battle of hurtgen forest (1 Viewer)

[Currahee Chris]

............ We won the war inspite of our leadership, not because of them.

OUCH!!! That hurt!! I'll hold my tongue- this time

 

[binder001]

We won the war inspite of our leadership, not because of them.

A bit harsh. The Allies had many fine leaders. There were certainly mistakes, but overall the Allies had a sound plan that was generally executed well. Our leaders performed generally as they were trained. Unfortunately many fell back on previous training and experience and didn't look at bold or imaginative solutions.

I will not even try to defend any decision to attack through the Huertgen Forest instead of bypassing it or finding another way to neutralize the Roer River dams. The only explanation is that Hodges feared a counterattack materializing out of the forest, slicing into extended First Army lines of communication. Plus the Allies had to remove German control from the dams. Either scenario leaves a lot of First Army stranded inside Germany and cut off by either a flood of Germans or a literal flood of water. Both would leave no way to advance, resupply, or effectively retreat. It would have been Hodge's "Arnhem" only losing a full corps instead of a division. The German Army doctrine was to counterattack to retake lost ground or to cut off advanicing foes, and they were often quite good at it, so this wasn't an idle worry. Hodges biggest problem is loss of focus. Instead of the dams, he got involved with clearing the forest, chewing up a lot on infantry for no significant gain. He fell into the trap of playing the enemy's game on his home turf.

Interestingly, author Steve Zaloga, writing in the recent Osprey volume "Siegfried Line" points out that the British Army should have stood in the Aachen corridor with the US Army in the Ardennes and Saar areas (according to the SHAEF master plan). Monty's little "bridges to nowhere" fantasy drew the Allied armies further north of the planned routes into Germany. The led to the US First Army moving through the Aachen corridor, while the Third Army was to assault through the Saar-Palatinate. That left the 80 mile exposed area between thinly manned.

The Allies also couldn't concieve of the "miracle of the West" where the German Army rose from its own ashes. After seeing the German losses of personnel and material in France, all the Allies felt they were facing a thin crust of opposition. They underestimated the ability of the Germans to rebuild units and they didn't give enough import to the fact that they were on Germany's doorstep. Jerry wasn't fighting for Hitler's dream anymore - he was fighting to protect his home.

The Germans had at least as many leadership problems as the Allies. The German apologist writing after the war just covered their tracks better, leading to the legend that the Germans were only overwhelmed by material, not outfought on every battlefront.

 

[Louis Badolato]

A bit harsh. The Allies had many fine leaders. There were certainly mistakes, but overall the Allies had a sound plan that was generally executed well. Our leaders performed generally as they were trained. Unfortunately many fell back on previous training and experience and didn't look at bold or imaginative solutions.

I will not even try to defend any decision to attack through the Huertgen Forest instead of bypassing it or finding another way to neutralize the Roer River dams. The only explanation is that Hodges feared a counterattack materializing out of the forest, slicing into extended First Army lines of communication. Plus the Allies had to remove German control from the dams. Either scenario leaves a lot of First Army stranded inside Germany and cut off by either a flood of Germans or a literal flood of water. Both would leave no way to advance, resupply, or effectively retreat. It would have been Hodge's "Arnhem" only losing a full corps instead of a division. The German Army doctrine was to counterattack to retake lost ground or to cut off advanicing foes, and they were often quite good at it, so this wasn't an idle worry. Hodges biggest problem is loss of focus. Instead of the dams, he got involved with clearing the forest, chewing up a lot on infantry for no significant gain. He fell into the trap of playing the enemy's game on his home turf.

Interestingly, author Steve Zaloga, writing in the recent Osprey volume "Siegfried Line" points out that the British Army should have stood in the Aachen corridor with the US Army in the Ardennes and Saar areas (according to the SHAEF master plan). Monty's little "bridges to nowhere" fantasy drew the Allied armies further north of the planned routes into Germany. The led to the US First Army moving through the Aachen corridor, while the Third Army was to assault through the Saar-Palatinate. That left the 80 mile exposed area between thinly manned.

The Allies also couldn't concieve of the "miracle of the West" where the German Army rose from its own ashes. After seeing the German losses of personnel and material in France, all the Allies felt they were facing a thin crust of opposition. They underestimated the ability of the Germans to rebuild units and they didn't give enough import to the fact that they were on Germany's doorstep. Jerry wasn't fighting for Hitler's dream anymore - he was fighting to protect his home.

