Why It Makes Sense... (2 Viewers)

Vanguard - that is interesting. Consider this, that the ANV was suffering from "lack o' Stonewall". Certainly Lee was without his most trusted and best Corps commander. Stonewalls loss forced Lee to reorganize into an unfamilier 3 Corps alignment with 2 untested commanders (at that level, anyway) who were not as good or trusted as Stonewall or Longstreet. For whatever reason the ANV command system and personel just were not as efficient as in the past, at this particular foray. Simply, Ewell and Hill were not Stonewall and Lee knew this but failed to compensate enough for the difference. -- lancer
 
Reb youre right in how these favorites lists tend to be biased toward what weve read and studied. That cant be argued at all I dont think. But sometimes they spark interesting conversation.
 
Reb, I am also in agreement on point of you being made up of what we have read or seen and to me this is what makes it interesting as well as educational. I forgot all about Wheeler until you mentioned him and that made me do a little reading today.

Lancer and Vanguard, as far as Gettysburg, well that could also prompt a good discussion on whether it was poor command strucutre and execution on the part of the ANV or did they just get out led and out fought for a change. Now this whole thought made me dig out my Coddington's and get refreshed on the rest of Gettysburg outside of Culp's Hill.

As a last thought from the Northern perspective, here is a quote from a letter from a soldier to an Uncle in Maryland, "You asked if I was in the battle of Gettysburg. I was from the beginning to the last. It was decidely glorious to see the rebels leave without taking the time to thank us for our hospitality or bid us good day." Sgt. Robert Bower, Co. H, 7th OVI, Sgt. Bower was discharged on disability in spring of 1864 and died at his home in April 1864 of service realted ailments.

Also, I always felt that Antietam was the ANV officer corps at it's best. They always seemed to be at the right place, at the right time with the right answer in that one.

Anyway, I am new to this forum and really enjoy the interaction. Back to the Culp's Hill diorama and making a backgound.

Thx
 
VanguardFC007 said:
Gettysburg is quite frankly one of the biggest paradoxes of the Army of Northern Virginia in my opinion. Lee and his subordinates had that army working very well and they were in a groove, especially after Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville. In every battle you might expect one or two of the high command to have an off day, but for basically the entire high command to just cease to function rationally at Gettysburg for 3 days is incredible to me. You can even go back farther and say it goes back Jeb Stuart being ambushed at Brandy Station in early June that just threw the Army of Northern Virginia off its rocker. It really is one of those strange instances of the war.
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This particular battle has been micro studied/analysed/researched and reflected upon by historians and military academics more than any other battle in history with perhaps the exception of Waterloo. It has also been refought multi-million times on war-gamers boards across the world but none of them have really narrowed it down to one particular reason for the Confederate failure during those three bloody days in the Pennsylvania sun-shine.

I too along with many other arm-chair generals have also studied/researched/walked the hallowed ground in an attempt to piece together of what went wrong. We have at our disposal many accounts from those who were actually there with their own particular version of events, but invariably they differ from each other's telling of the story. Lee died before he wrote his autobiography but I have no doubt that he too would have written just as confusing interpretations of events as most of his generals wrote after the war.

But we do have one unique moment when he bared his soul following the disaster of Pickett's charge-this happened in the early hours of July 4th when an exhausted Lee sat down with cavalry commander John Imboden and after extolling Pickett's troops as magnificent added......"And if they had been supported as they were to have been-but for some reason, not yet fully explained to me, were not-we would have held the position and the day would have been ours".
In many respects Lee's analysis immediately following the fighting on the third day and why it failed aptly describes the entire battle. My study of those three days have unearthed many tangible and direct reasons-in fact a whole catalogue of them-that I believe explain Lee's ultimate failure at Gettysburg. And when put together and transcribed onto the battlefield, one after another after another, any invading army commander would have to have been at the top of his game to successfully counteract those events to achieve an overall victory.

They are in no particular order of importance just merely chronological:

1. Buford's excellent evaluation of the high ground and the following sacrifice by the Federal I Corps in their valiant attempt to hold their lines on July 1st.

2. The failure of Ewell to timely inform General Lee on July 1 that Culp's Hill was vunerable and subject to capture.

3. The absence of JEB Stuart

4. Ewell's subsequent failure to pursue with his Second Corps later on July 1.

5. Powell Hill's complete mishandling of Third Corps

6. The failure of Second Corps senior officers to co-ordinate their commands into action on July 2.

7. The loss of John Bell Hood early in the fighting on July 2.

8. The breakdown of the July 2 echelon attack and the wounding of Dorsey Pender.

9. The collective decision by Meade and his corps commanders to stay and fight on July 3.

10. Lee's failure to assume direct tactical command on July 3.

11. Meade's localised counterattack at Culp's Hill early on July 3.

12. The magnificent performance of Winfield Hancock throughout the battle but especially on the third day.

13. Longstreet's disobedience on July 3.

14. The ANV high command completely under-estimating the resolve of the ordinary Union soldier when fighting to defend his home-turf.

