Victoria's Little Wars: Best/Favorite Commanders (2 Viewers)

[jazzeum]

Shane,

Agreed. However, if you have a chance, pick up the Leopod's Ghost book. I had vaguely heard of what had happened there but Hochschild's book was a real eye opener. He writes very well and it moves quickly.

He recently wrote a book about WWI that was quite interesting as well.

Brad

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

Agreed. However, if you have a chance, pick up the Leopod's Ghost book. I had vaguely heard of what had happened there but Hochschild's book was a real eye opener. He writes very well and it moves quickly.

He recently wrote a book about WWI that was quite interesting as well.

Brad

Thanks Brad,

I'll add this as well as a few others mentioned on this thread to my amzon.com wishlist.

While we're on the topic of source suggestions, I highly encourage anyone intersted in the evolution of British Army Uniforms of the period to consider checking out some of Timothy J. Reese's Digital Illustration CD's.

http://www.reeseartofwars.com/

I find them an invaluable resource for painting Queen Victoria's Little Men.

 

[swalterh]

OK, so we’ve discussed some background info on a couple of the more prominent men who helped construct the empire. I’m interested to see if anyone has any thoughts on what they think are some of the most important attributes that contributed to the make-up of a good colonial commander and administrator. One of the most remarkable aspects of this period is the breadth and depth of skills and personality traits that were required of Her Majesty’s officers when serving abroad.

Take Charles Gordon for example. Here was an individual who basically served as soldier-administrator of both China and the Sudan. When a more “political” soldier was required there was hardly a man better suited for the situation than Gordon. His command over the “Ever Victorious Army” in China (1860’s) and his masterful Governor-Generalship in the Sudan (1870’s) place him as one of the more versatile imperial figures during Vicky’s reign. The Gordon Relief Expedition (1884-85) that narrowly failed to save him could be considered one of the few black marks on Sir Garnet Wolseley’s service record. (This campaign is depicted in the film Four Feathers, unfortunately the film makers gave the British red coats which is not historically accurate but more visually appealing. I had to re-paint an entire box worth of AIP Brits when I finally did the research and discovered this.)

An interesting side note is that many of the French senior commanders of the Franco-German War (1870-71) cut their teeth in colonial theatres. Unfortunately their skills and experience did not fully transfer when engaged in operations against a more organized and industrialized opponent. Again I postulate that the nature of her colonial wars served to hinder instead of facilitate Great Britain’s preparedness for her involvement in the Great War.

 

[The Military Workshop]

Great subject for a thread Shane.

For those interested in history Queen Victorias reign has some great personalities, leaders, campaigns and interesting opponents (Russians, Afghans, Mutineers, Mahdists, Zulus and Boer Guerillas etc). Charges, sieges and relief expeditions etc. and some fascinating careers.
The Crimean War has always been a favourite mainly due to Charge of the Light Brigade, The Thin Red Line, famous artworks, the famous poem etc and the feud between the leaders Lord Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan who were brothers in law who barely spoke to each other.
This was the era of basically buying promotions/commands and as Wiki says about Cardigan :

"On 6 May 1824, at the age of 27, he joined the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars.Making extensive use of the purchase of commissions system then in use he became a Lieutenant in January 1825, a Captain in June 1826, a Major in August 1830 and a Lieutenant-Colonel, albeit on half-pay, only three months later, on 3 December 1830. He obtained command of the 15th The King's Hussars—at a reported premium of £35,000—on 16 March 1832."

and he went on to command the Light Brigade after a few scandals (one over a drink served in the Mess). Unfortunately he did not have much time for the experienced officers who had served in India.

The Reason Why by Cecil Woodham-Smith although published in 1953 is a good read explaining all the background.

Then there is the Indian Mutiny which is also an interesting period. The careers of some of the Generals of this period are great reads and I have spent quite a few hours jumping from name to name and battle etc on Wiki. Quite a few earned Victoria Crosses and they include :

Field Marshal Garnet Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley: Victoria Cross winner and commander of expeditionary forces in Africa, serving notably in the Indian Mutiny, Ashanti Wars, Anglo-Egyptian War, and serving as commander of the Gordon Relief Expedition in the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood: Victoria Cross winner and commander of troops in the Zulu War and the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Lord Roberts VC : Longtime British army officer in India and senior commander in the Second Afghan War; commander at one point in the Second Boer War. Check out all the campaigns he served in. Could have worn a great "been there done that" T shirt. Son awarded VC posthumously for Colenso and his father first to wear two VC's.

Check out the family of General Hugh Gough VC. His brother was a General with VC as was his Nephew and his Grandfather and Great Uncle were Field Marshalls.

However I do agree with Louis about MAGJEN Hector MacDonald who rose through the ranks. Very difficult to do at that time.

Also going on at this time was The Great Game, title of a good book by Peter Hopkirk summarised by Amazon below

"For nearly a century the two most powerful nations on earth, Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, fought a secret war in the lonely passes and deserts of Central Asia. Those engaged in this shadowy struggle called it "The Great Game," a phrase immortalized by Kipling. When play first began, the two rival empires lay nearly 2,000 miles apart. By the end, some Russian outposts were within 20 miles of India. This classic book tells the story of the Great Game through the exploits of the young officers, both British and Russian, who risked their lives playing it. Disguised as holy men or native horse-traders, they mapped secret passes, gathered intelligence, and sought the allegiance of powerful khans. Some never returned".

