German King Tiger Tank (1 Viewer)

[MCKENNA77]

Hey everyone:

I watched a good show on the history channel about the King Tiger tank. According to the show it took around 300,000 man hours in a factory to produce one King Tiger tank. It’s obvious that the King Tiger was far more technologically advanced then the American Sherman tank(especially in muzzle velocity - common knowledge). Does anybody know approximately how many man hours it took to produce a Sherman? America made a crap load of them thus winning the war in the attrition department. The show stated that the Sherman was easier to produce and didn’t require as much skilled labor as the King Tiger. Yet the History channel didn’t touch on the actual difference in time/man hours to produce a King Tiger versus a Sherman. It did state that the King Tiger required skilled labor and machine precision parts. If German engineering would have designed the pieces of the King Tiger to be manufactured with more ease without sacrificing any tank functions would it have had a more serious impact in the tide of the war? Theoretically speaking, lets state that improved parts design reduces production time by one third. That would mean a German factory with 500 workers working 8 hour days could make a King Tiger in 50 working days instead of 75 working days. Which taken over an entire year(250WD) would mean you could make 5 tanks out of the factory as opposed to 3 tanks. Now this is just one factory, if you had 5 factories producing King Tigers in a year you could produce 25 tanks vs. 15 tanks. This is a 66% increase in tank production. But this also assumes that you have no material resources limiting production. So would the Germans have won if they had 66% more King Tigers? I really have no idea but it’s a freaky thought.


I have to apologize; I just re-read this whole thing.

Its late, I’ve been drinking.

MCKENNA

 

[OzDigger]

I've seen similar comparisons on tv before and most neglect to mention the number of allied lives that were lost in the average of five Shermans required to knock out a German big cat. To me it's similar to the human wave type of warfare that most of us feel only applies to less developed countries such as China in WWII.

 

[Louis Badolato]

I agree with Oz. The Sherman was improved in the post-war era by adding more armor, a bigger gun with a much higher muzzle velocity and an improved track/suspension system, making it a much more viable tank. If the Allied designers had built a good tank to begin with, a lot more Allied Tankers would have survived the war. It all boils down to misunderstanding the concept of "military doctrine". Our doctrine was that tanks don't fight tanks, tank destroyers fight tanks. What we failed to understand was that if the Germans had better tanks, they would attack our tanks with them, thereby nullifying our doctrine. Our doctrine only effectively works if we have good enough tanks to discourage the Germans from applying a different doctrine, or if we have some other means of preventing German Tanks from attacking our tanks.

 

[Rob]

I agree with Oz. The Sherman was improved in the post-war era by adding more armor, a bigger gun with a much higher muzzle velocity and an improved track/suspension system, making it a much more viable tank. If the Allied designers had built a good tank to begin with, a lot more Allied Tankers would have survived the war. It all boils down to misunderstanding the concept of "military doctrine". Our doctrine was that tanks don't fight tanks, tank destroyers fight tanks. What we failed to understand was that if the Germans had better tanks, they would attack our tanks with them, thereby nullifying our doctrine. Our doctrine only effectively works if we have good enough tanks to discourage the Germans from applying a different doctrine, or if we have some other means of preventing German Tanks from attacking our tanks.

Enter the Typhoon!

 

[Combat]

Keep in mind that the US not only had to build these tanks but also ship them across the ocean to the Pacific, Africa and Europe, land them on beaches and fight in all sorts of terrain. So no way could they have produced a heavier tank like the Tiger or King Tiger. Even so the Sherman rarely ever encountered one of those big boys - too few of them with most on the Eastern Front. All in all the Sherman probably performed its tactical function better than the Tigers.

That program also noted that the tank commanders wore their headsets over only one ear. I don't recall any of the major toy soldier companies accurately portraying this.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Combat,

I am not suggesting a bigger tank was necessary, but that the improved version of the Sherman which became available after the war should have been how the Sherman was originally designed. The Sherman was designed by comittee, always a bad idea, and things like the short barelled 75mm resulted from Artillery officers on the comittee mandating that the gun be able to fire a certain number of shots before being replaced. It was these SNAFU's, along with short-sighted adherence to an ineffective and impractical doctrine that caused the Sherman delived to our troops to be such a "Deathtrap".

