Gettysburg Casualties (2 Viewers)

[Rob]

Rob

Have you any idea how much you currently owe me?.....Even George Osborne is getting concerned with your personal GDP debt.

Seriously though after Al perfectly articulated what this book is all about has definitely prompted me to put it on my list of "must haves". What I will do initially is search out the "book-man" and his table on the mezzanine floor on Saturday at the London show. Rob don't know if you have ever looked over his prolific library for sale that he usually has at every show but I have picked up any number of out of print military history books from him and all at reasonable prices.

However, if he does have Al's recommendation and it's north of £115.00 I'll leave it for you and borrow it downstream ^&grin

Bob

Bob,

Maybe I'll ask George then mate, you reckon he has the odd farthing to spare!{eek3}:wink2:

Thanks for heads up re Mr Book seller man, will check him out on the day. Does sound like a fascinating read doesn't it.

Mine's a VAT my friend:smile2:

Rob

 

[jazzeum]

Brad,

Thanks for posting this. I'd heard about this post Gettysburg letter but not seen the script.:smile2:

Rob

After the battle and when Lee had escaped back to Virginia, Lincoln's son Robert (back from Harvard) walked into his father's office and found his father with his head leaning in his desk and in much distress. Lincoln said "We had them in our grasp. We only had to stretch forth our hand and they were ours."

 

[Louis Badolato]

After the battle and when Lee had escaped back to Virginia, Lincoln's son Robert (back from Harvard) walked into his father's office and found his father with his head leaning in his desk and in much distress. Lincoln said "We had them in our grasp. We only had to stretch forth our hand and they were ours."

That is the version taught in school books, but, according the guide who took me through the Gettysburg battlefield, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Vietnam Veteran, Lincoln was, simply stated, as a politician without much grasp of military necessity, completely wrong. The Union did in fact pursue Lee as quickly as it could (remember, the Union forces were left to care for not only their own, but the Confederate wounded, as well as numerous prisoners) in fact pinned Lee against the bank of a flooded river, but Lee was well dug in, and it took the Union 13 days of preparation to be prepared to break the Confederate entrenchments without facing a disaster (just remember Cold Harbor if you want to think of the enormous casualties sustained precipitously attacking one of Lee's entrenchments). The night before the attack was to be launched, the river receded enough for the Confederates to cross and make good their escape. Lincoln, like Churchill before El Alemein in WWII, was unwilling to wait the time necessary to launch a successful attack, and took his frustration out on the commander who had laid the groundwork for victory, replacing him (Grant and Monty reaping the benefits).

 

[lancer]

After the battle and when Lee had escaped back to Virginia, Lincoln's son Robert (back from Harvard) walked into his father's office and found his father with his head leaning in his desk and in much distress. Lincoln said "We had them in our grasp. We only had to stretch forth our hand and they were ours."

One can understand Lincoln's distress at Lee's escape but I not sure Lincoln understood the conditions under which Meade was operating post-battle. The losses to the CSA had been horrible, but USA losses had been nearly as bad on a numbers basis. Nearly 25% of Meade's army were casualties and, even worse, his commissioned officers had been shot to pieces. Nearly 50%, 3100 officers, had become casualties. These losses could not have been effectively made good in the days immediately following Gettysburg. It would take time for the Army of the Potomac's leadership ranks to recover. Both armies had been badly hurt. I think Meade's failure to catch Lee is perfectly understandable. A Union victory, until that point, a rare occurrence, still had to be absorbed and understood by the men who had achieved it, the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac. -- Al

 

[jazzeum]

That may be what the guide said but Allan Guelzo, a Professor of History at Gettysburg College, who has just released a new book about Gettysburg, and who has won numerous prizes for his other books, mentions this in his book and I'm more inclined to believe him than a simple battlefield guide.

The opportunity was there to end the rebellion and it was missed.

 

[lancer]

That may be what the guide said but Allan Guelzo, a Professor of History at Gettysburg College, who has just released a new book about Gettysburg, and who has won numerous prizes for his other books, mentions this in his book and I'm more inclined to believe him than a simple battlefield guide.

The opportunity was there to end the rebellion and it was missed.

Brad, Guelzo's new book, "Gettysburg", has just been published by Knopf-Doubleday. It has been put on my 'must have' list as soon as I replenish my funds.:wink2: -- Al

 

[jazzeum]

Al,

He was recently at the Abraham Lincoln Bookshop as part of their Virtual Book Signing program, which are available on You Tube. However, I don't know if this one is on their yet. He's a very dynamic speaker, very enthusiastic.

Brad

 

[Rob]

After the battle and when Lee had escaped back to Virginia, Lincoln's son Robert (back from Harvard) walked into his father's office and found his father with his head leaning in his desk and in much distress. Lincoln said "We had them in our grasp. We only had to stretch forth our hand and they were ours."

Fascinating Brad, another of those 'what if's ' .

Rob

 

[jazzeum]

Yes, Rob, quite fascinating. As Louis notes, there is a divergence of opinion of how realistic were his expectations that Meade could have finished off Lee and his Army. Perhaps as Al said he was not in possession of all the facts -- and I'm no expert in this matter --but if you look at the excerpt from the July 14th letter, he seems to have more than a few facts at his disposal:

The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.


​

Again, I am no expert so defer to those who are.

 

[Rob]

Yes, Rob, quite fascinating. As Louis notes, there is a divergence of opinion of how realistic were his expectations that Meade could have finished off Lee and his Army. Perhaps as Al said he was not in possession of all the facts -- and I'm no expert in this matter --but if you look at the excerpt from the July 14th letter, he seems to have more than a few facts at his disposal:

The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.


​

Again, I am no expert so defer to those who are.