I'm sure that you three can come up with some more-Lancer's comment of lack-of Jack-although I may agree with his supposition to include Jackson in the list would be a direct what if? I have concentrated a list of what was! Far better military academics than this Reb could write whole dissertations on any of the above-but in my opinion-which doesn't amount to a hill of beans-the above list of events during those three days stacked the cards against Lee let alone his apparent attacks of angina robbing him of his usual indefatigable stamina and military craftiness.

Reb
 
As to there being no Jackson at Gettysburg, it is the big what if of the campaign. Had the 2 corp organization and Jackson still been in existence, then, the battle unfolds far differently. But this is useless to discuss beyond the fun factor. Lee had lost his "right arm" and I do not believe he had recovered from it. The litany of events (disasters) that Lee was faced with was just too much to deal with in light of the Jackson loss and the army reorganization. A healthy Lee at the top of his game might have coped but that is another what if. This is a great line of discussion. -- lancer
 
UKReb said:
...

But we do have one unique moment when he bared his soul following the disaster of Pickett's charge-this happened in the early hours of July 4th when an exhausted Lee sat down with cavalry commander John Imboden and after extolling Pickett's troops as magnificent added......"And if they had been supported as they were to have been-but for some reason, not yet fully explained to me, were not-we would have held the position and the day would have been ours".
In many respects Lee's analysis immediately following the fighting on the third day and why it failed aptly describes the entire battle. My study of those three days have unearthed many tangible and direct reasons-in fact a whole catalogue of them-that I believe explain Lee's ultimate failure at Gettysburg. And when put together and transcribed onto the battlefield, one after another after another, any invading army commander would have to have been at the top of his game to successfully counteract those events to achieve an overall victory.

They are in no particular order of importance just merely chronological:

1. Buford's excellent evaluation of the high ground and the following sacrifice by the Federal I Corps in their valiant attempt to hold their lines on July 1st.

2. The failure of Ewell to timely inform General Lee on July 1 that Culp's Hill was venerable and subject to capture.

3. The absence of JEB Stuart

4. Ewell's subsequent failure to pursue with his Second Corps later on July 1.

5. Powell Hill's complete mishandling of Third Corps

6. The failure of Second Corps senior officers to co-ordinate their commands into action on July 2.

7. The loss of John Bell Hood early in the fighting on July 2.

8. The breakdown of the July 2 echelon attack and the wounding of Dorsey Pender.

9. The collective decision by Meade and his corps commanders to stay and fight on July 3.

10. Lee's failure to assume direct tactical command on July 3.

11. Meade's localized counterattack at Culp's Hill early on July 3.

12. The magnificent performance of Winfield Hancock throughout the battle but especially on the third day.

13. Longstreet's disobedience on July 3.

14. The ANV high command completely under-estimating the resolve of the ordinary Union soldier when fighting to defend his home-turf.

I'm sure that you three can come up with some more-Lancer's comment of lack-of Jack-although I may agree with his supposition to include Jackson in the list would be a direct what if? I have concentrated a list of what was! Far better military academics than this Reb could write whole dissertations on any of the above-but in my opinion-which doesn't amount to a hill of beans-the above list of events during those three days stacked the cards against Lee let alone his apparent attacks of angina robbing him of his usual indefatigable stamina and military craftiness.

Reb
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You all are the experts, certainly relative to me but what about
-Pendleton's incompetence
-The missing 11,000 veteran ANV soldiers withheld by Davis
 
Spitfrnd said:
You all are the experts, certainly relative to me but what about
-Pendleton's incompetence
-The missing 11,000 veteran ANV soldiers withheld by Davis
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Yeah! a few historians have added both of the above to their lists of events that caused the Confederate defeat. I'm not sure I agree with either being main constituents.

Everyone knew Pendleton was not a military man and would never grow into the role, unlike his son Sandie who was an effective staff officer for Jackson and following his death Ewell.
Old man Pendleton was an Episcoplean preacher and firmly believed God would bring victory for the South. Lee had already reduced his role in the Confederate artillery heirarchy before the campaign-he wasn't so much incompetent rather more a civilian in uniform awaiting divine intervention. He could be condemned by not ensuring that the resupply ordnance wagons were available for the Confederate barrage on July 3-instead of being all the way back in Virginia. But just consider the effect of that said barrage before Pickett's advance-would ample Reb ammunition have really made that much difference. Porter Alexander had no idea that his guns were overshooting the Federal front line and the skill/know-how of a creeping barrage in front of advancing infantry was still 50 years away.

