if your squad, platoon, whatever, is pinned down by machine gun fire or superior enemy forces, etc. and a sherman or any tank shows up and helps you get out of that jam, that tank automatically jumps to the number 1 spot of best tanks in the world...
Top Ten Tanks (3 Viewers)
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panda1gen
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Good post! This is the right room for an argument!
OK guys - what about the top ten tanks of all of WW2? Based upon all of the above - production, kill rate, survivability, mobility etc.... Just for an argument....I can be persuaded to change......T34 - all round features plus so many made - upgrade to 85mm gun and better armour - allegedly less ground pressure than a walking man? Also developed SU 85 and SU 100mm
Pz4 - in service the whole war, reliable and still preferred in the Bulge for that - plus adapted to tough jagpanzers included L70 75mm gun
Panther - improved t34 not as many made but what a kill rate
Sherman - reliable - great in 42 but not sufficiently developed
Czech t38 - reliable and effective in the early war and then adaptable into vital temporary potent jagdpanthers - up to the hetzer - surely the best all round jagdpanzer of the war?
KV1 - invulnerable in 41, later 85mm gun
Tiger 1 - for only 1500 made, what a legend!
Tiger 2 - only under 500 made, invulnerable frontally but 70 tons restricted mobility
Pz3 - workhorse then nearly 10 000 stug and stuh 3s
Just for an argument - Comet
This was hard so look forward to replies.....LOL
binder001
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As we have gone over before - the US Armored doctrine favored a weapon with good HE capability over AP. Yes, they were certainly incorrect, but by the time we absorbed the combat lessons it was too late to affect operations in Europe.
By the way, referencing "Report of Operations, First US Army" one of the statistical references shows that there was FOUR TIMES as much 75mm HE as AP fired. The 75 was a fine artillery weapon, descended from the classic French 75mm M1897. The 76mm was slightly less capable as an HE thrower and the 17-pounder came in dead last. The British AT guns of the period were good hole punchers, but the HE shells for them were so-so at best. (Personally, my feeling is that IF the US had adopted the 17-pounder that the HE "problem" could have been addressed). If the Shermans all had 17-pounders the USMC would never have wanted to use them - they wanted that 75mm (even keeping some post-WW2). As far as HE throwing, the original request for upgraded tanks in the ETOUSA (made before DDay) was to have half of them with 90mm guns and half with 105mm howitzers (the reason for the production of the M45 howitzer-armed version of the Pershing). US armor doctrine was still in flux as the Allies invaded Europe. How could Ordnance provide a new tank when the users couldn't finalize just what they wanted?
On to the ammo question: the HVAP (Hyper-Velocity Armor Piercing) shot for the 76mm gun used a tugsten penetrator core. This was similiar to the British APDS, except that the outer part of the shot didn't peel away. The problem was that tungsten was not only in short supply, but it is essential in the tool making industries. Every batch of tungsten used in ammunition meant that many less machine tools, etc to make new plane, tanks and ship parts. It's like John Gambale's want lists - you just CAN'T have everything at once! American doctrine relied on the TD's as primary anti-armor gun platforms - so they good the bulk of the "hot" ammo. The short supply is why most 76mm Shermans got about 2rds/month of HVAP and some crews never saw it during wartime.
The carnage at Normandy was not due as much to the deffective tanks as to outdated doctrine, mediocre training and a lack of appreciation of the terrain. Every unit had to learn that you can't charge tanks through hedgerow country. The German tanks were only a part of the problem. The Germans were well supplied with close-in AT weapons (PanzerFaust and Panzerschreck) as well as towed AT guns. They were trained in how to coordinate them effectively in combination with the countryside. The German army and their SS buddies were tenacious defenders and knew the tricks of the trade. The managed to bleed the US and British for every yard gained in Normandy. The US Army had to build up from nothing to a huge army in just a couple years. In the haste to build units they shorted tank-infantry cooperation training. Every unit committed to Normandy seemed to have to learn the hard way - how to take the hedgerows, how to work with tanks, how to get the best use out of air support, etc. That was one tough school!