Very interesting times. About time somebody did a another movie of this period.

Brett

 

[lancer]

Thanks Brad,

I'll add this as well as a few others mentioned on this thread to my amzon.com wishlist.

While we're on the topic of source suggestions, I highly encourage anyone intersted in the evolution of British Army Uniforms of the period to consider checking out some of Timothy J. Reese's Digital Illustration CD's.

http://www.reeseartofwars.com/

I find them an invaluable resource for painting Queen Victoria's Little Men.

View attachment 118054

Hey! These guys don't look a thing like Caine, Baker, or Green. ^&confuse{sm3} -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Great subject for a thread Shane.

For those interested in history Queen Victorias reign has some great personalities, leaders, campaigns and interesting opponents (Russians, Afghans, Mutineers, Mahdists, Zulus and Boer Guerillas etc). Charges, sieges and relief expeditions etc. and some fascinating careers.
The Crimean War has always been a favourite mainly due to Charge of the Light Brigade, The Thin Red Line, famous artworks, the famous poem etc and the feud between the leaders Lord Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan who were brothers in law who barely spoke to each other.
This was the era of basically buying promotions/commands and as Wiki says about Cardigan :

"On 6 May 1824, at the age of 27, he joined the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars.Making extensive use of the purchase of commissions system then in use he became a Lieutenant in January 1825, a Captain in June 1826, a Major in August 1830 and a Lieutenant-Colonel, albeit on half-pay, only three months later, on 3 December 1830. He obtained command of the 15th The King's Hussars—at a reported premium of £35,000—on 16 March 1832."

and he went on to command the Light Brigade after a few scandals (one over a drink served in the Mess). Unfortunately he did not have much time for the experienced officers who had served in India.

The Reason Why by Cecil Woodham-Smith although published in 1953 is a good read explaining all the background.

Then there is the Indian Mutiny which is also an interesting period. The careers of some of the Generals of this period are great reads and I have spent quite a few hours jumping from name to name and battle etc on Wiki. Quite a few earned Victoria Crosses and they include :

Field Marshal Garnet Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley: Victoria Cross winner and commander of expeditionary forces in Africa, serving notably in the Indian Mutiny, Ashanti Wars, Anglo-Egyptian War, and serving as commander of the Gordon Relief Expedition in the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood: Victoria Cross winner and commander of troops in the Zulu War and the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Lord Roberts VC : Longtime British army officer in India and senior commander in the Second Afghan War; commander at one point in the Second Boer War. Check out all the campaigns he served in. Could have worn a great "been there done that" T shirt. Son awarded VC posthumously for Colenso and his father first to wear two VC's.

Check out the family of General Hugh Gough VC. His brother was a General with VC as was his Nephew and his Grandfather and Great Uncle were Field Marshalls.

However I do agree with Louis about MAGJEN Hector MacDonald who rose through the ranks. Very difficult to do at that time.

Also going on at this time was The Great Game, title of a good book by Peter Hopkirk summarised by Amazon below

"For nearly a century the two most powerful nations on earth, Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, fought a secret war in the lonely passes and deserts of Central Asia. Those engaged in this shadowy struggle called it "The Great Game," a phrase immortalized by Kipling. When play first began, the two rival empires lay nearly 2,000 miles apart. By the end, some Russian outposts were within 20 miles of India. This classic book tells the story of the Great Game through the exploits of the young officers, both British and Russian, who risked their lives playing it. Disguised as holy men or native horse-traders, they mapped secret passes, gathered intelligence, and sought the allegiance of powerful khans. Some never returned".

Very interesting times. About time somebody did a another movie of this period.

Brett

Terrific list, Brett! I would add Sir Colin Campbell. In addition to commanding the Highland Brigade in the Crimea (with the famous stand of the Thin Red Line), he was dispatched to India, and was instrumental in quelling the Sepoy Mutiny.

In addition to the books "Queen Victoria's Little Wars", Byron Farwell wrote several other excellent books about the campaigns and personalities of this era, from "Prisoners of the Mahdi" through "Eminent Victorian Personalities" and "The Gurkhas". After reading these excellent books, I started trying to get my hands on some first person accounts from the conflicts of this period. I have a wonderful book called "The Highland Brigade in the Crimea" which is the published letters and diary of a Colonel in the Highland Brigade, as well as "A Zulu War Diary" (which I loaned to Ken Osen about a year ago), a diary of a then Lieutenant serving throughout the Zulu War, who later became a General. I find the period fascinating, in large part because of the larger than life personalities: Chinese Gordon and the Mahdi (Mohamed Ahmed), Hugh Gough and the Ranni of Jansi, to name a few interesting foes.

One thing about this period I find most compelling is the British propensity for putting complete incompetents in command of their forces, leading to notable disasters. Edward Packenham leading the Sutherland Highlanders to near total annihilation at the Battle of New Orleans (a bit early, I know), General Elphinstone in Afghanistan with his disasterous retreat from Kabul, that one armed idiot Lord Raglan giving the command that launched the Charge of the Light Brigade, James Brudenell, the 7th Earl of Cardigan, leaving his men at the end of the charge and riding back out of the valley, Valentine Baker and his complete collapse in the Sudan, Lord Chelmsford splitting his forces in Zululand leading to Islandlawana, just to name a few that come to mind. I am completely convinced that the British Empire was built on the backs of the magnificent British, Scottish, Irish, Welsh (Welch?) and native NCO's who really won all the great victories in this period, despite the Generals, who, with the perhaps 10 exceptions detailed on this thread, were in large part incompetent.

