Victoria's Little Wars: Best/Favorite Commanders (3 Viewers)

[swalterh]

This is a concise article entitled "Zulu: The True Story" by Dr. Saul David on the BBC website.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/zulu_01.shtml

Here are some interesting paragraphs:

"In truth, the real hero of Rorke's Drift was Commissary Dalton. It was Dalton who persuaded Chard and Bromhead to remain at Rorke's Drift when their first instinct was to abandon the post, and it was Dalton who organised and inspired the defence. But Dalton, an ex-NCO, came from what was considered the wrong background, and was ignored for almost a year. He was eventually awarded a VC after intensive lobbying by the press - but not until January 1880, by which time the celebrations had died down."

"Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford was urgently burying all the evidence that could be used against him. He propagated the myth that a shortage of ammunition led to defeat at Isandlwana. He ensured that potential witnesses to his errors were unable to speak out. Even more significantly, he tried to push blame for the defeat onto Colonel Durnford, now dead, claiming that Durnford had disobeyed orders to defend the camp. The truth is that no orders were ever given to Durnford to take command. Chelmsford's behaviour, in retrospect, is unforgivable. Many generals blunder in war, but few go to such lengths to avoid responsibility."

"Chelmsford had, in any event, another weapon to use against his critics - that of Rorke's Drift. Though undeniably heroic, the importance of the defence of Rorke's Drift was grossly exaggerated by both the generals and politicians of the period, to diminish the impact of Isandlwana."

For the most part, it reflects my view of Chelmsford.

Best, Raymond.

Raymond

Thanks for tracking down the source. Perhaps we need to consider bumping Chelmsford's Command Rating down a few notches. Maybe poor to below-average would be more appropriate. Whether we agree on an eventual command rating or not he certainly doesn't score high marks for integrity.

At any rate, based on this account Commissary Dalton seems to deserve alot more praise and credit than what is traditionally given in the main-stream histories of the battle. And I should retract my remarks about the cover-up being aimed at Chard, instead we find it was aimed at Dalton. My appologies for not doing more thorough research on this issue.

Shane

 

[Louis Badolato]

Hi Louis,

Is this the full title of the book that you are referring to ?

For Queen and Country - The Zulu War Diary of Lieutenant Wilfred Heaton, 24th Regiment of Foot, 1879.

by Rodney Ashwood.

Thanks, Raymond

No Raymond, that is a different book. The full title of the Book I am referencing is "A Zulu War Diary". I lent it to Ken Osen, so I can't give you complete information, but I have posted the information, including a verbatim quote from the diary reference I paraphrased above, elsewhere on this forum, and maybe you can find it by searching the title in the advanced search box.

 

[Louis Badolato]

This is a concise article entitled "Zulu: The True Story" by Dr. Saul David on the BBC website.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/zulu_01.shtml

Here are some interesting paragraphs:

"In truth, the real hero of Rorke's Drift was Commissary Dalton. It was Dalton who persuaded Chard and Bromhead to remain at Rorke's Drift when their first instinct was to abandon the post, and it was Dalton who organised and inspired the defence. But Dalton, an ex-NCO, came from what was considered the wrong background, and was ignored for almost a year. He was eventually awarded a VC after intensive lobbying by the press - but not until January 1880, by which time the celebrations had died down."

"Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford was urgently burying all the evidence that could be used against him. He propagated the myth that a shortage of ammunition led to defeat at Isandlwana. He ensured that potential witnesses to his errors were unable to speak out. Even more significantly, he tried to push blame for the defeat onto Colonel Durnford, now dead, claiming that Durnford had disobeyed orders to defend the camp. The truth is that no orders were ever given to Durnford to take command. Chelmsford's behaviour, in retrospect, is unforgivable. Many generals blunder in war, but few go to such lengths to avoid responsibility."

"Chelmsford had, in any event, another weapon to use against his critics - that of Rorke's Drift. Though undeniably heroic, the importance of the defence of Rorke's Drift was grossly exaggerated by both the generals and politicians of the period, to diminish the impact of Isandlwana."

