Why It Makes Sense... (1 Viewer)

Lincoln's involvement/micro managing those early years of the war was really no more a simple premise as looking for a battle victory that seemed to elude the Union army in the east right up to Gettysburg.

His selection of McClellan after Manassas was based primarily on the praise lavished on the young Napoleon for his actions in West Virginia at Philippi and Rich Mountain by the Northern newspapers who were also looking for any Union victory to report. If you read the reports of both "battles" the casualty figures were almost in single numbers with the Confederates retreating. If they can be counted as Union victories the laurel leaves belong to Rosecrans not his pumped up superior who over-estimated Reb numbers was no where near the front line during both engagements and was already exhibiting behaviour for which he would later become notorious for.

As for the war in the West the Rebs never got to grips with a proper strategy in dealing with river/gun boats that Grant made full use of and although unbeknown to the South at the time by the fall of Vicksburg they had already lost the war.

Reb
 
...As for the war in the West the Rebs never got to grips with a proper strategy in dealing with river/gun boats that Grant made full use of and although unbeknown to the South at the time by the fall of Vicksburg they had already lost the war.

Reb
Do you mean because of Gettysburg or something else?
 
Forgive my ignorance for the following question, but I have done no reading on this. Did McClellan pose a credible threat to Lincoln in the 64 election? -- lancer

McClellan ran on the Democratic ticket on an anti-war platform-Grant's campaign had resulted in horrendous casualties although he had bottled the Rebs up in Petersburg but following the debacle of the Crater the North had had enough of the blood letting.

McClellan was still popular with the Army who had revered him as Li'l Mac and the Democrats believed him when he said every man jack in the Union army would vote for him (his egotism was simply colossal) to end this war by negotiation. Brad is right Sheridan's victory in the Shenandoah Valley and Shermans capture of Atlanta swung it for Lincoln and that election was more a referendum on Lincoln's leadership than a full blown presidential contest. Lincoln captured 22 States whilst McClellan only managed 3 proving to everyone, except perhaps him due to his ego, that the army vote did not go Democratic.

Reb
 
UKReb - thanks for the answer. I agree with the statement about the west. Vicksburg sealed the deal. -- lancer
 
McClellan ran on the Democratic ticket on an anti-war platform-Grant's campaign had resulted in horrendous casualties although he had bottled the Rebs up in Petersburg but following the debacle of the Crater the North had had enough of the blood letting.

McClellan was still popular with the Army who had revered him as Li'l Mac and the Democrats believed him when he said every man jack in the Union army would vote for him (his egotism was simply colossal) to end this war by negotiation. Brad is right Sheridan's victory in the Shenandoah Valley and Shermans capture of Atlanta swung it for Lincoln and that election was more a referendum on Lincoln's leadership than a full blown presidential contest. Lincoln captured 22 States whilst McClellan only managed 3 proving to everyone, except perhaps him due to his ego, that the army vote did not go Democratic.

Reb

From what Ive read a large portion of the soldiers didnt like the peace platform, thus contributing to McClellan not getting the soldier vote. Many of them felt that negotiating a peace would be an admittance that they were not capable soldiers.
 
From what Ive read a large portion of the soldiers didnt like the peace platform, thus contributing to McClellan not getting the soldier vote. Many of them felt that negotiating a peace would be an admittance that they were not capable soldiers.

Harris you're most probably right but remember it was McClellans ego that stated he had the army vote when in fact he hadn't. He was actually keen to continue the fight but had to come up or rather the Democrats had to come up with an alternative manifesto to Lincoln's. Their plan was to call a cease fire and negotiate but if the negotiations broke down they would "re-start the war". Now you know why he only gained 3 states.

However, this election was the last chance the Confederacy had of achieving independence. They had had only one other which I consider their best chance of achieving their goal and that was in the fall of '62 and was the true "high tide" for the Confederacy. The South was on the offensive in every arena east of the Mississippi in that September and threatening Washington; Louisville and Cincinatti while all of Europe was watching and a hairs breadth away from recognition and intervention. But all three offensives were stopped at Antietam, Perryville and Iuka/Corinth, after that they never had another chance until this election.

I unlike other colleagues have never seen a Southern victory at Gettysburg as doing anything other than prolonging the war. Vicksburg sealed the fate -militarily-for the Rebs and Lee's army could not have possibly sustained itself indefinitely in the North and was simply not strong enough to have taken the Washington stronghold. Other students of the war will no doubt disagree but in my book the only two chances the South had of "winning" was Sept '62 and the '64 election.

Reb.
 
I certainly agree with you Reb that a victory at Gettysburg wouldnt have delivered victory. The loss of the Mississippi River and Union Western Army dominance over their Confederate counterparts ensured that in the long run Lee couldnt have pulled off the miracle victory.
 
