Sherman tank: General Inspection (1 Viewer)

[Vezzolf]

Although this is an interesting piece: It is my opinion that there are too many sandbags on this tank......I personally would have preferred cleaner lines with subtle weathering......I say this so that the tank itself could better appreciated.......Again I like the tracks......I'm a bit hesitant on this tank but like the figures....

 

[Toy Soldier Brigade]

I love the sandbags. Without them the whole theme of the piece is lost. This is one of my favorite sets.

 

[Chuck Harris]

Although this is an interesting piece: It is my opinion that there are too many sandbags on this tank......I personally would have preferred cleaner lines with subtle weathering......I say this so that the tank itself could better appreciated.......Again I like the tracks......I'm a bit hesitant on this tank but like the figures....

I think you are missing the whole point here. The GI's are try to protect themselfs, the Sherman lights up the first time it's hit. The Generals felt that they were overloading the tanks.
My thoughts, A dead Tank and tankers can't fight do what you have do to stay alive & fight..
That is what this model is about. K&C has other Shermans that show the tanks lines.

 

[boot51]

I understand what you're saying, Vezzolf and maybe day Andy will do an unbagged, updated version of the cast hull Sherman (for North Africa maybe?), but the current BBA-15 is an awesome tank. The level of detail is incredible, the sandbagging, the stowage, and of course the tracks we've all been waiting for. Chuck makes a great point about the Sherman tankers doing what they felt they had to do just to stay alive, although in reality sandbagging couldn't have been very effective against high velocity 75 & 88 mm AP rounds and the more common and probably slightly more effective practice was welding addition armor plate on the sides and front, but I don't think that would create the visual affect Andy was looking for with this vehicls. I'd like to see a separate crew for the Sherman in a more action-like pose and maybe some American winter tank riders or possibly a separate crew, all full figures, resupplying and re-arming the tank for the next battle. Then again, maybe I've been reading too many of J. Gambale's posts and I'am asking for too much. Time to seek some professional help.

Fred

 

[binder001]

Some thoughts from a "Shermanoholic";

1) effectiveness of sandbags - yes, they are completely effective against direct fire AT guns. They were intended to counter the German close-in HEAT wepons like Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. By 1945 the GIs were losing many more tanks to Panzerfausts than German tanks.

2) The large amount of sandbags. Not many units went to this much effort. The 14th Armored Division had a standard arrangement like the model shows. The 2nd Armored Div and the 743rd Tank Battalion also had some extensively protected tanks. Many units concentrated the extra sandbags or extra stuff, on the glacis (front hull plate). Most of this extensive sandbag armor shows up in 1945 AFTER the Battle of the Bulge.

3) Just to mention, in regards to a cast hull Sherman for North Africa - just to make sure you know that the tank modeled, even with no sandbags, is NOT appropriate for North Africa. The M4A1 76mm Wet Stowage didn't reach combat until mid-July 1944 when a limited number were split between the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions. The North Africa M4A1s were very different.

4) Trivia - despite Patton's notorious dislike for the sandbags, he DID authorize Third Army depots to convert a number of M4A3 76mm and M4A3E8 to uparmored vehicles by taking plates from destroyed tanks (usually other M4A3s) and welding them in place. This was done due to the limited supply of M4A3E2 assault tanks available (only 254 were ever produced).

Now that's what we need - an M4A3E2 "Jumbo"! A number of these were in combat around Bastogne with 4th and 6th Armored Divisions.

The K&C M4A1 is a VERY GOOD model of a common ETO tank - it just needed a little better background homework.

Gary

 

[Louis Badolato]

Gary,

As a Shermanoholic, perhaps you can answer this question: is it true that during the design phase of the Sherman the reason that a short barelled low muzzle velocity 75mm gun was chosen was input from artillerymen who insisted the tank have a gun that wouldn't wear out quickly or need to be replaced until it had fired 1,500 rounds? If this is true, the Artillery men in question and the idiots on the design team that listened to them should all get a good swift kick in the butt (where their collective brains resided) as they cost thousands of allied tankers their lives.