For the most part, it reflects my view of Chelmsford.

Best, Raymond.

Great post, Raymond, and I couldn't agree more with every word.:wink2:

 

[Louis Badolato]

Raymond

Thanks for tracking down the source. Perhaps we need to consider bumping Chelmsford's Command Rating down a few notches. Maybe poor to below-average would be more appropriate. Whether we agree on an eventual command rating or not he certainly doesn't score high marks for integrity.

At any rate, based on this account Commissary Dalton seems to deserve alot more praise and credit than what is traditionally given in the main-stream histories of the battle. And I should retract my remarks about the cover-up being aimed at Chard, instead we find it was aimed at Dalton. My appologies for not doing more thorough research on this issue.

Shane

Shane,

You have nothing to appologize for - just because Dalton was swept under the rug doesn't mean that Chelmsford or the British Authorities didn't keep Bromhead from further advancement, through jealousy or the simple fact that the man's obvious deafness made the official story ring rather false.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

You have nothing to appologize for - just because Dalton was swept under the rug doesn't mean that Chelmsford or the British Authorities didn't keep Bromhead from further advancement, through jealousy or the simple fact that the man's obvious deafness made the official story ring rather false.

Louis

Perhaps you’re right. There was a lot of stuff swirling and political jockeying going on above the heads of good ole’ Tommy Atkins and the junior officers he shared the front lines with following this highly controversial operation (Zulu War). It seems that Queen Vicky may have gotten herself a little bit too involved in this one for her own good. Though I can understand the personal support she wished to extend to Lord Chelmsford.

This bit from wiki (I know, not the most academically accepted source) may provide some insight into certain members of the military establishment’s views regarding all of the members of the Rorke’s Drift garrison:

Certainly, Sir Garnet Wolseley, taking over as Commander-in-Chief from Lord Chelmsford later that year, was unimpressed with the awards made to the defenders of Rorke’s Drift, saying “it is monstrous making heroes of those who shut up in buildings at Rorke’s Drift, could not bolt, and fought like rats for their lives which they could not otherwise save.” However, there is no doubting that many of the defenders of Rorke's Drift - and each of the 15 winners of the VC and the DCM - did indeed exhibit the attribute required in order to win those awards: that of conspicuous valour in the face of the enemy.

Apparently the British military system at that time did not encourage its commanders to pay tribute to the men who under extreme circumstances rose to the occasion and were successful. Following the performance of his men at Austerlitz, Napoleon expressed his pleasure with their conduct. Saying “Soldiers I am pleased with you.” I suppose a truly great commander feels no need to deride his men when they help him achieve success.

Again, I propose that there existed some form of jealousy exhibited by elements of the British military establishment towards these men who were afforded true “hero” status from the British public. Wolseley was an officer who fought countless internal battles against the Queen’s “cronies” and here the public was making heroes of the men under the command of one of the Queen’s favorites. It would not stand to serve his own ends to enthusiastically support the success at Rorke’s Drift. I’m merely hypothesizing that perhaps the careers and reputations of some of the leading personalities of the battle (Chard, Bromhead, Dalton, Bourne, etc...) became collateral damage due to bureaucratic in-fighting amongst the “Traditionalists” and the “Wolseley Ring.”

 

[Louis Badolato]

Shane,

I have mixed feelings about Sir Garnett Woseley, and, while I certainly agreed with the reforms he wished to see in the British Military, I tended to be more sympathetic to the followers of Frederick Sleigh "Little Bobs" Roberts, who derided Woseley for his need to "advertise."

When I look at Woseley, I feel like he obtained his reputation primarily for his success in the Ashanti campaign, which was one of the many campaigns during this era where thoroughly modern forces, fighting natives without firearms, could only lose if their commander committed a monumental blunder.

Roberts, on the other hand, earned his reputation as a general marching from Kabul to Kahandahar in Afghanistan, including forcing the Dargai Heights, against a far more potent foe.