The Germans had at least as many leadership problems as the Allies. The German apologist writing after the war just covered their tracks better, leading to the legend that the Germans were only overwhelmed by material, not outfought on every battlefront.

The Allies had some good leadership on the divisional level (James Gavin comes to mind), but I am afraid I have to disagree with you on our high command. For my money, the German's had us whipped on leadership (with, thank god, the exception of Hitler himself, who managed to screw everything up to our advantage. I cannot imagine trying to defend Hodges. If he somehow manages to take the Huertgen Forest, the Germans open the ****s and flood us back out. Further, if he had the slightest clue as to the ground he was sending troops to fight on, even he could not have been stupid enough to order the attacks. And as far as us outfighting the Germans on every front, statistics disprove that assertion. In every theater of the war, and against every nationality they fought, the opposing nation sustained a far higher ratio of casualties (particularly Russia), except for the U.S. (whose casualty rates were about even with the Germans). The fact that we sustained a 1:1 casualty rate, however, does not reflect good leadership so much as it reflects the total air supremacy we enjoyed over europe. Don't even get me started on Monty (Market Garden, Goodwood) and Patton (the raid to save his son in law). And Ike was more a politician than a military leader. When the battle of the bulge occurred, he was so worried about being assassinated that he became completely isolated and was useless as a commander.

 

[modwalls]

Thats it, I don't think I'm ever going to view the History channel again, this is better. I Feel I was just eaves dropping on three Commanders discussing why the plan gained or failed. It reminded me a little of Shelby Foote, you almost thought he was there. Great stuff Lois, Binder,and Pandagen. Mike

 

[Warbuff26]

Watch it Louis if you start picking on my boy Patton.....I know how you feel. He was not in any way shape or form perfect but come on....give the man some credit. You can’t say he commanded from the rear when he was reprimanded several times, in both World Wars, for being in FRONT of his troops. (WWI he may have been the first American to breach the Hindenburg Line) He would be the one reprimanding his commanders that weren’t with the troops. Ok ok he made some bad judgment calls...I will never contest that, but its hard to argue what he was able to accomplish with Third Army, 600 miles in 2 weeks from Avranches to Argentan. Rather than engage in set-piece slugging matches, Patton preferred to bypass centers of resistance and use the mobility of US units to the fullest, defeating German defensive positions through maneuver rather than head-on fighting whenever possible. How many lives did that save??

You always want to condemn him because of the raid on Hammelburg and I am the first to agree that it was a total bad idea and mis-use of the resources but lets not throw the baby out with the bath water!

 

[jazzeum]

It seems like we've beat these Patton Monty subjects to death innumerable times. If you do a search, you should be able to find prior discussions.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Watch it Louis if you start picking on my boy Patton.....I know how you feel. He was not in any way shape or form perfect but come on....give the man some credit. You can’t say he commanded from the rear when he was reprimanded several times, in both World Wars, for being in FRONT of his troops. (WWI he may have been the first American to breach the Hindenburg Line) He would be the one reprimanding his commanders that weren’t with the troops. Ok ok he made some bad judgment calls...I will never contest that, but its hard to argue what he was able to accomplish with Third Army, 600 miles in 2 weeks from Avranches to Argentan. Rather than engage in set-piece slugging matches, Patton preferred to bypass centers of resistance and use the mobility of US units to the fullest, defeating German defensive positions through maneuver rather than head-on fighting whenever possible. How many lives did that save??

You always want to condemn him because of the raid on Hammelburg and I am the first to agree that it was a total bad idea and mis-use of the resources but lets not throw the baby out with the bath water!

Brian,

I will give credit where credit is due. Like Monty, he did a good job in Africa. He also did a fine job in disengaging his troops from the germans, making a 90 degree turn, and coming to the relief of Bastogne during the Bulge. His aggressive pursuit of the retreating Germans after U.S. Forces broke out was also excellent. He did lead from the front, an important quality he deserves credit for.

However, both he and Monty were so consumed with their rivalry in Sicily that they raced to bypass German forces and take a town (Messina) thereby allowing about 90% of the German forces to escape across the straight, rather than focusing on engaging German forces, pinning them in place, and wiping them out. This desire for the glory of winning the race to Messina on both Patton's and Monty's parts cost a lot of allied lives later during the fight for the Italian main land, when the forces that escaped fought very well in excellent fixed defensive positions.