"Victory" for the confederates could have occurred only as a result of war exhaustion and political collapse in the North. There was never a realistic possibility of a purely military victory. Similar in some respects to the German situation in Russia during WWII. The disparity of men and resources available to the North made it unlikely that the South could ever have won a military conquest over the Union forces. The North did not even utilize all of its resources for the war effort. The South needed a political collapse or settlement like the Germans obtained from Russia in WWI and France in WWII.
 
This might be a good time to mention a great site for Civil War Books: Civil War Books and Authors. They have great reviews of all kinds of Civil War books and links to publishers. This is a highly recommended site.
 
"Victory" for the confederates could have occurred only as a result of war exhaustion and political collapse in the North. There was never a realistic possibility of a purely military victory. Similar in some respects to the German situation in Russia during WWII. The disparity of men and resources available to the North made it unlikely that the South could ever have won a military conquest over the Union forces. The North did not even utilize all of its resources for the war effort. The South needed a political collapse or settlement like the Germans obtained from Russia in WWI and France in WWII.

Yeah! I fully agree with your statement reflected in my earlier comment that the South's only two chances of gaining independence were the fall of '62 with European intervention especially Britain and France and Lincoln being thrown out of the White House in the election of '64.

The Confederacy never had the slightest hope of winning the war with a knock-out military victory and this can be summarised albeit a simplification in a few brief paragraphs.

The hugely talented Lee squared off against the likes of McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker (a real Union B Team) while the equally talented Grant literally wiped the floor with the Confederate B Team such as Johnston; Beauregard; Pemberton and Bragg and bear in mind that most of the time Bragg was up against the not so sharpest knives in the Union drawer Beull and Rosecrans even then he was unable to achieve a resounding victory.

Lee was able to keep the Union off of Richmond and even carry the war twice into the North but whilst he did all of this over three years Grant; Sherman; Sheridan; Thomas; McPherson (the outstanding Union A Team) literally carved up the Western CSA and when they split the Confederacy by controlling the Mississippi the war was over for the South.

Consequently, when Grant and Lee finally met in May'64 during the Overland Campaign they were as closely and equally matched as any two generals in history. They were so well matched neither could fully implement what he really wanted to do. The casualties were high on both sides as you now had two A team commanders clashing together but Grant kept moving South (he was afterall just executing the strategy/tactics that had brought him success in the West) But his continual advances did not allow Lee to plan or pull off any of his brilliant manouvers that had brought him so much success against Union B Commanders. I can highlight this-name another Union general who stole a three day march on Lee and his Texas/Stonewall Brigade foot cavalry? Grant did this when he disengaged from the slaughter of Cold Harbor and moved towards Petersburg. Lee was absolutely clueless as to where Grant was or where he was going and it was only the inadequacies and failure of Grants front-line commanders (remember he only brought Sheridan with him from the A Team in the West) at the initial contact point at Petersburg that kept Lee from losing Richmond in June '64.

A number of historians believe that if Lee had been sent West following Shiloh- as was considered by Davis at the time- a different outcome may have resulted. Personally I very much doubt that.

Reb.
 
A number of historians believe that if Lee had been sent West following Shiloh- as was considered by Davis at the time- a different outcome may have resulted. Personally I very much doubt that.

Reb.


Thats a very interesting what if scenario Reb. Would have been interesting to see how Lee would have worked with the likes of Forrest, Clebourne, and other unknown Confederate talents out west.
 
Lets get a talk about leaders going. Who would you pick, 1 or 2 from each side, as your unknown mvp. Meaning one of the top generals and such who a normal person off the street wouldnt know.

For the South I would go with Pat Cleburne and/or Robert Rodes. For the North Id pick James McPherson and Ben Grierson.
 
Second the nomination of Cleburne. I always thought George Thomas never got the recognition he deserved. -- lancer
 
Speaking of Thomas there is a new book about him out on the market soon that the previews speak highly of. I dont know much about him other than his Virginian birth, Chickamauga, and Sherman being not all that fond of him.
 
Interesting question on the unknown's during the Civil War. You could almost pick any Federal Corps, Division or brigade commander or Confederate Division or brigade commander. The Army of Tennessee always seemed to get ignored as well as the Army of the Ohio and Cumberland. Brigade commanders were key in most engagements. Everyone knows the Iron or Irish brigade but few know people like Candy, Carroll, Updyke, Upton, Vincent, to name a few federal brigade commaders. Everyone knows the Stonewall and Hood's Texas Brigade, but I also like Granbury, Armistead, Gordon, Kershaw, Barksdale, Benning, and so on.