 

[lancer]

OK, so we’ve discussed some background info on a couple of the more prominent men who helped construct the empire. I’m interested to see if anyone has any thoughts on what they think are some of the most important attributes that contributed to the make-up of a good colonial commander and administrator. One of the most remarkable aspects of this period is the breadth and depth of skills and personality traits that were required of Her Majesty’s officers when serving abroad.

Take Charles Gordon for example. Here was an individual who basically served as soldier-administrator of both China and the Sudan. When a more “political” soldier was required there was hardly a man better suited for the situation than Gordon. His command over the “Ever Victorious Army” in China (1860’s) and his masterful Governor-Generalship in the Sudan (1870’s) place him as one of the more versatile imperial figures during Vicky’s reign. The Gordon Relief Expedition (1884-85) that narrowly failed to save him could be considered one of the few black marks on Sir Garnet Wolseley’s service record. (This campaign is depicted in the film Four Feathers, unfortunately the film makers gave the British red coats which is not historically accurate but more visually appealing. I had to re-paint an entire box worth of AIP Brits when I finally did the research and discovered this.)

An interesting side note is that many of the French senior commanders of the Franco-German War (1870-71) cut their teeth in colonial theatres. Unfortunately their skills and experience did not fully transfer when engaged in operations against a more organized and industrialized opponent. Again I postulate that the nature of her colonial wars served to hinder instead of facilitate Great Britain’s preparedness for her involvement in the Great War.

View attachment 118056

I apologize because this musing will veer off course to the subject matter, except the last sentence. Great Britains long 19th century involvement in small colonial-type wars very much effected her army's whole being in regards to be prepared for a major European land war. Leadership, organization, training were all heavily influenced by the 'small-war' mentality. Ready for the sudden flare-up of a small war that she could contend with on a logistical scale in both manpower and supply, GB would require a long time to get a large army in place for a European land war. This was not so for the other combatants like France, Russia, and Germany, all of whom had been consumed by and focused on Europe, instead of a colonial empire. True, France and Germany did have growing concerns in the colonial department, but they were secondary compared to their concern with their European neighbors. Great Britain hadn't been engaged in European-style warfare since Waterloo. Not so Germany and France, who had gone at each other as recently as 1870. The Franco-Prussian War was of huge importance to the preparedness of both France and Germany, but again, these influences and lessons learned are another subject. Germany, France, and Russia all were prepared in one form or another for WW1, even though it's huge size and duration were a shock to all. They all had large standing armies with efficient and well-planned reserve systems, a very big advantage over GB. All but GB had large stocks of artillery (whether it was the right sort is another subject dealing with strategic vision and tactical use), and all but GB had initial stockpiles of ammo even if it were only sufficient for what all thought would be a quick war. Military industrial capacity had to be increased by all combatants as the war lengthened, but GB had to come from further back.
Because GB was colonial empire centric, she had spent and was spending enourmous amounts of money and effort on her Navy. This enabled her to control the seas, of paramount importance for an island nation with a world-encompassing colonial network. In the Naval respect, GB was ahead of the European curve as she realized Germany was engaged in a massive Naval building program as a direct threat to her control of the sea. It was on the ocean where GB was prepared for war on a European scale.
This run up to WW1 and the question of preparedness and eventual responsibility is incredibly complicated, long, and ultimately confusing. Another terrific subject for a seperate thread. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

I apologize because this musing will veer off course to the subject matter, except the last sentence. Great Britains long 19th century involvement in small colonial-type wars very much effected her army's whole being in regards to be prepared for a major European land war. Leadership, organization, training were all heavily influenced by the 'small-war' mentality. Ready for the sudden flare-up of a small war that she could contend with on a logistical scale in both manpower and supply, GB would require a long time to get a large army in place for a European land war. This was not so for the other combatants like France, Russia, and Germany, all of whom had been consumed by and focused on Europe, instead of a colonial empire. True, France and Germany did have growing concerns in the colonial department, but they were secondary compared to their concern with their European neighbors. Great Britain hadn't been engaged in European-style warfare since Waterloo. Not so Germany and France, who had gone at each other as recently as 1870. The Franco-Prussian War was of huge importance to the preparedness of both France and Germany, but again, these influences and lessons learned are another subject. Germany, France, and Russia all were prepared in one form or another for WW1, even though it's huge size and duration were a shock to all. They all had large standing armies with efficient and well-planned reserve systems, a very big advantage over GB. All but GB had large stocks of artillery (whether it was the right sort is another subject dealing with strategic vision and tactical use), and all but GB had initial stockpiles of ammo even if it were only sufficient for what all thought would be a quick war. Military industrial capacity had to be increased by all combatants as the war lengthened, but GB had to come from further back.
Because GB was colonial empire centric, she had spent and was spending enourmous amounts of money and effort on her Navy. This enabled her to control the seas, of paramount importance for an island nation with a world-encompassing colonial network. In the Naval respect, GB was ahead of the European curve as she realized Germany was engaged in a massive Naval building program as a direct threat to her control of the sea. It was on the ocean where GB was prepared for war on a European scale.
This run up to WW1 and the question of preparedness and eventual responsibility is incredibly complicated, long, and ultimately confusing. Another terrific subject for a seperate thread. -- Al

Thanks Al

I think you make an interesting and thorough assessment/comparison of the nature and levels of preparedness of the major powers heading into the Great War. May I propose that given the impact of the colonial mentality on British military policy, organizational structure and doctrine that the two subjects are in fact intertwined at least to some degree. I would propose that for the plethora of intellectual, organizational and technological shortcomings that served to undermine the British Army’s preparedness for the eventual Great War, due in large part to the colonial experience under Victoria, the colonial period did provide a major advantage to the British over the central powers.