Woseley, admittedly dispatched to the Sudan very late in the game, failed to timely relieve Gordon at Khartoum. Roberts had his own failure during the Boer War. Both were far better than average commanders for the period, but I think Woseley was more concerned about his own personal success and reputation, while Roberts was more concerned with the men serving under him, which is why, in the end, I find myself always siding with Roberts in the debate of their respective merits.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

I have mixed feelings about Sir Garnett Woseley, and, while I certainly agreed with the reforms he wished to see in the British Military, I tended to be more sympathetic to the followers of Frederick Sleigh "Little Bobs" Roberts, who derided Woseley for his need to "advertise."

When I look at Woseley, I feel like he obtained his reputation primarily for his success in the Ashanti campaign, which was one of the many campaigns during this era where thoroughly modern forces, fighting natives without firearms, could only lose if their commander committed a monumental blunder.

Roberts, on the other hand, earned his reputation as a general marching from Kabul to Kahandahar in Afghanistan, including forcing the Dargai Heights, against a far more potent foe.

Woseley, admittedly dispatched to the Sudan very late in the game, failed to timely relieve Gordon at Khartoum. Roberts had his own failure during the Boer War. Both were far better than average commanders for the period, but I think Woseley was more concerned about his own personal success and reputation, while Roberts was more concerned with the men serving under him, which is why, in the end, I find myself always siding with Roberts in the debate of their respective merits.

Louis

I have to admit that I share your opinion that between the two Roberts was the better battlefield commander. Roberts was also, as you suggest a superior leader of men. His esteemed reputation with the troops was the exception rather than the rule during this period. And the characteristics and abilities you have mentioned no doubt greatly contributed to Robert's popularity amongst the rank & file.

I think that the reasoning behind why I am so appreciative of the career of Sir Garnet Woseley is because he clearly exemplified the aptitudes necessary to be successful on the actual battlefield. But, more importantly he demonstrated the moral courage and intellectual cunning to successfully subdue the more traditional attitudes in White Hall. His efforts and successes against the more conservative officers (such as Cambridge and Chelmsford) who enjoyed strong support from the Queen, opened the way for more reformed minded officers (such as himself and Roberts) to gain more positional authority and professional influence.

At times Sir Garnet could be overly outspoken about the shortcomings of the existing system and he no doubt possessed an insatiable appetite for self promotion and public notoriety. Unfortunately he had the tendency to get a bit carried away with his infighting by picking fights with individuals and groups within the establishment that did not deserve the harsh criticisms and judgments Wolseley laid upon them.

I think it difficult for us in America to fully conceptualize the difficulties experienced by the more talented officers (and enlisted men for that matter) in the British military system whose backgrounds, lineage and/or connections did not mesh with the better protected upper echelons of British society. The fact that Wolseley was able to successfully open the way for the more professional classes to ascend to the highest offices within the British Army is truly a feat worth the praise that is given him. Based on this analysis, one could conclude that without the efforts of Wolseley, “Bob” Roberts would’ve experienced more difficulty becoming the eventual CNC.

Interestingly, during the Great War it seems that the British Army reverted back to its more traditional ways. Many of the reasons behind Douglas Haig’s appointment to command of the BEF were more a result of high society connections at court rather than demonstrated command ability. If this argument does not satisfy the reasons for his selection it certainly could be used to explain his retention in that post.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Shane,

I completely agree with your assessment of the importance of the reforms that Woseley was able to push through against the wishes of the British Military establishment.

Please don't get me started on Douglas Haig . . . there is a thread somewhere on this forum (it might be entitled "Lions led by donkeys") where we had a tremendous (and not nearly as civil as this thread) debate on the respective merits of Haig and some of the other Allied commanders in WWI. I fall on the side believing what Haig did at Paschendale to save his position was a crime against his own troops. However, my knowledge of WWI (and of military history in general) is limited to what I have read, so I could very well be wrong about Haig as well . . . he certainly worked hard after the war to do right by the troops he had commanded (I tend to think this was the result of a guilty conscience).

 

[glossman]

Raymond

Thanks for tracking down the source. Perhaps we need to consider bumping Chelmsford's Command Rating down a few notches. Maybe poor to below-average would be more appropriate. Whether we agree on an eventual command rating or not he certainly doesn't score high marks for integrity.

