The Little Bighorn (1 Viewer)

[maddadicus]

This is intended to be an historical, reasonably fact based inquiry to the military whys and what fors of the Bighorn battle. Politicians and PC advocates need not respond. I want to know about the different books we have read from whatever country, concerning the subject. Conjecture as to combatants movements and intent are welcomed. Michael

 

[maddadicus]

First off, I am a Bighorn battle fan more than a Custer fan. I do not have an opinion as to whether Custer disobeyed his orders from Terry, which seemed opened to intepretation. I have always been curious as to why Custer, who knew the Indians were to his front, divided his command. After dividing his command and running into the village ( had to realize its size )further divided his command and without waiting for 45% of his command to catch up (with all his extra ammo )commenced an immediate attack with a only part of his men. If he ever intended to provide support, Custer was not in any position to do so, as he ended up meandering miles away from the action, because of broken terrain..Those are my questions..Michael

 

[eborris]

MY thought is that Custer sent Reno to occupy the braves so he could capture the women and children and therefore get the braves to give up the fight.

I recently read a Terrbile Glory.

 

[lancer]

I am not a Custer or LBH student but I have questions regarding the cavalry ammo supply. I have read references to Custer leaving behind his pack-train, thus his extra ammo. Was this a major consideration in terms of length of expected engagement? Did Custer have reason to expect (based on previous experience) that extra ammo would not be needed, ie., no long battle? What did the troopers carry with them into battle in the way of both carbine and revolver ammo (which I know was not interchangeable)? Just curious because the battle couldn't have lasted long enough for ammo supply to become a problem. -- lancer

 

[eborris]

Terrible Glory states 100 carbine rounds and 24 for the colt per man. They carried fifty carbine rounds on a belt or ammo pouch and 50 more in their saddlebags. There were another 28,000 carbine rounds with the supply train.

 

[maddadicus]

MY thought is that Custer sent Reno to occupy the braves so he could capture the women and children and therefore get the braves to give up the fight.

I recently read a Terrbile Glory.

That makes sense, but since Custer never had a chance to reconoiter the ground, who would he assume to be able to find the other end of the village before Reno might need his help..As it turned out, there was no immediate alternate ford nearby, which pushed Custer away from Reno. My last Custer read was Son of Morning Star. If anyone should get a chance to read Crazy Horse and Custer by Stephan Ambrose, they will find that the Morning Star movie was scripted almost verbatim from this book and not Connells..Michael

 

[eborris]

One would have to assume that he thought he would find them however, the best laid plans of mice and men often go astray. In this case much to his and his men's misfortune. I don't think he stopped trying though which could account for how split up his men were.

 

[maddadicus]

It is ironic that Reno and Benteen always get roasted for their percieved by some, abandonment of Custer, but Custer never takes a reputation hit, for abandoning Major Elliot and some 15 men, at the Wa****a fight, which made Custer's indian fighting reputation. They were found cut off and killed later..It is amazing how a number of Custer boosters, gloss over that part of his career ..Michael

 

[Njja]

I have read several books on Custer both at the Little Big Horn and his Civil

War service. He displayed remarkable courage in the Civil War and played

such a key role that the table the surrender was signed on was presented to

him.

Custer was advised that the indian party they were facing was considerably

smaller then the actual number present. The standard attack they had used

in similar engagements was to charge the indian camp from several directions,

which had proved sucessful many times eariler.

This time Custer's 200 man frontal assault met 8,000 braves many of which

had repeating rifles which spelled disaster.

Capt Thomas Custer (also killed) had won 2 Medals of Honor in the Civil War.

 

[trooper]