Did the Sherman change suddenly in late July? I don't hear anybody discussing how bad the tank was in taking Paris or in pursuing the Germans right back to their own border. How about Patton's Lorraine campaign? US M4s and Free French M4A2s chewed up Panthers in brigade after brigade. Most of the Allied tanks had the old 75mm guns. In these battles the Sherman fought the battle its designers aimed for - breakout and pursuit. The M4-types worked just fine in the fall, which is strangely unfortunate as it took away the urgency for a new tank. The Sherman was forced into close country combat with German armor again in the winter and was found wanting. It wasn't a tank to stand and slug it out with the Panzers, but it was forced into that role on narrow roads in the Ardennes. That's when the major hue and cry went up about our tanks.
So the Sherman certainly wasn't the "best" tank, but it was better than many tanks of WW2. It enabled the US Army to expand from being smaller than the Portugese Army to a huge instrument of victory with Shermans ending up in ALL the Axis capital cities. No Panther or Tiger can ever claim that kind of success in spite of their technology.
Gary
Louis Badolato
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It's a good list Kevin. I would add that the M26 Pershing should be added along side the Comet as an excellent late war tank that saw limited service. I would also add that, among tank destroyers, the Stug III, with its very low (6 foot 6 inch) profile and high velocity long barreled 76mm was also highly effective.
Louis Badolato
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Ah ha! My nemisis Gary is at it again! Gary, the problem with following our doctrine, and giving all the Tungsten rounds to the Tank Destroyers is that our doctrine involving TD's only works when we are on the defensive, fending off a German attack or counter-attack. Then the speedy M18 Hellcats can race ahead of the attacking panzers (whom our doctrine incorrectly assumes would be issolated from infantry support), lie in wait hit them hard and get away to fight again. The reality is we were going to be constantly on the offensive, the German's could dig in, use their tanks as basically mobile fortresses, with ample infantry and anti-tank support, and wreak havoc on our attacking tanks. When our open turreted tank destroyers were brought in, they were massacred by the panzer grenadiers, whose panzer fausts and panzer shrecks made quick of their light armor, and whose grenades could drop right into the open tops of the turrets. They had one ma-deuce to fight infantry, and they simply were not able to defend themselves.
Whoever came up with our doctrine had little or no grasp on the reality of armored war in Europe. And no offense to our courageous marines, but the Japanese had no effective modern tanks, so they could have got by with Stuarts if they didn't want to operate Shermans without HE capability. The last time I checked we had very effective Priest self-propelled artillery that could handle the HE requirements of our forces.
Designing a tank which was an over-tall, underarmored, self-propelled gun with inadequate off-road capability should not have earned our military kudos, just because our automobile industry could reliably mass produce it, and we had enough kids so that we could sacrifice 10,000 or so and still win the war.
As far as the no complaints after the break out and before we hit the German border, how much real tank combat was there during this period? The Germans were in full retreat, we had total air supremacy, and were driving down roads well behind enemy lines as fast as we could. We didn't really face a great deal of tank on tank combat during this period.
Also, why did a Sergeant have to come up with the concept of the rhino/hedge cutter? Why didn't our commanders, who had frog men studying the type of sand on the beaches, never figure out the defensive capability of hedge rows? And why did we refuse the Hobart's funnies that proved very effective for our British allies? Not to mention why did we ignore the recommendations of certain Naval commanders with experience in the Pacirfic that we should have used AMTRACs on the Normandy landings? In all fairness, I am getting off on a tangent about Allied leadership, so let me get back to the tank issue . . .
Gary, I have one question that really sums up my whole point: If you were in the hedgerows, facing what those brave 18-year-old old-men were facing, and you could design the tank that you were fighting from, would it have had the Sherman's high profile, inadequate armor protection, main gun, thin tracks, and fuel/ammunition stowage? If you say yes, Gary, my only possible response is to ask if you are suicidal.