At any rate, based on this account Commissary Dalton seems to deserve alot more praise and credit than what is traditionally given in the main-stream histories of the battle. And I should retract my remarks about the cover-up being aimed at Chard, instead we find it was aimed at Dalton. My appologies for not doing more thorough research on this issue.

Shane

Shane,

You have started a very good thread here with the potential for an interesting discussion on the military aspects of the Victorian Wars. As others have said, you have no need to apologise, as you have not done any wrong.

A forum is a platform for the sharing of perspectives and opinions that may (and often do) vary from member to member. As long as the exchange is polite and civil with members respecting the different views of others, there should be no problem and we all can learn from each other.

Raymond.

 

[glossman]

No Raymond, that is a different book. The full title of the Book I am referencing is "A Zulu War Diary". I lent it to Ken Osen, so I can't give you complete information, but I have posted the information, including a verbatim quote from the diary reference I paraphrased above, elsewhere on this forum, and maybe you can find it by searching the title in the advanced search box.

Louis,

Thanks. My gut feeling was that this was not the correct book. I shall track it down eventually. There is a plethora of books on the Anglo-Zulu War by a host of authors, some subscribing to the "revisionist" history and others not. If we subtract all the spin and hype, the fact remains that the Rorke's Drift garrison stood their ground against the enemy.....and prevailed.

Raymond.

 

[jazzeum]

While looking around the web this morning regarding the book referenced by Louis I came across this forum, Victorian Wars Forum, which may be of interest. The address is http://www.victorianwars.com/index.php

 

[swalterh]

OK, so how does one of the most critical threats to the British Empire during Queen Victoria’s reign (Indian Mutiny 1857-59) get started over a rumor that there may have been cow and/or pig fat on the cartridges. Don’t get me wrong, I’m aware that there were other underlying factors involved in the uprising. But, for almost an entire army to take up arms against their British overseers due to this issue seems severe. Perhaps the bureaucrat who decided to re-arm the Presidency Armies with the Enfield should have done some more research on the culture of the men who were actually going to be using them and the production process of the cartridges.

Ah, more bean counting SNAFU’s from the stuffed suits in their cozy offices.

The fun thing about the whole episode is that a lot of our leading personalities saw some form of service in this one and attired in their fancy, uncomfortable red coats to boot. Imagine finishing up with the whole Russian business on the Crimean Peninsula and then without any time to catch your breath getting shipped off to India to fight against the people who were supposed to be helping you protect your most valuable colonial possession against Ivan. Irony…

 

[Louis Badolato]

Shane,

You raise some very interesting points about the Sepoy Mutiny (I stress the Sepoy mutiny, as had the entire Indian People 200 million strong rose up against the Raj, the Raj would have been over). Here are a few more:

The majority of the "Princes" - the hereditary rulers of nominally independent states under British "protection" stayed loyal to the Empire, and helped put down the mutiny. I've always wondered why? Perhaps they feared that one of them would seize control, and they preferred British dominance to dominance by one of their piers?

The Gurkhas and the Sikhs remained loyal, and indeed, the King of the Gurkhas sent an army to assist the British in putting down the mutiny. Did religious and/or ethnic rivalries/prejudices play a role in helping to put down the mutiny, and keep British control of the sub continent (I of course absolutely believe they did)?

Why the unspeakable brutality against the British women and children? The image I get (from contemporary accounts and images [paintings/prints]) of the relationship between the British officers and the Sepoys throughout the early 19th Century is one of respect, perhaps even affection. How did the relationship sour to the point where, in rising up, the Sepoys on many occasions massacred the wives and children of these very officers? Did the conduct of the "memsahibs" (the wives of the British Officer/Politicians/wealthy merchants) play a role in this (i.e. did the women have a different, less cordial relationship with the Indian native troops)?

I would love for people with more knowledge (mine comes principally from reading history books written by British and American historians, as well as the fictional accounts of three of my favorite authors, Rudyard Kipling, George MacDonald Fraser and M.M. Kaye) of the relationships between the British ruling class and the native Indians to discuss, and possibly provide answers to, some of the above questions.