This advantage was the material and manpower resources of the Empire itself. For the first time the mother country undertook a massive mobilization and resource requisitions effort in pretty much every corner of her empire. These advantages helped to greatly offset some of the British Army's intial shortcomings and eventually facilitated to a large extent the allied victory. Some of these fighting contingents would go on to win great distinction for themselves and their actions on the field of battle would serve to greatly enhance their respective countries’ and territories’ sense of pride and nationhood.

I agree that we need a WWI thread though.

Great Post.

 

[lancer]

Thanks Al

I think you make an interesting and thorough assessment/comparison of the nature and levels of preparedness of the major powers heading into the Great War. May I propose that given the impact of the colonial mentality on British military policy, organizational structure and doctrine that the two subjects are in fact intertwined at least to some degree. I would propose that for the plethora of intellectual, organizational and technological shortcomings that served to undermine the British Army’s preparedness for the eventual Great War, due in large part to the colonial experience under Victoria, the colonial period did provide a major advantage to the British over the central powers.

This advantage was the material and manpower resources of the Empire itself. For the first time the mother country undertook a massive mobilization and resource requisitions effort in pretty much every corner of her empire. These advantages helped to greatly offset some of the British Army's intial shortcomings and eventually facilitated to a large extent the allied victory. Some of these fighting contingents would go on to win great distinction for themselves and their actions on the field of battle would serve to greatly enhance their respective countries’ and territories’ sense of pride and nationhood.

I agree that we need a WWI thread though.

Great Post.

Certainly the colonies enabled GB to tap large resources (even decisive amounts) of manpower and materials, once GB got organized on a war-footing and was able to take advantage of these resources. These resources also certainly enabled GB to carry on a long war and outlast Germany's more limited resources. All of these advantages would work towards victory once they were brought online, something that took a good while to gear up. I am more skeptical that all these advantages made GB any more prepared to fight when war finally did break out, with prepared obviously the key word. The nature of colonial warfare did provide GB and France alike, a certain proportion of men that had frontline experience and that had been under fire, something no training could provide, and the army of GB was certainly trained to a very high standard, especially with their weapons, which made them extremely effective in the opening campaign of the war, but I think the truth is that because of the initial time GB needed to build an army of equal size, the initial clash of arms was a matter of win or lose on what decisions were or weren't made and executed by the French and German armies. Had the French Army collapsed, been unable to rally at the Marne, GB would have been unable to do anything to influence the outcome and would have had to scramble, ala 1940, to save her army from the mainland. All this has nothing to do with GB's ability to wage or win the war in the long run, just her ability to influence land events initially, with such a small, albeit, professional force. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Not to get too off topic, but my birthday is October 25th. So, even as an American I’ve always reserved a special place for Queen Vicky, and her brave soldiers at Balaclava.

“Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.”

Stirring stuff. My favorite unit of the whole ordeal has to be the11th Hussars “Prince Albert’s Own” -Treu und Fest
The Crimea was one of the few major scuffs that occured while the Prince Consort was still alive.

 

[swalterh]

Terrific list, Brett! I would add Sir Colin Campbell. In addition to commanding the Highland Brigade in the Crimea (with the famous stand of the Thin Red Line), he was dispatched to India, and was instrumental in quelling the Sepoy Mutiny.

In addition to the books "Queen Victoria's Little Wars", Byron Farwell wrote several other excellent books about the campaigns and personalities of this era, from "Prisoners of the Mahdi" through "Eminent Victorian Personalities" and "The Gurkhas". After reading these excellent books, I started trying to get my hands on some first person accounts from the conflicts of this period. I have a wonderful book called "The Highland Brigade in the Crimea" which is the published letters and diary of a Colonel in the Highland Brigade, as well as "A Zulu War Diary" (which I loaned to Ken Osen about a year ago), a diary of a then Lieutenant serving throughout the Zulu War, who later became a General. I find the period fascinating, in large part because of the larger than life personalities: Chinese Gordon and the Mahdi (Mohamed Ahmed), Hugh Gough and the Ranni of Jansi, to name a few interesting foes.

One thing about this period I find most compelling is the British propensity for putting complete incompetents in command of their forces, leading to notable disasters. Edward Packenham leading the Sutherland Highlanders to near total annihilation at the Battle of New Orleans (a bit early, I know), General Elphinstone in Afghanistan with his disasterous retreat from Kabul, that one armed idiot Lord Raglan giving the command that launched the Charge of the Light Brigade, James Brudenell, the 7th Earl of Cardigan, leaving his men at the end of the charge and riding back out of the valley, Valentine Baker and his complete collapse in the Sudan, Lord Chelmsford splitting his forces in Zululand leading to Islandlawana, just to name a few that come to mind. I am completely convinced that the British Empire was built on the backs of the magnificent British, Scottish, Irish, Welsh (Welch?) and native NCO's who really won all the great victories in this period, despite the Generals, who, with the perhaps 10 exceptions detailed on this thread, were in large part incompetent.

