Creating the Battle of the Bulge.....Wacht Am Rhine (3 Viewers)

Looking at these a lot closer since I have started dabbling with Winter series, good material for inspiration. Robin.
 
72 years ago today, December 15th 1944, German forces had gathered for a major push into W Europe - a desperate gamble to reach the sea at Antwep and split the allies, via the Meuse bridges around Liege.


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The attack would be launched early on the misty winter morning of Dec. 16, 1944. More than 200,000 German troops and nearly 1,000 tanks would be launched through the Ardennes Forest, a 75-mile stretch of the front characterized by dense woods and few roads, held by four inexperienced and battle-worn American divisions stationed there for rest and seasoning.
 
It was on 16[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944 when Hitler told General Jodl he would counter attack, just as Market-Garden was getting underway. By October plans were drawn up and detailed, secret planning well underway. None of his Generals thought that the forces were adequate. None of them, not even Field Marshall Von Rundsted could argue. Especially at the death throes of the Reich, power was arbitrary, absolute and administered with lethal punishment.

Just as they had in May 1940, when they had settled the fate of France in one day, German armies would drive through the forest of the Ardennes to cross the River Meuse, then sweep north to retake Brussels and seize the port of Antwerp. Cut off from their American allies, the British Second and Canadian First Armies would be enveloped and destroyed. The Western alliance against the Axis would collapse, freeing Germany to deal with the mounting pressure being exerted on the Eastern Front by the Red Army.

This was the last occasion in the war when Hitler, an inveterate gambler, still possessed enough chips to double his stake. It was a bold plan, sweeping in concept and impossible to execute. When Hitler unveiled it on 24 October, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, his Commander-in-Chief West, was:

'staggered... It was obvious to me that the available forces were far too small - in fact no soldier really believed that the aim of reaching Antwerp was really practicable. But I knew by now that it was useless to protest to Hitler about the possibility of anything.'


Even the fanatically loyal General Sepp Dietrich, commander of Sixth SS Panzer Army, one of the two armies tasked with the operation, was not confident of success. He complained, 'All Hitler wants me to do is to cross a river, capture Brussels and then go on and take Antwerp. And all this in the worst time of the year ... when the snow is waist deep ....'


Hitler resisted all attempts by von Rundstedt to reduce the operation to a more modest scale, aimed at rolling up the American forces, which had pushed beyond the city of Aachen to the River Roer. The Führer was now seeking what the German General Staff referred to as a 'total decision'.


The plans were drawn up in the greatest secrecy, with Hitler obsessively controlling every detail. When Rundstedt received the final orders, the words 'Not To Be Altered' were scrawled across them in Hitler's spidery hand.
... with Hitler obsessively controlling every detail.


Thoroughly dispirited, Rundstedt relinquished overall control of the operation to Field Marshal Walther Model, commander of Army Group B, and spent the greater part of the offensive reading novels and drinking cognac.

Hidden from Allied air surveillance, a formidable force assembled in the narrow, mist-shrouded valleys and thick forests of the Eifel hills on the eastern edge of the Ardennes. In the north was 6th SS Panzer Army, commanded by General Sepp Dietrich. In the centre of the line was 5th Panzer Army, under General Hasso von Manteuffel, tasked with supporting Dietrich's left flank. Further south was 7th Army, a follow-up force shielding Manteuffel's left flank.


Between them, Dietrich and Manteuffel fielded 28 divisions, ten of them armoured. In the armoured divisions were concentrated 1,250 of the 2,600 tanks and assault guns amassed for the Ardennes offensive, now code-named Autumn Mist.
... a formidable force assembled in the narrow, mist-shrouded valleys and thick forests ...

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Most of the armoured divisions had been brought up to strength, but there was a significant shortage of fuel. Only 25 per cent of the minimum required was available when Autumn Mist was launched, the greater part of it held east of the River Rhine. The Germans planned to make up the shortfall with captured American fuel.


In the build-up to the offensive, the Allies had received a stream of tantalising hints about the German preparations. These came from decrypted German messages sent on the Enigma enciphering machine, and by 1944, the Allies were reading some of the messages in 'real time'.

But they interpreted the movement detected in the area of the Ardennes merely as an indication of the through passage of German formations, predictably concentrating against Allied thrusts to the north and south of the region.