 

[Louis Badolato]

While looking around the web this morning regarding the book referenced by Louis I came across this forum, Victorian Wars Forum, which may be of interest. The address is http://www.victorianwars.com/index.php

Brad,

I went back and found my old post about the book. The actual title of the book is "Zulu War Journal" by Colonel Henry Harford, C.B. It is actually a transcription of Harford's handwritten journal, kept during the war. At the time Harford was a brevet Captain serving on the staff of Commandant Lonsdale of the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent. There are several of his sketches of battlefields, as well as a very fresh and well written account of his experiences and observations. Here is a quote from his observations the day after Rorke's Drift:

"Acting Commissariat Officer, Mr. James Dalton, who in the absence of Lieutenant Chard, R.E., (who was down at the river . . . superintending Pontoon work at the moment when warning was received of the nearness of the Zulus), devised all the rapid arrangements for the defense as well as working like a Trojan himself with the men at the barricades and did much gallent work during the night. . . . Mr Thomas Atkins is the best judge of gallant deeds, and when he applauds you may be certain that he is right and does so with good reason, and I noticed that directly Mr Smith or Mr Dalton showed themselves they received an ovation from the men, Which was unmistakable." (Page 40).

Pretty interesting information about who really led the defense of Rorke's Drift. In light of the fact that Gonville Bromhead was nearly totally deaf and left behind at the drift because he was considered a total liability on combat, and John Rouse Meriot Chard never saw combat before or after, and Dalton had been a Sergeant Major who saw tons of action on the Northwest Frontier, the above quotation about who the men applauded after the battle gives an interesting twist on the battle that was never included in the movie Zulu. Harford saw a good amount of action (and was mentioned in the dispatches) so his action descriptions (while understated and modest) are quite interesting.

 

[swalterh]

Brad,

I went back and found my old post about the book. The actual title of the book is "Zulu War Journal" by Colonel Henry Harford, C.B. It is actually a transcription of Harford's handwritten journal, kept during the war. At the time Harford was a brevet Captain serving on the staff of Commandant Lonsdale of the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent. There are several of his sketches of battlefields, as well as a very fresh and well written account of his experiences and observations. Here is a quote from his observations the day after Rorke's Drift:

"Acting Commissariat Officer, Mr. James Dalton, who in the absence of Lieutenant Chard, R.E., (who was down at the river . . . superintending Pontoon work at the moment when warning was received of the nearness of the Zulus), devised all the rapid arrangements for the defense as well as working like a Trojan himself with the men at the barricades and did much gallent work during the night. . . . Mr Thomas Atkins is the best judge of gallant deeds, and when he applauds you may be certain that he is right and does so with good reason, and I noticed that directly Mr Smith or Mr Dalton showed themselves they received an ovation from the men, Which was unmistakable." (Page 40).

Pretty interesting information about who really led the defense of Rorke's Drift. In light of the fact that Gonville Bromhead was nearly totally deaf and left behind at the drift because he was considered a total liability on combat, and John Rouse Meriot Chard never saw combat before or after, and Dalton had been a Sergeant Major who saw tons of action on the Northwest Frontier, the above quotation about who the men applauded after the battle gives an interesting twist on the battle that was never included in the movie Zulu. Harford saw a good amount of action (and was mentioned in the dispatches) so his action descriptions (while understated and modest) are quite interesting.

Louis

It appears that there were an awful lot of negative comments leveled against Lt’s Chard and Bromhead by other junior officers involved in the Zulu Conflict. I believe you mentioned in a previous post that this brevet Captain Henry Hartford was not present during the action at Rorke’s Drift and therefore marks him as a secondary source when studying his account of the battle. Had he been directly involved in the action he would have in all likelihood assumed command of the post himself.

It seems that you (as well as some contemporary historians) are attempting to shift the traditionally accepted command credit for the successful defense of the post from Lt. Chard to Commissary Dalton based on this account from an officer who was very much a peer of Lt. Chard’s and who was not present during the action. In his attempt to discredit the official account of the battle Hartford cites some cheering from the troops as his only evidence to support his conclusions that Commissary Dalton was in fact the one who took charge of the command responsibilities during the battle.

