Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

Another terrific post, Kevin!:salute:: It was great seeing you!

It was fantastic to catch up, thanks.

Meanwhile, these may have been like the aircraft providing the air cover over Holland ......

 

[panda1gen]

As Company C moved into the town they suffered more casualties as resistance stiffened, although the bridges were relatively unguarded.




The Dutch Underground joined in, with numbers swelled by any brave Dutchman that could find a captured weapon. They were of most use to the paratroops as guides, or for their information gathering however. For example, several Dutch people lead some paratroops to a kitchen and pointed at the door to the cellar. Three German NCOs from a finance unit (due to pay the troops in the area tomorrow), were invited up and relieved of their pistols.




Around 5pm the town square filled up and the mayor reclaimed his chain of office, but the fighting was not yet over. The town was secured by 8pm after several running engagements that damaged the monastery and other parts of the town.






To the east, Company B’s target was now a road bridge, not footbridge. Although it was clearly visible on aerial photographs taken in September, it was still marked on the planners maps as a footbridge. Company B crossed the bridge and took up blocking positions in eastern part of the town.




Meanwhile captured supplies of German alcohol meant quite a few civilians were ill that night!

 

[panda1gen]

Monday 18[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944

Enemy paratroopers from the s’Hertogenbosch training regiment attacked early on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP], easily able to slip through the four mile gap between the 502 units at Best and St Oedenrode and attack 1/502 from ‘behind’.




Co A counter attacked, overpowering the less numerous and partly trained Germans, taking a mortar position and a number of prisoners, but it was soon apparent that there were considerable numbers of Germans to the north.

A group of staff officers from 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Allied Airborne HQ appeared at a Co C roadblock, along with two jeep loads of paratroops from the Divisional Reconnaissance Platoon.




They were advised that Germans were up the road towards Schijndel, an Army Air Corps major replied that he could read a map. Rather than follow Hell’s Highway to Veghel, the seven jeeps took the road to Schijndel, bumping into the enemy after a mile.

A machine gunner fired a burst, another gunner was on the other side of the road.




PFC Wysocki was in the second jeep,

‘We couldn’t stop so we proceeded on ahead to get out of the range of the machine guns. As we did this we came into this little town. To our surprise, it was filled with Germans. The road lead to a circular roundabout so we went to the right and hoped to circle around and come right back. We thought we were part of a western the way we were going through and shooting up the town – loaded as it was with Germans.’

The Colonel’s jeep managed to escape and summoned help. The rest were forced off the road and the men took cover in drainage ditches.




Two squads of 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Platoon, Co C, were sent to rescue them. Pvt Flanagan was in the leading group,

‘An MG42 cut loose. I let them have a full clip of M1 ball and ducked down into the ditch just in time as another MG42 mowed the bushes that I had been behind. About this time I heard the pum pum pump of someone stuffing a mortar in an expert manner. I had previously learned to pay attention to little things like that. The first hit about 100 yards to my left, number 2 about 75 yards..... number 4 hit about 25 yards away and I knew the next one was going to be close so I coiled up in a ball on the side of the ditch. I didn’t hear it explode. I was booted up in the air several feet. Everything in slow motion until I started down and I bounced when I hit the asphalt.’

2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Platoon were able to give sufficient covering fire to enable several jeep loads to remount and come back, despite the enemy fire, but the remainder, mostly wounded were taken prisoner.




So many Germans so close was a worrying development.

 

[panda1gen]

The Road to Schijndel, Tuesday 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September

Guards Armoured, complete with donated orange flags, arrived .......






....... but the 1/502’s elation was tempered by a warning from the Underground of an attack from Schijndel. Larson’s platoon was dispatched as a fighting patrol up the road. A German outpost line was forced back by fire, but the 502[SUP]nd[/SUP] were soon stopped by an estimated reinforced company. They took cover in the ditches, but were unable to win a second fire fight. Another Co C platoon was dispatched to help extricate them.




Making use of their numerical advantage, the Germans advanced and tried to outflank the withdrawing Americans.




All of Co C was now drawn into the fight.

