C companies, supported by the 15/19 tanks on the right, through the larger set of woods. The tanks mainly used BESA MG fire.



One tank was hit in the engine, otherwise they made progress, as they supported along narrow tracks, firing only when they could clearly see friend and foe. The tanks felt their support was mainly of morale only, as the going was slow. The going was also slow on the left as they collected the dazed survivors.

The road was full of tanks and vehicles by now.



The 15/19 Hussars then lost several vehicles to mines, including one of C Sqdn Challengers. The sides of the road, it was now discovered, were extensively mined. At least it was not possible to mine the concrete road.

 

[panda1gen]

Around 2 hours after zero hour, traffic jams on Club Route were already formed.



One CO had to hitch a lift with a motorcycle rider to progress to meet the IG, the tanks and half tracks were often 2 or 3 abreast.



The correspondent Chester Wilmot saw 2 destroyed 3 tonners that had strayed off onto the verge, later a sign appeared from the sappers warning everyone not to do the same.



Obviously, this only worsened the jams, as the mining tactic intended.

 

[The Colonel]

This is a really good diorama and it shows.

 

[panda1gen]

This is a really good diorama and it shows.

Thank you, glad you like it.

For the majority of XXX Corps, Garden was remembered as a tedious crawl interjected by never ending, unexplained halts. As 43[SUP]rd[/SUP] Wessex Division ‘followed up’ Guards Armoured, it took 3 days to travel 60 miles to the front line.

This is worse than the Harrod's sale.


To be fair, see post #1290 earlier. Patton made what was a ‘rapid’ breakout advance out of the Normandy beach head, taking 2 weeks to reach Argentan, 60 miles away. Given how optimistic the planning had been for Garden however, a rate of progress of two days, never mind two weeks, would not do here.

Crikey, that was exciting, nearly got out of first gear.


The exhaustion this unending traffic jam caused, with the constant stop/starts, should not be underestimated. It also undermined an attitude of forcing rapid progression and action. How can you ‘press on regardless’, when all you can see ahead is a regularly breaking tail light – if indeed it moved at all!

Ah well, at least we can have a brew.

 

[panda1gen]

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Roestel’s SS Pz Jg Abt 10 was trained in StuG IVs in East Prussia, then shipped to Aachen by train from Danzig on 8.9.1944, arriving on 11.9.1944 when it was subordinated to LXXXI Armee Korps.



It was originally to be part of 9[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Panzer and it was unclear when this changed to the 10[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Pz.





His surviving StuGs north of Hoek, were able, by the late afternoon of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] September, to use the close cover of the woods to advance on the road, engage and then withdraw into cover.




Meanwhile, unlike some of the immobile, ground mounted 88mm guns, they impacted on the battle by causing delays, even if they were unable to halt the advance.



Moreover, they effected a key decision.

 

[panda1gen]

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-story-of-operation-market-garden-in-photos

This is an Imperial War Museum photo of Irish Guard tanks knocked out by panzerfausts .....

We could not recreate this as we hadn't even seen this, but a group of British collectors got together in 2012 to try to put a XXX Corps theme together. I have shared, and will be sharing more of the photos taken in that shoot in this 'diodrama'.

 

[panda1gen]

By 17.30 the IG had penetrated the prepared and improvised positions to reach an intact, temporary bridge over the River Dommel, just south of Valkenswaard.

It could take tanks, which meant that the frustration and annoyance of trying to bring up the armoured bulldozer with the leading tanks to improvise a crossing was now unnecessary.




It was very narrow so there was no room for two way traffic (a Bailey Bridge would be built alongside it ASAP).




The Irish Guards (IG) history wryly noted that the bridge being intact was welcome. None of the IG wanted to spend the night in the woods with the ‘bazooka boys’.

 

[panda1gen]

The Irish Guards history went on to note that No 3 Sqdn were ‘warlike’ and took four 88’s from their crews.




The history continued, ‘Lt Isitt, thinking it rash to leave such dangerous things as 88’s laying around, tried to destroy them, but only succeeded in firing into the middle of the Group HQ’.




The history reported that unlike the 88 crews, the German infantry,




especially snipers, were very active.




Vandeleur experienced a burst of MG fire near him, ‘but no Germans came so near the mark as Lt Isitt’.