 

[sceic2]

Hey everyone:...Its late, I’ve been drinking. MCKENNA

So like as that great American philosopher Clint Eastwood said, “A man just has to know his limitations.”

 

[Tex]

If I am not mistaken, a better US tank was being sent to Europe by late 1944 and stood up much better against panzers. I can't recall what it was called, though. But I do know it was a much better, much more armored, much more powerful tank than the Sherman. I believe it was used until the early 60's, but I could be wrong.

I have heard several accounts of tank battles in WWII when a US commander would have both tank destroyers and shermans under his command, but accidently send in shermans--resulting, of course, in slaughter. Most of the time, though, I would assume that Shermans were the only assets available.

 

[Louis Badolato]

If I am not mistaken, a better US tank was being sent to Europe by late 1944 and stood up much better against panzers. I can't recall what it was called, though. But I do know it was a much better, much more armored, much more powerful tank than the Sherman. I believe it was used until the early 60's, but I could be wrong.

I have heard several accounts of tank battles in WWII when a US commander would have both tank destroyers and shermans under his command, but accidently send in shermans--resulting, of course, in slaughter. Most of the time, though, I would assume that Shermans were the only assets available.

You are correct about a much more powerful main battle tank seeing very limited action at the end of the war - the M26 Pershing. It could have been in full production in time for the Normandy invasion, but was put on the back burner by Patton at Tidesworth Downs, over the objections of every other officer present, because Patton incorrectly believed that because it was heavier, it would be slower and have poorer cross-country performance, and because of his adherence to our armor doctrine (tanks don't fight tanks).

In fact, while the Pershing was almost twice as heavy, it had a substantially more powerful engine providing a better horsepower per ton ration and was faster than a Sherman, and had tracks almost twice as broad, providing for a lighter weight per square inch of track, and so had better cross country performance. It had thicker sloped armor, and came with a standard 90mm long barreled canon with a muzzle velocity nearly equal to the german 88mm mounted on the Tiger. A modified M26-E Super-Pershing which saw action with the Third Armored (Spearhead) Division at one engagement had a more powerful gun than the tiger, and knocked out a German tank at more than 2,000 yards. All of this information comes from a book called "Deathtraps" by Belton Cooper, who was an ordinance officer with the 3rd Armored Division.

The tank never saw action after WWII, although a similar looking tank called the Walker Bulldog saw action up into the 1960's.

 

[Tex]

What was the primary US tank of Korea?--not that we were fighting too many armored battles there. Was that the Walker Bulldog?

 

[binder001]

1) re: the M26 tank in time for Normandy - Louis we have been over this area before. The late Belton Cooper deserves deep respect as a veteran and he obviously knew what he SAW, but he is patently wrong in a number of areas and the M26 issue is one of them! The Pershing's blueprints were barely drawn before DDay - I don't see how the tank could have been rolling out of the factories. Don't forget, this was before heavy-lift air transport. Any new items took from 3 to 6 months to get from the factories to the users in the ETO. The M24 Chaffee was one of the least troubled new vehicles developed and it only a few reached Europe before the Battle of the Bulge.
Patton was opinionated to a fault and the AGF did listen to field officers' reports, but one LTG did not hold up production of the M26. It was the deeply flawed doctrine and Army bureaucracy that delayed an improved medium tank.

2) re: US tanks in Korea. Initially the M24 Chaffee was deployed because it was all that was available. The Chaffee couldn't slug it out with the NKPA T34/85s. When the US reinforcements came they brought WW2 vintage M4A3E8 and M26 medium tanks. Both of these handled the T34/85 quite easily. Later a few M46s (essentially an M26 with a bigger motor) came and they became a dominant type late in the war.

3) By the way, few post war Shermans had the armor changed from the 1944 standards. The successful Israeli conversions concentrated on better guns and higher horsepower diesel engines. This emphasizes that the British were on the right track with the "Firefly" conversions - put a BIG gun in the M4 and it could at least hit back at the German cats.

