The 101[SUP]st[/SUP] were now again under attack by 107th Panzer Brigade tanks,
but they did not attack in full force, but rather shot from a distance at the column trying to move up north. A recon A/C spots targets ....
This was a successful tactic which enabled them to destroy and damage numerous vehicles. The Guards column was a juicy target ......
The enemy tanks at Son eventually pulled back, but the fighting all along the corridor continued throughout the day.....
The Rail Bridge was recaptured and the initial attack was beaten off. However, two more major and several minor attacks on other parts of the western perimeter were mounted by the Germans during the night. The German pressure was considerable on the 101st troops ......
Certainly a delicate balance trying to move forward and at the same time protecting the ever growing supply line from marauding German probes. The story continues. Robin.
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
Company E bore the brunt of the fighting and lost seven killed and twenty-six wounded before further 101[SUP]st[/SUP] counter-attacks drove the Germans back at dawn.
3/501 PIR, based at Eerde, was also attacked.
Pastor (Padre) Willi Schiffer accompanied a force of young Fallschirmjägers, a battalion of Jungwirth Training Replacement Regiment. He recorded:
‘The heavy-weapons companies were held back ...
.... while the light infantry companies walked straight into the machine gun fire of the Americans who were hiding in the station. In a bitter man to man fight, the Americans were driven away and went on along the railway track.
Supported by flak guns brought up from s’Hertogenbosch, we finally collected enough troops to attack the railway bridge in front of Veghel, which we took in the afternoon.
Shortly afterwards, to our complete consternation, we received orders to withdraw! What had happened? The Battalion HQ and HQ Company, which had remained in Schijndel, had been attacked by armoured cars [2/HCR], operating singly, from the direction of St Oedenrode, and they were afraid that an attack would follow into our flank.
Their fears were groundless, as it was several days before larger units could be brought forward by both sides, and the real battle began. But the very next day, a Regiment of our 59th Infantry Division had to retrace our path and were wiped out.’
Pastor (Padre) Willi Schiffer
Shortly afterwards, to our complete consternation, we received orders to withdraw! What had happened? The Battalion HQ and HQ Company, which had remained in Schijndel, had been attacked by armoured cars [2/HCR], operating singly, from the direction of St Oedenrode, and they were afraid that an attack would follow into our flank.
Their fears were groundless, as it was several days before larger units could be brought forward by both sides, and the real battle began. But the very next day, a Regiment of our 59th Infantry Division had to retrace our path and were wiped out.’
The British armoured cars were elements of the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Household Cavalry Regiment (2/HCR).
This unit was attached as a Corps reconnaissance unit at this stage of the war. It had been replaced by 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion Welsh Guards as reconnaissance for Guards Armoured Division in 1943.
See #1249 at p.125 for earlier exploits of 2 HCR.
PS Kind comments Louis but many others post much great stuff on here - e.g. fmethorst and villagehorse to name but two.
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
Jungwirth’s attack on Veghel did cause Colonel Johnson to withdraw 3/501 PIR from Eerde, to hold his vital ground around the Veghel bridges. The remainder of 18 September was taken up with consolidating positions and patrolling.
The 101st’s divisional history reminds readers that:
‘The mission … was not to kill Germans but to create and hold the corridor. Aggressive patrolling was taken for granted, but if too many groups spent too much time roaming around the country looking for a fight, the resulting engagements might seriously weaken the ability of the Division to accomplish its original mission. On the other hand, the road couldn’t be defended by sitting on it and letting the enemy organize his strength for an overwhelming attack at one crucial spot.’
By the morning of D+3, Colonel Johnson had sufficient information to be sure that one of Kampfgruppe Jungwirth’s battalions was in an isolated position to his west where he could eliminate them as a threat.
Consequently, he committed Lt Col Kinnard’s 1st Battalion to advance over familiar ground, towards the Battalion’s unintended DZ, beyond Heeswijk. The mission was to destroy enemy forces north of the Canal, rather than the capture or hold ground. Kinnard planned to encircle the enemy.
Company C had already established the bulk of its strength in the Regiment’s western outposts at Dinte. They were to advance to Heeswijk, outflank the enemy and take up blocking positions to his rear. Company A was astride the Aa. Company B was to the left, immediately north of the Canal. They were to push the enemy west, towards Company C’s position.
