Creating the Battle of the Bulge.....Wacht Am Rhine (1 Viewer)

[villagehorse]

Love the German horse train. Robin.

 

[cruelios]

Love the German horse train. Robin.

Yea me too, what's the brand ??

 

[villagehorse]

Yea me too, what's the brand ??

Long retired Figarti. ETG-073
Robin.

 

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[villagehorse]

Looking at these a lot closer since I have started dabbling with Winter series, good material for inspiration. Robin.

 

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72 years ago today, December 15th 1944, German forces had gathered for a major push into W Europe - a desperate gamble to reach the sea at Antwep and split the allies, via the Meuse bridges around Liege.










The attack would be launched early on the misty winter morning of Dec. 16, 1944. More than 200,000 German troops and nearly 1,000 tanks would be launched through the Ardennes Forest, a 75-mile stretch of the front characterized by dense woods and few roads, held by four inexperienced and battle-worn American divisions stationed there for rest and seasoning.

 

[panda1gen]

It was on 16[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944 when Hitler told General Jodl he would counter attack, just as Market-Garden was getting underway. By October plans were drawn up and detailed, secret planning well underway. None of his Generals thought that the forces were adequate. None of them, not even Field Marshall Von Rundsted could argue. Especially at the death throes of the Reich, power was arbitrary, absolute and administered with lethal punishment.

Just as they had in May 1940, when they had settled the fate of France in one day, German armies would drive through the forest of the Ardennes to cross the River Meuse, then sweep north to retake Brussels and seize the port of Antwerp. Cut off from their American allies, the British Second and Canadian First Armies would be enveloped and destroyed. The Western alliance against the Axis would collapse, freeing Germany to deal with the mounting pressure being exerted on the Eastern Front by the Red Army.

This was the last occasion in the war when Hitler, an inveterate gambler, still possessed enough chips to double his stake. It was a bold plan, sweeping in concept and impossible to execute. When Hitler unveiled it on 24 October, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, his Commander-in-Chief West, was:

'staggered... It was obvious to me that the available forces were far too small - in fact no soldier really believed that the aim of reaching Antwerp was really practicable. But I knew by now that it was useless to protest to Hitler about the possibility of anything.'


Even the fanatically loyal General Sepp Dietrich, commander of Sixth SS Panzer Army, one of the two armies tasked with the operation, was not confident of success. He complained, 'All Hitler wants me to do is to cross a river, capture Brussels and then go on and take Antwerp. And all this in the worst time of the year ... when the snow is waist deep ....'


Hitler resisted all attempts by von Rundstedt to reduce the operation to a more modest scale, aimed at rolling up the American forces, which had pushed beyond the city of Aachen to the River Roer. The Führer was now seeking what the German General Staff referred to as a 'total decision'.


The plans were drawn up in the greatest secrecy, with Hitler obsessively controlling every detail. When Rundstedt received the final orders, the words 'Not To Be Altered' were scrawled across them in Hitler's spidery hand.

... with Hitler obsessively controlling every detail.
​

Thoroughly dispirited, Rundstedt relinquished overall control of the operation to Field Marshal Walther Model, commander of Army Group B, and spent the greater part of the offensive reading novels and drinking cognac.

Hidden from Allied air surveillance, a formidable force assembled in the narrow, mist-shrouded valleys and thick forests of the Eifel hills on the eastern edge of the Ardennes. In the north was 6th SS Panzer Army, commanded by General Sepp Dietrich. In the centre of the line was 5th Panzer Army, under General Hasso von Manteuffel, tasked with supporting Dietrich's left flank. Further south was 7th Army, a follow-up force shielding Manteuffel's left flank.


Between them, Dietrich and Manteuffel fielded 28 divisions, ten of them armoured. In the armoured divisions were concentrated 1,250 of the 2,600 tanks and assault guns amassed for the Ardennes offensive, now code-named Autumn Mist.

... a formidable force assembled in the narrow, mist-shrouded valleys and thick forests ...




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Most of the armoured divisions had been brought up to strength, but there was a significant shortage of fuel. Only 25 per cent of the minimum required was available when Autumn Mist was launched, the greater part of it held east of the River Rhine. The Germans planned to make up the shortfall with captured American fuel.


In the build-up to the offensive, the Allies had received a stream of tantalising hints about the German preparations. These came from decrypted German messages sent on the Enigma enciphering machine, and by 1944, the Allies were reading some of the messages in 'real time'.

But they interpreted the movement detected in the area of the Ardennes merely as an indication of the through passage of German formations, predictably concentrating against Allied thrusts to the north and south of the region.


