Losses of Soviet and German armored vehicles in 1943. Kursk Bulge (4 Viewers)

[tank]

The Kursk Bulge and the battle of Prokhorovka, are still the subject of fierce debate among military history buffs. And one of the reasons for such a dispute is the irretrievable loss of tanks and self-propelled guns that the parties suffered.



More or less balanced estimates give a 4: 1 ratio in favor of the Germans - a number of sources refer to the irretrievable losses of 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns in Red Army and 1,500 in the “Panzervaffe”. Where did these numbers come from?


According to G.F. Krivosheeva, in the Kursk defensive, Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations conducted during July-August 1943, the Red Army lost 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns. Muller-Gillebrand reports that the total irrecoverable losses of Wehrmacht equipment in July-August amounted to 1,738 vehicles. The main losses in armored vehicles durring 1943 the Germans suffered near Kursk. Of the 1,738 irrecoverable losses the Nazi tanks some of them were often moved into the column “requires major repairs” and were written off later, which is noted by a number of Russian and Western researchers. Again, it should be remembered that the numbers are not comparable - in the number 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns by G.F. Krivosheeva got the number of tanks, which went down for major repairs and restoration.

http://lux.e-reading.bz/bookreader...._-_Suhoputnaya_armiya_Germanii._1933-1945.pdf

The fact is that the battle on the Kursk Bulge for Russians consisted of the 3 battles listed above: Kursk Defensive, Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive. The Germans, however, under the operation “Citadel", in fact, understood only the part of the Kursk defensive operation. The Kursk Defensive lasted 19 days, from July 5 to July 23, 1943: The Germans mean by operation "Citadel" only the period from July 5 to 17. If we assume that the Wehrmacht and the SS irrevocably lost 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns in all three operations, then it is obvious that their losses during the operation “Citadel” from July 5 to 17 were significantly lower.


And here a discrepancy arises between a number of sources, as well as Russian official history and the Western researchers.. Previously, it was generally accepted that the German units during the "Citadel" were exsanguinate, and for a long time lost their combat readiness. This is also confirmed by German author Kurt von Tippelskirchwho, after the attempts to cut off the Kursk ledge, points out: “Within a few days it became clear that the German troops, having suffered irreparable losses, were unable to achieve their goals.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_von_Tippelskirch

However, the Western researchers see the issue differently. They indicate that the Germans, according to various sources, concentrated 2,500 - 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, or even a little more, for Operation Citadel. At the same time, irretrievable losses in the armored vehicles during its implementation amounted to several hundred vehicles. For example, according to German researchers Zetterling and Frankson, who worked in the archives of Germany, the irretrievable losses of the South Army group advancing on the south face from July 5 to 17 amounted to only 172 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns, what is, only 190 vehicles. This is confirmed by the German General Heinrici, indicating the irreparable loss in 193 cars.


However, Russian researcher A.S. Tomzov did not agree with such estimates. Tomzov, personally went to Germany and studied German documents. Unlike Zetterling and Frankson, he took into account the fact that the Germans often gave the damaged armored vehicles the status of “requires major repairs”, and than were written off to the scrap. Following the “fate” of German tanks, he came to the conclusion that, taking into account later decommissioned vehicles, the real irretrievable losses of the armored vehicles of Army Group "South" in the period from July 5 to 17 were 290 vehicles. What is the real irrecoverable losses the Germans and that is about one and a half times exceeded the original calculated losses.

https://warspot.ru/users/217-aleksandr-tomzov/published

If we take the number of 290 tanks as the basis, it still turns out that the Soviet troops were only able to scratch the tank units of the German Army Group South. After all, it turns out that irretrievable losses the German amounted vehicles are no more than 20% of their original strength!


According to the Western researchers during the operation “Citadel" the German "Panzerwaffe" did not suffer significant damage, and the Germans stopped the operation solely under the influence of the Allied landing in Sicily and the need to transfer tank units to Italy. The same point of view is confirmed by German military leader Erich von Manstein, reporting that the German troops under his command were quite capable of completing the “Citadel” and defeating the opposing Soviet armies if there weren’t the Hitler order to withdraw the troops ...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein

Who is right?


Oddly enough, but both Western researchers. and Russian researchers. are right at the same time. Most likely, the Western researchers are absolutely right that the irretrievable losses of German armored vehicles during Operation Citadel ( from July 5 to July 17) are relatively small. But they completely mistakenly believe that the combat effectiveness of the tank forces is determined by the irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns.