And to anybody who wants to call the Sherman the best tank ever, I would just ask somebody to take a look at the role call of casualties among Sherman crews. The Third Armored (Spearhead) Division required 300% replacements for combat losses of its Shermans between Normandy and the Ruhr Pocket. That means if it started with 300 Shermans, 900 were knocked out in that time period (not counting ones which they were able to repair and put back in service). Think about that. One armored division, 900 Shermans totally destroyed in less than a year. Shermans have a 5 man crew . . . 4,500 tank crewman killed or wounded from this division alone. Its just criminal.
Gary, the problem with following our doctrine, and giving all the Tungsten rounds to the Tank Destroyers is that our doctrine involving TD's only works when we are on the defensive, fending off a German attack or counter-attack. Then the speedy M18 Hellcats can race ahead of the attacking panzers (whom our doctrine incorrectly assumes would be issolated from infantry support), lie in wait hit them hard and get away to fight again. The reality is we were going to be constantly on the offensive, the German's could dig in, use their tanks as basically mobile fortresses, with ample infantry and anti-tank support, and wreak havoc on our attacking tanks. When our open turreted tank destroyers were brought in, they were massacred by the panzer grenadiers, whose panzer fausts and panzer shrecks made quick of their light armor, and whose grenades could drop right into the open tops of the turrets. They had one ma-deuce to fight infantry, and they simply were not able to defend themselves.Whoever came up with our doctrine had little or no grasp on the reality of armored war in Europe. And no offense to our courageous marines, but the Japanese had no effective modern tanks, so they could have got by with Stuarts if they didn't want to operate Shermans without HE capability. The last time I checked we had very effective Priest self-propelled artillery that could handle the HE requirements of our forces.
Designing a tank which was an over-tall, underarmored, self-propelled gun with inadequate off-road capability should not have earned our military kudos, just because our automobile industry could reliably mass produce it, and we had enough kids so that we could sacrifice 10,000 or so and still win the war.
As far as the no complaints after the break out and before we hit the German border, how much real tank combat was there during this period? The Germans were in full retreat, we had total air supremacy, and were driving down roads well behind enemy lines as fast as we could. We didn't really face a great deal of tank on tank combat during this period.
Also, why did a Sergeant have to come up with the concept of the rhino/hedge cutter? Why didn't our commanders, who had frog men studying the type of sand on the beaches, never figure out the defensive capability of hedge rows? And why did we refuse the Hobart's funnies that proved very effective for our British allies? Not to mention why did we ignore the recommendations of certain Naval commanders with experience in the Pacirfic that we should have used AMTRACs on the Normandy landings? In all fairness, I am getting off on a tangent about Allied leadership, so let me get back to the tank issue . . .
Gary, I have one question that really sums up my whole point: If you were in the hedgerows, facing what those brave 18-year-old old-men were facing, and you could design the tank that you were fighting from, would it have had the Sherman's high profile, inadequate armor protection, main gun, thin tracks, and fuel/ammunition stowage? If you say yes, Gary, my only possible response is to ask if you are suicidal.
And to anybody who wants to call the Sherman the best tank ever, I would just ask somebody to take a look at the role call of casualties among Sherman crews. The Third Armored (Spearhead) Division required 300% replacements for combat losses of its Shermans between Normandy and the Ruhr Pocket. That means if it started with 300 Shermans, 900 were knocked out in that time period (not counting ones which they were able to repair and put back in service). Think about that. One armored division, 900 Shermans totally destroyed in less than a year. Shermans have a 5 man crew . . . 4,500 tank crewman killed or wounded from this division alone. Its just criminal.
panda1gen
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Ha - good posts
Gary - agree with just about everything you posted - when you add the 105mm version, the jumbo for cobra and the firefly, it was a really good tank - but at 35 tons or so, much less than the big cats in weight/armour.
The British accounts also unfortunately note the tommy cooker effect, but not many British crews would swap them for say the crusaders - although it should also be remembered that those tanks were also rushed into service with disastrous results.
The Brits also had the 2pdr gun for many years, due to the 'inability' to stop and retool for 6pdr guns.
I am sure that if you sit in DC or London, the 'bigger picture' effects these things, but at the end of the day, they did not listen to 'old sweats' who knew what they were up against.
The Brits had the same problem with the firefly, it was junior officers who 'insisted' and we only had about 5-600 of them.
