Creating the Battle of the Bulge.....Wacht Am Rhine (2 Viewers)

On the night of the 14th the infantry
divisions not already in place marched
quietly into Area II. Motorized artillery
went to assigned firing positions while
low-flying German planes zoomed noisily
over the American listening posts,
or it was dragged forward by horses.

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Josef “Sepp” Dietrich had the appropriate
political qualifications to ensure
Hitler’s trust but, on his military record,
hardly those meriting command of the
main striking force in the great counteroffensive.
By profession a butcher,
Dietrich had learned something of the
soldier’s trade in World War I, rising to
the rank of sergeant, a rank which attached
to him perpetually in the minds
of the aristocratic members of the German
General Staff. He had accompanied
Hitler on the march to the Feldherrnhalle
in 1923 and by 1940 had risen to
command the Adolf Hitler Division,
raised from Hitler’s bodyguard regiment,
in the western campaign.

After gaining considerable reputation in
Russia, Dietrich was brought to the west
in 1944 and there commanded a corps
in the great tank battles at Caen. He
managed to hang onto his reputation
during the subsequent retreats and
finally was selected personally by Hitler
to command the Sixth Panzer Army. Uncouth,
despised by most of the higher
officer class, and with no great intelligence,
Dietrich had a deserved reputation
for bravery and was known as a
tenacious and driving division and corps
commander. Whether he could command
an army remained to be proven.

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The attack front assigned the Sixth
Panzer Army, Monschau to Krewinkel,
was narrower than that of its southern
partner because terrain in this sector
was poor at the breakthrough points and
would not offer cross-country tank going
until the Hohes Venn was passed.

The initial assault wave consisted of one armored
and one infantry corps. On the
south flank the I SS Panzer Corps
(Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Hermann
Priess) had two armored divisions,
the 1st SS Panzer and the 12th SS Panzer,
plus three infantry divisions, the 3d
Parachute, the 12th Volks Grenadier,
and the 277th Volks Grenadier.
 
On the north flank the LXVII Corps (General
der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld) had only
two infantry divisions, the 326th and
246th Volks Grenadier, The doctrinal
question as to whether tanks or infantry
should take the lead, still moot in
German military thinking after all the years

of war, had been raised when Dietrich
proposed to make the initial breakthrough
with his two tank divisions.

He was overruled by Model, however, and

the three infantry divisions were given
the mission of punching a hole on either
side of Udenbreth.

Thereafter the infantry was to swing aside,
moving northwest

to block the three roads which led
south from Verviers and onto the route
the armor would be taking in its dash
for Liége.

Hitzfeld’s corps had a less

ambitious program: to attack on either
side of Monschau, get across the Mutzenich-
Elsenborn road, then turn north
and west to establish a hard flank on the
line Simmerath-Eupen-Limburg.

All five of the
Sixth Panzer Army infantry
divisions ultimately would wind up, or
so the plan read, forming a shoulder on
an east-west line from Rötgen (north of
Monschau) to Liége.

Under this flank cover the armored divisions of the
I SS
Panzer Corps would roll west, followed
by the second armored wave, the II SS
Panzer Corps (General der Waffen-SS
Willi Bittrich) composed of the 2d and
9th SS Panzer Divisions.

German infantry ready themselves and prepare to assault.

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Sepp Dietrich was the overall commander of the 6th Army.

He wrote a note to be read by all commanders, “Soldiers of the Sixth Panzer Armee. The moment of decision is upon us. The Fuhrer has placed us at a vital point. It is for us to breach the enemy front and push beyond the Meuse. Surprise is half the battle. In spite of the terror bombings, the Home Front has supplied us with tanks, ammunition and weapons. We will not let them down.”


6th SS panzer army in the north was by far the strongest of the three German armies, as it contained four elite SS Panzer divisions. The aim was a repeat of the breakthrough in June of 1940, it was even hoped to cross the Meuse within the first 24 hours.