Other reasoning behind your argument is that Lt. Chard was never involved in combat following his service at the Drift. But, he eventually went on to reach the rank of Colonel before retiring from Her Majesty’s Service due to being diagnosed with terminal cancer and dying a year after he left the Army. It seems that he was in fact enjoying a healthy career progression as an engineering officer and in all likelihood didn’t wish to see any more combat experience following his services in the Zulu War (1879) if it could be avoided. Based on this reasoning, I’m interested to here your perspectives as to why Commissary Dalton was not instantly awarded a battlefield commission following the battle and placed in a more ample position that would allow the army to take full advantage of his command abilities.

I believe that this type of revisionist history only serves to cloud the topic under contention in an attempt to perpetuate the underlying agenda of the adjusting party who possesses some form of social or political axe to grind. (i.e. Adjusting Party = Individuals who do not respect people in positions of institutional authority or who possess some perceived social standing superior to their own. So said individuals seek to discredit these societal concepts at every available opportunity)

Again, Rorke’s Drift was a siege that experienced multiple direct assaults against the works. Siege operations were the very form of military action in which the engineers (i.e. pioneers) were created for. I find it difficult to believe that Dalton and not Chard should deserve the credit for the more intricate design of the fortifications, an aptitude that nothing in Dalton’s service record or training suggests he would have acquired. It appears that Dalton’s main contribution to the planning of the battle was that he brought to the commander’s attention the number of wounded soldiers who would be unable to escape the pursuing Zulu’s if the decision to abandon the post was made. Once it was decided that a stand would be made there exists nothing in British Army protocol to suggest that the senior ranking officer of the post would defer to a man of non-commissioned rank, especially given the fact that the ranking officer of the post was professionally trained at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich.

This staff officer Hartford’s account could easily be discounted as being an attempt by a jealous peer to undermine a fellow junior officer who commanded one the most famous military actions in the history of warfare. IMO the continued discussion revolving around this particular source only serves to strengthen my argument that the other junior officers of the campaign (as well as other members of the British Army Establishment) were in fact jealous of the attention and accolades bestowed upon Lt’s Chard and Bromhead.

Shane

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis

It appears that there were an awful lot of negative comments leveled against Lt’s Chard and Bromhead by other junior officers involved in the Zulu Conflict. I believe you mentioned in a previous post that this brevet Captain Henry Hartford was not present during the action at Rorke’s Drift and therefore marks him as a secondary source when studying his account of the battle. Had he been directly involved in the action he would have in all likelihood assumed command of the post himself.

It seems that you (as well as some contemporary historians) are attempting to shift the traditionally accepted command credit for the successful defense of the post from Lt. Chard to Commissary Dalton based on this account from an officer who was very much a peer of Lt. Chard’s and who was not present during the action. In his attempt to discredit the official account of the battle Hartford cites some cheering from the troops as his only evidence to support his conclusions that Commissary Dalton was in fact the one who took charge of the command responsibilities during the battle.

Other reasoning behind your argument is that Lt. Chard was never involved in combat following his service at the Drift. But, he eventually went on to reach the rank of Colonel before retiring from Her Majesty’s Service due to being diagnosed with terminal cancer and dying a year after he left the Army. It seems that he was in fact enjoying a healthy career progression as an engineering officer and in all likelihood didn’t wish to see any more combat experience following his services in the Zulu War (1879) if it could be avoided. Based on this reasoning, I’m interested to here your perspectives as to why Commissary Dalton was not instantly awarded a battlefield commission following the battle and placed in a more ample position that would allow the army to take full advantage of his command abilities.