In fact, of course, the combat readiness of the tank forces from the point of view of equipment is not determined by their irretrievable losses, but by how many tanks remains in service. And here the Germans were not doing well, because the same General Gotthard Fedor August Heinrici cites data that in the operation "Citadel" the German army lost 1,612 tanks and self-propelled guns, 323 of them - irrevocably. Given the fact that the Germans, according to various sources, at the beginning of the operation had from 2 451 to 2 928 units. armored vehicles (it is interesting that the upper limit was not given by Soviet historiography, but by Glanz), it turns out that by July 17 Germans had only 35-45% armored vehicles in combat-ready condition from the original number. If we take as the basis the most common figure of 2,700 German armored vehicles - then it would be only 40% armored vehicles in combat-ready condition. Generally speaking, according to the rules of military science, a millitary unit that has suffered losses more than 50% is considered the incapable of fighting.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gotthard_Heinrici



The irretrievable losses of the Germans are - from 323 to 485 armored vehicles and this is mean that real German irretrievable losses were about one and a half times higher than their operational reports and that mean that by July 17th the tank units of the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and they lost their offensive potential.


And what about the Red Army?

Losses of the Soviet army during the Kursk defensive operation according to G.F. Krivosheeva made 1,614 tanks “beyond retrieve” and this figure includes both combat and non-combat losses ( not only destroyed tanks, but also requiring repairs). Logically speaking, if we compare the Soviet and German tank losses, the numbers of 1,614 Soviet tanks versus 1,612 German tanks (given by Glanzgive) would give us much more accurate picture than 1,614 “beyond retrieve” Russian tanks against 323-485 irretrievably lost German tanks and self-propelled guns.


Of course, such a comparison will also not be correct, because in 1,612 units. German losses included those tanks that have minor faults and do not require major repairs, and the 1,614 Russian tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR are not included tanks required repairs. On the other hand, we must not forget that the USSR lost 1,614 tanks between July 5 and 23, and German losses from July 5 to July 17.


But in any case, one can be firmly convinced - although the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns (irretrievable plus returnable) during the operation “Citadel” may have somewhat surpassed the German losses, but not by ten times. They were quite comparable, despite even some gross mistakes of the Red Army commanders, which led to heavy losses. The largest error was the battle near Prokhorovka, held on July 12 what was resulting in unreasonably high losses of Soviet tanks.

 

[tank]

The Russian view on the losses of Soviet and German armored vehicles in 1943. Kursk Bulge

https://topwar.ru/158876-poteri-sovetskoj-i-germanskoj-bronetehniki-v-1943-g-kurskaja-duga.html


The irreparable loss of armored vehicles as an indicator of the ability to fight


Based on the level of irretrievable losses from their general level according to General Heinrici and according to A.S. Tomazova, wecan see that the Germans in the operation “Citadel" irretrievably lost 20-30% of armored vehicles. That is exactly 323-485 “irretrievable losses” tanks and self-propelled guns account for the total number of German losses of 1,612 armored vehicles. It can be assumed that in other battles the percentage of irretrievable losses of German tanks was 20-30% of the total number of irretrievable losses.


At the same time, the irretrievable losses of Soviet armored vehicles averaged 44%, and in some operations 1943-44. could reach 65-78%.


Imagine that the battle for the possession of a village entered the German Panzer Division and the Soviet Panzer Corps. Both of them are pretty battered in previous battles, and have some 100 tanks and self-propelled guns. The battle went on all day and in the evening the parties retreated to their original positions. Imagine that both the Soviet and German units lost 50 tanks.


What conclusions can be drawn from the results of such a battle? Obviously, the battle ended in a draw. Both sides did not fulfill the combat mission, but at the same time they prevented the enemy from doing so, and suffered equal losses. So, we can say that the Soviet corps and the German division demonstrated approximately equal martial art.


But of the 50 wrecked Soviet tanks, 20 were completely destroyed, and of the 50 German tanks - only 10. That would mean that the irretrievable losses of Soviet and German armored vehicles are correlated as 2: 1. Although in reality the sides were equal in their combat qualities, an assessment of the irretrievable losses will show that the German division fought twice as good as the Soviet corps!


The same is the case with the Battle of Kursk. When a person who is interested in military history sees a ratio of irretrievable losses of roughly 4: 1 in favor of the Panzervaffe, he will naturally draw a conclusion about the overwhelming superiority of the material part and the skill of the Nazi troops. But if we dig a little deeper, we will see that the ratio of irretrievable losses was actually not at all four to one, but significantly better for the Soviet troops, and the overall level of losses gives a completely different ratio. And therefore, you need to understand that when we look at the ratio of irretrievable losses for any period of hostilities, or in a specific battle, we would see ... it is the ratio of irretrievable losses, but not the ratio of the fighting qualities of the parties.

 

[tank]

"Filled with corpses." Why the West Twists the WW2 History?

Recently, a German journalist from Die Welt newspaper Sven Felix Kellerhof urged to demolish the monument to those killed in the tank battle near Prokhorovka July 12, 1943. According to Kellerhof, who studied the aerial photography of the Luftwaffe - 235 Soviet tanks and only 5 German tanks were allegedly destroyed in this battle.
Where did the journalist get such numbers from?
He doesn’t say.
Indeed, the losses of the Soviet troops in this incident were higher than the German ones, but not to such an extent.