We also had the excellent 1942 tank, the cromwell - hmmmmmmmm - but the comet was good and the centurion was the best of the war bar none! That should start an argument!
Louis, I ummmmed and ahaaad about the pershing.
Hobart, who trained the instrument of Wavells famous desert victory, the western desert force, was reduced to lance coporal in the home guard before he created the 79th armoured - the funnies - the modern seige train, based on tough infantry support tanks - the churchill.
That is what the US missed in the hedgerows, but when it came to exploitation - you are dead right.
The german doctrine was also originally to leave tanks to the ATG screen, and leave their own tanks for the battlefield bully role against the weak HQ and supply echelons.
Gary - agree with just about everything you posted - when you add the 105mm version, the jumbo for cobra and the firefly, it was a really good tank - but at 35 tons or so, much less than the big cats in weight/armour.
The British accounts also unfortunately note the tommy cooker effect, but not many British crews would swap them for say the crusaders - although it should also be remembered that those tanks were also rushed into service with disastrous results.
The Brits also had the 2pdr gun for many years, due to the 'inability' to stop and retool for 6pdr guns.
I am sure that if you sit in DC or London, the 'bigger picture' effects these things, but at the end of the day, they did not listen to 'old sweats' who knew what they were up against.
The Brits had the same problem with the firefly, it was junior officers who 'insisted' and we only had about 5-600 of them.
We also had the excellent 1942 tank, the cromwell - hmmmmmmmm - but the comet was good and the centurion was the best of the war bar none! That should start an argument!
Louis, I ummmmed and ahaaad about the pershing.
Hobart, who trained the instrument of Wavells famous desert victory, the western desert force, was reduced to lance coporal in the home guard before he created the 79th armoured - the funnies - the modern seige train, based on tough infantry support tanks - the churchill.
That is what the US missed in the hedgerows, but when it came to exploitation - you are dead right.
The german doctrine was also originally to leave tanks to the ATG screen, and leave their own tanks for the battlefield bully role against the weak HQ and supply echelons.
binder001
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Louis, my favorite nemesis ;-). Obviously as a trooper in the Norman hedgerows I would want a deep bomb-proof bunker with a suitable supply of liquid refreshments and lots of girls! As far as tanks - everything is a compromise. An M1A2 Abrams might have been great to have in Normandy - but there was no way to get one off the ships and into France at that time period (a Pershing only had about a foot of clearance in a WW2 LST). You fight the war with what you've got.
The narrower tracks didn't really cause a problem for the M4s until the wetter weather in the fall/winter of 1944. By then the 23-inch tracked versions were on the way - at least the Army gets credit for addressing the problem, although it was after the Bulge before most of the wider tracked ("E8") vehicles got to Europe.
The aborted T23 would have addressed the too-tall issue (Think of a smaller Pershing using Sherman components). In fact T23 was the direct linear ancestor of the Pershing. Biggest delay in T23 was 1) the Army's fixation on numbers and 2) Ordnance's fascination with an electric-drive transmission leading to long delays during testing.
You mention the Pershing as worthy of note but it was a rushed design that had its own problems. It shared the same Ford engine as the M4A3 Sherman so it was pushing 10 more tons on the same horsepower. It was also notorious for overheating the engine. The first three M26s that went to Korea in 1950 were lost because they didn't have the right fan belts and the engines overheated, leading to abandonment.
I fully agree with you on the total failure of the US concept of the Tank Destroyer. Sounds real good on a sand table exersize at Ft.Meade, but never really worked out in combat. As we have discussed before, the existence of the TDs and the confidence the Army brass placed in them lead to disasterous delay in upgunning/replacing the M4s. I'm not saying that the 75mm M3 gun was great, it just happened to do what the designers intended. I wish the US would have jumped on the 17-pounder as enthusiastically as they did the 6-pounder (the US version being the 57mm AT gun M1-series -with 18 guns in each infantry regiment). I feel that US designers could have come up with a better HE shell and US production capacity would have meant that there would be plenty of "Firefly" tanks to go around right after DDay. Ordnance was holding out for a tank with the 90mm (good all-round performance and already in production) and I'm sure the institutional "NIH" (Not Invented Here) problem lead to excuses not to look seriously at a US 17-pounder. For the missions they ended up with, the TD crews would have been much better off with a tank. Imagine supporting house-to-house fighting with an open top vehicle with no protected MG - but the TD boys did it!