The real shame is that the AGF didnt realize how their doctrine was unrealistic on the battlefield. The German Army failed to cooperate by sending their tanks en-masse against our tank destroyers. The pesky panzers showed up in front of our Shermans instead. If the US had adopted the "Firefly" early enough we could have used our mass-production to get plenty of the guns available for converting more Shermans. It's possible that our Ordnance people could had addressed the mediocre HE performance of the 17 pounder gun (note that US tanks fired about 4X more HE than AP in Europe). HERE was a tank that was ready for DDay! They landed with Commonwealth forces on 6/6/44 and thereafter.

4) Certainly, the Sherman wasn't in the same league as the King Tiger, but US forces fought relatively few King Tigers. The US forces faced mainly Panther and Pz IV types. The bulk of US tank crew casualties didn't come from tank-to-tank combat, they came from hidden AT guns, mines and close-range HEAT weapons like the Panzerfaust. Mines and hollow-charge weapons are still a problem for a tank like the Abrams.

Further reading;
http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=282&Itemid=123&lang=en

http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/pool.pages/armor.myths.htm

Gary

 

[OzDigger]

1) The US Army were well aware they would be facing heavy tanks early in their war and even had some first hand experience in North Africa. I still can't understand why they did not give the matter more urgency considering the industrial capability of the US, combined with the fact that their factories were out of harms way. Meanwhile the Germans were able to produce increasingly advanced tanks (albeit with over-complicated systems) while being bombed day and night.

2) Given their experiences in WWII, why would the US Army believe a light tank (M-24 Chaffee) would be adequate in Korea I find the "that's all that was available" excuse hard to believe considering the amount of WWII surplus gear available.

3) The Israeli's were rather desparate and old M-4's were the best they could get hold of. That's apart from a few Centurions that they acquired, which they preferred over the Shermans. However the British weren't overly fond of Israel by that stage, so no more Centurions were forthcoming

4) It's true that more tanks in WWII were lost by means other than tank v tank engagements and this is still evident today. That doesn't change the fact that amour should be the main priority when you consider the crew as humans rather than a resource.

The Tank Destroyer doctrine only makes sense in a defensive battle and when the Germans attacked US forces in defended positions the tank destroyers proved effective - provided they could make a quick exit when things got to hot. The same can't be said for the US towed anti tank guns that were lost in much greater numbers because they took to long to get out of Dodge.

It's true that the German big cats lacked speed and reliability, but these aren't major issues when you are defending as the Germans were by 1944.

It's also true that you need more shipping space for larger tanks, but then they wouldn't have been knocked out as easily as the Sherman, therefore they would not have needed as many of them. As for crane/transport considerations for larger tanks, the Germans found ways to cope didn't they.

Sorry to rave on again, but I just can't see any positive spin for the Sherman especially when you consider the large crew losses it caused. To be more accurate these losses weren't the Sherman's fault, it was the US Army/Government

 

[binder001]

1) The US Army were well aware they would be facing heavy tanks early in their war and even had some first hand experience in North Africa. I still can't understand why they did not give the matter more urgency considering the industrial capability of the US, combined with the fact that their factories were out of harms way. Meanwhile the Germans were able to produce increasingly advanced tanks (albeit with over-complicated systems) while being bombed day and night.

**Actually the faced only a realtively few Tigers in North Africa and Sicily. They were a problem, but were handled. One of the contributing mistakes in US technical intelligence was that the Panther would also be a limited issue heavy tank. When the US got to Normandy they found large number of the excellent Panther in each Panzer Division. The German technical lead came from their shock at the T34 in the summer of 1941, while the US was still at peace. The Americans didn't get first hand combat against the Germans until late 1942. That lead of about 18 months meant that new German tanks would see regular combat and the US new tanks came into play at the end of the war.

2) Given their experiences in WWII, why would the US Army believe a light tank (M-24 Chaffee) would be adequate in Korea I find the "that's all that was available" excuse hard to believe considering the amount of WWII surplus gear available.