Well you sure as hell can feel the angst in his words can't you. You can also tell that he is trying to balance keeping up his commanders morale whilst wanting to give him a severe b*******g !

Apologies for repeating myself Brad as I know I say this often, but the ACW is so huge, so epic, so moving and full of terrible loss and famous battles that it is absolutely enthralling. I've been hooked since I first saw Ken Burns series and appreciate any item that you, Al, Bob ,Louis or anyone else post on it.

I've been an enthusiast of WW1 and WW2 since I was a kid, the ACW is my secret history ' mistress ' :wink2:^&grin

Rob

 

[Phantom Warrior]

That is the version taught in school books, but, according the guide who took me through the Gettysburg battlefield, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Vietnam Veteran, Lincoln was, simply stated, as a politician without much grasp of military necessity, completely wrong. The Union did in fact pursue Lee as quickly as it could (remember, the Union forces were left to care for not only their own, but the Confederate wounded, as well as numerous prisoners) in fact pinned Lee against the bank of a flooded river, but Lee was well dug in, and it took the Union 13 days of preparation to be prepared to break the Confederate entrenchments without facing a disaster (just remember Cold Harbor if you want to think of the enormous casualties sustained precipitously attacking one of Lee's entrenchments). The night before the attack was to be launched, the river receded enough for the Confederates to cross and make good their escape. Lincoln, like Churchill before El Alemein in WWII, was unwilling to wait the time necessary to launch a successful attack, and took his frustration out on the commander who had laid the groundwork for victory, replacing him (Grant and Monty reaping the benefits).

Both sides were depleted. People still didn't understand the effect of rifled weapons and entrenched positions which extended the killing zone from 50 yards to 300+ yards. Pickett's charge is only one of many examples of failed charges with massive casualties. Meade likely could have attacked sooner than he did and could have caused more casualties in a battle of attrition the South could not afford.

Terry

 

[lancer]

Been having a great time combing through this book. As bad as the casualties obviously were for the battle, close examination of the numbers has revealed to me that the number of Union dead is actually much higher than the reported official KIA figure of 3179. The reason for this is Union record keeping and reporting procedures. Included within the total Union losses of 23,501 is a figure for MORTALLY WOUNDED that is not included within the KIA or wounded statistics, but is kept as a separate stat. While this figure of mortally wounded, 2124, does not increase total casualties what it does do is increase the total number of Northern dead tied directly to the battle. The number of dead for the North thus increases to an eventual total of 5303. There is no such corresponding stat for the Confederates. The CSA losses are divided as KIA, 4675; wounded, 12266; and captured/missing, 5597, for a total of 22,538. Now, common sense dictates that the Confederate forces must have had mortally wounded close to Northern numbers as an overall percentage but I do not know whether these numbers have been already included with KIA numbers or the wounded numbers, (probably a little of each, giving the state of the CSA reporting system and records), but I don't know for sure. This is not the case with the Union figures as the number of mortally wounded, as stated, is a separate stat. This is going to take further investigation. -- Al

 

[Terp152]

One can understand Lincoln's distress at Lee's escape but I not sure Lincoln understood the conditions under which Meade was operating post-battle. The losses to the CSA had been horrible, but USA losses had been nearly as bad on a numbers basis. Nearly 25% of Meade's army were casualties and, even worse, his commissioned officers had been shot to pieces. Nearly 50%, 3100 officers, had become casualties. These losses could not have been effectively made good in the days immediately following Gettysburg. It would take time for the Army of the Potomac's leadership ranks to recover. Both armies had been badly hurt. I think Meade's failure to catch Lee is perfectly understandable. A Union victory, until that point, a rare occurrence, still had to be absorbed and understood by the men who had achieved it, the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac. -- Al

This is one of those "what if" situations. People have discussed countless times the "what if Jackson had been at Gettysburg" question." I would ask, "what if Grant had been the commander?" He did not recoil after heavy losses during the summer of '64. Would he have aggressively pursued the ANVA? Would the condition of the Army of the Potomac, as aptly portrayed by Al, have permitted it? Chris

 

[Rob]

I don't know why it's so expensive in the UK. Amazon US has it for $21 US.

Brad

Yes that can't have been right that earlier price, I just ordered mine yesterday from Amazon for fourteen quid!

Rob

 

[jazzeum]

I just mentioned a new book on Gettysburg in the book section, but I wanted to reach a wider audience with this thread. The new book is called "The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses: Synopses, Orders of Battle, Strengths, Casualties, and Maps, June 9-July 14, 1863". It is written by David Petruzzi and Steven Stanley, published by Savas Beatie, and is 210 pages long. It is, quite simply, the best thing I have seen in regards to it's subject matter. This work includes every unit on both sides, and it's casualties, by engagement, for the entire Gettysburg Campaign, beginning to end. Every skirmish and larger fight during the campaign is included, even where no casualties were inflicted. The authors also make outstanding use of visual strength/loss charts for each engagement, which for me, made it easier to keep track of the numbers then simply reading the numbers. I also was pleased to see that the authors had broken down losses during the 3 day battle by the day, thus giving me a really clear understanding of the brutal losses per day/action as opposed to just the final total. For a Gettysburg historian, amateur or professional, I would think this book is going to prove indispensable. I have really enjoyed it and HIGHLY recommend it, if you have any interest in Gettysburg. -- Al

Civil War Books and Authors has an excellent review of this book, http://cwba.blogspot.com/2013/08/petruzzi-stanley-gettysburg-campaign-in.html?m=1

 

[lancer]

Civil War Books and Authors has an excellent review of this book, http://cwba.blogspot.com/2013/08/petruzzi-stanley-gettysburg-campaign-in.html?m=1

Thanks for posting this, Brad. Now I am really looking forward to the 2014 publication of the Maryland Campaign numbers and losses volume mentioned in the comment section. -- Al