‘Watching from his battalion CP Colonel Cassidy saw that the company was hard pressed. Suddenly he remembered a tank that had come limping into the town that morning with the Irish Guards column. Unable to go more than 5 mph it had dropped out of line and stopped in front of the battalion CP.’

The Sherman was left with only its commander and driver.




Lance Sergeant James (Paddy) McCrory was very willing to help but needed some help in making up the crew. He took the gunners seat and Sgt Nickrent and Pvt O’Brien from HQ 1/502 joined the two of them as the tank roared forward – at 5 mph. They spotted 3 vehicle mounted 20mm guns engaging Co C from the flank. McCrory slid down into the gunner’s seat and, loading himself, dispatched all three.

“The timing could not have been more opportune. It came just as C’s whole line was getting its heaviest deluge of 88, 20mm and mortar fire in the middle of an enemy assault. The destruction of the enemy battery stifled the enemy offensive and for a few minutes, the action remained in the balance. McCrory went on up the road towards Schijndel. Sergeant Nickrent, again on the outside, saw what looked like another camouflaged gun position and he yelled until he got McCrory searched for about ten seconds, then cut loose and destroyed the gun with two rounds. The tank limped on.”

His second victim was an ammo truck that produced superb pyrotechnics. However, the fire that they attracted forced Nickrent to take cover behind the Sherman’s bulk, then into a ditch. Three Germans were already in there and promptly surrendered. Others soon jumped in and surrendered with them. Company C and ‘their tank’ pushed the Germans back about 500m.

A troop of Guards’ tanks arrived and the gains were consolidated, collecting 53 prisoners and 33 German bodies in the process, but Lt Col Cassidy had no wish to become embroiled in a close quarter battle with a strong German force.

 

[panda1gen]

The two Irish Guardsmen, Paddy McCrory and his forgotten driver, were warmly thanked and invited to be honorary members of 1/502 PIR. Sergeant Paddy McCrory also provided the battalion with a pithy, unofficial motto,

‘When in doubt, lash out’.




Dutch civilians provided help and information to the 501 PIR (‘The Geronimos’), including that Veghel was pronounced as Feghel. Veghel was the furthest 101st objective from the XXX Corps start-line, but it was also of particular importance, as 501 PIR needed to seize

‘the four rail and highway bridges over the Aa River and the Zuid Willems Vart Canal‘.

The bridges lay across the two water features, on either side of the town, leaving it as the ‘meat in the sandwich’ between them. Should the Germans hold a single crossing or the town, then the 101st would have considerable difficulty in opening the route north to Nijmegen.

During the planning process, Lt Col Kinnard considered that it would be advantageous to drop a battalion between the Canal and his second objectives on the River Aa, as any delay in taking the Canal bridges would give the Germans time to man their defences or blow the bridges. The airforce agreed as the flak assessment was favourable.

Lt Col Kinnard allocated the targets:

Company A to the railway bridge over the canal.

Company C to the rail bridge across the Aa,


Company B had furthest to go, to the road bridge across the river Aa.





Kincaid also stressed that his troopers, less a platoon from each company allocated to specific bridges, should head to the nearest bridge.

Also jumping with 2 and 3/501 PIR on DZ A were two platoons of 326 Engineers. They had orders to disarming any demolition charges on the bridges and they were to build an extra bridge alongside the single-track Canal Bridge. This would eliminate a potential choke point on XXX Corp’s route north.




It was expected that 501 PIR would not have to fight on its own for very long, as XXX Corps ordered,

‘A Regimental Group of 8 Armoured Brigade will advance to area VEGHEL and there come under operational command of 501 RCT, with a view to helping to clear 30 Corps’ main axis of advance into VEGHEL area.’

XXX Corps expected these reinforcements would arrive close on the heels of Guards Armoured Division, as early as midday on 18 September. However, due to the blowing of the Son Bridge, they did not arrive until 19 September.