Oberstrumbannfuhrer Joachim Peiper was in command of the “Absoluter Schwerpunkt” and had worried that the timetable was too optimistic. Kampfgruppe Peiper was assigned to attack the Losheim Gap.

He held back the slower moving Tiger II's, at the base of the spearhead because of their horrific fuel consumption, slow speed and poor manoeuvrability.

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He opted to lead with pz IV's and Panthers instead. Everything rested on the ability to access the major roads and bridges.



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The Jagdpanther was one of the finest tank destroyers of the war, with relatively good mobility, reasonably thick and well sloped armour, all combined with a gun that could destroy all allied tanks at normal combat ranges.

An order to develop a heavy assault gun by mating the 88mm Pak L/71 gun to a Panther chassis was given on 2 October 1942, Hitler saw the prototype on 16 December 1943 and production began in January 1944.

The upper hull plates and side plates of the standard Panther chassis were extended to create the fighting compartment. Defence against enemy infantry was provided by a Hahverteidigungsgerät (close-defence weapon) mounted in the superstructure roof, plus a machine gun in a hull mount in the superstructure front.

Jagdpanthers were grouped into independent schwere Panzerjager Abteilungens – heavy anti-tank battalions of 42 vehicles plus HQ ( 3 companies with 14 vehicles each and 3 vehicles in battalion HQ) and those that operated as part of Panzer Divisions. The first Jagdpanthers were issued to schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 and 654. Only the 654th ever had a full compliment of vehicles, while 559th had only 10 to 14 vehicles.


The majority of Jagdpanthers produced in 1944 saw service on the Eastern Front, while only a single battalion (schwere Panzerjaeger Abteilung 654) saw service during Normandy Battles in the Summer of 1944, with around 12 vehicles reaching the front. These vehicles scored some success against allied armour.

In preparations for the Ardennes Offensive, the largest number ever of Jagdpanthers was assembled, including vehicles transferred to the Western Front from the Eastern Front to take part in the offensive.

Some 51 Jagdpanther in six battalions took part in the fighting in December of 1944. Thereafter they were also issued to the tank detachments of at least seven panzer divisions.

In total, only, 392 were produced between January 1944 and March 1945, too few to stop the allies.

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Honour Bound made some of the finest vehicles I've ever seen in the hobby. I have at least one of each vehicle they made, except for the Gold Edition Sturmtiger. One of my biggest regrets in the hobby is getting my order for the Sturmtiger in (only) 1 day late when they stopped production.:redface2:
 
Interesting article at posting 985 below on the Jagdpanther but I think there is a typo error in the German. For the close defence weapon,perhaps it should read --> Nahverteidigungsgerät and not Hahverteidigungsgerät ?

Blackbob.
 
My favourite German tank. The HB one would have been the best to collect, but now way too late. Robin.
 
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the main German thrust had King Tigers .....

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And panthers ... with grenadiers hitching a lift where possible ...

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a US tank commander prepares to block the advance .....

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The official history goes on ...

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It is a shame more people are unaware of the 7th (and 10th) armor role ..
 
The courage of the men who defended St. Vith should never be forgotten. Thank you for reminding us, Kevin.
 
Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45)
Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center For Military History.


a: PURPOSE.

The purpose of reconnaissance and they types of units employed to obtain information are similar in the U.S. and the German Armies. German tactical principles of reconnaissance, however, diverge somewhat from those of the U.S. The Germans stress aggressiveness, attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitered, and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information. Often they assign supplementary tasks to their reconnaissance units, such as sabotage behind enemy lines, harassment, or counter- reconnaissance.


b. TECHNIQUE.

Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitered. Reserves are kept on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitered are changed. The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security forces. When their reconnaissance units meet superior forces, they fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the enemy.


c. CLASSIFICATION.

Reconnaissance is classified by the Germans as operational, tactical, and battle reconnaissance - corresponding to the U.S. distant, close, and battle reconnaissance.


2. OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE (Operative Aufklarung)

Operational reconnaissance, penetrating over a large area in great depth, provides the basis for strategic planning and action. This type of reconnaissance is intended to determine the location and activities of enemy forces, particularly localities of rail concentrations, forward or rearward displacements of personnel, loading or unloading areas of army elements, the construction of field or permanent fortifications, and hostile air force concentrations. Identification of large enemy motorized elements, especially on an open flank, is important. Operational reconnaissance is carried out by the Air Force and by motorized units. Aerial photography units operate at altitudes of 16,500 to 26,500 feet. Since missions assigned to operational air reconnaissance are generally limited to the observation of important roads and railroads, reconnaissance sectors and areas normally are not assigned. The motorized units employed for operational reconnaissance have only directions and objectives assigned.

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3. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE (Taktische Aufklarung)

a. PURPOSE

Tactical reconnaissance, carried out in the area behind the operational reconnaissance, provides the basis for the commitment of troops. Its mission embraces identification of the enemy's organization, disposition, strength, and antiaircraft defense; determination of the enemy's reinforcement capabilities; and terrain reconnaissance of advance sectors. Air Force reconnaissance units and motorized and mounted reconnaissance battalions are employed for tactical reconnaissance. Their direction and radius of employment are based upon the results of the operational reconnaissance.

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b. AIR RECONNAISSANCE.

Tactical air reconnaissance is normally made from altitudes of 6,500 to 16,000 feet. As a rule, air reconnaissance units are assigned specific reconnaissance areas, the boundaries of which normally do not coincide with sectors assigned to ground units. Reconnaissance planes generally are employed singly.


c. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE.

Sectors of responsibility are assigned to ground tactical reconnaissance battalions. In order to make them independent or to facilitate their change of direction, battalions may be assigned only reconnaissance objectives. In such instances, boundary lines separate adjacent units. The Germans avoid using main roads as boundary lines, defining the sectors in such a way that main roads fall within the reconnaissance sectors. The width of a sector is determined by the situation, the type and strength of the reconnaissance battalion, the road net, and the terrain. In general, the width of a sector assigned to a motorized reconnaissance battalion does not exceed 30 miles.

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d. ORDERS FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Orders issued to a reconnaissance battalion or it's patrols normally contain, in addition to the mission, the following:

(1) Line of departure
(2) Information concerning adjacent reconnaissance units
(3) Sector boundaries or direction of operation.
(4) Objectives.
(5) Phase lines.
(6) Instructions for transmission of reports.
(7) Location of immediate objectives whose attainment is to be reported.
(8) Instructions regarding air-ground liaison.
(9) Time of departure, route, and objective of the main force.

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e. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURES.

When a motorized reconnaissance column expects contact with the enemy, it advances by leaps and bounds. The length of bounds depends on the cover the terrain offers as well as on the road net. As the distance from the enemy decreases, the bounds are shortened. The Germans utilize roads as long as possible and usually use different routes for the advance and the return.

The reconnaissance battalion commander normally sends out patrols which advance by bounds. Their distance in front of the battalion depends on the situation, the terrain, and the range of the signal equipment, but as a rule they are not more than an hour's traveling distance (about 25 miles) ahead of the battalion. The battalion serves as the reserve for the patrols and as an advance message center (Meldekopf), collecting the messages and relaying them to the rear. Armored reconnaissance cars, armored half-tracks, or motorcycles compose the motorized reconnaissance patrols, whose exact composition depends on their mission and on the situation. Motorcycles are used to fill in gaps and intervals, thereby thickening the reconnaissance net.

When the proximity of the enemy does not permit profitable employment of the motorized reconnaissance battalion, it is withdrawn and the motorized elements of the divisional reconnaissance battalion take over.

Divisional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more than one day's march (18 miles) in front of the division, covering an area approximately 6 miles wide.


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4. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE. (Gefechtsaufklarung)

a. GENERAL

Battle reconnaissance as a rule is begun when the opposing forces begin to deploy. All troops participating in battle carry out battle reconnaissance through patrols, artillery observation posts, observation battalions, and air reconnaissance units. The information obtained on the organization and strength of the enemy provides the basis for the conduct of the battle.

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