Battle for Arnhem.... (3 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

You can feel for the locals with the emotional turmoil they must have been experiencing with the rapid changing events and the fact they were at the mercy of any outcome. Always amazes me Kevin, how you are able to continually source the figures and vehicles to align with the narrative. Robin.

Thank you Robin, very kind. It is sad just posting these kind of tales, but war is unforgiving.

As for the photos, I have been doing it for 20 years and have a few spare.

German troops set off towards Wolfheze, leaving two wounded soldiers to attempt to swap stories.

 

[panda1gen]

Page	Date	Arnhem Thread Contents
73	18 Sept 1944	Brief overview of US Paras positions and 2nd lift.
73	18 Sept 1944	British VIII and XII Corps forge bridgeheads across Meuse-Escaut Canal – heavy fighting.
73	19 Sept 1944	With the arrival of Panzer-Kompanie Mielke on the 19th September 1944, coordinated combined arms attacks could be employed against the British forces at the bridge. AFVs and infantry worked close together and would blast British strong points. Kampfgruppe Knaust would employ everything in their arsenal including small arms, MGs, Panzerfausts and Panzers to remove the ‘Red Devils' from the bridge.
73	19 Sept 1944	At 4:30 a.m., before dawn, the 1st Parachute Brigade began its attack towards Arnhem Bridge, with the 1st Battalion leading supported by remnants of the 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd South Staffordshires on the 1st Battalion's left flank and the 11th Battalion following beaten off with heavy losses.
73	19 Sept 1944	Frost under pressure with shortage of ammo – especially PIAT bombs. SS Sturmbannführer Brinkmann and Major Knausts’ units ceaselessly bombarded Frost at the bridge.
		I have tried to create an index of this thread, it is going slowly at the moment, but here is another installment with the page reference on the 'new' thread. Eventually, if I ever finish it I shall try to post the the whole together.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The Germans did not attack Wolfheze that evening. Except for Captain Queripel's force being attacked north of the railway, there was no further serious action on that day of dramatic event for the 4th Parachute Brigade. Except for those bogged down near the tunnel, all of the vehicles came safely south of the railway.




B Company of the KOSB was still present; finding his battalion departed from the agreed meeting point, Major Forman decided to remain in this area overnight.




The 4th Parachute Brigade, which with the KOSB had been at nearly full strength twelve hours earlier, now consisted of considerably less than half of that strength and had come to rest in Wolfheze and in the woods to the east of the village. An estimated fifty-four men had been killed during the day's actions; this figure includes the KOSB casualties but not a further seventeen killed in the 11th Battalion and the anti-tank troop fighting in Arnhem on that day. These were the heaviest single day's brigade casualties of the entire Arnhem battle. More than half of the dead - four officers and twenty-five other ranks were from the 10th Battalion.

A large proportion of the brigade was out of action, wounded or cut off and left behind to become prisoners. Brigadier Hackett's proud command was virtually broken only forty-eight hours after its arrival.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

An interesting point should be mentioned here. It has been described how the main part of the King's Own Scottish Borderers was easily able to reach the divisional area at Oosterbeek. Brigadier Hackett made no move to bring the remainder of his brigade into Oosterbeek, and units would suffer severely when they tried to come in the next day after the Germans attacked the area in strength.

I (Middlebrook) was several times asked by some of the keen local experts in Holland why Hackett had not brought his units into Oosterbeek that night; there is no doubt that most could have got there in reasonable safety.




Hackett's diary records that this was considered:

I discussed at some length with Div by RT advisability of moving during the night towards our final location. I wanted to get integrated into the Div area. I was quite happy to stay but would have preferred to move to a villa near final location at say 2300 hrs; by then 10 Bn would be fit to do so in good order. Div deprecated a move but said I was to send recce parties in by night and follow at first light. I saw nothing to be gained out of recce parties in the dark and it was agreed in the end that I should move the Bde at first light.

There was a substantial British force still at liberty back in the woods near Wolfheze. This was Major Michael Forman's B Company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. His men had seen much action since the start of this operation, defending the most exposed sector of the second lift's dropping zone at Ginkel Heath on Monday, defending part of the Polish glider landing zone and then providing part of the rearguard cover in the withdrawal to Wolfheze the previous day.