In looking at the design history of US armor, there wasn't a successor to the M4 that was ready to take over. It was too-tall, the ammo and gas lead to a very flammable vehicle and Army bureaucracy kept it from being up-gunned, but it was all we had. In realistic terms, even if the T23 or its later developments had proceeded without trouble I just don't see the US deploying a new tank until after the breakout from Normandy. It would still have helped the fall battles and would have been present in sufficient numbers fight in the Ardennes (no new tank was going to halt that attack - our forces were spread too thin).
I also agree that the US had a monumental intelligence failure in appreciating the French Bocage country as defensive terrain. These darned fields had been there since the middle ages but nobody thought about the effect they would have on military operations. As Stephen Ambrose points out in "Citizen Soldiers" the emphasis had been on getting ashore, not on how to fight inland after we were off the beaches. Ironically GEN Leslie McNair, the man responsible for organizing the Army Ground Forces and developing their doctrine, was killed during the bombing preceeding Operation Cobra - the final breakout from the bocage.
Gary
The narrower tracks didn't really cause a problem for the M4s until the wetter weather in the fall/winter of 1944. By then the 23-inch tracked versions were on the way - at least the Army gets credit for addressing the problem, although it was after the Bulge before most of the wider tracked ("E8") vehicles got to Europe.
The aborted T23 would have addressed the too-tall issue (Think of a smaller Pershing using Sherman components). In fact T23 was the direct linear ancestor of the Pershing. Biggest delay in T23 was 1) the Army's fixation on numbers and 2) Ordnance's fascination with an electric-drive transmission leading to long delays during testing.
You mention the Pershing as worthy of note but it was a rushed design that had its own problems. It shared the same Ford engine as the M4A3 Sherman so it was pushing 10 more tons on the same horsepower. It was also notorious for overheating the engine. The first three M26s that went to Korea in 1950 were lost because they didn't have the right fan belts and the engines overheated, leading to abandonment.
I fully agree with you on the total failure of the US concept of the Tank Destroyer. Sounds real good on a sand table exersize at Ft.Meade, but never really worked out in combat. As we have discussed before, the existence of the TDs and the confidence the Army brass placed in them lead to disasterous delay in upgunning/replacing the M4s. I'm not saying that the 75mm M3 gun was great, it just happened to do what the designers intended. I wish the US would have jumped on the 17-pounder as enthusiastically as they did the 6-pounder (the US version being the 57mm AT gun M1-series -with 18 guns in each infantry regiment). I feel that US designers could have come up with a better HE shell and US production capacity would have meant that there would be plenty of "Firefly" tanks to go around right after DDay. Ordnance was holding out for a tank with the 90mm (good all-round performance and already in production) and I'm sure the institutional "NIH" (Not Invented Here) problem lead to excuses not to look seriously at a US 17-pounder. For the missions they ended up with, the TD crews would have been much better off with a tank. Imagine supporting house-to-house fighting with an open top vehicle with no protected MG - but the TD boys did it!
In looking at the design history of US armor, there wasn't a successor to the M4 that was ready to take over. It was too-tall, the ammo and gas lead to a very flammable vehicle and Army bureaucracy kept it from being up-gunned, but it was all we had. In realistic terms, even if the T23 or its later developments had proceeded without trouble I just don't see the US deploying a new tank until after the breakout from Normandy. It would still have helped the fall battles and would have been present in sufficient numbers fight in the Ardennes (no new tank was going to halt that attack - our forces were spread too thin).
I also agree that the US had a monumental intelligence failure in appreciating the French Bocage country as defensive terrain. These darned fields had been there since the middle ages but nobody thought about the effect they would have on military operations. As Stephen Ambrose points out in "Citizen Soldiers" the emphasis had been on getting ashore, not on how to fight inland after we were off the beaches. Ironically GEN Leslie McNair, the man responsible for organizing the Army Ground Forces and developing their doctrine, was killed during the bombing preceeding Operation Cobra - the final breakout from the bocage.
