Longstreets attack at Gettysburg; brilliant or a serious tactical error? (1 Viewer)

[Warrior]

I recently constructed a diorama of this attack with part of my 20mm ACW collection and have been doing a lot of research on the attack and there appears to be two schools of thought on it, one calling it a brilliant assault, another calling it a serious tactical error.

On the one hand, it was an echeloned attack that rolled up the Union line at Devil's Den, Houcks Ridge, the Rose woods, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard and parts of Cemetery Ridge, smashing the Union III Corps in the process.

On the other hand, it stalled out at Little Round Top, around the Trostle Farm and along the crest of Cemetery Ridge, not achieving it's objectives.


Would it have been a total success had Laws, McLaws and Andersons attacks happened all at once or did it almost succeed due to the staggered/piecemeal way the divisions went in.

Curious what other forum members think of this..........

 

[Bama Boy]

My thought and understanding is more of his timing, or lack of, of the attack. He apparently waited till late in the day 4:00 PM or so to start an attack. Whether it is the thought on wanting to move up the road or not (he wanted to fight a defense campaign), MAY take part in this.

Also remember, that a lot of his success was apparently due to Sickle's failure.

 

[UKReb]

George

I've struggled with pinning this one down over the years of micro studying the battle-the whole second day is a real maze to get through and the more you research the more enigmatic it gets.

I anchor my thoughts on Longstreet's flank march a route of some thirteen miles. His men covered some respectable marching that second day. Allowing that the average soldier covered at least eight miles to reach his stepping off point, would mean a minimum of two and a half to three hours maybe more due to a slower pace by not always using the roads when faced with the rough woods and fields.

In those fields the two divisions doubled and moved abreast each other and at length Hood passed across the front of McClaws. This put Law's brigade on the extreme right of Lee's army. Kershaw's statement when Longstreet passed him and his men is also interesting as he said "Longstreet had his eyes cast to the ground with a look of gloom"

Did Longstreet unnecessarily delay the attack that should have been delivered in the morning? Points to consider:
Lee consented to await the arrival of Laws brigade before attacking
Law came at noon therefore the time of the delay is reduced to three and half hours from noon to 3.30 pm when Hood was in position to begin his bombardment. These hours are well accounted for by Longstreet's march behind the battlefield as he groped for a good route by which to reach Meade's flank undetected. The afternoon was indeed filled with mistakes, but not by deliberately stalling.

All Longstreet had to guide him across this unknown terrain was Captain Johnston's rough guide map he had undertaken earlier that morning. Now if Jeb Stuart had been present he would have played his accustomed role of exploring the routes and feeding this information back to Longstreet as to the best route to gain the enemy's flank. That was the whole purpose of cavalry in such a situation.of the army being in a hostile and unfamiliar country with absolutely no chance of finding local civilians as guides or imparting reliable information.

But with conditions such as they were-without Stuart-Longstreet should have scouted the routes in the morning hours whilst Law was hastening to join him. And before his column were exposed when they reached Black Horse Tavern.

However, when he finally launched his divisions no army could have fought more furiously. Their blood was well and truly up. It's pretty obvious now that Longstreet was attempting to imitate what Jackson had done at Chancellorsville and roll up the Federal left...all that was lacking maybe was a touch of Jackson's ingenuity and intuition.

Bob

 

[lancer]

Very interesting question and subject. I have a sort of "what if" to add. I am of the opinion that Longstreet's assault on the 2nd day was undertaken with inadequate resources. Since things played out the way they did, what contingencies did the Confederates have in place had they actually broken through at any of the assault points on the 2nd day? A breakthrough would have required fresh troops (reserves) to exploit it. All of Longstreet's troops were fought out, exhausted, by the days efforts. Now, given that the Union line didn't collapse early or easily, and long, hard fighting took place, where were the reserves to follow up any possible breakthrough? All the troops on Longstreet's front were committed and used up. Not for nothing was Longstreet concerned about going into action without Pickett's Division being on the field. A fresh, uncommitted division would have made the difference at any single point along the Confederate axis of attack. Can you imagine if Pickett had been available to back up the assault at LRT or to assist Barksdale? The Confederates just didn't have enough men available, unless, as I mentioned, the Union line collapsed easily and early. Was this another example of Confederate over confidence in their ability to once again beat an oft-beaten foe? At any rate, the day's action was a close run thing. Any opinions? -- Al

 

[UKReb]