Patton also was known to steal other commander's supplies (which left a lot of other allied forces in the lurch). Finally, his baiting of the Soviet forces (without whom the Allies have no chance of defeating the Germans) caused some real problems between the Allies.

In Patton's defense, Jimmy Doolittle, one of the finest Air commanders of the Second World War, thought very highly on him, as did roughly half of the men who served under him I've personally spoken to. The other half, however, hated him ("our blood, his guts"). I'd take General Rose over Patton as an armor commander.

 

[Warbuff26]

Oh Brad...its like a good punching bag....always fun to take one or two more swings at it from time to time!

 

[Peter Reuss]

On June 6th, the British came ashore virtually unmolested, and could have literally walked into Caen (their goal for the day of the landing) unopposed. However captain overcautious (my little knickname for your boy Monty) for whatever reason did not push them to do so. As a result, over the next couple of days the Germans sent the majority of their armored forces to Caen, as you correctly noted.

I'm in the middle of reading Overlord by Max Hastings, and he seems to argue that the British had no chance of getting to Caen on the first day without armor on hand because the 21st Panzer would have wiped them out. Also, they got bogged down in overcoming other strongpoints which delayed them too much. As he writes, "But a single infantry battalion with limited tank and artillery support had not the slightest hope of generating sufficient violence to gain a foothold in Caen."

I'm no expert - just thought I'd throw in my 2 cents.

Another thought. Perhaps the Allied Generals realized they had the manpower to win a war of attrition (i.e. Grant in the Civi War) and knew they didn't have to do grand maneuvers - but could plow forward and wear the Germans out. In the Civil War, Pope, McDowell, McClellan, and others tried to be fancy and didn't get the job done. It took a bulldog like Grant to accomplish the goal. (there - I have now included a Civil War debate in the Hurtgen Forest...)

 

[Louis Badolato]

I'm in the middle of reading Overlord by Max Hastings, and he seems to argue that the British had no chance of getting to Caen on the first day without armor on hand because the 21st Panzer would have wiped them out. Also, they got bogged down in overcoming other strongpoints which delayed them too much. As he writes, "But a single infantry battalion with limited tank and artillery support had not the slightest hope of generating sufficient violence to gain a foothold in Caen."

I'm no expert - just thought I'd throw in my 2 cents.

Another thought. Perhaps the Allied Generals realized they had the manpower to win a war of attrition (i.e. Grant in the Civi War) and knew they didn't have to do grand maneuvers - but could plow forward and wear the Germans out. In the Civil War, Pope, McDowell, McClellan, and others tried to be fancy and didn't get the job done. It took a bulldog like Grant to accomplish the goal. (there - I have now included a Civil War debate in the Hurtgen Forest...)

I'm somewhat suprised by Mr. Hastings assessment, in that the British Amphibious tanks almost all made it to shore safely, and regular tanks were being brought in to the beach all day. Further, with our complete air supremecy, had the 21st Panzer attempted to move up in daylight it would have been decimated. I just don't buy it. It doesn't jibe with the assessments of the men who were there.

Further, Sherman and Grant were fighting a different type of war. The South was not going to develope jet fighters, jet bombers that could reach New York and atom bombs were the Civil War to drag out for another year. And Grant had little choice as the attacker but to push forward. It wasn't until the First World War that the tank, the answer to the dominence of the defense in modern warfare, was invented. Had the idiots in the Allied high command paid attention to the developments in mobil warfare and combined arms techniques made by man like Basil Lidell Hart and Heinz Guderian, there would be no need to fight such a costly war.

 

[binder001]

I cannot imagine trying to defend Hodges. If he somehow manages to take the Huertgen Forest, the Germans open the ****s and flood us back out.

Louis, the dams didn't control flooding in the forest, they affected the level and current of the Roer River, a major barrier to the Rhine and that was the barrier to Berlin. For instance, if my followers want to come take New York City away from the anti-2nd Ammendment Hilary Clinton voters, I have to cross the Missouri River before I can think of the Mississipi and then on to your house. If your followers blow the bridges over the Missouri, then we both have to be concerned with the dams in South Dakota that control the flow of the Missouri. I don't really care about South Dakota but I don't want you flooding out my bridging sites.