​

Autumn Mist

Taken by surprise, US troops were scattered in the forest when fighting began. After several postponements, the attack was launched at 5.30am on 16 December 1944, on a 70-mile front from Monschau in the north to Echternach in the south.

The first blow fell on US 2nd, 99th, 106th and 28th Divisions, the last still recovering from fierce fighting in the Hürtgen Forest. In the American rear, German infiltrators wearing American uniforms cut telephone wires and spread confusion.


At first there was something approaching blind panic behind the American lines. Scattered bands of US infantry wandered about the wintry forests, fighting the Germans when they collided with them, or trying to link up with larger formations. The fighting was confused and vicious.







ref http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_bulge_01.shtml

 

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Operation Stösser (English: Operation Auk) was a paratroop drop into the American rear in the High Fens area during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II. Their objective was to take and hold the Baraque Michel crossroads until the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division.

The operation was led by Oberst Freiherr Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, who was given only 8 days to prepare the mission. The majority of the paratroops and pilots assigned to the operation were undertrained and inexperienced. The German paratroops' only nighttime drop during World War II, the mission was a failure.

Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, hero of the legendary if ill-fated airborne assault on Crete, was summoned on December 8 and told to prepare for a mission, but not given any details.

Heydte was given only eight days to prepare. He wanted to use his own regiment, but this was forbidden because their movement might alert the Allies to the impending counterattack. Instead, he was provided with a Kampfgruppe of 800 men.

The II Parachute Corps was tasked with contributing 100 men from each of its regiments. Instead of contributing their best men as ordered, the regiments sent their misfits and troublemakers.

Heydte could not afford to resist too strongly. A cousin of Claus von Stauffenberg, a central figure in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, he was under scrutiny.

In loyalty to their command, 150 men from Heydte's own unit, the 6th Parachute Regiment, went against orders and joined him. To avoid alerting the Allied forces, the German command planned to conduct the drop without prior reconnaissance or current aerial photographs.



The men had little time to establish unit cohesion or train together. Many of the men assigned to Heydte had never jumped out of an airplane before. Heydte later commented, "Never in my entire career had I been in command of a unit with less fighting spirit."

On December 13, Heydte visited the headquarters of Army Group B near Bad Münstereifel to complain that the resources allocated to him for the operation were wholly inadequate. Field Marshal Walter Model, who had tried to persuade Hitler to attempt a less ambitious counterattack, replied that he gave the entire Ardennes Offensive less than a 10% chance of succeeding.

Model told him it was necessary to make the attempt: "It must be done because this offensive is the last chance to conclude the war favorably."

The drop was delayed for a day when the assigned aircraft did not show up. The new drop time was set for 03:00 on 17 December; the drop zone was 7 miles (11 km) north of Malmedy. Their objective was to seize the crossroads and hold it for approximately twenty-four hours until relieved by the 12th SS Panzer Division, hampering the Allied flow of reinforcements and supplies into the area.

Just after midnight on 17 December, 112 Ju 52 transport planes with around 1,300 paratroops took off during a powerful snowstorm with strong winds and considerable low cloud cover. The Luftwaffe was short of experienced pilots: many of the pilots had never flown the Ju 52 before, half had never flown in combat, nor were they trained to conduct drops at night or to fly in formation.



Pathfinders from the Nachtschlachtgruppe 20 were supposed to lead the way, but the pilots were so inexperienced that they flew with their navigation lights on. Many planes went off course. Two hundred and fifty men were dropped near Bonn, 50 miles (80 km) from the intended drop zone. Some landed with their troops still on board.

Strong winds deflected many paratroops whose planes were relatively close to the intended drop zone and made their landings far rougher. Only a fraction of the force landed near the intended drop zone. Since many of the German paratroops were very inexperienced, some were crippled upon impact and died where they fell. Some were found the following spring when the snow melted.

Because of the extensive dispersal of the drop, Fallschirmjäger were reported all over the Ardennes, and the Allies believed a major division-sized jump had taken place, causing the Americans much confusion and convincing them to allocate men to secure the rear instead of facing the main German thrust at the front. An entire U.S. infantry regiment of 3000 men (U.S. 18th Infantry) along with an armored combat command of 300 tanks and 2,000 men searched several days for the German force.

The 12th SS Panzer Division, unable to defeat the Americans at the Battle of Elsenborn Ridge, never arrived. By noon on 17 December, Heydte's unit had scouted the woods and rounded up a total of around 300 troops. With only enough ammunition for a single fight, the force was too small to take the crossroads on its own. Heydte first planned to wait for the arrival of the 12th SS Panzer Division when they would suddenly seize the crossroads just before their arrival. After three days of waiting, he abandoned these revised plans and instead converted his mission to reconnaissance.

Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich had scoffed at Heydte's request for carrier pigeons, and none of the unit's radios survived the drop, so he was unable to report the detailed information he gathered.

With only a single day's food supply and limited water, on 19 December Heydte withdrew his forces towards the German lines. He used their limited ammunition to attack the rear of the American lines. Only about one-third reached the German rear. Heydte, wounded, frostbitten, and suffering from pneumonia, knocked on doors in Monschau until he found a German family. The next morning he sent a boy with a surrender note to the Allies.

 

[villagehorse]

Thank you for going to the trouble of refreshing the story, a good read. Was not aware before of this parachute drop plan. It's great when you can add the supporting vehicles and figures to the mix. Well done. Robin.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Kevin,

Your posts continue to educate and entertain!

Louis

 

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from - UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE ARDENNES:
BATTLE OF THE BULGE
by
Hugh M. Cole

The amount of ammunition and POL​

required to support the attack imposed​

a severe load not only upon the dwindling
​

German war economy but on the​

Eifel rail system as well. Hitler had
​

allocated one hundred trains of ammunition​

to nourish the counteroffensive, this​

coming from the special Fuehrer Reserve.



​

Over and above this special reserve,​

Generalmajor Alfred Toppe, the
​

O berquartermeister, figured on scraping​

together four units of what in German​

practice was considered a basic load. Of​

these units, one was allocated for the​

artillery barrage preparatory to the​

attack, one half would be used in breaking​

through the enemy main line of​

resistance, and one and a half would be​

fired to keep the offensive rolling.

Toppe had planned to have two basic loads of
​

ammunition in the hands of troops when​

the attack commenced and did deliver​

the loads as scheduled. However, he had
​

not counted on the Allied attacks, furnishing​

only enough extra ammunition​

for the normal day-to-day battle in the​

west. By the second week of December​

the two basic loads had been whittled​

down to one and a half. Even so, on the​

last day reported–13 December–Army​

Group B had 15,099 tons of ammunition​

in its dumps.

The heavy concentration
​

of antiaircraft artillery scheduled to support
​

the attack was better off than the​

ground gunners: the III Flak Corps, with​

66 heavy and 74 medium and light​

batteries, had 7 basic loads of ammunition.​

In net, the Army Group B logisticians​

estimated the attack would average​

a daily ammunition consumption of​

about 1,200 tons. Needless to say this​

figure was based on a fast-moving exploitation​

once the breakthrough was​

accomplished.

​

Motor fuel, a notorious logistic problem​

in German armies at this stage of​

the war, was the greatest headache in​

the Western Front headquarters, particularly​

in the last days before the attack.​

The journals of OB WEST are jammed​

during this period with messages​

attempting to trace promised trainloads​

of POL.

By 16 December, however, the
​

quartermaster and rail systems had combined​

to put the promised 4,680,000​

gallons in the hands of OB WEST,​

although perhaps half of this was in​

dumps back at .the Rhine.​

During the period 9 September–15​

December the Seventh Army, or main,​

concentration area received 1,502 troop​

trains and approximately 500 supply​

trains, most of which were earmarked​

for the counteroffensive.

The Eifel rail net in this time unloaded 144,735 tons
​

of supplies. At some point the Eifel rail​

system would be saturated; this point​

was reached on 17 December when OB​

WEST was forced to detrain its incoming​

reserve divisions on the west bank​

of the Rhine, a factor of some significance​

in the ensuing history of the Ardennes
​

battle.​

 

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The rail movement of the initial
​

attack divisions had nearly ended by 11​

December, although the transport of the​

second phase formations, belonging to​

the OKW reserve, still had a few days​

to go. The Seventh Army, quondam
​

caretaker on the Ardennes front, had​

most of its divisions in the line but in
​

the nights just before the attack would​

have to shift some of these southward​

into the final assembly area designated
​

for the Seventh on the attack left wing.​

The Fifth Panzer Army, slated to make​

the attack in the center, had begun its​

concentration in the Remagen-Mayen​

area of the Eifel as early as 26 November,​

but some of its armor was coming from​

as far north as Munchen-Gladbach–one​

attack division, the 116th Panzer, would​

not complete detraining until 16 December.​

The Sixth Panzer Army, which in
​

Hitler’s mind and in OKW plans represented​

the main effort and whose​

four SS panzer divisions were expected​

to pace the entire counteroffensive, by​

6 December had closed its armor in a​

zone stretching from west of Cologne​

to southwest of Bonn.