After waiting all of this morning at the Hotel Wolfheze for contact with someone from his battalion, Major Forman decided to move out south-westwards towards the Rhine, hoping to find British troops there. The only information he had about the main division was a BBC broadcast heard at the hotel that the 1st Airborne Division was fighting north of the river; he had never heard any mention of Osterbeek.

 

[Woodyskysolo]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

An interesting point should be mentioned here. It has been described how the main part of the King's Own Scottish Borderers was easily able to reach the divisional area at Oosterbeek. Brigadier Hackett made no move to bring the remainder of his brigade into Oosterbeek, and units would suffer severely when they tried to come in the next day after the Germans attacked the area in strength.

I (Middlebrook) was several times asked by some of the keen local experts in Holland why Hackett had not brought his units into Oosterbeek that night; there is no doubt that most could have got there in reasonable safety.

View attachment 357722


Hackett's diary records that this was considered:

I discussed at some length with Div by RT advisability of moving during the night towards our final location. I wanted to get integrated into the Div area. I was quite happy to stay but would have preferred to move to a villa near final location at say 2300 hrs; by then 10 Bn would be fit to do so in good order. Div deprecated a move but said I was to send recce parties in by night and follow at first light. I saw nothing to be gained out of recce parties in the dark and it was agreed in the end that I should move the Bde at first light.

There was a substantial British force still at liberty back in the woods near Wolfheze. This was Major Michael Forman's B Company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. His men had seen much action since the start of this operation, defending the most exposed sector of the second lift's dropping zone at Ginkel Heath on Monday, defending part of the Polish glider landing zone and then providing part of the rearguard cover in the withdrawal to Wolfheze the previous day.

View attachment 357723

View attachment 357724


After waiting all of this morning at the Hotel Wolfheze for contact with someone from his battalion, Major Forman decided to move out south-westwards towards the Rhine, hoping to find British troops there. The only information he had about the main division was a BBC broadcast heard at the hotel that the 1st Airborne Division was fighting north of the river; he had never heard any mention of Osterbeek.

View attachment 357725

Panda you really need to do a book with all the story telling and pictures from Arnhem and the Battle of the Bulge. It would be fantastic Paul

 

[panda1gen]

Panda you really need to do a book with all the story telling and pictures from Arnhem and the Battle of the Bulge. It would be fantastic Paul

Thanks Paul, but I can't see it happening .....

Meanwhile, continued from #2304 above: Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Also with him was that part of 156 Battalion which had become separated from its parent unit the previous afternoon. This party had been driven out of its overnight position in Wolfheze by tanks that morning.






Two of the officers, Captain Hector Montgomery and Lieutenant Ron Wood, had been severely wounded; Wood died later and Montgomery lost an arm.

The survivors of that action had then joined up with the much stronger KOSB company, but the entire force was very low on ammunition, very tired and very hungry, most having lost the packs containing their rations during previous actions.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

This force moved little more than a quarter of a mile from the hotel when they became aware that they were in a clearing in the woods and surrounded by Germans who had cleverly trailed them.






A German officer called on the airborne men to surrender. This was Major Forman's reaction:




There appeared to be two companies of Germans with two 81-millimetre mortars getting into position, and there was some exchange of fire. I thought about attempting an attack and started planning it; it seemed to be the only hope. Before issuing the orders, I decided to check the ammunition and found it had nearly all gone. So, what to do? There was no immediate opportunity to help any other unit. The options left to me were to cross 200 yards of open heather under fire from the Germans, being shot at from behind, losing half the men going across the open and with the prospect of heavy hand-to-hand fighting with the Germans if we did get across - or to surrender. I decided not to say 'every man for himself' but to tell them to surrender, which I did, making it my responsibility.