For some reasons such “sensations” in the West are happening more and more often. Victims among German soldiers are seriously underestimated, while among the Red Army soldiers they are overstated. Often a loud statements are made by amateur historians, or even by people who have no relation to historical science...

https://weaponews.com/news/65352629...-to-demolish-the-monument-in-prokhorovka.html


Things are even worse with Stalingrad Battle.

Russian Wikipedia: Soviet casualties at Stalingrad Battle - 1 million 129 thousand killed and wounded. The losses of the Wehrmacht and German allies (Romanians, Italians, Hungarians) - 1 million 500 thousand people.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Сталинград�ка�_битва

In English Wikipedia the maximum number of casualties among Germans and their satellites is 868,374 dead, wounded and sick (almost 2 times underestimated ).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad

German version of Wikipedia gives a modest figure of 300 thousand (!) casualties among the German army, without mentioning a word of a loss of the soldiers of Italy, Hungary and Romania.

Now a terrible German defeat on the Volga looks almost as a victory for Germany.

What is going on?

 

[sfarrelly]

reported. please ignore him everyone. this is nothing to do with toy soldiers and not a ww2 discussion forum.

 

[theBaron]

reported. please ignore him everyone. this is nothing to do with toy soldiers and not a ww2 discussion forum.

It was a little unfair of you to report the post. It is of interest-though this is a toy soldier forum, we have the Historical Discussion forum for precisely this sort of discussion.

Whether the poster offers biased information and sources is irrelevant. He has as much right to post this post as you or I do. You and I can then choose to engage him in debate or not.

 

[Poppo]

I don't see the point of this thread:whatever is the ratio of the losses, the facts are clear. Kursk was a frontal battle of friction, and the soviets lost more materials than the germans as used to happen since 1941 in Soviet Union. But the german tanks and planes were not renewable, while the russians had hugher number of tanks and almost limitless stocks ( weapons and men). The northern german pincer ( Model) was stopped after a few km , while the southern german pincer ( Mainstein with his 6th waffen ss korps: leibstandarte, das reich, totenkopf), succeded in their slow progress inside the russian lines. The german army was such that they could only win a short war because of several reasons: limited industrial production, limited mineral resources, fuels, men....For this reason, the german army was obliged since the very beginning of Barbarossa to choose limited objectives, and limited front lines. In fact, when the allies, in the middle of Citadel landed in Italy, the leibstandarte divison had to be withdrawn and sent to Italy. A week or so after this , Citadel was cancelled.
So, what is the point of considering the precise ratio of the losses? The germans would lose the battle anyway. Only a fool like Hitler could dream of a victory in Kursk..:smile2:

 

[Mirof]

In those loss of URSS tanks, what is the percentage of the 20.800 tanks given as loan by the USA, Canada and Great Britain to the URSS:salute::
For the infantry vehicles ( trucks, jeeps ...) 500.000 of those used by URSS army were american Canadian and British

Please stop trying convincing yourself you won the war alone, we are not buying .

 

[tank]

I don't see the point of this thread:whatever is the ratio of the losses, the facts are clear. Kursk was a frontal battle of friction, and the soviets lost more materials than the germans as used to happen since 1941 in Soviet Union. But the german tanks and planes were not renewable, while the russians had hugher number of tanks and almost limitless stocks ( weapons and men). The northern german pincer ( Model) was stopped after a few km , while the southern german pincer ( Mainstein with his 6th waffen ss korps: leibstandarte, das reich, totenkopf), succeded in their slow progress inside the russian lines. The german army was such that they could only win a short war because of several reasons: limited industrial production, limited mineral resources, fuels, men....For this reason, the german army was obliged since the very beginning of Barbarossa to choose limited objectives, and limited front lines. In fact, when the allies, in the middle of Citadel landed in Italy, the leibstandarte divison had to be withdrawn and sent to Italy. A week or so after this , Citadel was cancelled.
So, what is the point of considering the precise ratio of the losses? The germans would lose the battle anyway. Only a fool like Hitler could dream of a victory in Kursk..:smile2:

That is funny.

You guys repeated this biggest myth of Kursk Batle again and again.


Kursk bulge and landing in Sicily.

According to the most popular version among current West historians operation “Citadel" was stopped due to the landing of the Allies in Sicily on July 10, 1943.

So on July 10, the Allied forces launched Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. Despite the fact that the Italian divisions did not really show any resistance, the German tank division German Goering and the Italian Livorno tried to drop the landing force back into the sea, striking on July 11. General Conrad reported on partial success and that Americans started to load back on ships. However, the threat cannot be completely eliminated.
On July 12 the operation Kutuzov begins and at the same time the 1st Parachute Division (1 Fallschirmjäger Division) from France was transferred to Sicily.