Autumn Mist

Taken by surprise, US troops were scattered in the forest when fighting began. After several postponements, the attack was launched at 5.30am on 16 December 1944, on a 70-mile front from Monschau in the north to Echternach in the south.

The first blow fell on US 2nd, 99th, 106th and 28th Divisions, the last still recovering from fierce fighting in the Hürtgen Forest. In the American rear, German infiltrators wearing American uniforms cut telephone wires and spread confusion.


At first there was something approaching blind panic behind the American lines. Scattered bands of US infantry wandered about the wintry forests, fighting the Germans when they collided with them, or trying to link up with larger formations. The fighting was confused and vicious.

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ref http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_bulge_01.shtml
 
Operation Stösser (English: Operation Auk) was a paratroop drop into the American rear in the High Fens area during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II. Their objective was to take and hold the Baraque Michel crossroads until the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division.

The operation was led by Oberst Freiherr Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, who was given only 8 days to prepare the mission. The majority of the paratroops and pilots assigned to the operation were undertrained and inexperienced. The German paratroops' only nighttime drop during World War II, the mission was a failure.

Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, hero of the legendary if ill-fated airborne assault on Crete, was summoned on December 8 and told to prepare for a mission, but not given any details.

Heydte was given only eight days to prepare. He wanted to use his own regiment, but this was forbidden because their movement might alert the Allies to the impending counterattack. Instead, he was provided with a Kampfgruppe of 800 men.

The II Parachute Corps was tasked with contributing 100 men from each of its regiments. Instead of contributing their best men as ordered, the regiments sent their misfits and troublemakers.

Heydte could not afford to resist too strongly. A cousin of Claus von Stauffenberg, a central figure in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, he was under scrutiny.

In loyalty to their command, 150 men from Heydte's own unit, the 6th Parachute Regiment, went against orders and joined him. To avoid alerting the Allied forces, the German command planned to conduct the drop without prior reconnaissance or current aerial photographs.

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The men had little time to establish unit cohesion or train together. Many of the men assigned to Heydte had never jumped out of an airplane before. Heydte later commented, "Never in my entire career had I been in command of a unit with less fighting spirit."

On December 13, Heydte visited the headquarters of Army Group B near Bad Münstereifel to complain that the resources allocated to him for the operation were wholly inadequate. Field Marshal Walter Model, who had tried to persuade Hitler to attempt a less ambitious counterattack, replied that he gave the entire Ardennes Offensive less than a 10% chance of succeeding.

Model told him it was necessary to make the attempt: "It must be done because this offensive is the last chance to conclude the war favorably."

The drop was delayed for a day when the assigned aircraft did not show up. The new drop time was set for 03:00 on 17 December; the drop zone was 7 miles (11 km) north of Malmedy. Their objective was to seize the crossroads and hold it for approximately twenty-four hours until relieved by the 12th SS Panzer Division, hampering the Allied flow of reinforcements and supplies into the area.

Just after midnight on 17 December, 112 Ju 52 transport planes with around 1,300 paratroops took off during a powerful snowstorm with strong winds and considerable low cloud cover. The Luftwaffe was short of experienced pilots: many of the pilots had never flown the Ju 52 before, half had never flown in combat, nor were they trained to conduct drops at night or to fly in formation.

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Pathfinders from the Nachtschlachtgruppe 20 were supposed to lead the way, but the pilots were so inexperienced that they flew with their navigation lights on. Many planes went off course. Two hundred and fifty men were dropped near Bonn, 50 miles (80 km) from the intended drop zone. Some landed with their troops still on board.

Strong winds deflected many paratroops whose planes were relatively close to the intended drop zone and made their landings far rougher. Only a fraction of the force landed near the intended drop zone. Since many of the German paratroops were very inexperienced, some were crippled upon impact and died where they fell. Some were found the following spring when the snow melted.

Because of the extensive dispersal of the drop, Fallschirmjäger were reported all over the Ardennes, and the Allies believed a major division-sized jump had taken place, causing the Americans much confusion and convincing them to allocate men to secure the rear instead of facing the main German thrust at the front. An entire U.S. infantry regiment of 3000 men (U.S. 18th Infantry) along with an armored combat command of 300 tanks and 2,000 men searched several days for the German force.