Gary
eborris
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As a side note, they claimed on the history channel that the Shermans had such a narrow track base because they were designed to be shipped by railroad from Detroit and the other plants and if they made them any wider they couldn't get them over the tressels and through the tunnels. I would think the flat cars were wider then the Shermans, but that's what they claimed was the reason for the narrow track base and the reason for only producing a medium tank until late in the war.
Currahee Chris
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Just some observations- I am kicking the roadwheels here:
As has been stated several times over, the US government just didn't spend the money to build up an armored fighting force like the rest of Europe did. There were several high level officers who were for it and several high level officers who were against it- you see this reflected today in PGMs and other weapons systems- to include the Strykers.
We asked ourselves- what would we rather dominate- the skies and then the land or the land- we chose to dominate the air and our air force was second to none- as it is today. One of the most critical success factors was our ability to control the skies and that still hasn't changed today- good or bad.
Many noncoms and even junior enlisted develop battlefield improvisations that are really genius in their function. Rather than criticizing the command structures failure to address this situation take heart in the fact that they were flexible enough to allow the men to make those modifications- something the nazis probably wouldn't have been so quick to embrace.
Switching gears- I thought a lot of you would be interested to know that the Bradley AFV has MORE combat kills than the Abrams (stats from ODS- not sure about OIF). This is a very informative link on the subject:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm
So, given that essentially a troop transport scored more kills than the main battle tank of the US, well, maybe it shouldn't be considered for second place. And yes- I am well aware we positioned most of our armored units along the border as a feint for the ground invasion- that perhaps led to the disparity in kill stats.
I will be so bold as to go on the record in stating that I do not see tank warfare lasting beyond the next 35-50 years. Their role continues to diminish in US doctrine as the rapid response needs of the US military continue to increase. The logisitics of moving a division of abrams tanks is making tank warfare more and more difficult to consider- especially in light of PGMs and other air force developments.
Louis Badolato
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I could accept your premise if it wasn't for the fact that our misguided air doctrine believed that Bombers would always demonate fighters, and that pursuit planes were a waste (hence Clair Chenault being asked to leave the air force -- thank goodness he found his way to China and saved our bacon with his fighter tactics in the AVG) and the fact that at the outbreak of the war, we had such outdated or poorly concieved pieces of garbage as the Brewster Buiffalo (outdated), Wildcat (outdated), P40 (outdated) and the P39 Aircobra (poorly designed) in our arsenal. If the British hadn't taken an underperforming and nearly abandoned P-51 Mustang, and replaced its mismatched Allison engine with the Rolls Royce designed Merlin, our air forces would have been as poorly equipped as our armored forces. The only decent air corps fighters that the U.S. itself fully designed were the P-47 Thunderbolt and the P-38 Lightning, and they lacked the range to perform the escort duties our airforce so deperately required. The Navy didn't replace the outclassed F4F Wildcat with superior Grumman F6F Hellcat and Chance-Vought F4U Corsairs until mid-1943, fighting the first year and a half of the Pacific air war with a handicap as well.
Due to these shortcomings, two of my Uncles died in the 8th Airforce in B17's because of the misguided idea that they could perform daylight bombing of Germany without fighter escort (which resulted in an average of 10-15% losses per mission, and 40% losses on certain disasterous raids like the Schweinfert Ball Bearing Raid or the Ploesti Raid)!! Prior to the advent of the P-51D Mustang with the Rolls Royce designed Packard Merlin engine, our B17 and B24 crews suffered losses at least as devastating as those sustained by our armored crews.
I can't really accept the idea that we lacked a decent tank because we put all our resources into making sure he had the best planes and a dominant airforce, because, frankly, absent the help of our British Allies well into the war, we didn't.