On July 13, a meeting was held at Hitler’s headquarters, unfortunately the transcript of the meeting was not preserved. Only Manstein vision of the meeting is presented and used as a historical fact.

Here is a quote from his memoirs on this subject:


"The July 13 meeting began with Hitler's statement that the situation in Sicily, where the Western Allies had landed on July 10, was serious. The Italians didn’t fight at all. We’ll probably lose the island. The enemy’s next step could be a landing in the Balkans or in southern Italy.
To form new armies in Italy and the Western Balkans the eastern front must give up some of the forces, and therefore the operation "Citadel" can not continue longer. "


According Manstein, von Kluge, who is also was there, declared the impossibility of continuing the offensive of the 9th army on the Kursk bulge due to heavy losses and the lack of spare mobile units to cover up the breakthroughs during Soviet counterattacks.

And then Manstein himself reports:


“I said that - speaking of the South group - the battle entered a decisive stage. After successfully repelling the attacks of the enemy, who threw almost all of their operational reserves into battle in recent days, the victory is close. To stop the battle now, probably would mean to miss the victory! If the 9th army at least onlypin down the opposing enemy forces and, perhaps, then resumes the offensive. Then we will try to finally defeat the Russian forces who already badly battered. Then the group [.. .] will again advance to the Psel and will move to the east of Oboyan with two tank corps and then turn west. That will force the enemy forces located in the western part of the Kursk Bulge to accept the battle with an inverted front. Kempf should now immediately receive the 24th tank corps. Obviously the forces of the group are only enough to continue the offensive to the south of Kursk. "


There are two serious contradictions in this quote. Firstly, Manstein wants the 24th tank corps (remember!), And secondly, he confirms that it’s not realistic to surround the bulge, because there enough forces to continue the offensive “ to the south of Kursk” only.

Where was the 24th tank corps? It was in reserve on the Mius Front, where on July 17, 1943, the Soviet offensive on the Donbas began. On July 20, the corps was thrown into battle against the Soviet units.
The 24th tank corps was on the Mius Front on July 20 and not to the Sicily. Also the SS divisions Totenkopf and Das Reich were moved to the Mius Front.

By the way, the SS division Leibstandart Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) transferred all the heavy weapons, tanks, motor vehicles to the Das Reich. Only the personnel of the Das Reich went to northern Italy, where Mussolini was deposed from the power on the night of July 24-25.

Hitler was needed “politically correct” units in Italy and that would indicate the presence of Germany there and would not allow Italians to get out of the war.
Please note - the LSSAH division went to NORTHERN Italy - not to Sicily and defiantly not to the zone were the Allies landed.

From July 24, the Allies advance has stalled in Sicily, fighting has become positional and it takes almost a month for the Germans to evacuate their units from the island.

It should also be noted that the "Italian saga" LSSAH did not last long. In November of the same year, the division was urgently transferred to Ukraine. Once again, I would like to draw the attention to this fact.
Allies landed in Italy in September and in November, one of the most combat-ready formations moved back to the Eastern Front.


That's the whole story about the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Two of its most powerful divisions fill gaps near Donbas, and LSSAH disarms Italian units and it guards critical facilities in Italy and the top officials of the fascist leadership.
LSSAH had a rests for a couple of months and than again find itself in the thick of battles with the most dangerous enemy for Germany the USSR.

The motorized division “Great Germany”, also withdrawn to the reserve from Kurst Bulge, it was sent to the area near Orel to restore itself.


The Operation Citadel lost its strategic meaning as a result of a series of Soviet offensive operations. That is why Hitler gave the order to stop it.

The July 26 meeting, that was the day after Mussolini was removed from the power and it worth to mention the meeting separately as it refers to the occupation of Northern Italy.


From the transcript of the meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on July 26, 1943 (translation from German sources):


"Here in Italy, I can do something only with first-class formations, which are primarily politically devoted to fascism. We need to restore so many things in a short time. If we keep northern Italy, nothing will scare me ... "

There is no point in denying that the crisis in Italy greatly disturbed Hitler. He demanded that the SS units and tank units be removed from the Eastern Front in order to restore the situation in Northern and Central Italy but that was completely unrealistic.




At the same meeting Hitler said:


"As it has already been said: the first thing is to remove the SS corps from the front ... A desperate situation has been created. This must be realized. It cannot be called pleasant! These are very difficult decisions, caused by the fact that we have reached a crisis point."


However, as shown above, this was not possible.

The Battle of Kursk ended not because of the Allies invasion on the Sicily.

The Allies should thank the Red Army and personally comrade Stalin for the fact that the SS divisions did not roll them into a thin pancake right on the coast of Sicily in September 1943.

https://zen.yandex.ru/media/proarm/...orii-vse-bylo-ne-tak-5d6966ce8f011100ad6aebe5

Cheers.

