panda1gen
Major
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2005
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Combat said:I have always thought that military historians have been somewhat overly critical of Hitler's military decisions - particularly in the second half of the war. Even in the Russian endeavor it was perfectly reasonble for Hitler to assume that a quick victory was possible and even likely - particularly in light of the German experiences in the First World War. After the failure of his initial efforts in Russia, no military strategy could have led to a German victory. Hitler may have been among the first to recognize this. Rather, from about Dec. '41 onward his policy was simply to prolong the war for as long as possible by holding out to the last man in the East and contesting with the western allies in secondary theatres such as N. Africa and Italy. Most of the limited German offensives from 1942 onward were defensive in objective along these lines. In this, Hitler was quite successful in extending the war one or two years longer than perhaps it should have gone on given the allied superiority in material and manpower.
As with his pre-1933 political career, when faced with setbacks Hitler bided his time and hoped for something favorable to happen that he could exploit. His declaration of war on the US, for example, may have been a far sighted albeit risky gamble that recognized the potential tensions of an allied coalition that included the Americans and Russians. Most of the German generals, however, were overly optimistic until much later in the war based on their prior successes and failed to recognize that they could not reproduce such successes on a strategic level after 1941. Rommel is a good example of a general that achieved tactical successes, but only accelerated the demise of the Germans in N.A. due to his failure to recognize that no lasting success could be achieved due to allied superiority in supplies and that his duty was simply to prolong the fighting as long as possible. Kesselring did a much better job in Italy in this regard. I think there is an understandable need to castigate Hitler due to the German war crimes, however, many of the notions of Hitler contributing to the demise of the German army (particular by his own generals) have been somewhat exaggerated. Some of the otherwise more inexplicable decisions, such as diverting much needed Panzers to Hungary in '45 to protect oil reserves rather than Berlin, can only be viewed as consistent with his goal of extending the war at all costs. No oil - no capability to continue the fight. The loss of Berlin was of no strategic consequence -as even Eisenhower recognized.
This is the right room for an argument! I believe that the offensives in Russia in both 1942 and 1943 in the 'campaigning season' were designed to win the war and were not truly defensive. Defeat at Stalingrad meant they could not win the war in the east due to the losses, defeat at Kursk meant they would lose it. The real acheivement in all of that though was the increased capability of the Red Army during and after 1943 especially, which meant that frankly whatever Hitler decided was increasingly irrelevent. By the time it came, the western front shortened but didn't alter the outcome.