Further, at the end of the Zaloga volume mentioned earlier, their is a quote from a German staff officer that IF they still held the Huertgen area it WOULD have been the right hinge of the German attack "Wacht Am Rhein". Our people on that terrain meant that Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army got royally fouled up in its traffic management and never achieved any of their objectives (great German leaderhip!). The wooded hills (such as Elsenborn Ridge) served as the strong Allied left, and might have saved almost as many lives as it cost.

So, I can see why we wanted that piece of country, but I do agree that the METHOD was completely screwed up. The US consistently underestimated the numbers and firepower of the enemy and failed to allow for the full effect of the advantageous terrain. The US Army initially assigned too many efforts to too few troops.

"And as far as us outfighting the Germans on every front, statistics disprove that assertion. In every theater of the war, and against every nationality they fought, the opposing nation sustained a far higher ratio of casualties (particularly Russia), except for the U.S. (whose casualty rates were about even with the Germans). "

Let's also remember that after the first two years the Germans were generally defending, which means the attacker had to outman and outgun them. The WERE second to none in skillful use of terrain advantages (mountains in Italy, Bocage in France, etc), so holding the casualtes to 1:1 isn't too bad!

Gary

 

[Peter Reuss]

I think one of his arguments was that the tanks that were unloading got tangled up in traffic jams on the beach and were unable to get to where they should go. Also, he argues that the air support on the first day was not as well organized as it would be in later days and that the German tanks were getting through.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis, the dams didn't control flooding in the forest, they affected the level and current of the Roer River, a major barrier to the Rhine and that was the barrier to Berlin.

Gary

It's interesting that you say the dams wouldn't control flooding of the area, because every account of the Huertgen debacle I have read or heard specifically states that taking the forest was absolutely useless because whoever controlled the dams could flood the entire area. I can't state whether these accounts are accurate, as I have never been there. I am merely repeating what I have read.

As far as the German leadership during the battle of the bulge, all I can say is if not for the heroic stand made by the 101st Airborne with a tank destroyer combat group, an African American Artillery group, and some other remants of retreating forces, the Germans may well have split the Allied forces, obtained the fuel they needed, and recaptured Antwerp. They managed to gather and move a remarkable force, without Allied notice, launch an armored thrust in terrain we were convinced could not support such an attack, and do so at the exact right momment when weather prevented Allied Air Supremecy from saving our bacon. This attack was a bad idea of Hitler's from day one, but the fact that the German General Staff was able to pull it off while simultaneously dealing with the Russians speaks volumes for their superiority over our own command.

Finally, the superior German ratio of casualties was from 1939 through 1942 almost exclusively while the Germans were on the attack, and routing British, French, Soviet, Polish, Dutch, Norweigian and Belgian forces, when these forces had the advantage of defending.

If Hitler hadn't been such an incompetent leader, the British would have been finished via (1) the complete capture or annihilation of their expeditionary force at Dunkirk (Hitler holds beack the Armor at the request of Goering who incorrectly claims that the Luftwaffe alone could finish the job); and (2) Germany obtaining total air supremecy over Britian (Hitler changes the focus of his attacks from the Airfields and Radar installations to terror bombing of cities only about 2 weeks before the RAF by their own estimate would have been eliminated as an effective fighting force), thereby permitting the Luftwaffe to attack and destroy the British naval forces in the Channel, and a German invasion of England (Operation Sealion). Again, had Hitler been patient and not interfered, he would not have attacked Russia until Britain was finished, the Soviets would have been facing Germany alone, and also probably would have been defeated (again Hitler interfered with his commanders during operation Barbarossa, changing objectives and having army groups attacking different targets, screwing up a plan that came within a few miles of taking the rail hubs at Moscow). So you tell me, absent Hitler's interference, where are the screw ups on the part of the German Generals that match the foul ups of even the commanders most of us grew up believing were the Allies best? With all due respect, I just don't buy it.

 

[Rob]

Some very interesting points you've made Louis.I had always taken the proposed invasion of England as a foregone conclusion.And also that Hitler halting at Dunkirk was decisive.However i have seen various interviews over the last few years that suggest many high ranking officers in the Luftwaffe not only believed it was foolhardy but also bound to fail.Why was this?.Well i understand that many in the Luftwaffe were not nearly as confident as Hitler was in the Luftwaffe's abillity to destroy the Royal Navy.

I saw this interview with former Luft officer in which he stated he did not believe his airforce had the skill or experience to take on the RN.He believed his pilots would have had to fly in flat straight lines to bomb the ships making his planes easy meat for AA fire.He said he thought the losses on the Luftwaffe after what they already suffered would have been fatal.This was a complete eye opener for me as i had thought it was mainly the RAF that saved us.