 

[Poppo]

That is funny.

You guys repeated this biggest myth of Kursk Batle again and again.


Kursk bulge and landing in Sicily.

According to the most popular version among current West historians operation “Citadel" was stopped due to the landing of the Allies in Sicily on July 10, 1943.

So on July 10, the Allied forces launched Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. Despite the fact that the Italian divisions did not really show any resistance, the German tank division German Goering and the Italian Livorno tried to drop the landing force back into the sea, striking on July 11. General Conrad reported on partial success and that Americans started to load back on ships. However, the threat cannot be completely eliminated.
On July 12 the operation Kutuzov begins and at the same time the 1st Parachute Division (1 Fallschirmjäger Division) from France was transferred to Sicily.

On July 13, a meeting was held at Hitler’s headquarters, unfortunately the transcript of the meeting was not preserved. Only Manstein vision of the meeting is presented and used as a historical fact.

Here is a quote from his memoirs on this subject:


"The July 13 meeting began with Hitler's statement that the situation in Sicily, where the Western Allies had landed on July 10, was serious. The Italians didn’t fight at all. We’ll probably lose the island. The enemy’s next step could be a landing in the Balkans or in southern Italy.
To form new armies in Italy and the Western Balkans the eastern front must give up some of the forces, and therefore the operation "Citadel" can not continue longer. "


According Manstein, von Kluge, who is also was there, declared the impossibility of continuing the offensive of the 9th army on the Kursk bulge due to heavy losses and the lack of spare mobile units to cover up the breakthroughs during Soviet counterattacks.

And then Manstein himself reports:


“I said that - speaking of the South group - the battle entered a decisive stage. After successfully repelling the attacks of the enemy, who threw almost all of their operational reserves into battle in recent days, the victory is close. To stop the battle now, probably would mean to miss the victory! If the 9th army at least onlypin down the opposing enemy forces and, perhaps, then resumes the offensive. Then we will try to finally defeat the Russian forces who already badly battered. Then the group [.. .] will again advance to the Psel and will move to the east of Oboyan with two tank corps and then turn west. That will force the enemy forces located in the western part of the Kursk Bulge to accept the battle with an inverted front. Kempf should now immediately receive the 24th tank corps. Obviously the forces of the group are only enough to continue the offensive to the south of Kursk. "


There are two serious contradictions in this quote. Firstly, Manstein wants the 24th tank corps (remember!), And secondly, he confirms that it’s not realistic to surround the bulge, because there enough forces to continue the offensive “ to the south of Kursk” only.

Where was the 24th tank corps? It was in reserve on the Mius Front, where on July 17, 1943, the Soviet offensive on the Donbas began. On July 20, the corps was thrown into battle against the Soviet units.
The 24th tank corps was on the Mius Front on July 20 and not to the Sicily. Also the SS divisions Totenkopf and Das Reich were moved to the Mius Front.

By the way, the SS division Leibstandart Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) transferred all the heavy weapons, tanks, motor vehicles to the Das Reich. Only the personnel of the Das Reich went to northern Italy, where Mussolini was deposed from the power on the night of July 24-25.

Hitler was needed “politically correct” units in Italy and that would indicate the presence of Germany there and would not allow Italians to get out of the war.
Please note - the LSSAH division went to NORTHERN Italy - not to Sicily and defiantly not to the zone were the Allies landed.

From July 24, the Allies advance has stalled in Sicily, fighting has become positional and it takes almost a month for the Germans to evacuate their units from the island.

It should also be noted that the "Italian saga" LSSAH did not last long. In November of the same year, the division was urgently transferred to Ukraine. Once again, I would like to draw the attention to this fact.
Allies landed in Italy in September and in November, one of the most combat-ready formations moved back to the Eastern Front.


That's the whole story about the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Two of its most powerful divisions fill gaps near Donbas, and LSSAH disarms Italian units and it guards critical facilities in Italy and the top officials of the fascist leadership.
LSSAH had a rests for a couple of months and than again find itself in the thick of battles with the most dangerous enemy for Germany the USSR.

The motorized division “Great Germany”, also withdrawn to the reserve from Kurst Bulge, it was sent to the area near Orel to restore itself.


The Operation Citadel lost its strategic meaning as a result of a series of Soviet offensive operations. That is why Hitler gave the order to stop it.

The July 26 meeting, that was the day after Mussolini was removed from the power and it worth to mention the meeting separately as it refers to the occupation of Northern Italy.


From the transcript of the meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on July 26, 1943 (translation from German sources):


"Here in Italy, I can do something only with first-class formations, which are primarily politically devoted to fascism. We need to restore so many things in a short time. If we keep northern Italy, nothing will scare me ... "

There is no point in denying that the crisis in Italy greatly disturbed Hitler. He demanded that the SS units and tank units be removed from the Eastern Front in order to restore the situation in Northern and Central Italy but that was completely unrealistic.