I think part of the reasoning behind the consistent lack of talent in the British officer corps comes from the fact that the institution only drew from a specific segment of the societal pool. The officer ranks were manned by the nobility and other select groups. Commissions were very difficult to come by for lower classes in the more traditional line oriented service branches (i.e. infantry, cavalry). The engineers and artillery arms were an exception due to the more technical nature of their trade. This situation was played heavily upon in the movie Zulu when Chard and Bromhead are sparing back and forth a bit as they work out who is going to take the lead in command responsibilities.

Let’s remember that the commission system formally ended in 1871, so remnants of it would have existed during the fighting in Zululand in 1879. The attitudes and training of the senior officers of this time period were definitely products of the commissioning system. Chard takes a proverbial shot at Bromhead about him having his commission arranged before he learned to shave. From this dialog we can assume that Chard (in the movie at least) did not hail from the nobility and therefore was not particularly impressed with his colleagues in the line.

Understanding this very exclusive and closed culture provides some important insight into the reasons why the senior commanders of British forces were, more often than not, ill-suited for the responsibilities of high command.

 

[swalterh]

Great subject for a thread Shane.

For those interested in history Queen Victorias reign has some great personalities, leaders, campaigns and interesting opponents (Russians, Afghans, Mutineers, Mahdists, Zulus and Boer Guerillas etc). Charges, sieges and relief expeditions etc. and some fascinating careers.
The Crimean War has always been a favourite mainly due to Charge of the Light Brigade, The Thin Red Line, famous artworks, the famous poem etc and the feud between the leaders Lord Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan who were brothers in law who barely spoke to each other.
This was the era of basically buying promotions/commands and as Wiki says about Cardigan :

"On 6 May 1824, at the age of 27, he joined the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars.Making extensive use of the purchase of commissions system then in use he became a Lieutenant in January 1825, a Captain in June 1826, a Major in August 1830 and a Lieutenant-Colonel, albeit on half-pay, only three months later, on 3 December 1830. He obtained command of the 15th The King's Hussars—at a reported premium of £35,000—on 16 March 1832."

and he went on to command the Light Brigade after a few scandals (one over a drink served in the Mess). Unfortunately he did not have much time for the experienced officers who had served in India.

The Reason Why by Cecil Woodham-Smith although published in 1953 is a good read explaining all the background.

Then there is the Indian Mutiny which is also an interesting period. The careers of some of the Generals of this period are great reads and I have spent quite a few hours jumping from name to name and battle etc on Wiki. Quite a few earned Victoria Crosses and they include :

Field Marshal Garnet Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley: Victoria Cross winner and commander of expeditionary forces in Africa, serving notably in the Indian Mutiny, Ashanti Wars, Anglo-Egyptian War, and serving as commander of the Gordon Relief Expedition in the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood: Victoria Cross winner and commander of troops in the Zulu War and the Mahdist War.

Field Marshal Lord Roberts VC : Longtime British army officer in India and senior commander in the Second Afghan War; commander at one point in the Second Boer War. Check out all the campaigns he served in. Could have worn a great "been there done that" T shirt. Son awarded VC posthumously for Colenso and his father first to wear two VC's.

Check out the family of General Hugh Gough VC. His brother was a General with VC as was his Nephew and his Grandfather and Great Uncle were Field Marshalls.

However I do agree with Louis about MAGJEN Hector MacDonald who rose through the ranks. Very difficult to do at that time.

Also going on at this time was The Great Game, title of a good book by Peter Hopkirk summarised by Amazon below

"For nearly a century the two most powerful nations on earth, Victorian Britain and Tsarist Russia, fought a secret war in the lonely passes and deserts of Central Asia. Those engaged in this shadowy struggle called it "The Great Game," a phrase immortalized by Kipling. When play first began, the two rival empires lay nearly 2,000 miles apart. By the end, some Russian outposts were within 20 miles of India. This classic book tells the story of the Great Game through the exploits of the young officers, both British and Russian, who risked their lives playing it. Disguised as holy men or native horse-traders, they mapped secret passes, gathered intelligence, and sought the allegiance of powerful khans. Some never returned".

Very interesting times. About time somebody did a another movie of this period.

Brett

Excellent post Brett

I was wondering when someone was going to bring up the Great Game. Kind of a 19th Century version of the Cold War. Your example povides some strategic perspective as to why all of that stuff that happened along the NW Frontier was so important.

You also give an excellent example of the shortcomings of the commission system by charting Lord Cardigan's "march" up the ranks.
Hope you continue to share your perspectives as they are very insightful.

 

[Louis Badolato]

I think part of the reasoning behind the consistent lack of talent in the British officer corps comes from the fact that the institution only drew from a specific segment of the societal pool. The officer ranks were manned by the nobility and other select groups. Commissions were very difficult to come by for lower classes in the more traditional line oriented service branches (i.e. infantry, cavalry). The engineers and artillery arms were an exception due to the more technical nature of their trade. This situation was played heavily upon in the movie Zulu when Chard and Bromhead are sparing back and forth a bit as they work out who is going to take the lead in command responsibilities.