Here in the U.S., we just have to accept the sad truth that because of isolationist political forces, and ignorant dogmatic high command, as WWII approached, we had an army and air corps that was poorly equipped, poorly led, and ridiculously undersized. We paid for these deficiencies with the blood of brave young American men.
binder001
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Well said Louis!
On a diverging note - I appreciate the members of this forum. We have good discussions and nobody resorted to flaming or name calling. A nice bunch of gentlemen.
Gary
Currahee Chris
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Technically, if you are calling us "gentlemen" isn't that name calling???
I appreciate what everyone has said on the subject. I think it was Kevin who touched on the Hetzer as the best Jagdpanzer- I agree 100% there.
To me, the Sherman can best be personified as an icon of the era- a fine example of American industry and the willingness of America to fight- the tank conjures up romantic images of Rosie the Riveters toiling for our boys overseas. The tank is in a lot of respects a "fan favorite".
And yes, if lead is buzzing around, I ain't anywhere near the Sherman
Plus, as Pugio said, my favorite tank is the one that shows up and helps me out- if nothing else- at least he is getting shot at now and it ain't me!!!
panda1gen
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Looking at Louis' post - Every body does approach war unprepared though! The Kriegsmarine wanted to wait for 1943 when their ships would be launched and could strangle Britain with U boats and surface raiders. They only started with a handful and still 'outsank' us for three years.
The fact is that in 1942 the Sherman was as good as it's best adversary, the pz4 with L43 or L48 75mm gun, with 80mm frontal armour and reliability!
The Brits also loved the M3 Stuart calling it 'Honey', again primarily due to reliability, but also good stats against the majority of the armour it faced in Italian M40 and 41s, pz2 and early/mid pz3s, although it was inferior to the H and J version of pz3.
That should be the starting point.
Within months, the Germans had unveiled the Tiger and Panther. What was the response???????????? None? That should be where the criticism should be - even taking into account the problems of rapid mobilisation (as per the Brits needing to persevere with the 2pdr as any gun was better than no gun?).
BTW, on reflection, the churchill pushes the comet out of the top ten - without them (79th Armoured, the funnies) we may still be on the beaches, and they had already distinguished themselves in N Africa and Tunisia (Longstop Hill for example).
It is interesting how the concept of the infantry tank did prevail in the reality of all arms warfare from the Matilda to the churchill via the valentine.
panda1gen
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Technically, if you are calling us "gentlemen" isn't that name calling???
I appreciate what everyone has said on the subject. I think it was Kevin who touched on the Hetzer as the best Jagdpanzer- I agree 100% there.
To me, the Sherman can best be personified as an icon of the era- a fine example of American industry and the willingness of America to fight- the tank conjures up romantic images of Rosie the Riveters toiling for our boys overseas. The tank is in a lot of respects a "fan favorite".
And yes, if lead is buzzing around, I ain't anywhere near the Sherman
Plus, as Pugio said, my favorite tank is the one that shows up and helps me out- if nothing else- at least he is getting shot at now and it ain't me!!!
Blimey - a severe agreement!
I watched a hetzer live a few years ago, small, easy to hide, tough armour, adequate punch - and boy could it move! Astonishing mobility. Guderian's baby and they built 2500 approx in the last year and a bit of war. You have to be little to fit in it though I understand, but isn't that true of most AFVs?
Currahee Chris
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Blimey - a severe agreement!
I watched a hetzer live a few years ago, small, easy to hide, tough armour, adequate punch - and boy could it move! Astonishing mobility. Guderian's baby and they built 2500 approx in the last year and a bit of war. You have to be little to fit in it though I understand, but isn't that true of most AFVs?
Yeah- all accounts I have read, we HATED them- I mean, no quarter was spared- it was all out hatred.
AFVs aren't creature friendly- being a weightlifter,I have a pretty broad upper body (53" chest) and trying to squeeze into the driver's hathes in the 113s was always a blast!! I would have to wiggle and wiggle and wiggle to get into it. Some guys joked about slapping grease on the sides of me to help out!!
