Battle for Arnhem.... (5 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

XXX Corps was still advancing essentially up one road on a ‘one tank front’, so Major Wignal, CO of B Squadron 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR), leading up the one main road, ‘Club Route’, ordered his reserve reconnaissance troops to search around Aalst, to find alternative routes to Eindhoven.





The remnants of Regiment von Hoffman were in XXX Corps’ way. The senior surviving officer of Regiment von Hoffman (RVH), Major Kerutt,




had deployed the remnants of his 1[SUP]st[/SUP] and 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalions,




a platoon of quad 20mm AA guns




and 11 75mm AT guns on the southern edge of Aalst.




For defensive depth, elements were posted along Tongelreep stream about a mile to the rear.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Love this thread, Kevin!. A lot of these photos bring back some great memories!:salute::

 

[OzDigger]

Love this thread, Kevin!. A lot of these photos bring back some great memories!:salute::

Yes, almost 12 years Louis. I wonder how long before we see another K & C Glider.

 

[panda1gen]

Love this thread, Kevin!. A lot of these photos bring back some great memories!:salute::

Yes, almost 12 years Louis. I wonder how long before we see another K & C Glider.

Twelve years indeed. Meanwhile......



Major Kerutt reported contact at 1020 hrs, in front of Aalst.




Two hours later he was ‘under attack’. Infantry had lead through the woods to Aalst, so the 2hr delay was in getting the Irish Guards (IG) Sherman tanks to the front of the column to deploy.




Two whole regiments of 25 pdrs supported the IG advance.




Lance-Sergeant Cowan in the lead tank, a Firefly, saw an SPG and reported that he engaged it with 5 rounds, scoring hits but there was no reaction and the “Stable Boy’s” (HCR) armoured cars continued into the village.





The IG entered Aalst with infantry supporting the tanks. The enemy seemed to have melted away until the advance stopped about 1km further along, where an assault gun and ATGs guarded the next water obstacle to the north of Aalst.

 

[panda1gen]

Lt Tabour dismounted some of his men and, as recce troops do, had a closer look.




Whilst they were observing the gun a bike and sidecar pulled up.





He could not resist giving it a long burst from the bren, which annoyed the SPG enough for it to fire 3 rounds of AP at them.





Shortly, the SPG withdrew and Tabour followed it in his scout cars, straight into a carefully baited ambush.

 

[panda1gen]

The HCR scout cars were focused more to the right of the road and the SPG,




when two emplaced guns opened fire from the opposite left side at 200yds.





Sparrow put down smoke and reversed, fortunately the Daimler had been designed with such a reversing manoeuvre in mind. Tabour could not use smoke as he would blind Price, Sparrow’s driver. He fired the Bren at the guns instead. Both scout cars got out despite 7 rounds fired at them. The Irish Guards (IG) tank commanders were grateful for the heads up. They considered a dash like at JOE’s bridge, but unlike at that bridge, they did not have the element of surprise. The AT and MG fire convinced them against as Major Kerutt’s Kampfgruppen and the 10[SUP]th[/SUP] SS PD assault guns appeared to be a higher quality of adversary.

 

[panda1gen]

Col Joe assessed the situation and called in Typhoons, only to be told that none were available due to the fog in southern England and France.




The dug in AT gun positions blocked the main axis of advance, which was essentially a one road front. So for now, the tip of the XXX Corps spear could only shell them whilst trying to find a different route.




This area to the south of Eindhoven should have been cleared on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] by the overstretched 101[SUP]st[/SUP], according to the plan, but the blown Son bridge prevented this.

 

[panda1gen]

Meanwhile Lt Tabour of the 2/HCR was still busy



and later found an OP in the top of a house that gave limited observation of the emplaced AT guns.

Once communications were installed in the OP and the guns positioned, they had several artillery shoots and after another there was a large explosion.




Contributing significantly to the artillery battle was a manager from Philips who had sketched the positions in detail, based on his view from cycling to and from work. This enabled the arty to pinpoint the targets. Subsequent examination proved the accuracy of his drawings.