The 12th SS Panzer Division, unable to defeat the Americans at the Battle of Elsenborn Ridge, never arrived. By noon on 17 December, Heydte's unit had scouted the woods and rounded up a total of around 300 troops. With only enough ammunition for a single fight, the force was too small to take the crossroads on its own. Heydte first planned to wait for the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division when they would suddenly seize the crossroads just before their arrival. After three days of waiting, he abandoned these revised plans and instead converted his mission to reconnaissance.

Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich had scoffed at Heydte's request for carrier pigeons, and none of the unit's radios survived the drop, so he was unable to report the detailed information he gathered.

With only a single day's food supply and limited water, on 19 December Heydte withdrew his forces towards the German lines. He used their limited ammunition to attack the rear of the American lines. Only about one-third reached the German rear. Heydte, wounded, frostbitten, and suffering from pneumonia, knocked on doors in Monschau until he found a German family. The next morning he sent a boy with a surrender note to the Allies.

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Thank you for going to the trouble of refreshing the story, a good read. Was not aware before of this parachute drop plan. It's great when you can add the supporting vehicles and figures to the mix. Well done. Robin.
 
from - UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE ARDENNES:
BATTLE OF THE BULGE
by
Hugh M. Cole

The amount of ammunition and POL
required to support the attack imposed
a severe load not only upon the dwindling
German war economy but on the
Eifel rail system as well. Hitler had
allocated one hundred trains of ammunition
to nourish the counteroffensive, this
coming from the special Fuehrer Reserve.

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Over and above this special reserve,
Generalmajor Alfred Toppe, the
O berquartermeister, figured on scraping
together four units of what in German
practice was considered a basic load. Of
these units, one was allocated for the
artillery barrage preparatory to the
attack, one half would be used in breaking
through the enemy main line of
resistance, and one and a half would be
fired to keep the offensive rolling.

Toppe had planned to have two basic loads of

ammunition in the hands of troops when
the attack commenced and did deliver
the loads as scheduled. However, he had
not counted on the Allied attacks, furnishing
only enough extra ammunition
for the normal day-to-day battle in the
west. By the second week of December
the two basic loads had been whittled
down to one and a half. Even so, on the
last day reported–13 December–Army
Group B had 15,099 tons of ammunition
in its dumps.

The heavy concentration

of antiaircraft artillery scheduled to support
the attack was better off than the
ground gunners: the III Flak Corps, with
66 heavy and 74 medium and light
batteries, had 7 basic loads of ammunition.
In net, the Army Group B logisticians
estimated the attack would average
a daily ammunition consumption of
about 1,200 tons. Needless to say this
figure was based on a fast-moving exploitation
once the breakthrough was
accomplished.

Motor fuel, a notorious logistic problem
in German armies at this stage of
the war, was the greatest headache in
the Western Front headquarters, particularly
in the last days before the attack.
The journals of OB WEST are jammed
during this period with messages
attempting to trace promised trainloads
of POL.

By 16 December, however, the
quartermaster and rail systems had combined
to put the promised 4,680,000
gallons in the hands of OB WEST,
although perhaps half of this was in
dumps back at .the Rhine.
During the period 9 September–15
December the Seventh Army, or main,
concentration area received 1,502 troop
trains and approximately 500 supply
trains, most of which were earmarked
for the counteroffensive.

The Eifel rail net in this time unloaded 144,735 tons

of supplies. At some point the Eifel rail
system would be saturated; this point
was reached on 17 December when OB
WEST was forced to detrain its incoming
reserve divisions on the west bank
of the Rhine, a factor of some significance
in the ensuing history of the Ardennes
battle.

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The rail movement of the initial
attack divisions had nearly ended by 11
December, although the transport of the
second phase formations, belonging to
the OKW reserve, still had a few days
to go. The Seventh Army, quondam
caretaker on the Ardennes front, had
most of its divisions in the line but in
the nights just before the attack would
have to shift some of these southward
into the final assembly area designated
for the Seventh on the attack left wing.
The Fifth Panzer Army, slated to make
the attack in the center, had begun its
concentration in the Remagen-Mayen
area of the Eifel as early as 26 November,
but some of its armor was coming from
as far north as Munchen-Gladbach–one
attack division, the 116th Panzer, would
not complete detraining until 16 December.

The
Sixth Panzer Army, which in
Hitler’s mind and in OKW plans represented
the main effort and whose
four SS panzer divisions were expected
to pace the entire counteroffensive, by
6 December had closed its armor in a
zone stretching from west of Cologne
to southwest of Bonn.