Obviously Pickett's two brigades left behind to protect Richmond would have made a difference but Lee weighed this up before commencing his campaign and went ahead without these men. But put yourself in Davis's position his ANV would be miles into enemy territory-hopefully advancing without being seen-leaving the capital exposed to attack by the Army of the Potomac who on June 4th were encamped North of the Rappahannock looking across at Fredericksburg-if they had advanced across the river they would have been in striking distance of Richmond with not many Reb soldiers to stop them.
Lincoln had committed this same so called "sin" many times on his several commanders when they began their campaigns in the South-preservation of Washington was as important to Abe as Richmond was to Jeff.

Reb
 
To add on to Alexander not knowing how his shots were faring for those who may not know. Prior to Gettysburg the Richmond Laboratory had a fire and lost the ability to produce ammunition for a time. This time being Gettysburg. Artillery ammunition was subsequently brought in from South Carolina. So whats the big deal? Well there wasnt much in the way of uniformity as far as ammunition production was concerned in the South. ANV artillerymen were used to fuses from Richmond and not the slower burning fuses from South Carolina. Because the artillerymen didnt know this, they over shot the target. It wasnt until mid-July that (I think) Gorgas was able to test the Charleston ammunition and discover that flaw. To late for Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.
 
Vanguard, the quality of the fuses on the Confederate side has been discussed before but has discounted. This was based on the performance of the Confederate batteries on July 1st and 2nd. They did not seem to have any issues in hitting their targets. Field artillery was not an exact science and always required adjustments based on visual confirmation of shell impact which most experienced crews could accomplish. This was also my experince when live firing 18th and 19th century field guns.

Reb, what "Meade ordered localized counter attack on Culps Hill on July 3rd" are you referring to?

Let me know.

Thx
 
7th OVI said:
Reb, what "Meade ordered localized counter attack on Culps Hill on July 3rd" are you referring to?

Let me know.

Thx
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"Allegheny" Johnson's Division advanced late in the day of the 2nd July up Culp's Hill to probe the Federal right flank, they made good progress as the Union XII Corps which had been manning Culp's Hill had pulled out to help repulse Longstreet's attack on the opposite end of the line. This enabled Johnson's men to occupy the abandoned trenches on the lower parts of the hill. They were now in a position to threaten the Baltimore Pike.

Meade's decision for a pre-dawn attack to dislodge Johnson's troops ruined the Confederate plan of using Ewell's men to draw off Federal troops from the center of Cemetery Ridge during Pickett's main assault. Meade's initiative began at 0430 hrs with a 12 gun artillery barrage and by 1100hrs Johnson's troops were forced to withdraw to the marshy low ground just west of Rock Creek. Consequently, they were then unable to gain the initiative to support the grand advance. This without doubt was one of the key events which together with the others mentioned caused the ultimate Confederate failure at Gettysburg.

Reb
 
I totally agree with Reb's point !

Had the Confederates been able to hold Culp's Hill and reinforce it - it might have caused Meade to retreat from his position in the middle not to be out flanked on his right. This would have also caused a great disruption in the Union Position and the strategy of the battle could have changed.

Confusion and fear would have benefited the Confederates.
 
Wow, we've come a long way from, "Why do some people call it the 'War Between the States', some 'the Civil War' and others the 'War of Northern Aggression'?" :)

Prost!
Brad
 
theBaron said:
Wow, we've come a long way from, "Why do some people call it the 'War Between the States', some 'the Civil War' and others the 'War of Northern Aggression'?" :)

Prost!
Brad
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Are you talking to me - you Blue Belly Yankee ?? ;)

LOL :)
 
Are you NORTH of HERE ?? :
 

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7th OVI said:
Vanguard, the quality of the fuses on the Confederate side has been discussed before but has discounted. This was based on the performance of the Confederate batteries on July 1st and 2nd. They did not seem to have any issues in hitting their targets. Field artillery was not an exact science and always required adjustments based on visual confirmation of shell impact which most experienced crews could accomplish. This was also my experince when live firing 18th and 19th century field guns.
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Did they mix the different ammunition in together into the caissons? If thats the case then sure I agree that it makes no difference. But I would think they would finish their current supplies before breaking out the new Charleston batch. That would explain decent firing on the 1st and 2nd but not the 3rd. I agree that WBTS field artillery was by no means an exact science but Alexander was a competent artilleryman and surely knew how to compensate for smoke and other objects/terrain obscuring his view.
 
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