At the same meeting Hitler said:


"As it has already been said: the first thing is to remove the SS corps from the front ... A desperate situation has been created. This must be realized. It cannot be called pleasant! These are very difficult decisions, caused by the fact that we have reached a crisis point."


However, as shown above, this was not possible.

The Battle of Kursk ended not because of the Allies invasion on the Sicily.

The Allies should thank the Red Army and personally comrade Stalin for the fact that the SS divisions did not roll them into a thin pancake right on the coast of Sicily in September 1943.

https://zen.yandex.ru/media/proarm/...orii-vse-bylo-ne-tak-5d6966ce8f011100ad6aebe5

Cheers.

Ok, now I understand your point:"The Battle of Kursk ended not because of the Allies invasion on the Sicily." Thank you for explaining, I didn't understand this from your previuos post .
For sure the allies had to thank Stalin, because it is a fact that ww2 took place at 85 per cent on the eastern front. It is a fact that at least 85 per cent(or about) of whermacht fought on the eastern front, not on the western one. It is a fact that the allies helped Stalin with supplies and with the landing in Sicily and the following year in Normandy opening a second front, even if the biggest effort was taking place in the eastern front. The landing in Sicily, if wasn't the only reason to stop Citadel, at least was one of the reasons. And it is a fact, that Germany couldn't win the war against both Soviet Union and the allies together. It is my opinion that,considering the whole situation, even Soviet Union alone would have won the war against Hitler, even if in a longer period of time and with even heavier losses. But this is my opinion, not a fact. And it is a fact that the allies propaganda through historians, school, politics during and after the war entitled to them the merit of winning ww2 while objectively it was Soviet Union who made the job, with the help of the allies.:salute::

 

[tank]

In those loss of URSS tanks, what is the percentage of the 20.800 tanks given as loan by the USA, Canada and Great Britain to the URSS:salute::
For the infantry vehicles ( trucks, jeeps ...) 500.000 of those used by URSS army were american Canadian and British

Please stop trying convincing yourself you won the war alone, we are not buying .

Could you please let everyone know where did you get your numbers?


Lend-lease in the USSR was supplied from the USA: light tank M3A1 “Stuart” - 1676 pcs., Light tank M5 - 5 pcs., Light tank M24 - 2 pcs., Medium tank M3 “Grant” - 1386 pcs., Medium tank M4A2 “Sherman” (with a 75 mm gun) - 2007 pcs., Medium tank M4A2 (with a 76 mm gun) - 2095 pcs., Heavy tank M26 - 1 pc. From England: Valentine infantry tank - 2394 pcs, Matilda MkII infantry tank - 918 pcs, Tetrarch light tank - 20 pcs, Churchill heavy tank - 301 pcs, Cromwell cruising tank - 6 units. From Canada: Valentine infantry tank- 1388 pcs. Total: 12199 tanks.

In all, 86.1 thousand Russian and Leand tanks were delivered to the Soviet-German front during the war years.

The Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 12.3% of the total number of tanks produced / delivered to the USSR in 1941-1945.


Source: https://statehistory.ru/35/Lend-liz--Mify-i-realnost/


Cheers.

 

[waynepoo]

One undeniable fact that no one, for all they try, can deny is the USSR alone could not have defeated Nazi Germany......

 

[Mirof]

sources
https://ww2-weapons.com/lend-lease-tanks-and-aircrafts/

https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/ww2-soviet-tanks.asp

https://books.google.be/books?id=T4...ert de forces ss sur le front italien&f=false

In short 12 jul Germany was winning in Koursk even if they were shorter in soldiers and tanks attacking 5000Km of defense works, but Sicily attack plus the disinformation distilled by the allies "Operation Mincemeat' had already the German forces to expect an attack in Greece and the balkans, so the unexpected attack in Italy convinced Hittler that the biggest threat was perhaps Sicily / Italy invasion and he took away the SS forces to send them there, still afraid of an attacl in Greece
Mincemeat was then a success, as it allowed the URSS to defeat a greatly weakened force, and the determination of Stalin, never shy to send his troops to the butchery, helped a lot through all the war . I thanks the peoples of URSS taken between the hammer and the anvil; the brutal force of the german and the fear of the soviet police . They literally fought fot they life .

Oh yes ... IMHO

 

[tank]

One undeniable fact that no one, for all they try, can deny is the USSR alone could not have defeated Nazi Germany......

Good Day Wayne.
Thanks for your post.

I have got in my library a very good book:

The combat history of SCHWERE PANZER-ABTEILUNG 503.

On the Page 116.