The question remained whether the
Sixth infantry
divisions, some of which were in the
Roer battle line, could be pried loose
and moved south in time for H-hour.

The
Fifteenth Army, once intended to
cover the north flank of the Sixth Panzer
Army advance, had its hands full on the
Roer front. Here there was no immediate
assembly problem, although the
army would have to plug the gaps left
as divisions pulled out for the Ardennes.
Ultimately, however, the Fifteenth
might be reinforced from the OKW reserve
and join the attack. If the Fifteenth
Army is excluded the German
attack front extended for 143 kilometers
(89 miles).

The main armored concentration,

however, would take place
on a frontage of 97 kilometers (61
miles) .

The timetable for final assembly in
attack positions required three days, or
better, three nights, since nearly all
movement would be confined to hours
of darkness.

To prevent premature disclosure

by some unit wandering into
the assembly area, all formations except
those already deployed on the original
Seventh Army front or immediately
behind it were banned from crossing
the Army Group B base line, twelve
miles behind the front, until the final
assembly was ordered by Hitler.

Once across the base line every movement had

to follow rigid timing. For further control
the infantry and armored divisions
were each assigned two sectors for assembly.
Infantry Area I was marked by
a restraining line six miles from the
front; Area 11 extended forward to
points about two and a half to three
miles from the front.

Armor Area I
actually was east of the base line which
served as the forward restraining line;
Area 11 was defined by a line six to ten
miles from the front. The armored
divisions, of course, would be strung out
over greater distances than given here
but their assault echelons would be
fitted inside the two armored areas.
 
Timing was defined by coded days
from the alphabet. Since O-Tag or Dday
was in fact 16 December the calendar
dates can be given for what in the
plan was merely an undated sequence
of events.

On
K-Tag (12 December)
troops were alerted for movement. As
yet they had no knowledge of the offensive;
they would receive this information
the night before the attack jumped off.

By
L-Tag (13 December) all units were
supposed to have their forward detachments
up to the base line; most of them
did. During the night of 13 December
the clockwork march to the final attack
positions began. Those infantry divisions
not already in place moved to the
forward restraining line of their Area I.

This also was the night for the guns and
howitzers belonging to army and VAK
batteries to move. Using horses from
the neighboring infantry artillery regiments,
and liberally employing straw to
muffle the wheels (just as had been done
in 1918), the batteries were dragged
into positions about five miles to the
rear of the ultimate firing emplacements.

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The rocket projectors, easier to camouflage,

were hidden immediately behind
their firing positions.

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The rocket projector crews dug their pieces
into the pits from which the preparation
for the attack would be fired. The
tracked elements of the panzer division
assault groups churned into Armor Area
II over roads which only two days earlier
had been iced completely and along
which treacherous stretches remained.
Wheeled units moved up to the Area I
restraining line.

This armored movement
in the dark of night was difficult
indeed, but to avoid entanglement each
panzer division had been given a road
of its own and in no cases did the distance
traveled during the two nights
total more than fifty miles; for most it
was less.

On the night of 15 December
all formations marched to the line of
departure or to forward combat positions.
It would appear that nearly all
units were in place an hour or two before
H-hour, 0530 on the morning of
16 December.
Although the troops knew nothing of
their mission until the night of the 15th,
save what they could surmise, the commanders
had been given the picture in
time to do some individual planning.
By the end of the first week in December
all corps and division commanders
knew what was expected of them. Most
of the division staffs seem to have been
briefed on 10 December.

Hitler received the commanders entrusted with
the attack in two groups on the nights
of 11 and 12 December. Most of the
visitors seem to have been more impressed
by the Fuehrer’s obvious physical
deterioration and the grim mien of
the SS guards than by Hitler’s rambling
recital of his deeds for Germany which
constituted this last “briefing.”
The forces assembled. for the counteroffensive
were the product of an almost
psychotic drive by Hitler to put every
last man, gun, and tank that could be
stripped from some part of the declining
German war establishment into the
attack.

Thirteen infantry and seven
armored divisions were ready for the
initial assault. Five divisions from the
OKW reserve were on alert or actually
en route to form the second wave, plus
one armored and one mechanized brigade
at reinforced strength. Approximately
five additional divisions were
listed in the OKW reserve, but their
availability was highly dubious.

Some 1,900 artillery pieces-including rocket
projectors-were ready to support the
attack.

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