As I have stade elsewhere on another thread, Custer did have political ambitions, (sorry Maddadicus, but it is necessary to understand this,) and needed a major achievement to grab the headlines and reinstate his reputation damaged by the Indian Agency enquiry. Within the regiment the officers had settled in to two factions, pro and anti Custer. Reno and Benteen fell into the latter category. Because of this Benteen was sent off on a pointless sweep which would deny him any part in the glory and reno was sent to make first contact and draw off the warriors. custer meanwhile would cut round to the rear, capture the women and children, then charge through the village to take the warriors in the rear and "rescue" Reno, thus enhancing his own part while Reno would appear somewhat inadequate in needing help to do his.
Despite all the hype in the newspapers, largely written by Custer himself, he and the 7th were not the great Indian fighters they were portrayed to be. there had been one major action, the attack on a sleeping village at Wa****a, and a lot of fruitless pursuits with very little actual contact. Because of this Custer was convinced that the Indians would always run and when he found that on this occasion they were not only prepared to stand, but also positively eager to fight he was completely out of his depth. Nothing in his limited experience had prepared him for this, and the Indians came boiling out like gangbusters and overwhelmed his command in very little time. The limited number of 0.45 catridge cases found on the battlefield indicate that the troops barely had time to use their pistols, let alone reload them.
Benteen was right to stay with Reno, whose command had been badly battered. Had he left and tried to find Custer, whose exact position was unknown would have exposed both commands to being destroyed piecemeal, and to have taken reno with him would have meant abandoning the wounded, which was unthinkable.
Custer had spent all his military life puffing himself up to be a great military leader and tactician. His biggest mistake was that at the end he actually believed his own B. S.

 

[marco55]

The 4th Cavalry under Mackenzie was considered the best followed by 9th and 10th Cavalry.
Mark

 

[Aleš]

I have read several books on Custer both at the Little Big Horn and his Civil

War service. He displayed remarkable courage in the Civil War and played

such a key role that the table the surrender was signed on was presented to

him.

Custer was advised that the indian party they were facing was considerably

smaller then the actual number present. The standard attack they had used

in similar engagements was to charge the indian camp from several directions,

which had proved sucessful many times eariler.

This time Custer's 200 man frontal assault met 8,000 braves many of which

had repeating rifles which spelled disaster.

Capt Thomas Custer (also killed) had won 2 Medals of Honor in the Civil War.

There were never 8000 indians,but 2000 the most.And Custer have 600 man which it will be enogh if he didnt divide them into 3 group.
So,if we know that he have 600 man,all armed with rifles,some training expirience,advantage of a surprise,....he should win this.There is no excuse.Why he divide all his power to three groups know only him,but all that we know is that this was mistake.
All the campaign was a mistake,because he should wait for other generals to arrive,he should rest his man,he should prepare a tactic based on something diferent than just "shot-gun-run" tactics.There is million mistakes and i do not know why such a man like Custer do this mistakes.Maybe he was just a crazy,brave soldier in the Civil war when the other generals tell him what to do and he do it,because he was crazy and brave enough,but that do not mean that he was also a good general.There is diference-some people just know how to take orders,like Custer did in a civil war where some other people who was West point train give him this tactis and he obey,but when he was alone to think of a tactics,he failed,he didnt think nothing better and his lack of strategy kill him and his man.But brave man that he was and a little crazy he stand up and fight thinking maybe this will be enough,but it was not enough.
And Benten and Reno,they didnt stay there because they wannt to protect their wounded,this is just an excuse,but they stay there because they know that Custer is lost and that there is no reason they should get killed too,and off course they were also scare.And they do the right thing that they didnt come to help Custer because in the end they will also get killed.But if they are not scared they should help Custer with at least 100 man and they will still have enough for protect the wounded,but they didnt send no man,not one,they are not even try.Well one commander try but i do not know why he turn away later(maybe he get scared-ups did i say this loud)

 

[Aleš]

here you can read all about this battle


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Little_Bighorn

 

[Njja]

There were never 8000 indians,but 2000 the most.And Custer have 600 man which it will be enogh if he didnt divide them into 3 group.

........................................................................................................

There are quite a few different accounts of this battle, and I suppose the

exact number of indians will never be known. I have read there were as

many as 15,000 present. When you consider Custer's military experience,

and the fact that several members of his family were present, I do not

believe he intended to wipe out his command. It is always easy to second

guess a situation once it is over and the results are known.

I certainly respect the fact they stood their ground and fought to the last

man.

 

[Njja]

Custer had spent all his military life puffing himself up to be a great military leader and tactician. His biggest mistake was that at the end he actually believed his own B. S.

........................................................................................................

Custer certainly was proud and pompous, as many famous generals have

been, think of Patton and Montgomery for example. He also lead from the

front and had several horses shot out from under him during the Civil War.

I believe your remarks above do not really do justice to a man that bravely

fought for his country his entire life. Did he make a fatal error at the Little

Big Horn? Who knows for certain? We were not there, it is easy to see the

errors when the results are known. I certainly do not believe he intended to

have his command, and several family members wiped out. I believe he

thought they were facing a much smaller group of indians which he knew his

command and tactics could handle. Unfortunately that was not the case, one

should remember his men stood their ground and fought to the last man. I

certainly admire their courage.

