battle of hurtgen forest (2 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

In the summer we visited Normandy, (great tour and some good pictures)soon we go to hurtgen forest and perhaps more. Whilst researching the battle I came a cross this website below.

http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm

Also have the film 'when trumpets fade', very good dramatisation it would seem when you read this account from a veteran.

Why does this battle not get a high profile?

 

[Crossroads]

I don't recall hearing anything about that battle myself. After reading the website it is very hard to understand. I guess it shows that there is incompetence at every level.

Ronnie
www.crossroadsdiecast.com

 

[DMNamiot]

Hi Guys,

I was stationed not that far from the area of the battleand will tell you that the terrain totally favors the defenders and to attack down a valley with high ground defended by a very resolute emeny who was defending his home turf was the recipe for disaster. There aren't a lot of accounts of this particular fight out there to dig through and even in the mound of reference books I have here at home, the only references I have that talk in minor detail are Gavins Book On To Berlin because the 82d was minorly involved with the fight there and Harmons Book Combat Commander because 2d Armored Div was also on the periferals of the fight.

Hodges First Army was the lead in this battle and was, in the opinion of Harmon, out of their depth. He felt that the area should have been enveloped with armored columns along the flanks. The areas to the north and south of this forrest were and still are quite good for tanks maneuver, and if this had been the method of attack instead of a frontal assault of a heavily defended enemy position we might have been able to take the area with out virtually destroying the bulk of 3 Infantry Divisions the 2nd, 4th and 28th. The loss of 24,000 soldiers killed and another 9000 due to injury is unexceptable by anyones standards. Interestly, Gavin makes nearly the same conclusions and having been in the area and looked at these pieces of terrain from a military point of view I have to wonder why they did what they did too.

I also think there are two reasons why many historians have neglected to discuss this fight. First, because it was a disaster for the Americans in the way Passchendale was for the British in WWI. Second and probably most important, it was eclipsed by the fight we all know as the Battle of the Bulge.

All in all it was a very bad time for the American 1st Army and should be examined in more detail, especially the planning and intelligence that was used to base the attack on. If anyone can suggest a good book or books on this from the commanders perspective I would like to read them.

Dave

 

[binder001]

I agree that more attention should be paid to this action as a lesson in "don't let this happen again!". Charles Whiting has one or two books on the Huertgen actions and it is covered in several other books, such as Ambrose's "Citizen Soldiers", and Yeide's "The Longest Battle". The general agreement is that the First Army lost focus on their REAL mission - seizure of the Rohr River dams. As mentioned, they got into a fight with a prepared and motivated enemy, on his chosen terrain, in conditions that negated the Allied advantages of mobility, firepower and air support. A useless waste of men and resources, but a real tribute to the infantry of the US Army.

Gary

 

[indiana81]

If anyone can suggest a good book or books on this from the commanders perspective I would like to read them.

Dave

Hi Dave!
Here are a few titles you might want to check out. I haven't read any of these books (yet) but then these may be the best of the lot:

-The Battle of Hurtgen Forest by Charles MacDonald
-A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945 by Edward G. Miller
-Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment by Robert S. Rush

All three are available on Amazon.com. I hope this helps!
Justin

 

[DMNamiot]

Hi Justin,

Thanks for the info on the books, I think I have read MacDonalds book but will have to look at it and see. I appreciate the information.

Dave

 

[indiana81]

Dave,
You're welcome! If you're ever in need of finding titles about a specific subject of World War II, this website should be of interest to you:
http://stonebooks.com/
At this point they have about 14,000 books under about 4700 subjects in their database.
Have a good one!
Justin

 

[Leadmen]

General Omar Bradley in his biography "A Generals Life" says his plan to smash through to the Rhine and capture the seven dams across the Roer failed miserably.In launching General Cota's 28 Division we grossly underestimated both the terrain and the German defenses.We could not get tanks in the area whereas the Germans had better access to the area.The weather impeded air attacks supporting Cota. The 28th lost 6,000 killed. Bradley says the push to the Roer, cost the First and Ninth armies 35,000 casualities. We were mired in a war of attrition. Leadmen

 

[Louis Badolato]

What I get from reading about this battle is a problem I see thorughout the war with regard to (the sadly poor) Allied (even more sadly, particularly the American) leadership: commanding from so far behind the lines that there is absolutely no understanding of the feasibility of what you are commanding your troops to accomplish. The idiots in commanding our brave troops (and I think the term "idiots" may be generous) wouldn't get within 10 miles of the front lines, and would give orders without a clear understanding of the terrain. Asking the Bloody Bucket Division to take that forrest was the modern military equivalent of Raglan's commanding the Light Brigade to Charge at Balaclava. Not to mention the fact that had we taken the Forest, the Germans need only have opened the dams and flooded the valley, rendering the attack doubly ridiculous.