I believe that this type of revisionist history only serves to cloud the topic under contention in an attempt to perpetuate the underlying agenda of the adjusting party who possesses some form of social or political axe to grind. (i.e. Adjusting Party = Individuals who do not respect people in positions of institutional authority or who possess some perceived social standing superior to their own. So said individuals seek to discredit these societal concepts at every available opportunity)

Again, Rorke’s Drift was a siege that experienced multiple direct assaults against the works. Siege operations were the very form of military action in which the engineers (i.e. pioneers) were created for. I find it difficult to believe that Dalton and not Chard should deserve the credit for the more intricate design of the fortifications, an aptitude that nothing in Dalton’s service record or training suggests he would have acquired. It appears that Dalton’s main contribution to the planning of the battle was that he brought to the commander’s attention the number of wounded soldiers who would be unable to escape the pursuing Zulu’s if the decision to abandon the post was made. Once it was decided that a stand would be made there exists nothing in British Army protocol to suggest that the senior ranking officer of the post would defer to a man of non-commissioned rank, especially given the fact that the ranking officer of the post was professionally trained at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich.

This staff officer Hartford’s account could easily be discounted as being an attempt by a jealous peer to undermine a fellow junior officer who commanded one the most famous military actions in the history of warfare. IMO the continued discussion revolving around this particular source only serves to strengthen my argument that the other junior officers of the campaign (as well as other members of the British Army Establishment) were in fact jealous of the attention and accolades bestowed upon Lt’s Chard and Bromhead.

Shane

Shane,

I have three responses to your (certainly credible and possible) assessment of Harford's potential motives in making the entry:

First, this was his private journal, kept by him at the time, and never intended for publication (it was published after his death by his daughter). If he intended the account to discredit Chard and Bromhead out of petty jealousy, why never publish this or any other statement in his lifetime? Plus, no where in the account does he bad mouth Chard or Bromhead. He merely talks about the survivors' adulation of Dalton.

Second, when Dalton was not immediately awarded a VC after the battle, the other enlisted survivors of the Drift campaigned so hard for him to be awarded a VC that he was subsequently awarded one about a year later. If there is no truth to the account making him the principal actor behind the defense of the drift, why did everyone else campaign so hard for his VC?

Third, the basis for his assessment (that Chard was at the river when the news of the approaching Zulus reached the post, that Dalton arranged the defense, and, in fact, convinced Chard and Bromhead not to abandon the post), is accepted fact set forth in most of the contemporary accounts by the survivors.

As far as the question of Dalton getting a battlefield promotion for his leadership, there are two very good reasons why there was little chance this could have been possible: First, as the official publicized account made Chard and Bromhead (members of the appropriate officer classes) the heroes of the action, how could the government had awarded an acting commisary officer a battlefield commission for leading the action? Second, disregarding the fact that he was from the wrong social class, he was an older man, a retired Sergeant Major, not a young man who one would expect to see awarded a Leiutenant's commission.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

I have three responses to your (certainly credible and possible) assessment of Harford's potential motives in making the entry:

First, this was his private journal, kept by him at the time, and never intended for publication (it was published after his death by his daughter). If he intended the account to discredit Chard and Bromhead out of petty jealousy, why never publish this or any other statement in his lifetime? Plus, no where in the account does he bad mouth Chard or Bromhead. He merely talks about the survivors' adulation of Dalton.

Second, when Dalton was not immediately awarded a VC after the battle, the other enlisted survivors of the Drift campaigned so hard for him to be awarded a VC that he was subsequently awarded one about a year later. If there is no truth to the account making him the principal actor behind the defense of the drift, why did everyone else campaign so hard for his VC?

Third, the basis for his assessment (that Chard was at the river when the news of the approaching Zulus reached the post, that Dalton arranged the defense, and, in fact, convinced Chard and Bromhead not to abandon the post), is accepted fact set forth in most of the contemporary accounts by the survivors.

As far as the question of Dalton getting a battlefield promotion for his leadership, there are two very good reasons why there was little chance this could have been possible: First, as the official publicized account made Chard and Bromhead (members of the appropriate officer classes) the heroes of the action, how could the government had awarded an acting commisary officer a battlefield commission for leading the action? Second, disregarding the fact that he was from the wrong social class, he was an older man, a retired Sergeant Major, not a young man who one would expect to see awarded a Leiutenant's commission.

Louis

You present many interesting and valid conclusions/questions.