Very interesting question and subject. I have a sort of "what if" to add. I am of the opinion that Longstreet's assault on the 2nd day was undertaken with inadequate resources. Since things played out the way they did, what contingencies did the Confederates have in place had they actually broken through at any of the assault points on the 2nd day? A breakthrough would have required fresh troops (reserves) to exploit it. All of Longstreet's troops were fought out, exhausted, by the days efforts. Now, given that the Union line didn't collapse early or easily, and long, hard fighting took place, where were the reserves to follow up any possible breakthrough? All the troops on Longstreet's front were committed and used up. Not for nothing was Longstreet concerned about going into action without Pickett's Division being on the field. A fresh, uncommitted division would have made the difference at any single point along the Confederate axis of attack. Can you imagine if Pickett had been available to back up the assault at LRT or to assist Barksdale? The Confederates just didn't have enough men available, unless, as I mentioned, the Union line collapsed easily and early. Was this another example of Confederate over confidence in their ability to once again beat an oft-beaten foe? At any rate, the day's action was a close run thing. Any opinions? -- Al

Al

I think you are forgetting that Pickett's Division was available. Pickett and his 3 brigades began July 2nd near Chambersburg, broke camp at 2.00am and marched the 26 miles to reach Marsh Creek, about 3 miles from Gettysburg just in time to hear Longstreet's guns open up about 4.00pm.

He immediately sent his aide Major Walter Harrison to army headquarters with word for either Lee or Longstreet that his division was at hand and were ready to be called for duty wherever they were required. With Longstreet personally involved in the Peach Orchard Harrison found Lee and returned with the message from the ANV commander "I shall not want him today but shall have work for him tomorrow"

In addition to these 3 Virginian brigades two of Hill's divisions sat it out in the center of the Confederate line without lifting a finger to intervene or support.

Therefore a more appropriate question would be "Why didn't Lee throw one or more divisions under Pickett, Pender or Heth into the battle once Hood and McClaws started their attack?

Bob

 

[Louis Badolato]

Al

I think you are forgetting that Pickett's Division was available. Pickett and his 3 brigades began July 2nd near Chambersburg, broke camp at 2.00am and marched the 26 miles to reach Marsh Creek, about 3 miles from Gettysburg just in time to hear Longstreet's guns open up about 4.00pm.

He immediately sent his aide Major Walter Harrison to army headquarters with word for either Lee or Longstreet that his division was at hand and were ready to be called for duty wherever they were required. With Longstreet personally involved in the Peach Orchard Harrison found Lee and returned with the message from the ANV commander "I shall not want him today but shall have work for him tomorrow"

In addition to these 3 Virginian brigades two of Hill's divisions sat it out in the center of the Confederate line without lifting a finger to intervene or support.

Therefore a more appropriate question would be "Why didn't Lee throw one or more divisions under Pickett, Pender or Heth into the battle once Hood and McClaws started their attack?

Bob

Reb,

Please excuse my ignorance of your subject, but I am always interested in learning from the better read members of this forum like yourself. It would appear from your comments that Lee was committing his forces into the battle piecemeal, rather than choosing a strategic objective and going at it with everything he had. I imagine this might have had something to do with JEB Stuart leaving him blind, but it doesn't seem like a very good approach to taking a position.

I recall that he divided his forces during another campaign, where that putz McClellan found his plans, and had it been any competent general, or even an incompetent but aggressive general, Lee's forces would have been defeated in detail at that battle as well. Was this a flaw in Lee's approach to offensive operations, or just a couple of isolated instances?

 

[lancer]

Al

I think you are forgetting that Pickett's Division was available. Pickett and his 3 brigades began July 2nd near Chambersburg, broke camp at 2.00am and marched the 26 miles to reach Marsh Creek, about 3 miles from Gettysburg just in time to hear Longstreet's guns open up about 4.00pm.

He immediately sent his aide Major Walter Harrison to army headquarters with word for either Lee or Longstreet that his division was at hand and were ready to be called for duty wherever they were required. With Longstreet personally involved in the Peach Orchard Harrison found Lee and returned with the message from the ANV commander "I shall not want him today but shall have work for him tomorrow"

In addition to these 3 Virginian brigades two of Hill's divisions sat it out in the center of the Confederate line without lifting a finger to intervene or support.

Therefore a more appropriate question would be "Why didn't Lee throw one or more divisions under Pickett, Pender or Heth into the battle once Hood and McClaws started their attack?