I have no respect for those Nazi scum, but I will say this about the German leadership: they understood their profession. German leaders like Panzer Meyer were known to hop in a sidecar cycle with an Aide and drive right up to the front to get a proper grasp of the ground. They outclassed the bums leading our troops. The disgraces responsible for ordering the attack on the Hurtgen Forest should have been court martialed (or in a just world, turned over to the survivors of their misbegotten offensive).

 

[binder001]

Louis is right about many US leaders keeping to the rear. In theory this was to "maintain control" over the whole battle, but Louis is quite right that any successful leader has to go see a situation for themselves.

Unfortunately for those of us "in the trenchs", most current American managers still command from an office. They not only don't visit the people responsible for getting work done, but they often don't even fully understand the core business or product line. Some things never seem to change.

Gary

 

[Combat]

Louis is right about many US leaders keeping to the rear. In theory this was to "maintain control" over the whole battle, but Louis is quite right that any successful leader has to go see a situation for themselves.

Gary

This is a much more valid criticism of the WWI generals because their communications often broke down completely at the outset of the battle and they were left in the dark until it was over (see Keegan's WWI book). Not exactly sure who in the chain of command is being referred to here, but you would not want the WWII generals in a position of danger. There was no advantage to be gained by their being closer to the line. I agree, for other reasons, though that the allied generals were typically poor (e.g., overly cautious, unimaginative, etc).l

 

[Louis Badolato]

Combat,

I have to totally disagree with you on this one. Absent first hand knowledge of the ground you are planning on attacking or defending, you have no accurate idea of what type of strategy or tactics to employ. The best generals of the War (Guderian, Rommel, Meyer) had an excellent idea of the ground they were fighting on, studying it up close (Rommel flying around only yards above the ground in his Feisler Storch) and used it to their advantage.

The Allied general staff did not even effectively consider aerial recon data in planning its moves, as for example they had no idea of the meaning and effect of the hedgerows depicted on thousands of photos of Normandy, or they planned or chose to approve the plan for Market Garden, where armor was expected to traverse a one lane raised roadway under fire.

Rommel, on the other hand, trained his forces to use the bocage hedgerows as ready made fortifications which caused the Allies weeks, hundreds of tanks and thousands of lives to penetrate. If the Allied high command had made a proper consideration of the ground in Normandy, hedgecutters mounted on tanks should have been standard issue, not a clever innovation by an NCO weeks after the invasion began.

Such a review of the ground can be accomplished without a great deal of risk to the Generals themselves, who can sit 2000 yards behind the lines and review the ground through a telescope, or, at the very least thoroughly examine aerial recon photos when considering action.

Much is made of Monty's ignoring a handful of recon photos showing German armor along the route of Market Garden. What I would like to know is how he failed to notice that the entire road he planned on sending tanks down was both exposed and narrow. All the Germans had to do was knock out a lead tank (or hope one broke down, as they requently did) to hopelessly bog down the attack. It just goes to show that no matter how good you grand tactical design, a failure to properly appreciate the ground will often ensure abject failure.

 

[Leadmen]

I am reading for the second time the book by Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943. This book is written from the German side along with historical interviews with Russian Generals after the war. Colonel Von Manteuffel was at the head of his panzer infantry and had his troops ride on armor and vehicles which allowed him to be one of the first army units to capture the Moscow highway and was also credited with capturing several key bridges by Moscow and encirling three Russian armies. Some leaders were always in the vanguard of attack. Leadmen

 

[binder001]

I can't remember the book, but there were comments made about the point of the Battle of the Bulge that Monty took over the northern shoulder of the bulge. He and the British officers were aghast to find that US colonels, etc were often in rear command posts and didn't go forward to check the situation or welfare of their troops. I agree that you don't want field grade or flag officers living up front as a rule, but they DO need to have a look and see the situation and check on the men who are THEIR responsibility.

As far as the Normandy hedgerows, one problem was that the Allied officers doing the planning thought that these would be more like the English hedgerows the troops were training in, shorter and more open. When the troops got to Normandy they found hedgerows that were tall and densely grown. With Normandy just across from England there had to be people who knew about the terrain.