 

[panda1gen]

The reshuffle of the IG groups and crossing the narrow bridge took ages.
Eventually, 2 Sqn




and 4 Company, very cautiously proceeded to Valkenswaard,









whilst a battery shelled likely points of resistance.

 

[panda1gen]

It was already dark, the only light coming from burning houses. The IG battered their way in to Valkenswaard to find some big fires and destruction of some buildings with rubble in the streets.



Some Germans were trying to escape to Germany, some were still firing at the IG.




Yet all the while, the civilians stood in the street yelling themselves hoarse, ‘getting in the way of the fighting’. At 21.40 XXX Corps were told that IG group was in the centre of Valkenswaard and had blocked all the approaches. The IG took over the German HQ in the Post Office in the town square, which soon filled up with vehicles.




Soon afterwards, the town clerk took a telephone message and was pleased to report to the IG, ‘they (the Germans) were to hold out at all costs and reinforcements were on their way’. This was further incentive to push on past the crowds to the north of the town. As a result, a counter attack was expected that night, but in the event did not occur until the morning.

 

[panda1gen]

Meanwhile, Vandeleur and Bredin, CO of 1 Dorsets, had agreed in the afternoon to push on past Valkenswaard and advance the extra five miles to meet up with the 101[SUP]st [/SUP]at Eindhoven. Instead, they were ordered to halt, which has caused some debate.

Before judging, consider:

1. British armour doctrine was not to fight at night, especially against panzerfaust armed infantry that they could not easily see (especially if buttoned up) or hear over the noise of tracks and engine.

2. XXX Corps was ordered NOT to move at night as it would need lights and on a single road with open flanks would have been extremely vulnerable to flank or air attack. The Luftwaffe would be capable of inflicting harm at night if flares or lights were used. At night Allied air superiority would be nullified. It was the end of daylight in the early evening. Sunset was 18.47 and last light was at 19.41 hrs. In the event, scheduling XXX Corps to start in the afternoon (which was largely a result of the air force timetable for a daylight drop) was far too late. It guaranteed they would only reach the first objective.

3. The IG group had had a hard battle and were OK for fuel but were running low on ammo. As the echelon troops were having difficulty reaching them and resupply was not immediately likely, it would be foolish to press on with low ammo.

4. There was no indication that the Son bridge had been blown. A message cascaded down from the RAF command stating the bridge was seen intact by aerial reconnaissance at 15.30. This flight was just prior to its destruction. Had the IG known this it may have made a difference to the plan for the night.

5. To the IG rear, the Germans were far from beaten. The security of the road was still tenuous as the ‘front’, which effectively ran along the road, was too long to man as a ‘line’. This meant that patrols by the 2 Devons were the only means to keep the Germans off the road.

Late in the evening, 2 HCR spoke to a US major on the phone to Son, who told them the bridge had been blown. This meant that the whole of the traffic jams would have to be cleared as a bridging group would need to be brought forward from an engineer park far behind the Escaut canal. Proceeding in the night without them was almost pointless.

 

[panda1gen]

Brigadier Stanier, the commander of 213 Brigade, also ordered 1 Dorset not to advance to Valkenswaard. Without such an advance the town would not be garrisoned so the IG could not move on to Eindhoven. Bredin and Vandeleur, remembering Horrocks’ emphasis on speed, were furious. The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Dorset’s diary noted at 2100, Bn HQ and S Co arrive and are dispersed up a track. It was pitch black and raining, the enemy were all around.

To help keep them off, mortaring commences along the line of the road, but 300 yds east of it.




However, 2 Devons had already suffered the worst casualties so far and the area between Hoek and Valkenswaard was not secure.




At 23.30 a liaison officer brought a personal note from the Brigadier, to the effect that they needed to halt overnight and protect the artillery, 90 Field Regiment (FR), which was in their midst, and then push on first thing in the morning.

 

[panda1gen]

Later on the 17th, Guards Armoured Division (GAD) HQ would order the two Vandeleurs to halt. It was not an Irish Guards decision to halt.




The problems lay mainly with the late H Hour for Garden, that was set as a result of air requirements, not ground. However, by late on 17[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944 XXX Corps were still confident. They had punched right through the crust of the defences as planned.