XXX Corps’ Movement Order stated:

‘35 VTM [vehicles to the mile] at 10 MPH. There will be NO movement on the main axis during the hours of darkness. … Groups leaguering for the night will probably have to do so on the main road owing to the nature of the ground. No lights will be allowed on the main axis or in its immediate vicinity. Rear-ward traffic on the main axis of advance will be kept to the barest minimum for at least the first 48 hours.’



However, as the situation deteriorated, the XXX Corps ban on night movement was generally ignored.




XXX Corps suffered tremendous congestion.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden

Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders


2 and 3/501st were the leading elements of 101st Airborne Division on Sunday 17 September 1944. The two battalions successfully dropped in tight groups at 13.06 hours, on DZ A. This had been clearly marked by the Regiment’s pathfinders who had preceded them.

Corporal Beyer described the landing.

‘Landing unopposed. Terrain flat and sandy with frequent patches of pine trees. Civilians much in evidence, cordial. Dropped about one mile west of designated DZ Light injuries sustained on jump.’

With Company D in the lead, 2/501 secured the Willemsuaart Canal Road Bridge by 14.30 hours and 3/501 PIR captured the Railway Bridge.




Official accounts describe the initial stages of operation as ‘unopposed’, although Private Cartledge recalled that a German motorcyclist appeared on the road bridge:


‘The fool had stopped and jumped off his motorbike with his machine pistol and was going to win the battle of the bridge by himself.’





In addition to the motorcyclist, several other German vehicles were shot up or captured. As the battalions advanced, a roadblock was established on the Veghel – St Oedenrode road and Eerde was also occupied by elements of 3/501 PIR.

Corporal Flanagan was dispatched to the roadblock, where he found:

‘… two GIs in a foxhole beside the road with a bazooka and they yelled, “Get off the road there’s a tank coming!”

… “It’s OK, it’s a Limey tank!”

… wearing American uniform, I walked out on the highway and sure enough this tank came barrelling down the highway towards me - a medium tank.’

This tank was probably from the same troop that had requested that Allied fighter bombers knock out the two Mark IVs on the outskirts of St Oedenrode, some two miles south.




But, Corporal Flanagan continued:

‘The tank commander was standing up in the turret and waving his hand. I immediately started to think, what word should I greet him with but I am listening to a little voice in my mind - that’s a funny colour for a Limey tank.

They paint theirs OD, like ours and about that time, I realized I was looking at the black German cross painted on the front. The guy who waved at me had a Luger in his hand …

I had my M1 rifle under my right arm and I crouched in the middle of the road and brought it up like a Kentucky squirrel hunter trying to snap off a shot before he did. He shot first and I heard the snap of his round past my left ear. I shot from the hip and he threw up his hands and went down the turret. To this day I don’t know if I shot him through the navel or missed him by ten yards.’


The tank thundered on towards the bridge. The paratroopers at the roadblock attempted to engage, but surprised by its arrival, the bazooka men failed to arm the warhead.



At the bridge, HQ 501 PIR also made a mistake in identifying the tank. Colonel Johnson and his staff were engaged by machine-gun fire and:

‘… ended up dangling from the bridge supports while the tank roared across the town. It went clear down the twisting street, came out in the main section of the town where priests were passing out beer and pretzels and people were dancing in the street and made a right turn, being pursued by a pathfinder sergeant who was [forlornly] shooting a .45 pistol into the motor in an attempt to disable it’.

The tank made good its escape.

 

[panda1gen]

The bazooka could fire a rocket carrying an effective anti-tank grenade to about 300 yards.

However, crews needed to be well-trained on how to handle it as, although it was a simple-looking weapon, the bazooka was in fact complex to operate. For example, the weapon fired electrically, so crews had to ensure there were no broken wires, drained batteries or a dirty trigger mechanism.

 

[panda1gen]

1/501 PIR flew aboard the first forty aircraft of the stream heading for DZ A1.




As they crossed the Belgian coast they unfortunately lost their pathfinders to anti-aircraft fire, so there was some divergence from the main body as they approached DZ A1.

Sergeant George Koskimaki:

‘The lead plane had to depend on the skill of it’s pilot and navigator to determine the locations of the fields in which to drop the 600-man battalion. They missed!’