Another of the many flaws in Market-Garden was the rushed planning and Monty's failure to clear the north side of the Scheldt estuary, thus allowing the bulk of the German 15th Army to man the very defenses he planned to breeze right through. I'm sure that someone commented on the road, but someone on staff reassured them that an undefended narrow road wouldn't be a problem.

Gary

 

[panda1gen]

The story on the websites quoted the British General Horrocks visiting and as you say, being horrified at the distnace between the US commanders and their men. After the ww1 Somme holocaust this would have been difficult for most British officers in ww2 (but someone may be able to find an exception).

It was the scale of the casualties that struck me, and the Somme like 'keep pushing, they will get tired or run out of ammo' approach. That really surprised me.

I have Charles Whiting's book, thanks for the other references.

As for Market Garden, it was those old men and boys on bikes again - where did we hear that one before.....Funny if wasn't so tragic.

I hope to visit Eben Emael as well if I can find it. Now that was clever!

 

[Currahee Chris]

From what I undestand about Huertgen is that it occurred so close in proximity to the Bulge (timewise), that it has just been eclipsed by that battle. After all, what makes for better history- the story of some mistakes in the Heurtgen or the against all odds defense of Bastogne.

How ironic in my military career I served with a battalion that was in Batogne and a battalion that was in the thick of it in the Heurtgen.

 

[panda1gen]

From what I undestand about Huertgen is that it occurred so close in proximity to the Bulge (timewise), that it has just been eclipsed by that battle. After all, what makes for better history- the story of some mistakes in the Heurtgen or the against all odds defense of Bastogne.

How ironic in my military career I served with a battalion that was in Batogne and a battalion that was in the thick of it in the Heurtgen.

Chris - I am only an armchair historian, but I agree with you completely - the Battle in the Hurtgen was very badly run and in a way the Bulge saved it from too much publicity - ironically it may have also saved the Bulge because the northern axis was up to the Meuse via the Elsenborne ridge - this had a very strong US artillery group on it that helped effectively to stop the attack dead in that sector - there because of the southern Hurtgen battle?

Now for the wind up. Where would we have been without Monty, bless him. The whole bulge was undoubtedly mainly a US affair, but if you visit the museum at La Roche in the Ardennes you see some of the Commonwealth participation in the battle.

As for Normandy - I share your amazement Louis - the resistance, the English upper echelons - all must have known about the bocage hedges - I go back again to the US higher ranks - why did they not accept Hobarts funnies - the modern seige train of AVREs? or put other measures in place, bulldozers even

Also, I watched 'Patton' again the other day - great film BUT - thank goodness he saved the world and beat the germans all on his own (despite Monty) - especially in Normandy - no credit that the Commonwealth forces held down more than three quarters of the german army (including more than that of the German armour) - but they were the slow ones in closing the Falaise gap. See the Polish memorial at Mt Ormel to see how tough it was Whereas who was left to fight Patton as he drove down empty roads?

How is the wind up going - any takers?

 

[Louis Badolato]

Chris - I am only an armchair historian, but I agree with you completely - the Battle in the Hurtgen was very badly run and in a way the Bulge saved it from too much publicity - ironically it may have also saved the Bulge because the northern axis was up to the Meuse via the Elsenborne ridge - this had a very strong US artillery group on it that helped effectively to stop the attack dead in that sector - there because of the southern Hurtgen battle?

Now for the wind up. Where would we have been without Monty, bless him. The whole bulge was undoubtedly mainly a US affair, but if you visit the museum at La Roche in the Ardennes you see some of the Commonwealth participation in the battle.

As for Normandy - I share your amazement Louis - the resistance, the English upper echelons - all must have known about the bocage hedges - I go back again to the US higher ranks - why did they not accept Hobarts funnies - the modern seige train of AVREs? or put other measures in place, bulldozers even

Also, I watched 'Patton' again the other day - great film BUT - thank goodness he saved the world and beat the germans all on his own (despite Monty) - especially in Normandy - no credit that the Commonwealth forces held down more than three quarters of the german army (including more than that of the German armour) - but they were the slow ones in closing the Falaise gap. See the Polish memorial at Mt Ormel to see how tough it was Whereas who was left to fight Patton as he drove down empty roads?

How is the wind up going - any takers?