Let’s remember that the commission system formally ended in 1871, so remnants of it would have existed during the fighting in Zululand in 1879. The attitudes and training of the senior officers of this time period were definitely products of the commissioning system. Chard takes a proverbial shot at Bromhead about him having his commission arranged before he learned to shave. From this dialog we can assume that Chard (in the movie at least) did not hail from the nobility and therefore was not particularly impressed with his colleagues in the line.

Understanding this very exclusive and closed culture provides some important insight into the reasons why the senior commanders of British forces were, more often than not, ill-suited for the responsibilities of high command.

Shane,

Just a few tidbits about Chard and Bromhead: Gonville Bromhead was from a military family, and in fact had brothers with commisions in the regiment who died at Isandlawana - he was left behind because he was almost completely deaf, for his own protection. He was known to be absolutely useless in a battle because with the additional noise, he was completely unable to communicate. John Rouse Merriott Chard was a Royal Engineer, who also completely lacked command experience, but was presumably at least useful in designing fortifications, although his real purpose at the drift was assisting in the construction of pontoon bridges. It is highly unlikely that either of these "officers" were in command at Rorkes Drift in anything but name. They received all the credit, and Victoria Crosses, because they were the only upper class people present, and held commissions.

In the Zulu War Diary I referenced in my earlier post, the author, who arrived back at Rorke's Drift 2 days after the action, wrote in his entry that day that "Tommy Atkins [i.e. the British soldiers] knows who the real heroes are, and gave a standing ovation to [Acting Comissary Officer] Dalton whenever he left his tent." Dalton, who also received a V.C., had been a Regimental Sergeant Major who saw extensive action on the North West Frontier and in Afghanistan before being given a commisary [i.e. non-combat] commission, in effect the equivalent of a warrant officer. It seems very evident that Dalton, not the totally inexperienced and nearly totally deaf Bromhead, or the completely green Chard, lead the defense of the Drift. This is bourne out by the fact that Bromhead was never trusted with a combat command after the Drift, and Chard went off to Palestine to map biblical sites, neither ever hearing a shot fired in anger again, not exactly the conduct of crack combat leaders whose V.C.'s would have allowed them to right their own ticket in the military had they truly been able.

 

[marco55]

Another lower rank soldier who went from private to field marshal was William Robertson who fought mainly on the NWF.He became a FM in WWI or shortly after.
Mark

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

Just a few tidbits about Chard and Bromhead: Gonville Bromhead was from a military family, and in fact had brothers with commisions in the regiment who died at Isandlawana - he was left behind because he was almost completely deaf, for his own protection. He was known to be absolutely useless in a battle because with the additional noise, he was completely unable to communicate. John Rouse Merriott Chard was a Royal Engineer, who also completely lacked command experience, but was presumably at least useful in designing fortifications, although his real purpose at the drift was assisting in the construction of pontoon bridges. It is highly unlikely that either of these "officers" were in command at Rorkes Drift in anything but name. They received all the credit, and Victoria Crosses, because they were the only upper class people present, and held commissions.

In the Zulu War Diary I referenced in my earlier post, the author, who arrived back at Rorke's Drift 2 days after the action, wrote in his entry that day that "Tommy Atkins [i.e. the British soldiers] knows who the real heroes are, and gave a standing ovation to [Acting Comissary Officer] Dalton whenever he left his tent." Dalton, who also received a V.C., had been a Regimental Sergeant Major who saw extensive action on the North West Frontier and in Afghanistan before being given a commisary [i.e. non-combat] commission, in effect the equivalent of a warrant officer. It seems very evident that Dalton, not the totally inexperienced and nearly totally deaf Bromhead, or the completely green Chard, lead the defense of the Drift. This is bourne out by the fact that Bromhead was never trusted with a combat command after the Drift, and Chard went off to Palestine to map biblical sites, neither ever hearing a shot fired in anger again, not exactly the conduct of crack combat leaders whose V.C.'s would have allowed them to right their own ticket in the military had they truly been able.

Louis

This is a great post with very interesting commentary and based on the evidence you have provided your conclusions are sound. Not to dispute, but merely to pose an alternate perspective. It seems to me inconsistent with the norm that the British military system would have bothered to hinder these officers’ continued rise up the chain due to incompetence alone. As you state, the VC’s supposedly would have allowed each of them to write their own ticket (if the institutional culture was similar to the current culture found in the US military).

Might I add that in previous posts you berate the quality of the officers of the British Army. I’ve also noticed that in other threads, you’ve severely scolded the leadership of other military organizations from various time periods and sought to give all of the credit for success to the enlisted or otherwise subordinate ranks, who despite incompetent leadership at the top gain victory for themselves and the glory goes to their leaders.

“You can make excuses for him (after all that's what he was really best at) or you can accept that Monty, like the rest of the Allied high command, really wasn't as good at his job as his German counterparts. We won the war inspite of our leadership, not because of them.”

http://www.treefrogtreasures.com/forum/showthread.php?2295-battle-of-hurtgen-forest/page3

Surely other British officers of limited abilities were allowed to continue their career progression despite being lax in there martial aptitude and enthusiasm. I wish to interject the thought that these two officers (Chard more so than Bromhead) were ostracized by their more ambitious superiors and colleagues who possessed some form of jealousy towards them for their conduct and subsequent hero status amongst the British public. If in fact it was Chard who oversaw the successful defense at Rorke’s Drift (basically a defensive fortress battle consistent with the trainning of an engineer), it would create an uncomfortable situation for officers of the line to have to face the fact that an officer of engineers was capable of fending off a proportionately larger force of Zulu’s then that which wiped out the elements of the 24th Foot, under command of line officers, at Isandlwana.