 

[binder001]

I would have to look that up for an exact answer, but it sounds like a US design criteria. Look at a Sherman vs a T34 - the Sherman was designed to operate (with proper maintenance and spares) for years, where a T34 was designed for a few weeks.

The real problem is less with the artillery people, but again goes back to the basic philosophy of the US Armored Force doctrine. Army Chief of Staff McNair (a former artilleryman) bought into the concept that the best AT defense was an AT gun. If the gun could be made mobile, it would be able to meet enemy armored attacks with massed fires - the birth of the Tank Destroyer Command. History tells us that for numerous reasons the TDs didn't work as advertised in the real world. The new Armored Force pulled in the former tankers from the Infantry and Cavalry branches, but the Cavalry people's ideas ended up dominating the new procedures. That meant that the Armored Force was looked as as a weapon of exploitation, not as a weapon to deal with enemy armor. The Germans learned fast in Russia that the best AT weapon is a better tank, the US lacked that practical experience due to our late entry into the war. The tankers went to war equipped with a weapon that was quite good at defeating infantry, dug-in positions and AT guns, but weak on penetrating newer tanks like the German "big cats". IN THEORY the TDs were supposed to be able to deal with enemy tanks, leaving the tanks free to maneuver and run wild in enemy rear areas. Look at the American fascination with light tanks. We often read about the deficiencies of the M4, but many tankers went to battle in the M5A1 from DDay to VE Day - talk about a waste of brave men! That's why the light tanks ended up on security patrols or less stenuous duties, or served as replacements for the medium tank companies. By the time the Army realized its error - the battle was underway and it took too long to get new gear deveoped and deployed. You might say that US tankers suffered in 1945 for decisions made in 1942!

The 75mm gun M3 was prized for its ability to put HE on target, that's one of the reasons that the 76mm Shermans didn't go to the Pacific - the Marines wanted that HE weapon (the M4A3 with 75mm gun lasted in the USMCR until about 1950). The 76mm or the British 17-pounder didn't have the weight of HE round or the effectiveness on target as the 75mm. ETO supply reports printed in the First US Army "Report of Operations" show that there were 4 75mm HE shells fired for each 75mm AP shot.

This a quick over-simplified answer, but the REAL culprit is flawed doctrine adhered to by staff officers and a choice for high quantity of an OK weapon to equip an expanding army. Look at the Germans - they produced many fine tanks, but they were under tested, had poor reliability, and could never be provided in the needed quantities so many of their tankers still died in older machines.

Gary

 

[desk11desk12]

Wow Gary and Louis,

Great stuff, keep it coming. It is shame that poor management has sometimes deadly consequences.

Carlos

 

[sceic2]

I understand what you're saying, Vezzolf and maybe day Andy will do an unbagged, updated version of the cast hull Sherman (for North Africa maybe?), but the current BBA-15 is an awesome tank. The level of detail is incredible, the sandbagging, the stowage, and of course the tracks we've all been waiting for. Chuck makes a great point about the Sherman tankers doing what they felt they had to do just to stay alive, although in reality sandbagging couldn't have been very effective against high velocity 75 & 88 mm AP rounds and the more common and probably slightly more effective practice was welding addition armor plate on the sides and front, but I don't think that would create the visual affect Andy was looking for with this vehicls. I'd like to see a separate crew for the Sherman in a more action-like pose and maybe some American winter tank riders or possibly a separate crew, all full figures, resupplying and re-arming the tank for the next battle. Then again, maybe I've been reading too many of J. Gambale's posts and I'am asking for too much. Time to seek some professional help.

Fred

Ditto for me too. Fred said it best.

 

[Louis Badolato]

IThe real problem is less with the artillery people, but again goes back to the basic philosophy of the US Armored Force doctrine. Army Chief of Staff McNair (a former artilleryman) bought into the concept that the best AT defense was an AT gun. If the gun could be made mobile, it would be able to meet enemy armored attacks with massed fires - the birth of the Tank Destroyer Command.