Panda,

You know how much I respect the commonwealth forces, and I would never take away from the hard fighting they did in Normandy, but, and its a big but, they were often fighting the German's fight, because they were poorly led. Monty's sending hundreds of tanks across open ground towards the ruins of Caen (an instant fortress), where he knew the Germans were well dug in with superior armor and 88's, was a suicidal attack that cost hundreds of tanks and thousands of lives. Oh, and the reason that Patton was on open roads was that during operation Cobra, the U.S. forces under Bradley, with the help of huge quantities of air support, after weeks of hard fighting, broke out, something that Monty, with similar air support, was unable to do during operation Good Wood.

 

[panda1gen]

Louis, I hoped I could rely on you. Missed our little discussions.....check out the dispositions of the German forces at that time (Cobra), most of it around the Brits and Canadians (including the Poles)

As for the 'charge across the plain', agree, been there don't recommend it. Although I have read accounts of tanks driving straight into Caen after the bombing.

Much of the problem was the fanatical Hitler Jugend (Meyer et al) against the Canadians over the ridges outside Caen, although they were practically wiped out. Tilly sur Seulle, south of Bayeaux for example (not sure I spelt it right) changed hands around 20 times.

Stand on the Bourgebois ridge with a panther, tiger or 88 and ouch, lovely view........Point was though the strategy was right - tie them down on the crucial ground, wear them down and have the breakout to the right flank.

People forget what a close run thing the initial build up of forces actually was. If Hitler had have let them move everything right away or if Patton had not had his army of deception it could have been very different. Good old Patton, he really did contribute to victory in that way.

BTW, as you know compared to what the Russians achieved at the same time involving destroying many more divisions and much greater gains this was relatively much smaller - what are the odds of Hollywood doing a film about the Russian offensive Bagration - do you think?

How are we doing, right room for an argument? Best wishes, Panda

 

[Louis Badolato]

Panda,

I certainly agree that Hitler's interference greatly assisted the Allies, as had he not overruled both Rommel and Von Runsted, and ordered the Panzers to be neither on the beaches (as Rommel correctly determined they would need to be to have a decisive effect, as Allied air supremecy rendered their effective movement by day virtually suicidal) nor far enough back to constitute a mobil reserve (as Von Runsted, who obviously stuck to doctrine regardless of the realities of Allied air supremecy, wanted), and not been convinced that the real attack was coming at Pas De Calais, things might have been different.

But now back to our little discussion. On June 6th, the British came ashore virtually unmolested, and could have literally walked into Caen (their goal for the day of the landing) unopposed. However captain overcautious (my little knickname for your boy Monty) for whatever reason did not push them to do so. As a result, over the next couple of days the Germans sent the majority of their armored forces to Caen, as you correctly noted. However, what you seem to have overlooked is the reason they did so: They had perfect natural fortresses all set up in the bocage country facing the Americans, so had neither the need nor the incliniation to put more of their armor into that terrain so ill suited for armored combat. The panzer faust, panzer shrek, Machine gun and morter were far more effective weapons in the blind fighting going on in the hedgerows than tanks would have been, whereas the open country around the British and Canadian front lines was better suited for tank warefare.

And that goes both ways, had Monty used the air supremecy and his numerical superiority in both tanks and infantry well in the terrain he was operating on, he should have broken out, as, despite his disingenuous later claims to the contrary, he clearly intended to do. His own chief of staff's (De Guinand? the name escapes me right now) book admits as much. Despite facing much more brutal close in fighting where air supremecy could only be effectively used via mass carpet bombing, and far harder terrain to attack through, Bradley found a way to break out. His men found a means to make tanks more effective in the hedge rows (the hedgecutter and rhino attachments), and Bradley ordered the right kind of air support (carpet bombing a half-mile wide area along the front only a few hundred yards from his own troops) to succeed. Monty tried a similar break out plan, but used the air power ineffectively (flattening Caen into better defensive terrain after warning the occupants of the City that the attack was coming, so the Germans simply moved their troops out before the attack, and back in once it was over) and didn't have the guts to order his men up under the bombardament (thereby inevitably loosing a few hundred men to friendly fire like Bradley did, but having his forces in position to capitalize on the confusion and shock the germans would have suffered under the bombardament). Instead, like a World War I general, hw waited for the dust to settle (and the Germans to reoccupy Caen) before ordering his armor to in essence "go over the top" and attack without adequate infantry support across open fields, wasting the lives of a lot of good men, as well as hundreds of tanks.

You can make excuses for him (after all that's what he was really best at) or you can accept that Monty, like the rest of the Allied high command, really wasn't as good at his job as his German counterparts. We won the war inspite of our leadership, not because of them.