When Lt Col Kinnard jumped from his C-47 at 13.01 hours, the expected landmarks of Veghel and the railway line were out of sight throughout his seven-hundred feet drop. He realized that,

‘It’s the wrong field again’.




On landing, as they were unable to identify their position, the Battalion’s Intelligence Section dispatched Private Batts to find out where they were.



They were three and a half miles north-west of their intended DZ, near the village of Kameren.

Despite this, the battalion was dropped in a tight pattern, so by using orange smoke grenades and waving red battalion ID flags, the battalion assembled quickly and was soon ready to move off. There were ‘the usual’ jump casualties, not all of whom could be mobilised.

Staff Sergeant White recalled,

‘I hurt my ankle very bad on the jump but I hobbled around fairly well. On the march from the DZ to Veghel, a Dutch family gave me a bicycle to ride’.

The battalion had no transport, so eight men who were too badly injured to be moved were left behind with the doctor, in Heeswijk Castle. This was located on the eastern edge of their DZ and was guarded by some Headquarter Company soldiers under the command of Captain Burd.

Burd’s group expected to find transport, so that once fractures were stabilised they could move everyone, including these injured men, to Veghel. However, assisted by a friendly population and currently comfortable in their castle, there seemed to be no immediate hurry to move.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden

Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders

Meanwhile, most of 1/501 PIR quickly moved the three and a half miles to Veghel. As they entered Veghel they met 2/501 PIR coming from the opposite direction and together they quickly cleared the town (taking fifty prisoners).




They received an enthusiastic welcome from the liberated Dutch population, but this welcome hampered them from taking up better defensive positions. This delay in organizing Veghel’s defence would create problems later.

News also reached Kinnard that, shortly after they had left their wounded with the Headquarter Company in Castle Heeswijk, Germans had arrived. The unexpected attack forced that group to retreat to a large stone building.




These Germans were the leading elements of a ‘March battalion’ arriving from s’Hertogenbosch.






According to the divisional history, Colonel Kinnard:

‘… at once asked for permission to send a company in relief. The Regimental CO, Colonel Johnson, did not feel that a company could be spared from the mission; the defence of Veghel, and would agree to nothing larger than a platoon.’

Lieutenant Rafferty was to command the designated platoon. They were duly dispatched, but were stopped eight hundred yards short of the ancient castle by German fire and forced to dig-in.

 

[panda1gen]

Constraints on transport capacity and his need to cover a very large area meant General Taylor was forced to choose to leave some elements out of the initial landing.

Senior Allied commanders before the operation.





He opted to land 146 jeeps with his 6,641 paratroops, at the expense of their heavy support weapons.

The calculation was that jeeps such as these would add vital mobility and speed of capture of the many bridges.

None of the integral artillery battalions landed with the rest of the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] (Screaming Eagles). Despite the mobility advantages inherent in this decision, its adverse effects were keenly felt at Veghel.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders

The Defence of Veghel – Night Sunday 17/Monday 18 September 1944

By sunset on Sunday 17 September, 1/501 PIR held the two Aa Bridges




and 2/501 PIR the canal bridges.




3/501 PIR was concentrated around Eerde.




XXX Corps were behind schedule after Son Bridge was blown.

 

[panda1gen]

An aside:

As discussed above, the only artillery support the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] could currently call on was from their 81mm mortars (which had limited ammunition after the first drop).

Ref: Wikipedia

The M1 mortar is an American 81 millimetre calibre weapon based on the French Brandt mortar. The M1 mortar was used before WW2 and served to the 1950s when it was replaced by the lighter and longer ranged M29 mortar.

Weight:

• Tube 44.5 lb (20 kg)
  
• Mount 46.5 lb (21 kg)
• Base plate 45 lb (20 kg)
  • Total 136 pounds (62 kg)
    

Ammunition

M43A1 Light HE: 6.87 lb (3.11 kg); range min 200 yd (183 m); range max 3290 yd (3010 m); 80% fragmentation radius 25 yd (23 m) (compared favourably with the 75 mm howitzer). M53 Short Delay fuse (explode on surface).