Moving off topic somewhat- were any of the German high command in favor of moving to the larger panthers and Tigers and KTs?? Were Rommel and/or Guderian in favor of the "bigger is better" train of thought or was this one of Adolph's ideas?
panda1gen
Major
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- Jul 29, 2005
- Messages
- 6,067
Yeah- all accounts I have read, we HATED them- I mean, no quarter was spared- it was all out hatred.
AFVs aren't creature friendly- being a weightlifter,I have a pretty broad upper body (53" chest) and trying to squeeze into the driver's hathes in the 113s was always a blast!! I would have to wiggle and wiggle and wiggle to get into it. Some guys joked about slapping grease on the sides of me to help out!!
Moving off topic somewhat- were any of the German high command in favor of moving to the larger panthers and Tigers and KTs?? Were Rommel and/or Guderian in favor of the "bigger is better" train of thought or was this one of Adolph's ideas?
Guderian hated the 'bigger is better' - he wanted a copy of the T34 - top tank or what?
He pushed very hard for a lot of manouveurable and cheaper jagpanzers and medium reliable tanks.
I suppose he liked the panther but doubt if he approved much of the Tigers, although of course putting them in the Army controlled units meant they must have been very effective as they were constantly sent to critical points, so most people would continue to get by with jagdpanzers, stugs, the 'good ol' pz4 and the panther where they had them. Many of the Normandy units did not have their quota of all tanks and several had no panthers.
They were going to have to put the 88mm L70 on something though as the towed gun could hardly move and nothing else was going to stop the JSU and JS tanks....
Not a problem in the west......only the.....oh no not that again....
Louis Badolato
Lieutenant General
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- Apr 25, 2005
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- 17,228
You are absolutely correct. The old adage is that as a new war approaches, an army is usually prepared to win the last war it fought (this is certainly true of the French with the Maginot Line). The problem with the U.S. forces as WWII approached, is that we probably couldn't have won WWI with what we had in 1941.
Don't get me wrong, U.S. industry did a fantastic job of eventually providing our forces with an embarassment of riches when it came to, for example, the Jeep, the Deuce and a Half Truck, the M1 Garand Rifle, the B17G Flying Fortress with the chin turret, the B29 Superfortress, the P-51D Mustang (with a tip of the hat to our resourcefull British Allies), the late War P-47 D Thunderbolt, the Priest Self Propelled Gun, and enough ammunition to solve almost any problem with an artillery barrage. I just am always stunned by our armored losses.
And you are correct, the Sherman was a match for the Panzer III and Panzer IV (before they were equipped with side skirts, turret skirts, and long barrelled 76mm high velocity main guns) and the Stuart was a match for just about anything the Italians had (with the exception of the Semovente self-propelled gun). The problem, as you aptly point out, is that while the Germans were constantly upgrading their armor, we just didn't keep pace. And that just pisses me off. It wasn't like their weren't obvious available solutions. How about welding a top with a hatch on the M18 Hellcat, giving it a coaxial and/or hull machine gun, and making it a more survivable vehicle against infantry support? How about giving all our tanks sideskirts to render the panzerfaust and the panzershreck a lot less effective? How about upgunning all Shermans coming into production to a high velocity gun (like the 90mm or 17 pounder)?
panda1gen
Major
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- 6,067
This is the interesting point - why not?
We could innovate the funnies, lay a fuel line under the channel, invent a harbour or two, defeat german radar technology, crack their codes - but couldn't copy a mild steel side skirt?
panda1gen
Major
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2005
- Messages
- 6,067
Yeah- all accounts I have read, we HATED them- I mean, no quarter was spared- it was all out hatred.
AFVs aren't creature friendly- being a weightlifter,I have a pretty broad upper body (53" chest) and trying to squeeze into the driver's hathes in the 113s was always a blast!! I would have to wiggle and wiggle and wiggle to get into it. Some guys joked about slapping grease on the sides of me to help out!!
Moving off topic somewhat- were any of the German high command in favor of moving to the larger panthers and Tigers and KTs?? Were Rommel and/or Guderian in favor of the "bigger is better" train of thought or was this one of Adolph's ideas?
Chris, my baby son won a ride 'in' a chieftan - he couldn't get in it! All the tankers were about 5'3" tops.
He is 6'6"