** The M24 was available because the US Army in the Far East of 1950 was oriented to occupation duties in Japan. The Japanese roads and bridges were of light construction, so the M24 was issued. It was NEVER meant to combat medium tanks. When the NKPA surged across the 38th parallel the US troops went into combat with the stuff they had. They still had old WW2 2.36" bazookas, which were ineffective against the T34/85 - they had 6-7 years to realize that the early bazooka wasn't good enough but the new 3.5" bazookas were in depots in CONUS.

3) The Israeli's were rather desparate and old M-4's were the best they could get hold of. That's apart from a few Centurions that they acquired, which they preferred over the Shermans. However the British weren't overly fond of Israel by that stage, so no more Centurions were forthcoming

**Very true - there are fascinating stories about where Israel got their first few M4s before they started getting them from France. Due to treaty restrictions the M48A2 Pattons had to go through West Germany. Still - well armed Shermans were able to take on much "better" tanks because of 1) the skill and courage of the Israeli tankers and 2) having a gun that would give as good as they got.

4) It's true that more tanks in WWII were lost by means other than tank v tank engagements and this is still evident today. That doesn't change the fact that amour should be the main priority when you consider the crew as humans rather than a resource.

**EVERY tank is a compromise. Armor, firepower and mobility are traded off to get a design that works for each nation's approach.

The Tank Destroyer doctrine only makes sense in a defensive battle and when the Germans attacked US forces in defended positions the tank destroyers proved effective - provided they could make a quick exit when things got to hot. The same can't be said for the US towed anti tank guns that were lost in much greater numbers because they took to long to get out of Dodge.

** Even in the defense US tank destroyer doctrine failed. In North Africa the crews had a mediocre weapon (M3 Gun Motor Carriage) and were dispersed over a wide area. TD doctrine called for massed fires from concentrated AT assets. The only other two times the US faced large German armored attack (Mortain and the Ardennes) found the TDs dispersed for infantry support. The gunners fought bravely, but their doctrine was never executed. By the way, many of the large towed US AT guns were 3" guns from Towed Tank Destroyer battalions - deployed because McNair and Bradley thought they would be cheaper than SP mounts.

It's true that the German big cats lacked speed and reliability, but these aren't major issues when you are defending as the Germans were by 1944.

** But many people act as if the US should have used them for the offensive drive across Europe. One common quote is that if Patton's Third Army had been equipped with Panthers in Normandy there would not have been ANY operational tanks when the reached the German border.

It's also true that you need more shipping space for larger tanks, but then they wouldn't have been knocked out as easily as the Sherman, therefore they would not have needed as many of them. As for crane/transport considerations for larger tanks, the Germans found ways to cope didn't they.

** When???? NO Tiger or Panther ever went ashore on an amphibious assault. The only large water barrier was moving a small number of Tigers to North Africa, from one established port to another. By the time the Pershings got to Europe they were landed at Antwerp, a fully functional port. The US and Britain had to move thousands of tanks to Europe for combat - Germany just threw them on a train. By the way, the clearance of an M26 Pershing in the door of a WW2 LST is measured in inches.

Sorry to rave on again, but I just can't see any positive spin for the Sherman especially when you consider the large crew losses it caused. To be more accurate these losses weren't the Sherman's fault, it was the US Army/Government

** Agreed, it was stubborness and short-sightedness of the US Army that meant that the M4 series were in front line service for a year after they should have been. I'm less into a "positive spin" than in pointing out that the crews made an obsolescent vehicle work in many situations around the world. The Sherman succeeded because of the Allied tank crews. Still, in the end, the Panthers lay rusting and the Shermans were parading through all the enemy capitols.

Last rant - why is it that people focus on the Sherman and not the Stuart? The US Army's fascination with the light tank lasted WAY too long. Each 1943-style tank battalion had 17 M5A1s which were little more than rolling MG platforms with minimal armor. Obviously the History Channel didn't do any shows on the Stuart.

Gary

 

[damian]

I thought it was overwhelming Allied air superiority which rendered the German tank advantage null and void
Regards
Damian

 

[binder001]

Allied air superiority certainly was a huge factor in the victory, but pilots don't "kill" as many tanks as they think - even today. That said, the air superiority certain raises h#$% with trucks, infantry and support equipment. No tank will go far without its fuel convoys whether it be a Tiger, Sherman or Abrams. Tanks are pretty helpless when confronted with a deep river or stream and a bombed bridge, so yes air support was (and is) vital. There were a number of battles where tac air wasn't able to intervene as directly as desired and it still fell to men on the ground to do the job.