The Canal was an obstacle to all manoeuvres. In contrast, the Aa could be forded by infantry at most points on its length.
Once contained between the two forces and the Canal, the German battalion could be destroyed. H Hour for the attack was 09.30 hours.
Company C pushed west from Dinther, well ahead of Companies A and B, and was soon in action. They brushed aside limited opposition and reached Heeswijk, as Private Carpenter recorded:
‘… we swung left from the Dinther – Heeswijk intersection, we ran into enemy fire and had to fight our way to the canal. Captain Phillips was leading us. The platoons were well deployed. We pushed our way through whatever Germans were in front of us to a drawbridge at the canal and anchored ourselves in position.’
Radio operator Private Haller, accompanied Captain Phillips and described the action at the canal bridge:
‘I remember down by the canal, the Germans raised a white flag. They wanted to give up. They had me, because I could speak German, and one other fellow, who was to cover me, go down to there to talk to the Germans. They opened fire on us. We jumped into the canal. I yelled to Captain Phillips to, “Let them have it!” Our men opened fire again for about half an hour and the Germans gave up. We got about fifty prisoners. A lot were real young and some very old fellows. They weren’t good soldiers and the young ones didn’t even shave yet.’
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
The American blocking troops were now in position and had already eliminated one German position. As Company C moved out, Companies A and B began their sweep along the relatively narrow, but shallow, Aa Valley. The Aa valley was bisected by drainage ditches and the ground was too soft for tanks.
Tanks would not have fared well in this terrain even if they had been available.
However, with help from brave Dutchmen, who pointed out German positions, the advance went well. For example, valuable information was provided by Hans Kropman who,
‘… pinpointed their position on the map. That made it possible for Lieutenant Puhalski and his 3rd Platoon to cross the canal on the southern flank, then move north to capture two hundred men with a group of 45 men.’
However, not all the Germans gave up so easily. Companies A and B came under machine gun fire from a windmill so engaged the Germans in a fire fight, using small arms and mortars. Under cover of this fire, they advanced on the enemy outposts, adopting fire and manoeuvre across the open fields or using drainage ditches as covered approaches.
A platoon from Company B noticed that three 20mm anti-aircraft guns were causing casualties. However, they were not dug in so were vulnerable to small arms fire, which the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] duly provided. They took the guns and denied the Fallschirmjager crucial fire support.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Puhalski’s manoeuvre to the rear of the Germans undermined their morale, which was already fragile after they had suffered heavy casualties in the previous days. This prompted at least one company of Germans from a training battalion to surrender.
Key moments in the fighting set the tone. Lieutenant Turner stood confidently in the open, appealing for the Fallschirmjäger to surrender. But when he tried to approach them, he was shot dead.
Another casualty was Lieutenant Puhalski who, as Sergeant West recalled, was killed when:
‘… the Germans put up a white flag and then shot him when he stood up’.
Lieutenant Blackmon referred to this incident,
‘This taught us a lot. We didn’t worry about white flags anymore. If a man stood up, we would honor him. We didn’t pay any attention to flags.’
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
Tactically, this first phase of the operation was a considerable success. Rather than pressing home a direct attack on the main German position, the Americans had outmanoeuvered an enemy force in well-prepared positions that were supported by numerous machine guns.
Those Germans who had not yet surrendered were driven west towards Company C’s blocking position.
According to the 101st’s history:
‘When the two Companies moved forward again it was shoulder to shoulder, for the sector had narrowed. Advance was quick for the back of the resistance had been broken. By 15.00 hours, the two companies abreast were only five hundred yards short of Dinther. Patrols were out along the highway to round up any enemy who tried to escape to the north-east.’
The Germans withdrew into ad hoc positions, which they occupied in the narrow neck of land between the Aa and the canal. Here they stopped and realizing that they were almost cut off, some made a break to the north but were turned back by fire from Company C in Heeswijk.
The divisional historian describes the action: ‘It was about 15.00 that the Germans made their all-out attempt to break out of the trap. With a rush, they moved towards a wooded area along the canal. But Captain Phillips had carefully placed a machine gun to cover their route. It caught them in the flank, mowed some of them down, and drove others back.’
By 17.30 hours, it was all over. The Germans casualties were 418 taken prisoner along with approximately forty dead and a similar number wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Kinnard had achieved his aim of destroying an enemy battalion and eliminating a significant threat to Hell’s Highway.