In the Southern Sector of the Easterb Front (1943)

“For me it was a failure of Operation Zitadelle in the summer of 1943 that first made it clear to me that the war was lost for Germany. In spite the commitment of large amounts
of troops and equipment, only local success were achieved. At the time we were not aware the concentration had only been achieved by irresponsibly thinning out other sectors.
When Operation Zitadelle bogged down after intial success and the Red Army began to drive us back “on the backhand”, that could only result from German inferiority that could never be redressed.

The overal result was that, starting with the summer of 1943, the German army in the east had lost the initiative and could only react. That mean that the war with the USSR could not be won. At that point in time, the invasionof the European continent by the Western Allies had not yet begun.
The costly war in the east and the conquest and occupation of almost all of Europe had exhausted German personal and equipment.

We were almost entirely dependant on our own sources for production of armaments. There were an increasing number of bottlenecks.
The supply of aircraft, tanks and motor vehicles no longer covered our losses. Durring 1943 the number of German divisions on the east sank from 214 to 190.
The Red Army could increase the number of its divisions from 442 to 512....”

Only in the Kursk Bulge battle Red Army wiped out 24 German divisions. That is roughly 240,000 men.
Waine, do you still think that the USSR alone could not have defeated Nazi Germany.

If you have this book you can read it yourself.

USSR could win the war without the Second Front.

Dr Franz-Willhelm Lochmann, Richard Fresher von Rosen and Alfred Rubbel admit that in this book.

Kind Regards.
Serge.

 

[tank]

sources
https://ww2-weapons.com/lend-lease-tanks-and-aircrafts/

https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/ww2-soviet-tanks.asp

https://books.google.be/books?id=T4...ert de forces ss sur le front italien&f=false

In short 12 jul Germany was winning in Koursk even if they were shorter in soldiers and tanks attacking 5000Km of defense works, but Sicily attack plus the disinformation distilled by the allies "Operation Mincemeat' had already the German forces to expect an attack in Greece and the balkans, so the unexpected attack in Italy convinced Hittler that the biggest threat was perhaps Sicily / Italy invasion and he took away the SS forces to send them there, still afraid of an attacl in Greece
Mincemeat was then a success, as it allowed the URSS to defeat a greatly weakened force, and the determination of Stalin, never shy to send his troops to the butchery, helped a lot through all the war . I thanks the peoples of URSS taken between the hammer and the anvil; the brutal force of the german and the fear of the soviet police . They literally fought fot they life .

Oh yes ... IMHO

Hi Mirof.

1.
Here is your quote:
“those loss of URSS tanks, what is the percentage of the 20,800 tanks given as loan by the USA, Canada and Great Britain to the URSS”

And here is what your source give us
“A total of 20,800 armoured veahicle were delivered to the Red Army”

Do you really can’t see the differnce between the tanks and armoured veahicle?

2.
Your quote
“he took away the SS forces to send them there"

Could you please provide list the SS units which went to Sicily from the Kursk bulge.

Cheers.
Serge.

 

[Rutledge]

To borrow a phrase, the only good Russian soldier is a dead one.

 

[Poppo]

“For me it was a failure of Operation Zitadelle in the summer of 1943 that first made it clear to me that the war was lost for Germany."


Adolf was even smarter than that...He understood that the war had been lost after the failing of the winter 41 offensive in front of Moscow...Of course, this didn't stop his fanaticism to continue the fight till the end.

 

[tank]

Adolf was even smarter than that...He understood that the war had been lost after the failing of the winter 41 offensive in front of Moscow...Of course, this didn't stop his fanaticism to continue the fight till the end.

That was spoken well. :salute::

 

[Mirof]

Good Day Wayne.
Thanks for your post.

I have got in my library a very good book:

The combat history of SCHWERE PANZER-ABTEILUNG 503.

On the Page 116.

In the Southern Sector of the Easterb Front (1943)

“For me it was a failure of Operation Zitadelle in the summer of 1943 that first made it clear to me that the war was lost for Germany. In spite the commitment of large amounts
of troops and equipment, only local success were achieved. At the time we were not aware the concentration had only been achieved by irresponsibly thinning out other sectors.
When Operation Zitadelle bogged down after intial success and the Red Army began to drive us back “on the backhand”, that could only result from German inferiority that could never be redressed.

The overal result was that, starting with the summer of 1943, the German army in the east had lost the initiative and could only react. That mean that the war with the USSR could not be won. At that point in time, the invasionof the European continent by the Western Allies had not yet begun.
The costly war in the east and the conquest and occupation of almost all of Europe had exhausted German personal and equipment.

We were almost entirely dependant on our own sources for production of armaments. There were an increasing number of bottlenecks.
The supply of aircraft, tanks and motor vehicles no longer covered our losses. Durring 1943 the number of German divisions on the east sank from 214 to 190.
The Red Army could increase the number of its divisions from 442 to 512....”