Gary

 

[OzDigger]

** Agreed, it was stubborness and short-sightedness of the US Army that meant that the M4 series were in front line service for a year after they should have been. I'm less into a "positive spin" than in pointing out that the crews made an obsolescent vehicle work in many situations around the world. The Sherman succeeded because of the Allied tank crews. Still, in the end, the Panthers lay rusting and the Shermans were parading through all the enemy capitols.

Last rant - why is it that people focus on the Sherman and not the Stuart? The US Army's fascination with the light tank lasted WAY too long. Each 1943-style tank battalion had 17 M5A1s which were little more than rolling MG platforms with minimal armor. Obviously the History Channel didn't do any shows on the Stuart.

Gary

Garry, at least we agree the Shermans succeeded because of the Allied tank crews

However you, or anyone else, has yet to convince me that the US Army did not have enough time nor the capability to build and utilise a heavier tank earlier than they did.

I guess people focus on the Sherman because it is often promoted as being an ideal tank design rather than one that was used in combat long after it was basically obsolete.

I agree that light tanks such as the Stuart were overated and are perhaps better replaced with faster wheeled vehicles. However it must be said that most Stuart crews liked their little tank more than most Sherman crews liked the M-4

 

[binder001]

Oz,

It wasn't that the US Army lacked the time or capability to build a heavier or better-armed tank as much as the desire. The senior officers in AGF (Army Ground Forces) firmly felt that fighting tanks with tanks took your tank away from its primary mission - raising Cain in the enemy's rear areas after a breakthrough. That's where the faulty TD doctrine raises its head - "we have tank destroyers to fight tanks - we don't need an AP weapon for our tanks, we need an HE weapon", or "A tank doesn't fight tanks, a tank is a weapon of exploitation". Heck, the field commanders in the ETO didn't even want the new M4A1s with 76mm guns (the 76mm wasn't as good at HE as the 75mm). Several hundred arrived before DDay but they were parked in tank depots in England. Rather than pointing to Patton as holding up the T26E3 project (later the M26) one CAN point to Patton as one of the senior commanders who didn't see the need to upgun the M4s or even to employ the upgunned tanks that had arrived. The Germans already had an 18 month lead, the AGF handed them another year. It was 1944 in France that the real deficiencies became a huge problem. In July the new M4A1 76mm versions were rapidly sent over to France and issued to the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions. Then the tankers were shocked to see that their new tank wasn't that much better than the previous model. The 76mm M1 was a better AP gun than the 75mm M3, but it still couldn't penetrate the frontal plate of a Panther at battle ranges. Ike was furious, but there wasn't a new tank in the pipeline. There was fiscussion about upgunning the M4s to 90mm but Ordnance balked - they claimed that such a project would delay introduction of the Pershing (there are mixed opinions about whether this was true). Tankers were disappointed in the M4 in Normandy, but it redeemed itself in the drive across France. When the weather turned cruddy in the fall of 1944 the Shermans lost mobility and the complaints increased. THEN everyone wanted a better tank, but none were available.

So the problem was less about building a better mousetrap than selling it to the users.

Gary

 

[Tex]

I think the Stuart might be overlooked because its continued use is even more embarrassing than that of the Sherman.
In the 20's or 30's, an inventor tried to sell the US army a better track/suspension system for tanks, but the Army rejected it. If I am not mistaken, he took his idea elsewhere, and eventually sold it in Europe. The later Panzers utilized his ideas. Can anyone tell me the guy's name--I am blanking.

 

[Louis Badolato]

His name was Christie, and both Russian and German tanks adopted his suspension, which allowed for both greater speed and wider tracks for better cross-country performance.

 

[Tex]

Yep, that sounds right.
What exactly made the army reject his idea? Typical bureaucracy, traditionalism, politics? My guess would be a mixture of all three.