 

[panda1gen]

Although C Sqdn 2/HCR had failed to find a route to expand to the east, to the west, the Grenadier Guards (GG) started to make slow progress around Eindhoven. Lt Palmer’s armoured troop explored, ‘a maze of small streams spanned by fragile wooden bridges, until, they eventually found a way across the River de Run, and thereafter the route improved’.




A US 101[SUP]st[/SUP] NCO travelled with the HCR in a Humber armoured car and continuously tried to contact 101[SUP]st[/SUP] HQ and update them on progress, or lack of, and steps taken.




They surprised the few Germans they did see, who thought even light armoured cars could not cross the weak bridges, never mind tanks.




At one bridge over a dyke with 6’ banks, 20’ across, Lt Palmer decided it was too weak to risk his tank and radioed his CO. The CO was to the rear of the Sqdn and was under the impression that the cavalry assessed the bridges as suitable for tanks. He gave a clear order to advance, so Lt Palmer went over as quickly as he could. He felt it give a little and looked back to see a central sag and gaps at each end of the bridge. He ordered the next tank to stop but too late, it ended on its side in the river, luckily everyone got out.

Wistful thoughts of Hobart’s Funnies, the 79[SUP]th[/SUP] Armoured Div, and their Churchill bridging tanks may have occurred, but the 79[SUP]th[/SUP] were deployed trying to open the fortified Channel ports. They might have been useful here.

 

[panda1gen]

There were four bridges in the city centre of Eindhoven, crossing a canal and the River Dommel. The 506 PIR of the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] should have taken them on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] according to the plan. Col Sinks men were delayed at the canal when the Son bridge was blown and stopped overnight in Bokt, to the north of Eindhoven. At dawn on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] he emphasised speed was essential in the capture of the bridges, they were to press on with the attack and let Germans filter through the 506[SUP]th[/SUP] for the 502[SUP]nd[/SUP] PIR, the “Ducks” to deal with.

Rear echelon and retreating Germans, given time by the delay at the Son bridge, would form the defence of the town.





Two companies of 3/506 and 2/506 would advance and 1/506 would follow behind. A garrison was left at Son with engineers preparing ground for a British bridge. At 0730 H and I Companies advanced astride the road and G and HQ Co on it. They encountered rifle and MG fire from small groups of infantry and some artillery fire, ‘though the character of the resistance was so weak and irresolute that it had hardly more than nuisance and delaying effect’. However, casualties mounted with officers especially targeted by snipers. H Co, following I Co, ran into a couple of MG emplacements and caught an 88mm being backed into an alley so destroyed it.



3/506 PIR came to a halt in N Eindhoven facing infantry and 2 88’s. Frontal attack would be costly so Sink ordered 3/506 to pin them while 2/506 swung left towards the bridges and centre and while F Co flanked the enemy positions. The Dutch resistance and ordinary members of the public helped 2/PIR’s D and E Cos to finish off the Germans in Eindhoven, chasing rather than fighting them through the town and leaving many of those surrendered to the care of the Dutch.



The Dutch guided F Co to the flank and rear of the enemy positions and a classic surprise attack took 41 prisoners, killing 13, for the cost of 2 wounded paras. The paras were greeted by ‘exuberant Dutch civilians’, in contrast to ‘the dour French’, they had liberated, they recorded. After this victory in the centre, resistance in the south of Eindhoven soon also collapsed.

 

[panda1gen]

At 1230 hrs, led by 2/HCR the Guards entered the city. Lt Tabour of 2/HCR describes impatiently driving through Eindhoven and on at top speed, reaching Son in an hour, where they had to wait and settle down for the night. ‘Stableboys have contacted our feathered friends’, was the radio report.




Information was shared and two sets of engineers were now also talking. The British bridge trains of 14 Field Sqn RE would obviously be delayed, but US engineers were busy preparing abutments at the bridge site.




The IG were next behind 2/HCR and Col J Vandaleur gave the order, ‘All aboard and motor on’, but their way was blocked by the exuberant Dutch civilians.



Nevertheless, JOE Vandaleur soon reached the canal at Son and crossed it in a rowing boat to meet with the paras on the north bank. The 506 PIR and Irish Guards were both optimistic that the bridge would be completed overnight and, having already penetrated 20 miles, they felt that they could push on tomorrow, the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September, as there were no counter attacks reported on the next 10 miles held by the 101[SUP]st[/SUP].