It was the supremely ambitious Sir Garnet Wolseley who succeeded Lord Chelmsford at the end of hostilities in Zululand. Wolseley was highly conscientious of his own image and surrounded himself with subordinates who valued and admired his abilities as much if not more so than he did. These two officers (Chard & Bromhead) constituted the bright spot for the British public during one of the most damaging periods to British prestige during Victoria’s entire reign. I’m merely suggesting that this Battle at Rorke’s Drift constituted a special situation that very well may have been handled in a less than scrupulous manner by the more bureaucratically inclined members of the officer corps.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis

This is a great post with very interesting commentary and based on the evidence you have provided your conclusions are sound. Not to dispute, but merely to pose an alternate perspective. It seems to me inconsistent with the norm that the British military system would have bothered to hinder these officers’ continued rise up the chain due to incompetence alone. As you state, the VC’s supposedly would have allowed each of them to write their own ticket (if the institutional culture was similar to the current culture found in the US military).

Might I add that in previous posts you berate the quality of the officers of the British Army. I’ve also noticed that in other threads, you’ve severely scolded the leadership of other military organizations from various time periods and sought to give all of the credit for success to the enlisted or otherwise subordinate ranks, who despite incompetent leadership at the top gain victory for themselves and the glory goes to their leaders.

“You can make excuses for him (after all that's what he was really best at) or you can accept that Monty, like the rest of the Allied high command, really wasn't as good at his job as his German counterparts. We won the war inspite of our leadership, not because of them.”

http://www.treefrogtreasures.com/forum/showthread.php?2295-battle-of-hurtgen-forest/page3

Surely other British officers of limited abilities were allowed to continue their career progression despite being lax in there martial aptitude and enthusiasm. I wish to interject the thought that these two officers (Chard more so than Bromhead) were ostracized by their more ambitious superiors and colleagues who possessed some form of jealousy towards them for their conduct and subsequent hero status amongst the British public. If in fact it was Chard who oversaw the successful defense at Rorke’s Drift (basically a defensive fortress battle consistent with the trainning of an engineer), it would create an uncomfortable situation for officers of the line to have to face the fact that an officer of engineers was capable of fending off a proportionately larger force of Zulu’s then that which wiped out the elements of the 24th Foot, under command of line officers, at Isandlwana.

It was the supremely ambitious Sir Garnet Wolseley who succeeded Lord Chelmsford at the end of hostilities in Zululand. Wolseley was highly conscientious of his own image and surrounded himself with subordinates who valued and admired his abilities as much if not more so than he did. These two officers (Chard & Bromhead) constituted the bright spot for the British public during one of the most damaging periods to British prestige during Victoria’s entire reign. I’m merely suggesting that this Battle at Rorke’s Drift constituted a special situation that very well may have been handled in a less than scrupulous manner by the more bureaucratically inclined members of the officer corps.

Shane,

I do not for a minute deny that I am very hard on officers. I believe that if you lead men in battle, and hold their lives in your hands, you better know you trade, and put their welfare before his advancement. So yes, I often find fault with officers. In this case, however, I am not finding fault with Bromhead and Chard, merely pointing out the merits of Dalton. Bromhead unquestionable displayed physical courage of the highest order at the Drift, despite an extremely vexing physical disability. The man was deaf as a stone, could not hear a word that was said to him in the heat of that battle, but never left the front line. Chard designed excellent defenses, and also stayed on the line throughout the fight. Like the rest of the survivors, they deserved all the credit they received for their courage. If, as the author of "A Zulu War Diary" posits, it was really Dalton who lead the defense, they also deserve credit for knowing their own limitations, recognizing and defering to Dalton's superior experience and abilities.

If I were to find fault with officers during the Zulu War, it would be with Lord Chelmsford (Frederick Thiesinger), the Queens cousin, who was so convinced that the Zulus would never dare fight him that he divided his command into three columns for the invasion, thereby exposing the 24th Foot to the disaster at Isandlawana. He also left Colonel Durnsford in command of the troops at Isandlawana, and they obviously failed to post adequate pickets or prepare to defend against an attack. Durnsford paid with his life, but Lord Chelmsford never even lost his command. As you pointed out, Sir Garnett Woseley was sent out to replace Chelmsford, but Chelmsford finished off Cetswayu at Ulundi before Woseley arrived, and returned to Britain as a conquering general.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

I do not for a minute deny that I am very hard on officers. I believe that if you lead men in battle, and hold their lives in your hands, you better know you trade, and put their welfare before his advancement. So yes, I often find fault with officers. In this case, however, I am not finding fault with Bromhead and Chard, merely pointing out the merits of Dalton. Bromhead unquestionable displayed physical courage of the highest order at the Drift, despite an extremely vexing physical disability. The man was deaf as a stone, could not hear a word that was said to him in the heat of that battle, but never left the front line. Chard designed excellent defenses, and also stayed on the line throughout the fight. Like the rest of the survivors, they deserved all the credit they received for their courage. If, as the author of "A Zulu War Diary" posits, it was really Dalton who lead the defense, they also deserve credit for knowing their own limitations, recognizing and defering to Dalton's superior experience and abilities.