Bob

Bob, you are correct. I had forgotten Pickett's proximity. As Marsh Creek is literally a quick march from the fields where Longstreet was engaged, it still begs the question why wasn't he used. I just don't understand the lack of support on immediate hand to exploit a possible breakthrough. Perhaps Lee just figured Longstreet's partial Corps was sufficient to beat an army he had defeated on so many other occasions. Perhaps Lee was hedging his bet by holding back some reserves for a 3rd day of action. It just doesn't make much sense to launch such a crucial attack on such a wide front, expect success, and then have nothing on hand to cement success. Interesting to contemplate what might have happened had Pickett's message reached Longstreet instead of Lee. I think Longstreet would have ordered Pickett into action, thus tipping the scales. It is fascinating to question. -- Al

 

[lancer]

Reb,

Please excuse my ignorance of your subject, but I am always interested in learning from the better read members of this forum like yourself. It would appear from your comments that Lee was committing his forces into the battle piecemeal, rather than choosing a strategic objective and going at it with everything he had. I imagine this might have had something to do with JEB Stuart leaving him blind, but it doesn't seem like a very good approach to taking a position.

I recall that he divided his forces during another campaign, where that putz McClellan found his plans, and had it been any competent general, or even an incompetent but aggressive general, Lee's forces would have been defeated in detail at that battle as well. Was this a flaw in Lee's approach to offensive operations, or just a couple of isolated instances?

Good question, Louis. The campaign you are referring to would be the Sharpsburg (Antietam to yankees) campaign. And you are right. Lee got caught with his back to the river. Lee didn't so much divide his forces as much as shift his forces to meet the piecemeal attacks launched my McClellan. It was McClellan's inability to launch an all out, simultaneous attack on Lee's positions that allowed Lee to survive by shifting troops to the threatened sector, thus surviving the day. By all rights, Lee should have been smashed. In May, 1863, Lee did divide his forces in the face of Hooker's vastly larger army at Chancellorsville and the result was a brilliant victory, often called the shining example of Lee's career. Again, Lee knew his foe and took advantage of a timid general. I think it possible this was part of the problem at Gettysburg. Lee had done so well against the various Union generals, he felt he could beat anyone the Union sent against him. Over confidence was just one of the factors in the Gettysburg defeat, though. -- Al

 

[UKReb]

Reb,

Please excuse my ignorance of your subject, but I am always interested in learning from the better read members of this forum like yourself. It would appear from your comments that Lee was committing his forces into the battle piecemeal, rather than choosing a strategic objective and going at it with everything he had. I imagine this might have had something to do with JEB Stuart leaving him blind, but it doesn't seem like a very good approach to taking a position.

I recall that he divided his forces during another campaign, where that putz McClellan found his plans, and had it been any competent general, or even an incompetent but aggressive general, Lee's forces would have been defeated in detail at that battle as well. Was this a flaw in Lee's approach to offensive operations, or just a couple of isolated instances?

Hi Louis

I fully agree with Al......a darn fine question.

More myth and misconception enshroud the second day at Gettysburg than any other ACW battle I have ever studied. Lee's second day plan (simplified for this post) was as follows:-

He was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavour to gain a position from which it was thought that the Confederate artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McClaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the Union's left, which he was to drive in.
Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and cooperate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.
Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous "demonstration" upon the Union right flank to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. Lee attached Anderson's division from Hill's corps to Longstreet's command with instructions to make a frontal attack in cooperation with Longstreet's envelopment of the Union left. The remainder of Hill's corps was to exploit any advantage that might accrue from the planned joint attack by Longstreet and Ewell against the Federal left and right flank.

Lee taking the fight to the Federal army before the numerically superior foe could fully concentrate was an accurate decision he also thought that Meade would be cautious by being new to command of the whole army.

That was the plan but now throw iinto the pot the occupation of LRT and Sickles moving forward and McClaws and Hood's plans went slightly awry and instead of attacking as a team they both entered the fray disjointedly.

But nevertheless as Longstreet's men attacked Meade's left it did indeed siphon off thousands of Federal troops from other parts of Meade's line. Hill's three right most brigades advanced perfectly, collapsing the Federals holding the Emmitsburg Road front driving them back to Cemetery Ridge. But then for some unknown reason Hill and Anderson failed. Neither followed this advance up as per Lee's overall plan. The ridge was now thinly held- as Meade fought the battle like a fireman putting out fires as they broke out- and could have been taken. Proved by Wright's brigade which penetrated the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge but he was unsupported, left high and dry he was soon ejected. It was this inaction by Hill and Anderson's Division that decided the battle on the second day rather than just the fighting and defending on Little Round Top.