If SHAEF was correct in its intelligence assessments and planning, there should be little more major resistance on the road to Arnhem...............

 

[panda1gen]

The night of 17/18 September was cold, wet and uncomfortable for the infantry of the Dorsets and Devons. Bredin’s Battalion HQ and 2 companies of 1/Dorsets set out at 0430 hrs to Valkenswaard. 15/19 Hussars lead with A Co riding on their tanks.




C Co followed on in trucks.




By 0630 they had started to establish a strongpoint in Valkenswaard and thus start to relieve the IG of its defence.




By 0710, B and D Cos of 1 Dorsets were summoned forward as well, but traffic jams meant that the IG were not relieved until 0900.

 

[panda1gen]

Having formed a defence of the town, the Dorsets set about patrolling the vicinity. Collaboration with the Dutch Resistance (PAN) was profitable and useful information about German dispositions was sent back to XXX Corps. The Dorsets were ordered to hold Valkenswaard until the adjacent VII and XII Corps flanking offensives made progress. Given the overall supply situation, these two Corps were relatively starved of resources.




The Germans were in trouble, a communication intercept at 0415 hrs read, ‘There is no doubt about it the enemy has broken through’. 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Fallschirmjager Army HQ was reeling from the chaos caused so far, recording feelings of helplessness against such an overwhelming blow.




FJ Regt 6 withdrew westwards until it met with 85[SUP]th[/SUP] Inf Div. General Chill’s 85[SUP]th[/SUP] Div held the western side of the corridor (salient).




Kamfgruppe Walter held the eastern side but were also attempting to bring some order after the initial assault.

 

[29 Let's Go]

What a spectacular series. Lots of thought went into this.

Steve

 

[panda1gen]

What a spectacular series. Lots of thought went into this.

Steve

Thank you. I don't know about thought so much, more overcompensating for insomnia...... Meanwhile .........


Neither the 101[SUP]st[/SUP], nor the IG were, sure how much progress each other had made.

I spy with my little eye..... blinkin' eck, its got black crosses on


The plan was for IG to press on through Eindhoven to Son and the blown bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal. An RE bridging train would follow.

So now they want a bridge again? Wish they would make their blinkin' mind up!


They would link with the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] en route and Eindhoven would be taken.

Where are those limeys? They are going to be late for tea!


A secondary objective was to expand the front using the Welsh Guards (WG), who would fan out and press to the north east. They were to develop more routes and by expanding the width of the corridor, protect the current main axis. The WG had tried to sleep by the side of the road. A trooper wrote that a long line of vehicles was packed two abreast and, ’thank goodness there were no enemy planes and little enemy shelling’.

Now I know how a duck feels

 

[panda1gen]

C Sqn of 2 Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR) was to spearhead the WG with their armoured cars.







Major Herbert’s Sqn of 2 HCR was halted after only 3 miles, near the village of Leende, by the remnants of Roestel’s kampfgruppe




and panzerfaust ambushes.




C Sqn and Cromwells of the WG were busy all morning, but all alternative routes along back roads were either blocked or had very weak bridges over the waterways. The small bridges would just manage to take some light armoured cars and were judged certain to collapse under a Cromwell. The WG were called back to the main route. The corridor was thus denied vital width east, leaving it vulnerable to counter attacks.

 

[villagehorse]

Never ceases to amaze me Kevin, how you can find a building, vehicle or figure to continue the story as a form of illustration. So well done. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Never ceases to amaze me Kevin, how you can find a building, vehicle or figure to continue the story as a form of illustration. So well done. Robin.

Thank you Robin.


On the ‘centre line’ north, B Sqn HCR’s advance was slow due to very poor visibility. At 0530, Lt Tabour’s troop advanced 1.5 miles ahead, through pinewoods then flat, sandy country. About 2 miles on, with visibility around 400yds Corporal Sparrow in the lead scout car saw a Panther and 2 SPG’s in a side turning.




The Panther crew were sitting on the tank so he greeted them with a long burst from his Bren before retiring.





Tabour was ordered to observe until IG tanks arrived. Infantry arrived first but three of the German vehicles, heard not seen, drove out of the side road off to Aalst.
‘The two scout cars were after them like terriers and after another mile or so one of the SPGs was sighted on the outskirts of Aalst’.