 

[UKReb]

Anyone who has visited the LBH battlefield and studied the terrain quickly identifies the vastness of the area and trying to locate an Indian village within those thousands of acreage was no mean task. Even the spread of the Custer fight can overwhelm a visitor (it took me one hour and a half to just locate Keogh's marker-although the many signs for "beware of rattlesnakes" makes one tread slowly and carefully.)

Custer followed his orders precisely up to the evening of June 24 following the trail of the Indian for over 70 miles along the Rosebud, in two and half days keeping to the prescribed orders from Terry of 30 miles a day. He was right on schedule on his scouting mission. It then became for him a mission of locate and destroy before the Indian scattered. At a Custer Symposium in 1991 Robert Church put forward an interesting interpretation of what might have been:-

"the combination of events that defeated Custer and the 7th Cavalry was:-
1. The widely accepted idea that Indians would not stand and fight but would scatter when attacked
2. Custer's own command style, centered around chasing Indians
3. The phenomenon of intellectual vertigo-the brain believing what it wants to believe and not what it is told by it's senses."

I have always liked this analysis for example; What if Custer had accepted the evidence of the size of the village? He could have saved his command by following Terry's orders to go farther south and avoid the LBH valley. It also makes a lot of sense when you align this with Crook's defeat at the Rosebud some days before when the Indian did stand and fight (Custer and Terry had no knowledge of this) And as we know Custer did not and now perhaps could not believe his scouts.
And finally an interesting sidebar to whether Custer disobeyed Terry's orders-or not. Are two little known seperate accounts from officers of Terry's staff relate that when Terry stood over Custer's corpse on the battlefield the next day he cried "Dam# him! Dam# him!" and turned away with tears blinding his eyes. Speaks multitudes to me!

I agree with trooper re the Benteen/Reno fight. If Benteen had not taken decisive action to rejoin the rest of the column, if he had in fact, been where Custer had every reason to believe him to be-scouting the hills and valleys to the left of the main column's advance, his order to rejoin the column, brought by Private Martin might have taken many hours to deliver, in fact Martin may not have been able to even contact him. Had this been the case, Reno's command atop the bluffs would most likely have been wiped out along with Custer and his column. When Benteen received the message he rode to the sound of the gun-fire and in doing so provided support to Reno's shattered troops fighting for their lives.

Exactly what happened after Custer led his command into the LBH valley is far from certain. The enigma of its annihilation spurs students of military history (yours truly included) to infinite speculations over why and how Custer met his defeat-but most students of this fight will agree by suffering one of the worst defeats in the history of the Indian wars, Custer won for himself and his regiment an immortality that no victory, however brilliant and decisive, could ever have achieved

Reb

 

[Njja]

Reb:

An excellent post!

 

[binder001]

Thanks for your posting UKReb. That is some good info. I have also read several sources claiming that Custer's excuse for the divided command was to prevent the Indians from escaping. The frustration of the US Army at the time was generally bringing the Native Americans into a "set battle" that would favor the US troops tactics and weapons. It was basically an insurgent warfare over lots of open ground.

Speaking of ground, UKReb - what was your opinion of the battleground? I had a friend who toured the area and said it was lousy country for cavalry with the coulies restricting routes and the Indians having lots of concealment.

By the way, in the popular mythology of the 7th US CAvalry as "crack troops", the US Army on the frontier was a largely immigrant force. Some of the troopers barely knew English. Further, the US Army did not adopt a system of marksmanship training until about 1884. "Nebraska History" magazine once had a fascinating article on firearms accidents in the US Army in the West. What firing range training did take place was under no safety regulations and the standards were up to the units' officers.

There was another article (I wish I could remember where I found it) that mentioned that one of the factors leading to the demise of Custer's battalion was that the unit lost integrity. As the fight became more heated and moved there were small parties or individuals involved in seperate fights. There was no cohesion, no teamwork (not at all like Errol Flynn's version!).

The Custer fight marked one of the worst moments for the US Army in the West - incapable or inept leadership, overconfidence, mediocre training. For the indigenous people it was a brief flame that was quickly extinguished. The Native Americans couldn't manage a multi-nation alliance for long and the US response was to send more troops and increase the pressure.