M43A1 Light Training An empty version of the M43A1 Light HE with an inert fuse. It was used as a training shell until it was replaced by the M68 Training Practice shell.

M45 Heavy HE: 10.62 lb (4.82 kg); range max 2558 yd (2064 m); bursting radius comparable to the 105 mm howitzer. Equipped with a delay fuse so some penetration is possible for demolition use.

M56 Heavy HE: 15.01 lb (6.81 kg); range max 1300 yards (1200 m). Early shells used the M53 fuse, but it was replaced by the M77 Timed Super Quick (TSQ) fuse.

M57 WP White Phosphorus) "Bursting Smoke": 10.74 lb (4.87 kg); range max 2470 yd (2260 m); designed to lay down screening smoke, but had definite anti-personnel and incendiary applications.

M57 FS (a solution of Sulphur trioxide in Chlorosulphonic acid) Chemical Smoke: 10.74 lb (4.87 kg), range max 2470 yd (2260 m); laid down dense white fog consisting of small droplets of hydrochloric and sulphuric acids. In moderate concentrations, it is highly irritating to the eyes, nose, and skin.

M68 Training Practice: 9.50 lb to 10.10 lb. An inert teardrop-shaped cast iron shell without provision for a fuze well that was used to simulate the M43 Light HE shell. The casing on early models was painted black but post-World War 2 versions are painted blue. It came in 9 different weights (engraved on the shell) to allow it to simulate shell firing with and without booster charges. Weight Zone One (9.5 lbs.) simulated a shell with the maximum of 8 booster charges and Weight Zone Nine (10.10 lbs.) simulated the shell being fired without booster charges.

M301 Illuminating shell: range max 2200 yd (2012 m); attached to parachute; burned brightly (275,000 candelas) for about 60 seconds, illuminating an area of about 150 yards (137 m) diameter. It used the M84 time fuse, which was adjustable from 5 to 25 seconds before priming charge detonated, releasing the illuminator and chute.




Fuses

The M1 Mortar's shells sometimes used the same fuses as the shells for the M2 60 mm mortar. An adapter collar was added to the smaller fuses to allow them to fit the larger shells.

M43 Mechanical Timing (MT) Fuse: Clockwork timed delay fuse. Models M43A5.

M45 Point Detonating (PD) Fuse: Selective fuse that could be set for time delay or super-quick (less than a second) detonation on impact. Replaced by the M52 and M53 fuses.

M48 Point Detonating (PD) Fuse: Selective Powder Train burning fuse that can be set to Super Quick or Delay ignition on impact. The factory pre-set delay time was stamped on the shell body. If the Super-Quick flash ignition failed, the Delay fuse kicked in. If set on Delay, the Super Quick flash ignition mechanism was immobilized to prevent premature ignition. Models: M48, M48A1, M48A2 (either 0.05 or 0.15 second Delay), & M48A3 (0.05 second delay).

M51 Point Detonating (PD) Fuse: Selective Powder Train burning fuse that can be set to Super Quick or Delay ignition after impact. It is a modification of the M48 fuse with the addition of a booster charge. Models: M51A4, M51A5 (M48A3 Fuse with M21A4 booster).

M52 Point Detonating Super-Quick (PDSQ) Fuse: Super-Quick fuse that activates less than a second after impact. The pre-war M52 was made of aluminium, the M52B1 model was made of Bakelite and the M52B2 model had a Bakelite body and an aluminium head; the suffix would be added to the shell designation.

M53 Point Detonating Delay (PDD) Fuse: Delay fuse that activates after impact.

M54 Time and Super-Quick (TSQ) Fuse: Powder Train burning fuse that can be set for time delay (slow burn) or super-quick (flash ignition) detonation on impact.

M77 Time and Super Quick (TSQ) Fuse: Powder Train burning fuse that can be set for time delay (slow burn) or super-quick (flash ignition) detonation on impact.

M78 Concrete Penetrating (CP) Fuse: Delay fuse that was set off after the shell had impacted and buried itself to increase the damage done.