Gary

I would bet Chief of Staff McNair bought this concept based on WWI experiences - when small groups or individual slow lumbering early tanks were easily knocked out by massed dug in artillery. It just goes to show you that the old adage that most armies starting a new war are designed to win the last war is sadly often true.

 

[OzDigger]

I seem to recall several previous discussions on the US tank doctrine and it's influence on losses in WWII

There is no doubt it is an advantage to have a dual purpose main weapon but the primary requirement for a tank must be to destroy other tanks. If that requirement isn't there the tank will not achieve it's purpose unless it is available in huge numbers - luckily the Sherman was.

The US tank doctrine may well have been a success in the defending role where the tank destoyers could have been dug in with good defence support from infantry etc. However, in Europe from D-Day onward the allies were usually attacking.

 

[binder001]

I would bet Chief of Staff McNair bought this concept based on WWI experiences - when small groups or individual slow lumbering early tanks were easily knocked out by massed dug in artillery. It just goes to show you that the old adage that most armies starting a new war are designed to win the last war is sadly often true.

Actually it was based on the Army's perception of the defeat of France in 1940. I did not realize until recently that, despite our historical connection to Britain, that the US Army looked to France as their inspiration. When the French Army was so utterly defeated the US Army perceived that it was massed tank attacks that did them in. McNair looked at how to stop a massed tank attack, missing the effect of mobile combined arms with good close air support. German tactics evolved, but we were ready for a mass of German tanks to come charging at our guns where they would coneniently die in droves like Indians in a cheap wetern movie. As mentioned previously, we were usually on the offense versus defense and the Germans just didn't attack the US forces with massed armor. On the one occasion they did (the Ardennes) the TDs had been dispersed for infantry support and local defense. Tank Destroyer doctrine just never really worked like it was supposed to, leaving the tanks under-armed to deal with enemy tanks that showed up in their path.

Gary

 

[panda1gen]

Is this the right room for an argument? My British 2 cents.

In 1942 I think the Sherman was as good as anything around - the main protagonist was the L43 or L48 armed panzer four and not many of those at El Alemain on the Sherman's debut, most of the german armour was still panzer 3, 2, T38 etc.

The main problem I would suggest was that the gun/armour race so important on the eastern front - t34/76 to 85, KV 1 to KV 85 then JS with 122mm - made all german armour obsolete and so we had the development of the panther etc. Still only 4-5000 made in the whole war from 43-45.

Also, the Russian mud season in spring and autumn meant that towed anything was in trouble and so self propelled (with wide tracks) became necessary for the germans.

As for AT guns, Rommel used the tanks as the battlefield bully to smash through weak points and destroy the HQ and rear areas and the german doctrine in the desert was to withdraw and fight tanks with a screen of AT guns - not tanks - even the 50mm dug in was useful but the 88 of course was the main problem, and the Sherman was the antidote (compared with other British Armour) due to its HE capability.

Monty stopped the cavalry charging at Alam Halfa ridge.

Thank you US for sending that first shipment of Shermans at Alemain or a lot more Brits would be dead.

The key problem for me with the Sherman was not the tank itself, like the panzer 4 it was developed throughout the war and used because it was - like the panzer four - reliable etc. The Germans loved the pz4 even at the end, for reliability etc in the Ardennes for example.

The problem was the lack of development of heavier armour to complement it due to the decision regarding shipping from the US. More 35ton M4s could be made (48 000 by not messing with it) and sent in the holds of ships, rather than pressing on with the heavier stuff of 50-70 tons.

Even in 43 the Sherman was still good in tank v tank against pz3 and 4, but the armour race accelerated after the panther D in the summer at Kursk and with the L70 75mm -the sherman was not going to stop that with it's armour. Without the up gunning of the Firefly or the Jackson on the M10, what were they to do? You can't rely on Artillery, Typhoons and Thunderbolts all the time?