I will add/adjust one thing to your third point. This is that the accepted view concludes that Dalton initiated arrangement and construction of the defensive perimeter before Chard arrived at the post. Once work on the fortifications was begun and Chard arrived and took formal command, it is perfectly feasible that he (an Engineer) assumed responsibility for the final design and layout of the perimeter. Chard is traditionally given credit for ordering the additional barricade of biscuit boxes to be built across the inner perimeter to provide a smaller fall-back area in case the Zulu's overwhelmed a portion of the outer works.

I agree with your second point that Commissary Dalton certainly deserves credit for playing a principal role in the defense. The troop’s appreciation and his eventual earning of the VC can attest for that. I’m merely proposing that Chard’s accepted role in the action not be discredited due to opinions postulated by a source that was not present during the battle. Especially given that there exists a very limited ammount of primary evidence supporting the view that Commissary Dalton exercised effective command during the action.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis

You present many interesting and valid conclusions/questions.

I will add/adjust one thing to your third point. This is that the accepted view concludes that Dalton initiated arrangement and construction of the defensive perimeter before Chard arrived at the post. Once work on the fortifications was begun and Chard arrived and took formal command, it is perfectly feasible that he (an Engineer) assumed responsibility for the final design and layout of the perimeter. Chard is traditionally given credit for ordering the additional barricade of biscuit boxes to be built across the inner perimeter to provide a smaller fall-back area in case the Zulu's overwhelmed a portion of the outer works.

I agree with your second point that Commissary Dalton certainly deserves credit for playing a principal role in the defense. The troop’s appreciation and his eventual earning of the VC can attest for that. I’m merely proposing that Chard’s accepted role in the action not be discredited due to opinions postulated by a source that was not present during the battle. Especially given that there exists a very limited ammount of primary evidence supporting the view that Commissary Dalton exercised effective command during the action.

Shane,

I have to confess that I have rarely had a more enjoyable conversation about a topic than the one I have been participating in on this and the Civil War thread for the past several days. I cannot disagree at any of with your points, which I believe have at least as much basis in the historical record as mine. The one final point I would make on this topic, before hopefully stearing the conversation back to the Mutiny in India, is that we may both be correct: a close friend of mine who was a U.S. Marine sniper in Vietnam, talked about how the best Captain he served under in combat, when he first arrived at the firebase to take command, told the men that he was their commander, and would expect them to follow his commands without hesitation. He went on to say that he would pass along some commands as soon as he got his orders from the Gunney Sergeant (an experienced NCO who had fought in Korea and had been the lead NCO in the firebase pretty much since the outset). If young officers in the Victorian Era looked for guidance to experienced NCO's the way my friend described, it is certainly possible that Chard and Bromhead commanded the defense of the Drift, while seeking advice and guidance from Dalton, a retired Regimental Sergenat Major with years of combat experience on the Northwest Frontier.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,

I have to confess that I have rarely had a more enjoyable conversation about a topic than the one I have been participating in on this and the Civil War thread for the past several days. I cannot disagree at any of with your points, which I believe have at least as much basis in the historical record as mine. The one final point I would make on this topic, before hopefully stearing the conversation back to the Mutiny in India, is that we may both be correct: a close friend of mine who was a U.S. Marine sniper in Vietnam, talked about how the best Captain he served under in combat, when he first arrived at the firebase to take command, told the men that he was their commander, and would expect them to follow his commands without hesitation. He went on to say that he would pass along some commands as soon as he got his orders from the Gunney Sergeant (an experienced NCO who had fought in Korea and had been the lead NCO in the firebase pretty much since the outset). If young officers in the Victorian Era looked for guidance to experienced NCO's the way my friend described, it is certainly possible that Chard and Bromhead commanded the defense of the Drift, while seeking advice and guidance from Dalton, a retired Regimental Sergenat Major with years of combat experience on the Northwest Frontier.

Louis

I concur wholeheartedly with this conclusion.

 

[marco55]

Getting back to other commanders how about Sir Redvers Buller.He wasn't suited for high command but in battle he was fearless.
Mark