M84 Mechanical Timing (MT) Fuse: Clockwork fuse that can be set from 0 to 25 seconds in 1-second intervals; seconds were indicated by vertical lines and 5-second intervals were indicated by metal bosses to allow it to be set in low-light or night-time conditions.

M84A1 Mechanical Timing (MT) Fuse: Clockwork fuse that can be set from 0 to 50 seconds in 2-second intervals.

 

[panda1gen]

To continue this short aside:

By way of comparison, although called the '3-inch mortar' by the British Army, its calibre was actually 3.209 in (81.5 mm). The ML 3-inch mortar was in service throughout WW2, with British and Commonwealth troops.

The original version lacked the range of its wartime contemporaries, so Stokes' basic design was changed to "Ordnance, ML Mortar, 3" Mk II. It had an operating weight of 112 pounds, fired 10-pound shells at 1,600 yards at a muzzle velocity of 650 feet per second, and required at least three specially trained personnel to operate.

The 8 cm Granatwerfer 34 (8 cm GrW 34) was the standard German infantry mortar throughout WW2 and was at least comparable in performance to the allied versions.




After early British operational experience against the German mortars, the ML 3-inch mortar range was improved. German mortars had a range of 2,600 yards, while the British Model Mk II could only reach 1,600 yards under ideal conditions - a 60% difference.

British engineers worked to improve the Mk II's design, with an extended barrel and a new projectile with increased load, giving it longer range (up to 2,800 yards). As the war progressed, the British 3" mortar was further modified with a new aiming system and a revised base plate. Another improvement was a reduction of the minimum range, to 125 yards if needed. This short-range capability could prove useful for close support against advancing enemy forces.

By 1944 the British 3-inch mortar proved to be a reliable and robust weapon system, without the limitations of the original production model. When fine tuned with sighting equipment and ammunition it was accurate and could fire standard high-explosive (HE) projectiles, smoke and flares.

It had a simple design with three main components:
- launch tube
- base plate
- bipod

It weighed 126 pounds, so when the weapon was disassembled for transport, it required at least three people tasked with transporting a major component each, plus others to carry ammunition.

Typically, when available, the British Army used their fast, nimble, fully tracked "universal carriers” (Bren carriers in common parlance) to transport heavy infantry weapons and their crews, including 3 inch mortars and Vickers medium machine guns.

The ubiquitous 'Bren Carrier'

Bren carrier with Vickers 303 medium MG

The 3 inch mortar was not designed to fire from the vehicle itself, it had to be unloaded and set up on the ground. However, this method of rapid cross country transport allowed mortar teams to reach designated areas quickly and already equipped with their ammunition supplies.

Given enough time, the crew would dig a mortar pit, providing the crew with basic protection from enemy fire. As long as the ammunition supply was maintained, the mortar team could deliver a steady rate of fire.

As an "indirect fire" weapon, the mortar is designed to strike an area and its high-explosive projectiles are very useful against enemy personnel concentrations. Smoke grenades can be used to cover friendly tactical operations, while flares are used to mark enemy positions in low light conditions.

The standard British Infantry Battalion would have six 3in mortars, which could each fire up to twelve rounds per minute and cover an area with a barrage at least comparable to a troop of 25pdr guns, although at a much shorter range of 2,500 to 2,700 yards.

A more portable form was also developed for use by paratroopers, some of which were used in tropical and mountainous environments in the Far East, where British and Commonwealth troops fought the Imperial Japanese.

For paratroops, the 3-inch mortar would be dropped in three main sections - the barrel, bipod and the base plate - each in a hardened container. There would also be containers for the ammunition.

A first Arnhem series K&C 3in mortar

A later K&C Arnhem version

 

[panda1gen]

To return to the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] action, the 501st PIR at Eerde and Veghel was faced by a strong German attacking force. The Germans attacked from the West sending in troops from the Schijndel area. The fighting force (Kampfgruppe) consisted of regular infantry,




Luftwaffe troops,




and troops from the elite Fallschirmjäger Regiment 6, which had fought XXX-corps at Neerpelt two days earlier.