XXX Corps shared this view; however, there was very little information from 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne at Arnhem, which was becoming a concern.



Meanwhile the Germans had been given valuable time with the Son bridge blown to plan for their own attacks.




The HCR reached Son by 14.00 hrs. It would take time for the British Engineers to fight their way through the traffic jams, but with thanks to the US engineers and the use of the Dutch telephone network, 14 Sqdn Royal Engineers (RE) began building a Bailey Bridge on the US Engineer's prepared abutments by the 80’ or so wide canal. As predicted by Lt Col Jones, CO of Guards Armoured Division Engineers, a 100’ class 40 Bailey bridge was completed in less than 10 hours and was ready at 0600 hrs on the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944.

 

[panda1gen]

Before I deal with XXX Corps on the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September, I shall highlight some other parts of this complex campaign starting on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944.

1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne had not been dealt ‘a particularly good hand’ in the planning by 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne Army.

1. Proximity to some Ruhr flak and the fighter airfield at Deelen north of Arnhem, meant drop zones to the east of Arnhem could not be safely used.






2. The RAF had insufficient transport aircraft so the risk to the transports was high in the planning essentials.

3. They were allocated DZs west of Arnhem. The wooded country to the west meant DZs in open ground several miles from the three targeted bridges – the road, rail and pontoon bridges.

4. The lack of transports, including those borrowed from the USAF, meant that the British Division needed three lifts, even though it was smaller than the US para division equivalents.

 

[panda1gen]

1. On the first day the lift was:

a. The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Para Brigade (roughly equivalent to a US PIR), consisting of 1, 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions, by parachute to Renkum Heath with orders to march on three routes close to the river and seize the Arnhem Bridges.






b. The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airlanding Brigade was dropped by glider at Reijerskamp with orders to secure follow up DZs and LZs and secure resupply DZ at Lichtenbeek. It consisted of 1 Battalion the Border Regt, 2 Battalion South Staffs and 7 Kings Own Scottish Borderers.






c. Divisional HQ, Div Arty and Divisional troops were landed by glider at Heelsum. This included 1[SUP]st[/SUP] AB Recce Sqn and their jeeps.

 

[panda1gen]

1. The plan for the second day (10.00 18 Sept 1944) was to parachute 4 Para BDE (10, 11 and 156 Para Bats) at S Ginkel with orders to move to Lichtenbeek and secure the NE perimeter of the town. The balance of the first lift would be taken to their respective DZ/LZs.





2. On the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Day (0930 19 Sept) 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Polish Para BDE would land in two parts, by parachute south of the road bridge to link with 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Para BDE on the bridge and glider elements would land north of the Rhine at Joanna Hoeve to strengthen anti tank defences.






3. XXX Corps were due to link up during 19 Sept.

 

[panda1gen]

To continue this brief summary, all drops on 17 Sept were successful, in good weather, with casualties lighter than on exercise. Enclosed is a map of the 1st Airborne DZ/LZ and SDZs.





1. However, some sources report that a crashed Waco glider near Student’s HQ, from the Officers mess 1st Airborne Army, gave the Germans the complete Market Garden plan, taken from a dead US Officer’s briefcase.

Or was it a British officer, or was there was a Dutch traitor in the underground, or was it a spy in Ike’s HQ (who used the story of the crashed glider to preserve his cover). It is hard to say when ‘truth is the first casualty of war’. What is undoubtedly true however is that the strategic surprise of parachute drops quickly turns into a tactical problem for those airborne troops who are relatively lightly equipped and almost immobile.

The paras were especially vulnerable to armoured counter attack.


The Germans tried similar airborne assaults in 1940, moving in the opposite direction. They were successful in a surprise attack on a neutral nation, but at a cost at some locations, e.g. Nijmegen.

German Fallschirmjager in 1940.


What is certain in 1944 is that the reports of the airborne landings were rapidly interpreted by competent, experienced commanders such as Student (a parachute General) Bittrich and Model (‘the Fuhrer’s Fireman’) as exactly what they were – an attempt to cross the formidable Dutch water obstacles by capturing successive bridges to the North German Plain. Reaction was therefore swift.