If I were to find fault with officers during the Zulu War, it would be with Lord Chelmsford (Frederick Thiesinger), the Queens cousin, who was so convinced that the Zulus would never dare fight him that he divided his command into three columns for the invasion, thereby exposing the 24th Foot to the disaster at Isandlawana. He also left Colonel Durnsford in command of the troops at Isandlawana, and they obviously failed to post adequate pickets or prepare to defend against an attack. Durnsford paid with his life, but Lord Chelmsford never even lost his command. As you pointed out, Sir Garnett Woseley was sent out to replace Chelmsford, but Chelmsford finished off Cetswayu at Ulundi before Woseley arrived, and returned to Britain as a conquering general.

Louis

Again, I believe you make some very good points. I find myself in agreement with the majority of your comments. Your attitude towards officers is tough, but understandable. Unfortunately it seems that the vast majority of individuals entrusted with such positions of responsibility never seem to fully grasp the special nature of their profession. I suppose that is why officers such as J.L. Chamberlain, J.B. Gordon, Richard Winters and the like garner so much attention due to their rarity.

Commissary Dalton should be commended for his actions as well as all of the heroes of this battle on both sides for their brave conduct. I believe that we agree to a large extent on the performance of Lord Chelmsford and the nature of the British command structure during this period. Chelmsford could probably be ranked as an average or possibly above average commander based on the exploits (or lack there of) of other Victorian commanders.

Your source, “A Zulu Diary” sounds like an excellent reference and should be consulted when studying the conflict.

Thanks again for another engaging discussion. I look forward to similar discussions in the future.

Shane

 

[glossman]

Hi Louis,

Is this the full title of the book that you are referring to ?

For Queen and Country - The Zulu War Diary of Lieutenant Wilfred Heaton, 24th Regiment of Foot, 1879.

by Rodney Ashwood.

Thanks, Raymond

 

[glossman]

This is a concise article entitled "Zulu: The True Story" by Dr. Saul David on the BBC website.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/zulu_01.shtml

Here are some interesting paragraphs:

"In truth, the real hero of Rorke's Drift was Commissary Dalton. It was Dalton who persuaded Chard and Bromhead to remain at Rorke's Drift when their first instinct was to abandon the post, and it was Dalton who organised and inspired the defence. But Dalton, an ex-NCO, came from what was considered the wrong background, and was ignored for almost a year. He was eventually awarded a VC after intensive lobbying by the press - but not until January 1880, by which time the celebrations had died down."

"Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford was urgently burying all the evidence that could be used against him. He propagated the myth that a shortage of ammunition led to defeat at Isandlwana. He ensured that potential witnesses to his errors were unable to speak out. Even more significantly, he tried to push blame for the defeat onto Colonel Durnford, now dead, claiming that Durnford had disobeyed orders to defend the camp. The truth is that no orders were ever given to Durnford to take command. Chelmsford's behaviour, in retrospect, is unforgivable. Many generals blunder in war, but few go to such lengths to avoid responsibility."

"Chelmsford had, in any event, another weapon to use against his critics - that of Rorke's Drift. Though undeniably heroic, the importance of the defence of Rorke's Drift was grossly exaggerated by both the generals and politicians of the period, to diminish the impact of Isandlwana."

For the most part, it reflects my view of Chelmsford.

Best, Raymond.

 

[swalterh]

By the way, speaking about the military questions of the british army in Victorian age, I guess that lord Kitchener was one of the biggest personalities, am I right?

Your question regarding Kitchener is a little bit more complex when considering the colonial period because his involvement in the later campaigns served as sort of transitional period between imperial expansion and consolidation. Kitchener’s service just happened to coincide with the genesis of a more modernized outlook that transferred the Army’s focus from the far reaches of the empire to events transpiring closer to home (i.e. the more aggressive German policies regarding colonization and maritime expansion).

He began his career in 1871 as an officer of engineers and then saw extensive service in the Anglo-Egyptian Army. He was very much the soldier-administrator similar to Gordon. His victories in the Sudan served to redeem the embarrassment of the Gordon Relief Expedition. He later served in South Africa against the Boers. Here he initially served as Chief of Staff under Freddie “Bobs” Roberts. His experience in these operations no doubt prepared him in some degree for his eventual role as Secretary of State for War during the Great War. He eventually succeeded Roberts as CNC and prosecuted the counter-insurgency operations in the waning stages of the 2nd Boer War.

I will interject here that the Boers did serve on the Allied side during the Great War and played a critical role in the seizure of a significant portion of German colonial possessions. They experienced a bit of trouble with the colony of German East Africa though. During the campaign in East Africa the British and their Boer allies faced off against a German commander who would become something of a legend at wars end, earning the distinction of only German commander to never be defeated. This individual was Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. Perhaps the story of Lettow-Vorbeck and his brave German Schutztruppe and native Askari can be discussed some other time on the WWI thread.

But, to answer the question. Yes, Kitchener was a very prominent personality in the final operations and campaigns of Victoria’s Little Wars.

Perhaps some of the forum members who have taken it upon themselves to study the more intiment details of Kitchener's career could weigh in to provide a little more perspective on the nature of his involment during the period.