 

[panda1gen]

The 501st was pushed out of Eerde .....




...... and they set up defensive lines at Veghel.





In the evening of the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944, the sky above Eindhoven was lit by flares.





Aircraft were heard although it wasn’t allied planes flying in paratroops, but German bombers.

A rare wooden K&C Heinkel 111.





The Luftwaffe had been ordered to disrupt the XXX Corps corridor of advance by bombing the narrow streets in the city of Eindhoven.


The town was badly damaged and roads were blocked. Over 230 civilians were killed during the bombing raid and hundreds more were injured (see earlier posts on the initial XXX Corps advance and 101[SUP]st[/SUP] link up).


British troops pass a bombed out building in Eindhoven ....

 

[panda1gen]

The German armies in the west had been severely mauled since D-Day and the battles for Normandy. Therefore the retreating German armies faced numerous challenges, for example:

Infantry were tired as they had to march by foot in retreat ........





There were wounded to tend to .......





Tanks needed maintenance or repair ......







They all needed feeding .......





Nevertheless, even whilst fighting rearguards, the Germans were still able to organise and mount frequent, vigorous counter-attacks.

 

[Grey Heron]

Thank you once again. Such a gritty story.

 

[panda1gen]

Jungwirth’s Fallschirmjaeger Training Replacement Regiment arrived from s’Hertogenbosch by midnight ......




...... but only after a series of attacks did the Americans fully appreciated the enemy’s strength.




Company E held the north-west sector of Veghel, however it had been unable to properly co-ordinate its positions and fields of fire or register its defensive mortar fire tasks before dark.




The Germans launched an attack at 02.00 hours, assisted in their approach by an early autumn mist that settled in the Aa valley. Approximately 300 Fallschirmjäger advanced astride the canal and after a brisk fight, they pushed back Company E’s outposts, sited around a large warehouse building on the canal bank, three hundred meters to the west. Just to their left were the outposts of Company D.




Private Cavaluzzo recalls:

‘I was on outpost duty … Company E was engaged in close-in fighting to our right. This had us sweating because we feared getting cut off from our MLR [Main Line of Resistance]. It actually sounded as though the Krauts had gotten behind us.’




The German attack was solely along the line of the canal so the outposts fell back on the MLR to the west of the Railway Bridge, where Lieutenant MacGregor’s platoon was dug-in.

 

[panda1gen]

The citation for Lieutenant MacGregor’s posthumous Silver Star reads:

‘… the overwhelming superiority of the enemy greatly taxed the strength of his platoon and Lt MacGregor was ordered to withdraw his men. Realizing that a critical situation had developed and that rapid withdrawal was imperative, Lt MacGregor remained at the centre of the road junction fully exposed to enemy fire, and directed the movement of his confused forces.

Desperately shouting orders to his men, he held back the onrushing enemy by firing his sub-machine gun from his exposed position, killing several of the enemy. This afforded his men sufficient time to effect an orderly withdrawal.

Although seriously wounded, he remained to direct his troops until the position was overrun and he became, temporarily, a prisoner. He was rescued the following day by counter-attacking, friendly forces …’

Lieutenant MacGregor subsequently died of his wounds.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden


Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
20 September 1944:

Lt Colonel Harry Kinnard commanded the 1st Battalion of the 501[SUP]st[/SUP] and ordered deployment of his troops as follows:





Company C of 1st Battalion 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment were sent to the castle at Heeswijk to see if the wounded troops that had been left behind were still there. In the event, no one was found. Company C was then ordered to dig in......





.....while Companies A and B attacked westward from Veghel towards Heeswijk.





Company C acted as a ‘dustpan’ while the attackers acted as a ‘broom’, sweeping and clearing the German paratroops caught between the Aa river and Zuid-Willemsvaart canal.




The attack was successful, a lot of ground was gained and 1st Battalion captured over 400 enemy troops.





Meanwhile, 2nd Battalion remained in Veghel, whilst 3rd Battalion moved back into Eerde again.