Added to the german 'advantage' of being on the defensive, even a pak40 or TD was a match in ambush position... (I saw a Hetzer run around Beltring Show in Kent a while back - small at head height, hard hitting, well armoured and unbelievably fast and manouverable - and 2500 made in the last year of the war).

Please note though, when in a 'traditional' Rommel style exploitation role, the Sherman - and even the obsolete British Cromwell (also of 1942 vintage but late arriving) were superb for their reliability and speed. Look how Patton got to Prague and Monty to the Elbe....

The Russians had the best tanks though perhaps

Arguments please Gentlemen...

 

[Louis Badolato]

Kevin,

I think you make some excellent points, but playing devils advocate (which, I am often called to do in my professional life) the Sherman wasn't called a "Ronson" by our own troops and a "Tommy cooker" by the Germans for nothing. The way the fuel and ammunition was stored in combination with the thin and unsloped armor made the Sherman highly vulnerable to to any tank with a decent main gun. Additionally it had a very high profile (it was as tall as a heavy Tiger tank), making it an easy target.

As far as Rommel's use of the anti tank guns in North Africa is concerned, I think that was more a function of the terrain and the lack of any decent commanders in the British Army in North Africa pre-Montgomery (and as you know I don't particularly care for Monty either). Auchlinchek, Alexander and Cunningham repeatedly fell for the same trick used by Rommel - he would have his tanks retreat, the Briish Armor would charge out after them, right into the dug in 88's, and get massacred.

To give credit where credit is due (grudgingly) Monty understood this, and refused to send out his armor after Rommel's feigned retreat at El Alamein. Further, the North African terrain also played into Rommels favor initially, and Monty's favor later, with regard to the use of anti tank guns. with the (for the most part - the L.R.D.G. and Anzac Forces executed a left hook through the desert to outflank the German's next dug in possition at El Ageila after El Alamein) impassable desert on one side and the sea on the other, and the liberal use of minefields, there was little or no opportunity to outflank the dug in guns, so advancing armor was often extremely vulnerable to stationary anti tank guns. The "boxes" (dug in infantry and artillery positions surrounded by minefields) the British employed at El Alamein devoured the few pieces of functional armor the Germans and Italians had left.

This held true in the Italian Campaign, where the terrain (a penninsula covered with mountains and rivers) also heavily favored the defense. However, in the Russian Front and in Western Europe, where maneuver was possible, stationary anti tank guns were often bypassed, flanked and destroyed.

Perhaps the best argument for the tank having to be prepared to fight other tanks comes from the Russian front. The Russians built perhaps the best tank of the war, the T-34. The Germans had to develop heavier, better tanks like the Tiger and the Panther to counter the Russians. The Russians chose to mass-produce a better designed but less well executed tank in the thousands. The Germans chose to produce fewer of super well made tanks. As we are aware, the Russians won.

So there are three approaches:

American & British: Mass produce a poor design, and sacrifice lives to overcome the enemy by force of numbers.

German: Build a small amount of extremely well designed tanks which are more than a match for anything the enemy can throw at you, counting on the superior tanks in the hands of better trained and more experienced tank crews to overcome the numbers of enemy tanks.

Russian: Mass produce an excellent design which is poorly executed, not caring about the comfort or survivability of the tank for the crews, and figuring that in the couple of weeks each tank and crew survives, it will destroy enough of the enemy to allow you to overcome it with a combination of quantity and quality.

For my money, the German approach, while unsuccessful, was the best. I believe the Germans would have succeeded had they not been fighting an enemy that outnumbered them 20 to 1 on the Eastern front, while simultaneously facing a foe on the Western front with total air supremacy. I think the British and United States have totally adopted the WWII German approach to armor production today. The Israeli, British and American Main battle tanks are produced in far smaller numbers than their Soviet counterpart the T-72, but are so superior that a few hundred of them knocked out a few thousand T-72's without only a handfull of Israeli, British or American losses in the various conflicts fought in the middle east between 1970 and the present.

