binder001
Command Sergeant Major
- Joined
- Apr 30, 2005
- Messages
- 2,729
Louis, First, remember that the History Channel has a point of view to present, they only show the interviews that support what the producer wants you to see. I spend more time strudying armor in a weekend than the average documentary producer does in a year.
Second, I suggest that you look at some of the Osprey titles by Steve Zaloga. As mentioned earlier, look at "Lorraine 1944, Campaign #75" by Steven J. Zaloga published by Osprey in 2000.
I take the liberty of quoting one paragraph; "The popular myth of the superiority of German tanks in combat in north-west Europe is belied by the record of their actual performance. In an engagement of the type seen around Arracourt, with both sides in an offensive posture and neither side enjoying particular numerical advantage, panzer units were overcome by the superior American training and tactics. While airpower played an important role in some encounters, such as Dompaire, most of the fighting took place under rainy and foggy conditions where airpower could not intervene to a significant extent. German tanks and anti-tank guns could still exact a painful toll against American tanks when skillfully employed from defensive positions, as would be evident in the remaining months of the war. However the same was true of American tank and tank destroyer units, as was seen in the difficult opening weeks of the Ardenes offensive, when the panzer offensive was stopped in its tracks far short of its objectives."
In the book Mr. Zaloga talks of German losses, where 616 tanks and assault guns were committed to the Lorraine fighting in September only 127 were operational by 10/1/44. Losses included 101 PzKPFW IVs, 118 Panthers, and 221 assault guns. There were an additional 148 vehicles in German units that were damaged and/or in need of repair. He mentions that total armor losses for the Third Army in September included 49 light tanks and 151 medium tanks and tank destroyers. A total of 392 tanks were issued in September, so that, by the end of September, Third Army had more than replaced all its losses.
Further, the Sherman was in many ways superior to the original T34 (gun was about equal, better radios, better crew layout). Biggest problem - the Germans ran into T34 first, they learned hard lessons and went for technical superiority. By the time they met the Sherman in large numbers that had adopted better weapons to meet its challenges. By the time the US Army took the German Panther seriously it was too late to get a replacement into production and shipped over to the ETO. The US armor doctrine also delayed any replacement for the M4 series. Again, locate a copy of "Faint Praise, American Tanks and Tank Destroyers of WW2" by Charles M. Baily, published in 1983. An excellent overview of why the troops were stuck with an obsolescent tank in Europe.
Second, I suggest that you look at some of the Osprey titles by Steve Zaloga. As mentioned earlier, look at "Lorraine 1944, Campaign #75" by Steven J. Zaloga published by Osprey in 2000.
I take the liberty of quoting one paragraph; "The popular myth of the superiority of German tanks in combat in north-west Europe is belied by the record of their actual performance. In an engagement of the type seen around Arracourt, with both sides in an offensive posture and neither side enjoying particular numerical advantage, panzer units were overcome by the superior American training and tactics. While airpower played an important role in some encounters, such as Dompaire, most of the fighting took place under rainy and foggy conditions where airpower could not intervene to a significant extent. German tanks and anti-tank guns could still exact a painful toll against American tanks when skillfully employed from defensive positions, as would be evident in the remaining months of the war. However the same was true of American tank and tank destroyer units, as was seen in the difficult opening weeks of the Ardenes offensive, when the panzer offensive was stopped in its tracks far short of its objectives."
In the book Mr. Zaloga talks of German losses, where 616 tanks and assault guns were committed to the Lorraine fighting in September only 127 were operational by 10/1/44. Losses included 101 PzKPFW IVs, 118 Panthers, and 221 assault guns. There were an additional 148 vehicles in German units that were damaged and/or in need of repair. He mentions that total armor losses for the Third Army in September included 49 light tanks and 151 medium tanks and tank destroyers. A total of 392 tanks were issued in September, so that, by the end of September, Third Army had more than replaced all its losses.
Further, the Sherman was in many ways superior to the original T34 (gun was about equal, better radios, better crew layout). Biggest problem - the Germans ran into T34 first, they learned hard lessons and went for technical superiority. By the time they met the Sherman in large numbers that had adopted better weapons to meet its challenges. By the time the US Army took the German Panther seriously it was too late to get a replacement into production and shipped over to the ETO. The US armor doctrine also delayed any replacement for the M4 series. Again, locate a copy of "Faint Praise, American Tanks and Tank Destroyers of WW2" by Charles M. Baily, published in 1983. An excellent overview of why the troops were stuck with an obsolescent tank in Europe.