I guess my favorites would be Clebourne's Divsion and Hancock's 2nd Corps or Slocum's 12th Corps. I would have loved to see Cleboune's and Hancock's men square off. The 12th had a couple of opportunities and did all right except for Ringgold Gap. Old Pat got the best of them that time.
 
Granbury and Updyke are great choices if for no other reason than their performance at the slaughter of Franklin. Who doesn't know of Barksdale at Gettysburg? Great history all. -- lancer
 
These types of favorite battle commanders lists are not far removed from one's bestest movies/authors or singers etc. Depends on what you have read/studied and whether the authors/accounts that you have read had either Southern or Northern sympathies is very much- in my opinion- how you come up with your own ACW mvp. Very few authors of ACW biographies/battle accounts manage to write a well-balanced account of both sides without somewhere in the text revealing whether they personally wear the blue or the gray.

But nevertheless my personal favorite has always been my avatar-but I would be the first to agree with Lancer that Hood was never cut out to be a Corps or Army Commander and very few of BG''s or MG's were given the opportunity to demonstrate- for the history books- if they would have been any better or worse than John Bell Hood.
Commanding a whole Army or Corps was a completely different ball game than commanding a brigade in the field and even then most of the famous ACW leaders on both sides most definitely had their off-days that inevitably resulted in the wholesale slaughter of their men. Grant at Cold Harbor, Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain, Lee and Longstreet on the third day at Gettysburg-the commander dumb and blind while the corps commander acted like a petulant child who couldn't get his own way.
And yet almost as a paradox- although Hood on that second day in Pennsylvania instinctivelly knew that sending his men up Little Round Top would be futile and murderous, when commanding the Army of Tennessee exactly imitated Lee and refused to listen to any of his brigade commanders at Franklin. Sending his army on their own "Picketts charge of the West" which was no more than committing a Confederate mass suicide against the Union works and the deaths of six Confederate generals to boot including all of your favorite Cleburne.

Would Little Pat-the Stonewall of the West- been a great army commander? We don't know but the idea that he would have been is purely based on his valiant actions as a Brigade Commander as were reported and he just may have been as disastrous at the job as Hood was- if you get my drift.

If however I was to pick two generals not widely known to the great unwashed public my Reb choice would be old fightin' Joe Wheeler as one of the best cavalry raiders in the war-whose story and actions were always over-shadowed by the exploits of Bedford Forrest reverently reported in the Southern news-sheets. He also was at the defense of Ringgold Gap and was wounded for his sterling efforts although Cleburne got the glory. But Hell the old guy was still leading his cavalry 35years later in Cuba much to Teddy Roosevelt's astonishment and awe.

My Yank choice would be John Sedgewick revered by his troops as Uncle John and for good reason-the welfare of his men was always, always his top priority-never popular with Lincoln's cabinet due to the fact that he was a proud Democrat and never lost the chance in voicing that. He was however, a supreme commander of VI Corps described by Meade as "Sedgewick, under fire, was the coolest man I ever saw". He was also a firm favorite and great friend of Grant's, they had known each other since serving as young lieutenants under Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War. Wounded three times until finally a Reb sharpshooter killed him at Spotsylvania- Grant was to remark "The loss of John Sedgewick is that of losing a whole division-he will be irreplaceable". In 1868 a bronze statue of him was cast from a cannon captured by his beloved VI Corps and unveiled at West Point. Tradition has it that a cadet in danger of failing his academic coursework will pass his examination if he sneaks out of the barracks after taps and spins the rowels of Sedgewicks spurs. Uncle John is still looking after his troops!

Two excellent although not widely known civil war commanders reflected in the fact that very few books have been written on either Sedgewick or Wheeler.

Reb
 
UKReb - these are all excellent points. Some of the "fun" of history comes with the great unknown factors, the "what ifs". Who knows if Cleburne could have been a good corps or army CO? Just fun to speculate, if rather useless. Props to your choices of Wheeler and Sedgwick. Both outstanding CO's. So many on each side and as you said, each had good and bad points, good and bad days. What ifs are fun to study and kick around as long as they are not allowed to overshadow What Is. -- lancer
 
Gettysburg is quite frankly one of the biggest paradoxes of the Army of Northern Virginia in my opinion. Lee and his subordinates had that army working very well and they were in a groove, especially after Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville. In every battle you might expect one or two of the high command to have an off day, but for basically the entire high command to just cease to function rationally at Gettysburg for 3 days is incredible to me. You can even go back farther and say it goes back Jeb Stuart being ambushed at Brandy Station in early June that just threw the Army of Northern Virginia off its rocker. It really is one of those strange instances of the war.
 

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