The question remained whether the Sixth infantry
​

divisions, some of which were in the​

Roer battle line, could be pried loose​

and moved south in time for H-hour.
​

The Fifteenth Army, once intended to
​

cover the north flank of the Sixth Panzer​

Army advance, had its hands full on the​

Roer front. Here there was no immediate​

assembly problem, although the​

army would have to plug the gaps left​

as divisions pulled out for the Ardennes.​

Ultimately, however, the Fifteenth​

might be reinforced from the OKW reserve​

and join the attack. If the Fifteenth​

Army is excluded the German​

attack front extended for 143 kilometers​

(89 miles).

The main armored concentration,
​

however, would take place​

on a frontage of 97 kilometers (61​

miles) .

​

The timetable for final assembly in​

attack positions required three days, or​

better, three nights, since nearly all​

movement would be confined to hours​

of darkness.

To prevent premature disclosure
​

by some unit wandering into​

the assembly area, all formations except​

those already deployed on the original​

Seventh Army front or immediately​

behind it were banned from crossing​

the Army Group B base line, twelve​

miles behind the front, until the final​

assembly was ordered by Hitler.

Once across the base line every movement had
​

to follow rigid timing. For further control​

the infantry and armored divisions
​

were each assigned two sectors for assembly.​

Infantry Area I was marked by​

a restraining line six miles from the​

front; Area 11 extended forward to​

points about two and a half to three​

miles from the front.

Armor Area I
​

actually was east of the base line which​

served as the forward restraining line;​

Area 11 was defined by a line six to ten​

miles from the front. The armored​

divisions, of course, would be strung out​

over greater distances than given here​

but their assault echelons would be​

fitted inside the two armored areas.​

 

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Timing was defined by coded days
​

from the alphabet. Since O-Tag or Dday​

was in fact 16 December the calendar​

dates can be given for what in the​

plan was merely an undated sequence​

of events.

On K-Tag (12 December)
​

troops were alerted for movement. As​

yet they had no knowledge of the offensive;​

they would receive this information​

the night before the attack jumped off.​

By L-Tag (13 December) all units were
​

supposed to have their forward detachments​

up to the base line; most of them​

did. During the night of 13 December
​

the clockwork march to the final attack​

positions began. Those infantry divisions​

not already in place moved to the​

forward restraining line of their Area I.​

This also was the night for the guns and​

howitzers belonging to army and VAK​

batteries to move. Using horses from​

the neighboring infantry artillery regiments,​

and liberally employing straw to​

muffle the wheels (just as had been done​

in 1918), the batteries were dragged​

into positions about five miles to the​

rear of the ultimate firing emplacements.


​

The rocket projectors, easier to camouflage,
​

were hidden immediately behind​

their firing positions.


​

The rocket projector crews dug their pieces

into the pits from which the preparation​

for the attack would be fired. The​

tracked elements of the panzer division​

assault groups churned into Armor Area​

II over roads which only two days earlier​

had been iced completely and along​

which treacherous stretches remained.​

Wheeled units moved up to the Area I​

restraining line.

This armored movement​

in the dark of night was difficult​

indeed, but to avoid entanglement each​

panzer division had been given a road​

of its own and in no cases did the distance​

traveled during the two nights​

total more than fifty miles; for most it​

was less.

On the night of 15 December​

all formations marched to the line of​

departure or to forward combat positions.​

It would appear that nearly all​

units were in place an hour or two before​

H-hour, 0530 on the morning of​

16 December.​

Although the troops knew nothing of​

their mission until the night of the 15th,​

save what they could surmise, the commanders​

had been given the picture in​

time to do some individual planning.​

By the end of the first week in December​

all corps and division commanders​

knew what was expected of them. Most​

of the division staffs seem to have been​

briefed on 10 December.

Hitler received the commanders entrusted with​

the attack in two groups on the nights​

of 11 and 12 December. Most of the​

visitors seem to have been more impressed​

by the Fuehrer’s obvious physical​

deterioration and the grim mien of​

the SS guards than by Hitler’s rambling​

recital of his deeds for Germany which​

constituted this last “briefing.” ​

The forces assembled. for the counteroffensive​

were the product of an almost​

psychotic drive by Hitler to put every​

last man, gun, and tank that could be​

stripped from some part of the declining​

German war establishment into the​

attack.

Thirteen infantry and seven​

armored divisions were ready for the

initial assault. Five divisions from the​

OKW reserve were on alert or actually​

en route to form the second wave, plus​

one armored and one mechanized brigade​

at reinforced strength. Approximately​

five additional divisions were​

listed in the OKW reserve, but their​

availability was highly dubious.

Some 1,900 artillery pieces-including rocket​

projectors-were ready to support the​

attack.







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