Only in the Kursk Bulge battle Red Army wiped out 24 German divisions. That is roughly 240,000 men.
Waine, do you still think that the USSR alone could not have defeated Nazi Germany.

If you have this book you can read it yourself.

USSR could win the war without the Second Front.

Dr Franz-Willhelm Lochmann, Richard Fresher von Rosen and Alfred Rubbel admit that in this book.
Kind Regards.
Serge.

Sure ... those guys were 20/22 years old at Kursk, just NCO driving tanks, I'm sure they were eating at the Berghof every week end and exchanged with Adolf their point of view .
..
An I'm happy you didn't won alone, seing that the freed countries had to live in a near salvery state under the yoke of the great liberators

 

[tank]

Sure ... those guys were 20/22 years old at Kursk, just NCO driving tanks, I'm sure they were eating at the Berghof every week end and exchanged with Adolf their point of view .
..

Dear Mirof.

Could you please remind us how old you were during the Kursk Battle in 1943.
Sure you have a many vivid memories of those days to share it with us.

For some reasons I trust those 20/22 years old guys much more than the couch experts who can’t even see the difference between tanks and armoured vehicles.

Kind Regards..
Serge.

 

[tank]

Once again about the Kursk Bulge Battle.

The German Army before the beginning of the Kursk Bulge Battle had:

Just before the beggining of the Battle of Kursk, the German tank divisions participating in the offensive had a total of 2173 tanks of all modifications.
This tank forces were iincluding flamethrower tanks (41), commander tanks (119) and light tanks (119) plus there were at least 90 Tigers and 200 Panthers
The infantry divisions had at least 1000 assault self-propelled guns.


All these tanks and assault self-propelled guns in terms of combat qualities were vastly exceeded the Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns.
Especially the heavy Tigers, Panthers and the long-barrel modifications of the Pz IV.
They could destroy the medium T 34 tanks from a distance of 1000m to 2000m.
On the other side the Soviet 76mm anti-tank artillery could reliably destroy the German tanks of the latest modifications from a distance no more than 400m or even less.

So to make it short the reliably distance of an armour penetration the opposing tanks for the T-34 was at least twice less then for the German tanks.



The Red Army before the beginning of the Kursk Bulge Battle had:

Central Front (2nd Tank Army, 129th Tank Brigade, separate tank regiments (five), 9th Tank Corps, 13th, 70th, 60th and 65th Armies):


KV-1 heavy tanks - 70 tanks


Medium tanks T 34 and M3 "General Lee" - 864 tanks


T 70 and T 60 light tanks - 647 tanks


In addition there were SU-152 - 25 pieces, SU-122 - 32 pieces and 34 SU-76 - 34 pieces.


Voronezh Front. (1st Tank Army, 10th Tank Corps, 5th Guards Tank Corps, 86th, 180th and 190th Separate Tank Brigades, 3 Separate Tank Regiments, Two Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiments and the 1461st Self-Propelled artillery regiment.)


KV-1 - 105 heavy tanks


Medium tanks T-34 - 1109 tanks


Light T-70 and T-60 - 463 tanks


24 SU-122 - 24 pcs and SU-76 - 33 pcs.

Please note: The Army reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army (about 450 tanks), what were in the counterattack near Prokhorovka.

Thus, we can see that by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk USSR troops had no noticeable superiority in tanks - neither quantity, nor quality.

German - 3173 tanks and assault self-propelled guns.

Red Army - 3406 tanks and self-propelled guns plus 450 tanks reserve.


The epic “wall to wall” battle on July 12 near Prokhorovka in reality was a series of counter-battles separated in time at a front 32–35 km long. This situation arose as a result of almost simultaneous offensive operations on both sides. The Germans made the first move - on June 11, they struck in the direction of Prokhorovka and Oboyan, partially disrupting the preparation of the Red Army counteroffensive.


5th Guards the tank army, operating in a 17–19 km long band, together with attached units at the beginning of the battle, numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the advancing German group was up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The Rotmistrov’s tank army (5th Guards Tank Army) lost up to 60% of its tanks in the tank battles on July 12.
The Red Army counteroffensive failed but the Germans did not achieve their goals either.
In view of the fact that the actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army disrupted the German attack on Kursk, these operations were later considered successful.

Western historians repeat that German troops retreated from the Kursk Bulge only because they had to be transferred to Italy due the Allies landing in Sicily.


The landing in Sicily took place at about the same time - from July 9 to August 17.
The 16th panzer division, the 26th panzer divisions and the “German Goering” division, fought with the Allies in Italy in September 1943.
These panzer divisions did not participate in the Battle of Kursk and weren’t on the Eastern Front (16th panzer division was formed again).


Hitler did not transfer any troops “from Kursk” to Italy.

That is a myth. (regards to Mirof)

Cheers.
Tank