German commanders plan the reaction.

German forces get their orders

 

[panda1gen]

2. The Zon and Best bridges were blown, needing nearly 2 days to make Zon passable for tanks.

3. At Best, Pte Joe S Mann (502 PIR) earned the Congressional Medal of Honor.

His citation reads: He distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. On 18 September 1944, in the vicinity of Best., Holland, his platoon, attempting to seize the bridge across the Wilhelmina Canal, was surrounded and isolated by an enemy force greatly superior in personnel and firepower. Acting as lead scout, Pfc. Mann boldly crept to within rocket-launcher range of an enemy artillery position and, in the face of heavy enemy fire, destroyed an 88mm. gun and an ammunition dump. Completely disregarding the great danger involved, he remained in his exposed position, and, with his M-1 rifle, killed the enemy one by one until he was wounded 4 times. Taken to a covered position, he insisted on returning to a forward position to stand guard during the night. On the following morning the enemy launched a concerted attack and advanced to within a few yards of the position, throwing hand grenades as they approached. One of these landed within a few feet of Pfc. Mann. Unable to raise his arms, which were bandaged to his body, he yelled "grenade" and threw his body over the grenade, and as it exploded, died. His outstanding gallantry above and beyond the call of duty and his magnificent conduct were an everlasting inspiration to his comrades for whom he gave his life.

4. Veghel and St Odenrode bridges are taken intact.

5. At Grave, E Co 504 PIR land almost on the bridge and take it.

6. Road/Rail bridges over Maas/Waal Canal are blown or impassable for tanks, but elements of 504 and 508 PIR take a small bridge at Heumen near Groesbeek.

7. The main bridges over the Waal, ultimate objective of the 82[SUP]nd[/SUP] AB remain firmly held by the Germans.

Map of NW Europe and Market Garden.

US troops just prior to the drops.

 

[panda1gen]

8. In Arnhem, 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion Parachute Regiment (2 Para) and the HQ of 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Parachute Brigade take the northern end of Arnhem Bridge ramp by 2030 hrs. They try to take the southern end but are repulsed.

View attachment 252070 2 Para take the north end of Arnhem bridge

2 Para are repulsed when they try to take the southern end


9. C Company of 2 Para peels off to assault the rail bridge en route to the road bridge, but it was blown by the Germans. As C Co move into the town to link with the rest of 2 Para, it is destroyed by armour belonging to advance elements of 9 and 10 SS PZ Divisions.

C Co 2 Para try to assault the rail bridge

9 SS Pz recon battalion effectively destroy C Co

 

[panda1gen]

10. 1 and 3 Para Battalions start to move off their DZs but are blocked by rapid deployment of an SS training Battalion at Wolfheze.







As well as holding up 1 and 3 Para, they destroy all the Recce Sqn vehicles that had managed to land and tried to push to the bridge.




11. 1 Air Landing BDE (1 AL BDE) deploys to its tasks.




12. Airborne radio links fail, only artillery nets and the Phantom links remain available.

13. In the UK the good weather starts to deteriorate.

 

[panda1gen]

14. In Apeldoorn, where they are refitting after Normandy, 9 SS Pz Div has enough equipment to move.

Sdkfz 251/3 command vehicle

In the Doetinghem area 10 SS Pz Div is also able to move.

Protze light truck, 75mm towed infantry gun and panzer grenadiers


Although they had barely 20 tanks between them at this point, both 9th and 10th SS PZ Divs had relatively intact reconnaissance battalions.

Lynx recon tank

The 9[SUP]th[/SUP] and 10[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Pz Divs could muster around 150 light armoured vehicles and half tracks, feeble against an Allied tank division but potentially potent against immobile, lightly armed partial parachute division.

The Ruhr factories are only 70 miles or so away, so unlike the paratroopers, they can be easily reinforced as priority is gained.

Pz Grenadiers

Their sdkfz 251/1 half track

 

[villagehorse]

Your running commentary is intriguing Kevin. The visual aspect just makes it that much better. Robin.