The day ended with C Company occupying a bridgehead south of the canal. Meanwhile B Company occupied a perimeter around Heeswijk and A Company around Dinther.
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
By the evening of 21 September 1944 MARKET GARDEN was not going according to plan, but the Allies were still far from defeated. On Hells Highway, the Bailey Bridge built by the Royal Engineers at Son had nominally been open to Guards Armoured Division traffic for sixty hours.
However, in reality, attacks by the 107 Panzer Brigade had twice closed the route (as discussed from post #1363 at page 137).
Not only had the 107[SUP]th[/SUP] Panzer Brigade attacked towards Son halting traffic along the road, but the German bombing of Eindhoven had also severely disrupted the vital logistic traffic due to the raid filling the streets with rubble (see from #1375 on p138).
Also in 101st Airborne’s area, the battle at Best had reached its climax the day before (see from #1453 p 146). XXX Corps now had the American airborne divisions under their command.
However, they had very limited information about 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne in Arnhem. As they were already forty-eight hours behind schedule, they realized that 1st Airborne Division must be under severe pressure.
Meanwhile, on a more positive note, in the previous four days, the resource starved British VIII and XII Corps had managed to advance alongside XXX Corps.
For example, the 11[SUP]th[/SUP] Armoured Division (sign - black bull on yellow background) was tasked with securing the right flank (east) of the operation as part of VIII Corps.
It began moving on 18 September and, advancing in two columns, it managed to reach the US 101st Airborne Division at Nuenen. (See from #1365 on p137) Later, on the 22nd, its engineers established a bridge over the Zuid-Willemsvaart canal.
XII Corps were deployed to the west of XXX Corps.
In all, this progress was sufficient that the 506 PIR could be released from defending Eindhoven and they were now available to Gavin for tasks further up Hell’s Highway.
Beyond Veghel, the advanced elements of the Guards had reached Grave and the 82nd Airborne Division, so on the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] and 20[SUP]th[/SUP] September, the Guardsmen were able to join the 82nd’s paratroopers in fighting a bitter battle in Nijmegen for the bridges across the River Waal.
Meanwhile, the German ‘Korps Feldt’ responded to the 82[SUP]nd[/SUP] landings by attacking their positions south of Nijmegen, directly from the Reichswald (Germany). It exerted considerable pressure, so that the Allies were required to move some of their limited resources to defend and were weakened in their Thrust towards Elst.
On Thursday 21 September, the Allied corridor of its advance now reached fifty miles into the German rear areas.
However, in contrast to the Allied view of the battle, the Germans were still optimistic that they could administer a bloody check on the Allies. Therefore, Feldmarschall Model issued orders for concerted attacks.
His forces were bolstered by the growing numbers of troops who had escaped the Allied trap on the Channel Coast and were now arriving into the battle area.
He believed that he might now cut off and destroy the four Allied divisions currently fighting in the Nijmegen and Arnhem areas (1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne, Guards Armoured, 101[SUP]st[/SUP] and 82[SUP]nd[/SUP]).
LXXXVIII Korps war diary summarizes the orders given to Generaloberst Student’s First Fallchirmjäger Army:
‘Feldmarschall Model has ordered that the enemy columns marching on Nijmegen are to be attacked at the Veghel bottleneck on 22 September from the west and east. This is to be helped by a panzer brigade from Heeresgruppe B from the east and through a Kampfgruppe of the 59th Division from the west, consisting of two battalions strongly supported by artillery and Panzerjäger [assault guns].’
A panzer brigade from the east ....
Attacks from the west with StuG and artillery support ....
With the towns of St Oedenrode and Veghel secured by 502 and 501 PIR respectively, 101st Airborne mounted a mobile defence of the Corridor. Their aim was to keep the enemy away from the vital traffic on Hell’s Highway. Information from Dutch civilians soon alerted them that the Germans were concentrating for an attack at Schijndel.
59th Division travelled from western Holland via s’Hertogenbosch and at 17.00 hours, the significance of Schijndel was confirmed to the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] by a report of the arrival in the town of trucks carrying 2,000 German troops.
This was Kampfgruppe Huber, part of 59th Division. The force was built around two battalions of Wehrmacht infantry,
.... well supported by artillery ....
.... and by four Jagdpanthers of 1st Company, 559 Panzerjäger Battalion.
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