Lieutenant Dennis Kayne was one of the two 156 Battalion officers present:

We were down to virtually nothing to fight with by then and the KOSB officer said we should surrender to save further casualties. While he was negotiating this, I told my men what was happening. The next thing I did was to take my dog-tag off and throw it away, because it had my religion, Jewish, on it. The Germans then came up to us and we laid down all our arms on the ground. It was a terrible feeling to realize that this is what it had come to, that first-class troops had come to this. There were at least 200 Germans, looking quite fresh and smart and well armed.

The other 156 Battalion officer, Lieutenant Jeff Noble, was slightly apart from the main body; he and his men had been acting as a screen for the KOSB company:

I personally didn't agree to the surrender and took to the woods again with some of my parachutists. But the Borderers surrendered, and that was probably the right decision, because some 130 men lived to see the end of the war, whereas if we had fought it out most of them probably would have died. I don't think it would have affected the Battle of Arnhem, because we were completely isolated. It wouldn't have had any impact on anything at all.




Lieutenant Noble was soon wounded and captured,




... but a few of his men may have escaped, the only ones to do so from yet another large body of men taken prisoner.

 

[panda1gen]

The 'cavalry' was on its way, but still faced huge difficulties in reaching 1st Airborne in time ......

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Brigadier Hackett's force in the hollow held out all afternoon and evening. Almost half of the 150 men became casualties as the Germans tried to surround and eliminate the position with fire, but reluctant to come to close quarters.








When it started to become dark, Hackett decided that there was no alternative but to make one determined charge. With fixed bayonets, the seventy or so men still on their feet charged screaming through the woods between the hollow and what was thought to be the location of the Oosterbeek perimeter. This was successful, and with only a few further casualties the rushing men burst into the positions of A Company, 1stBorder.

​

Both sides noticed the contrast in the appearance of the two forces. One of the Border officers requested Major Powell to move his men away as quickly as possible -

'Please move your filthy lot away from here' — in case their scarecrow appearance affected his men's morale’.

The total strength of fit men of the 4th Parachute Brigade Group when its various units mustered in Oosterbeek, including the men of the 11th Battalion who had returned from their action in Arnhem, was probably no more than 500 from the 2,300 or so who had flown from England two days earlier.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The battles in the woods by the 4th Parachute Brigade just described, together with the earlier described failed attempts by the battalions in west Arnhem to reach the road bridge, epitomise the basic and fundamental weaknesses of the Arnhem plan. These airborne units were dropped too far from the Arnhem bridge and so failed to gain their objective (the bridge). Not only that, they were so weakened in the fighting to try to capture it, they reached the point at which they became incapable of further offensive action.

The whole purpose of deploying an airborne unit was to exploit its ability to descend almost anywhere. By surprise, it could seize almost any vital objective quickly, but had then to be prepared to defend that objective until relieved by ground forces.

The defence of the seized objective should have been the unit's main battle, not the initial buttault on it (compare Arnhem with the Pegasus Bridge 6/6/1944 operation near Caen).




In addition, in this case, the division landed piecemeal because of the shortage of available transport. There was a failure to deliver the whole division to action in one day.

Not only that, but the air force planners refused any ‘coup de main’ on the bridge and opted to ‘play-safe’ (of suspected flak positions) for the transport aircraft, by adopting a policy of utilising distant dropping and landing zones away from these suspected flak batteries, some of which did not actually exist.




As a result, seven of the 1st Airborne Division's nine battalions were reduced to skeleton units by fighting the wrong battle in the wrong place. Instead of seizing the objective and then fighting the intended defensive battle, they had to march miles to reach their objective and fight hard to even reach it. They also had to defend their landing/supply zones at the same time.




In short, the airborne division had been robbed of its one great advantage and used almost like a ground division making a conventional attack from a distant Start Line (but without as many heavy weapons as an infantry division). Even this analogy breaks down however, as a completely surrounded infantry division (like the paras were) would be more likely to dig in and defend, rather than attack in this way.

I shall return to Frost at the bridge, to show how his gallant 2nd Battalion force, with some extras (a few hundred men in total, maybe less than 10% of the division?), put up a very good fight, but was ultimately too weak to perform a task which had been allocated to most of the division.




Meanwhile, the Germans had internal lines of communication, so could reinforce to Arnhem quickly and powerfully.