Since I live on the great plains in the west I am of mixed opinions about the Native Americans cause and my ancestors' actions, but we need not start down that path. Let's keep it on the military aspects.

A very interesting thread.

Gary B.

 

[Mister Dave]

Especially insightful posts, Trooper and Reb.

More than ever now, I am looking forward to touring the site again during my swing through the West in July. Have not been since 1980 or so, but have pretty strong memories of the place. A bit of an eerie feel there. Very remote. I am anxious to explore a bit more this time around.

MD

 

[UKReb]

Thanks for your posting UKReb. That is some good info. I have also read several sources claiming that Custer's excuse for the divided command was to prevent the Indians from escaping. The frustration of the US Army at the time was generally bringing the Native Americans into a "set battle" that would favor the US troops tactics and weapons. It was basically an insurgent warfare over lots of open ground.

Speaking of ground, UKReb - what was your opinion of the battleground? I had a friend who toured the area and said it was lousy country for cavalry with the coulies restricting routes and the Indians having lots of concealment.

By the way, in the popular mythology of the 7th US CAvalry as "crack troops", the US Army on the frontier was a largely immigrant force. Some of the troopers barely knew English. Further, the US Army did not adopt a system of marksmanship training until about 1884. "Nebraska History" magazine once had a fascinating article on firearms accidents in the US Army in the West. What firing range training did take place was under no safety regulations and the standards were up to the units' officers.

There was another article (I wish I could remember where I found it) that mentioned that one of the factors leading to the demise of Custer's battalion was that the unit lost integrity. As the fight became more heated and moved there were small parties or individuals involved in seperate fights. There was no cohesion, no teamwork (not at all like Errol Flynn's version!).

The Custer fight marked one of the worst moments for the US Army in the West - incapable or inept leadership, overconfidence, mediocre training. For the indigenous people it was a brief flame that was quickly extinguished. The Native Americans couldn't manage a multi-nation alliance for long and the US response was to send more troops and increase the pressure.

Since I live on the great plains in the west I am of mixed opinions about the Native Americans cause and my ancestors' actions, but we need not start down that path. Let's keep it on the military aspects.

A very interesting thread.

Gary B.

Gary

Your friend was correct definitely not cavalry terrain-although I am not a horseman it was difficult enough traversing the field on foot one can only imagine how tough it was for horse-soldiers. And you are also correct the 7th Cavalry with Custer were in the main inexperienced immigrants- 136 Irish; 110 German; 40 English with a mix of Swiss, Italian and Canadian. Benteen commented after the fight that a good half of the troopers were not trained sufficiently for active duty.

Add that to the fact that their horses were "played out" having carried their riders and equipment over 60 miles across some pretty tough terrain from 5 in the morning of the 24th to approx 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th. A period of 33 hours, including halts with very little rest, water or oats. In fact the horses of two troopers from Company C had died of fatigue during the 24th and they had to walk/ride with the mule train. Considering Company C was Tom Custer's command those dead horses probably saved those two troopers lives.

Your marksmanship comment also aligns with a critical report to the Chief of Ordnance-following this campaign- on the poor performance of the Springfield 1873 carbine. Jammed breeches on this carbine plagued soldiers throughout the frontier cavalry. The Army's solution had been to provide one wooden cleaning rod to each 10 carbines, thereby requiring soldiers in a fire fight to "wait their turn" if their carbine jammed. Most experienced frontier troopers bought butchers knives from post sutlers to use in prying stuck cartridge casings from the breech. Back to marksmanship and the accuracy of this weapon many complaints were forwarded following the Reno fight that within short ranges the carbine shot too high, while it's extreme range was simply insufficient-many requests had been made to increase the cartridge grains powder from 70 grains to 80-85 grains-but executing this resulted in a murderous recoil and a few broken shoulders.

And on that subject here's another one of those darn interesting side-bars about the LBH that always fascinates me -in 1877 a William A Allen visited the Custer battlefield that had remained almost untouched since the fight and he recorded and noted the evidence of dozens of forked sticks along the Indian firing line around the Reno-Benteen position, an indication that the buffalo hunter's method of steadying his weapon had been used by Indian "marksmen" using newly captured Springfield carbines from the Crook/Custer fight and the Reno charge into the village.

Reb