 

[Warrior]

Louis,
I find your point interesting that the Germans were outnumbered 20 to 1 on the Eastern Front as from numerous accounts I have read concerning the Eastern Front Campaigns, for every German who died, 20 Russians did. Slaughter on a mass scale.

Also a bit disturbing that massive numbers of Germans who surrendered on the Eastern Front neve returned to Germany. It's no wonder that they fought with enormous intensity on the Eastern Front............

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis,
I find your point interesting that the Germans were outnumbered 20 to 1 on the Eastern Front as from numerous accounts I have read concerning the Eastern Front Campaigns, for every German who died, 20 Russians did. Slaughter on a mass scale.

Also a bit disturbing that massive numbers of Germans who surrendered on the Eastern Front neve returned to Germany. It's no wonder that they fought with enormous intensity on the Eastern Front............

According to the Military Channel, 14.5 Russians died for every German. Twenty Million Russian troops lined up against 1.5 million Germans initially, and the Russians put several million more into the line in the ensuing campaigns. The Germans just couldn't kill the Russians fast enough.

 

[panda1gen]

Dear Louis,

I was counting on it.

Are you sure that the numbers were so disparate, except in artillery, the Russian 'God of War', they very often had similar or even fewer tanks and men after the initial assault, e.g. for the defense of Moscow. Even in 43 at Kursk and for the superb Russian summer offensive in 44 the numbers were not too disimilar - the Russians had learned the art of strategic surprise and concentration by 43 and 44 especially.

I agree that twenty russian tanks were the average for each tiger on the open plain.

I also agree about the ronson, 'lights every time', which is why we should ask why it still produced, this we agree on.

All I am saying that in a global conflict of attrition 48000 Shermans give an edge (pincer with 45000 t34s). How many pershings could have been shipped across the Atlantic - even if it were just 5000, presumably the troops would have preferred this - but would it have been enough to hold the Normandy bridgehead? If you could get that many ashore. We shall never know.....

Also the Sherman did claim a few panzers in the western front e.g. in accounts of the Ardennes, as the shooting distances were shorter, unlike in Russia.

So why didn't the yanks adopt the 17pdr? The Brits were apparently pushed into it by junior officers, did the senior American officers not like the idea? Could it take a 90mm? (the Israeli's put a 105mm on it).

It is still the right room for an argument..... no it isn't...... oh yes it is ...anyway this isn't an argument

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

Dear Louis

BTW - it must be Christmas to give Monty grudging credit. Look forward to winding up the spring a little more in future.....tee heee

For what it is worth I did also give Patton ('don't sandbag my tank') some credit for his superb dash across open roads to Prague. Pity they stopped him as it could have saved much trouble later.

Could the Germans have done the same in 45 with gas guzzling and unreliable Tigers, I doubt it even with allied logistics, but they might have done with pz4s.

Pity about the wagon train supplies though..........

 

[jazzeum]

You fellows need to remember that not all the victims on the Eastern front were from military reasons. The Germans didn't intend to colonize but to destroy. The Einszatsgruppen were sent in to eradicate even to groups who might have been outwardly friendly to the Germans because of their hatred for central Russian rule. On top of that the Germans at first would shoot prisoners. This was a fight to the death between two brutal dictators. What happened in Eastern Prussia in the closing days of the war was payback, pure and simple. Thus, the reduced numbers of Germans who made it back after the war, and not right after the war either but quite a bit after the war ended.

 

[jazzeum]

Regarding Soviet war deaths, this is from Niall Ferguson's The War of the World (one of the best books I've read): 25 million deaths are estimated. The breakdown is 8.7 million military deaths (but may be as high as 10.2 millions if German estimates are accepted); and 13.7 million victims of German occupation, of whom 7.4 million were executed, 2.2 million were worked to death in Germany and 4.1 million succumbed to starvation or disease. Ferguson writes "Yet at least two million and probably more Soviet citizens died in places beyond the reach of Germans. It would be an error to blame Hitler for all Soviet war victims."

When you break down deaths from just an absolute number of 25 million to subset, it boggles the mind.