I understand there is a recently published book with a title something like 'What really won the Battle of Britain' that suggest the Royal Navy and the THREAT of the Royal Navy played a huge and unrecognised role in preventing the invasion.This is all very interesting and adds a new dimension to those dark hours and begs a question.

How much did Hitler and Goering fear the Royal Navy?

Rob

 

[Louis Badolato]

I read the book you mentioned (Andy suggested I buy it when we were shopping in the City after the Symposium) and the conclusion the author reached is that the threat of the Royal Navy, rather than the RAF, prevented Operation Sealion, citing to some of the sources you mention. Frankly, I thought the book was well researched, well written, and totally wrong. As I recall, the Japanese sank the pride of the Royal Navy's fleet, the Prince of Wales and its accompanying ship, with land based bombers, the Bismark was disabled and rendered all but helpless, and half the Italian Fleet sunk at Taranto, by outdated Fairey Swordfish Bi-Plane torpedo bombers not so affectionately referred to as "string bags". What the author of that book, and the German sources cited, failed to realize, is that absent air cover, a fleet is a helpless target for aircraft. Once the RAF was destroyed, Stuka dive bombers (which were all but useless when there was opposing fighter cover), as well as fast Heinkel medium bombers, could have sunk any royal navy ships within their range. I think we should ask Beaufighter, our resident pilot, what his knowledge is concerning the record of surface vessels versus aircraft in combat. I think battles like Pearl Harbor, Midway, the Coral Sea, etc. have conclusively demonstrated that a fleet is only as good as its aircover.

 

[binder001]

Louis,

You and I finally agree on something! Yes, the WW2 experience showed withot any doubt that naval forces can NOT operate effectively unless they have air cover. His Majesty's Navy would have fought quite bravely in the defense of the Channel, but probably would have been defeated by land-based air supported by U-boats (use the air arm to sink the destroyers and let the submariners have a field day sinking BB's and CA's). On one hand you have the Luftwaffe's mediocre record of combat against naval targets in the first years of the war, but the state of naval AA was pretty mediocre in 1940 also. The presence or absence of a defending fighter force would be the deciding factor.

Seeloewe would have been an intersting proposition. One area that your mighty German leadership never really excelled at was amphibious invasion. Their capture of Norway was as much due to a belated and disorganized Allied response as to their ability to get men ashore and keep them supplied.
Again, Seeloewe would depend on the BEF escaping from France, and the success of the air superiority efforts. As you say, both of those were basically given away. Even if Rooseveldt had wanted to directly help and gotten through isolationist sentiment, the US miliary just wasn't up to facing the Germans in 1940, except for the US Navy's surface forces.

Gary

 

[Rob]

I just thought it was interesting that you have a high ranking Luftwaffe officer saying that the Germans did not have the technique or experience to take on the RN. Of course air cover is always vital,but i don't think the destruction of the RN would have been as straight forward as we may think.

Am i right in thinking there was some kind of historical excercise in the 1970's in which German and British ex officers played their role in a recreation of the invasion of Britain.The invasion was a failure because the RN cut supply lines and sank many landing craft.

If we assume the Luftwaffe would have destroyed the RN,then the decision to switch bombing from airfields to London must rank as one of the biggest mistakes in military History.To rank alongside Custer splitting his forces,Neys attack on the British squares (sorry Ron)and the first day of the Somme.

How fascinating is the 'what if' stuff?!

Rob

 

[Louis Badolato]

Iwe assume the Luftwaffe would have destroyed the RN,then the decision to switch bombing from airfields to London must rank as one of the biggest mistakes in military History.To rank alongside Custer splitting his forces,Neys attack on the British squares (sorry Ron)and the first day of the Somme.

How fascinating is the 'what if' stuff?!

Rob

I don't think there is any question that this, along with launching Barbarossa when Hitler did rank among the biggest mistakes in military history.

 

[OzDigger]

Barbaross was an error in timing rather than a poor military decision as it was the Russian winter that caused the main problems for the Germans. If they had taken Moscow I feel things would have been much harder for the Russians. The Germans still would have lost the war of course because they knew they couldn't win a war of attrition.

 

[Rob]

Do we think that the German high command was more enthusiastic about Barbarossa than the invasion of Britain?

Rob