I have been thinking about this since the thread was posted, and I think that in a lot of ways, Chancellorsville could be said to be the true high water mark of the Confederacy. It is true that the Army of Northern Virginia went into Pennsylvania, but Chancellorsville was the last major Confederate victory in the east where the Union was forced to retreat back into Maryland and the Confederates were in control of the battlefield when it was over.
You can't call the Wilderness a victory for the Union but Grant decided to slide south rather than retreat again.
I by no means want to denigrate the battle of Gettysburg. I would be interested in your thoughts.
Cannot agree with Chancellorsville being described in any way as the true high water mark of the Confederacy. True the Yankee army retreated back over the Rappahannock just as Burnside had done after Fredericksburg but this agitated the hell out of Lee as once again he was unable to deliver the killer punch that he thought was necessary to permanently knock the Army of the Potomac off of his chessboard.
The battle has to be accounted as the costliest of Lee's victories up to that time with ANV casualties close to 13500 and Confederate dead far exceeding those of Hooker's army. Lee was to state that Chancellorsville depressed him the most out of all of his battles, the severe overall loss coupled with Jackson's death and for what? the South had not gained one inch of ground, the enemy could not be pursued and he had brought no relief to his hungry army except what they found in abandoned Yankee knapsacks. However, Chancellorsville had proved to Lee that he could beat "Fighting Joe Hooker", whom he privately referred to contemptuously as "Mr F.J. Hooker" and believed that he would likely be suffering from demoralization and the second time they met his ANV would resoundly beat him in the field. Lee was never short of arrogance, subsequently, he finalised a plan with Longstreet and presented it to Davis and Seddon. His audacious plan was to cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania but it opened up a whole host of possibilities for the South.
It would pull the Army of the Potomac out of it's fortified lines
It would disarrange any Union plans for a summer offensive into Virginia that alone would justify a march north
It would free Lee of the defensive strictures of the Rappahannock and allow him to maneuver at will.
Once across the Potomac his hungry army could feast in a land of plenty
It would allow Virginia's ravaged fields and farms time to replenish their stock.
By being victorious over Hooker in his own back yard and the mere threat of a Confederate army roaming free would panic the Northern citizens enough to swing public opinion to demand a truce.
Therefore Chancellorsville would be better described as the crucible that forged what would become known to history as Gettysburg rather than it being a high water mark.
I do however, agree with George's brief summary on the three days of missed opportunities at Gettysburg-all pure conjecture of course but much beloved by all historians and armchair generals.
If Jackson instead of Ewell had been at Culp's Hill
If Longstreet had listened to Sam Hood about updating the attack plan at the Round Tops
If the artillery had done a more effective job on Cemetery Ridge
If Lee had listened to Longstreet
If Longstreet had not laid the responsibility for Pickett's attack on his 28 year old chief of artillery.
All of these and a hundred more are the nails of a horseshoe, any one of which may well have swung the battle to a Confederate victory-but the simple truth is as we well know the responsibility of victory or defeat is solely that of the commander. No one else-And in the case of Gettysburg Lee committed more tactical errors than he had ever done before-he was in an aggressive mood and his blood was up during the second and third days with a cast iron determination to attack-attack-attack-when encirclement and maneuver, or possibly even defense may have been the answer.
Reb