Reb

 

[lancer]

Hi Louis

I fully agree with Al......a darn fine question.

More myth and misconception enshroud the second day at Gettysburg than any other ACW battle I have ever studied. Lee's second day plan (simplified for this post) was as follows:-

He was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavour to gain a position from which it was thought that the Confederate artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McClaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the Union's left, which he was to drive in.
Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and cooperate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.
Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous "demonstration" upon the Union right flank to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. Lee attached Anderson's division from Hill's corps to Longstreet's command with instructions to make a frontal attack in cooperation with Longstreet's envelopment of the Union left. The remainder of Hill's corps was to exploit any advantage that might accrue from the planned joint attack by Longstreet and Ewell against the Federal left and right flank.

Lee taking the fight to the Federal army before the numerically superior foe could fully concentrate was an accurate decision he also thought that Meade would be cautious by being new to command of the whole army.

That was the plan but now throw iinto the pot the occupation of LRT and Sickles moving forward and McClaws and Hood's plans went slightly awry and instead of attacking as a team they both entered the fray disjointedly.

But nevertheless as Longstreet's men attacked Meade's left it did indeed siphon off thousands of Federal troops from other parts of Meade's line. Hill's three right most brigades advanced perfectly, collapsing the Federals holding the Emmitsburg Road front driving them back to Cemetery Ridge. But then for some unknown reason Hill and Anderson failed. Neither followed this advance up as per Lee's overall plan. The ridge was now thinly held- as Meade fought the battle like a fireman putting out fires as they broke out- and could have been taken. Proved by Wright's brigade which penetrated the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge but he was unsupported, left high and dry he was soon ejected. It was this inaction by Hill and Anderson's Division that decided the battle on the second day rather than just the fighting and defending on Little Round Top.

Reb

A much appreciated review, Bob. I have to go back and do some reviewing to refresh my memory. I knew that Ewell was supposed to attack to hold Meade in position but had quite forgotten that Hill was supposed to support any success from the attack on the Union left. Seems like I am forgetting more than I remember, at times.:redface2: Lee was not well served by his Corps command at Gettysburg. -- Al

 

[Terp152]

Would Pickett's brigades have been in any kind of shape to attack after a 26 mile march? 20 miles in a day was a pretty good hike then, 26 would have pushed the limit. Maybe that influenced Lee's decision not to commit those VA bgdes.

Anderson failed miserably during this battle. Failed to support the attacks of brigades on his flanks. Don't remember an explananation for this. Wright commented before Pickett's attack on 3 July, "getting there is not the problem, staying there is." He was referring to the lack of support on 2 July. Chris

 

[UKReb]

Would Pickett's brigades have been in any kind of shape to attack after a 26 mile march? 20 miles in a day was a pretty good hike then, 26 would have pushed the limit. Maybe that influenced Lee's decision not to commit those VA bgdes.

Chris

You raise a valid point. However, Lee was an avid admirer of Napoleon's campaigns and I have no doubt he would have been aware that history was replete with examples of exhausted troops being used to combat after forced marches to tip the scales of victory.

Two of Bonaparte's most famous and important victories had evolved in this manner. On June 14, 1800 French troops under General Desaix undertook a forced march before entering and helping to turn the tide at the Battle of Marengo. Five years later Marshal Davout led elements of his corps on a forced march of 70 miles in 48 hours before going into battle and providing a key contribution to victory at Austerlitz.

No! Lee missed a trick here by not using Pickett's Divisions in a frontal assault behind Hill's men. In fact history could have had Pickett's charge one day earlier that may just have carried the field.

However, as Al has stated in a previous post Lee was not served well by his Corps Lieutenants at Gettysburg. His style of command had always been investing his subordinate commanders with the tactical responsibility for executing his battle plans. As a result Longstreet and Jackson had rarely let him down. But the failure of all three Corps commanders at Gettysburg caused Lee to conclude that the command style that had served him so well and for so long was now no longer a good fit for the men who were now leading his three corps. A more tactical control by him was now necessary and this decision was very evident in how he took full command control during all the battles of Grant's Overland Campaign in May/June 1864.

Reb