Worst intelligence blunders in history (2 Viewers)

[Mitch]

I think Hitler must be covered under this!!!!
In relation to the Enigma codes etc it may not be an intelligence failure as such and may be a supreme over confidence and arrogance that the code was too intelligent for the allies to crack.
Mitch

 

[Gideon]

It is painful to even think about but our pre-invasion of Iraq intelligence or at least it's interpretation was not outstanding. Before somebody starts looking for a rope, I believe we did the right thing for the wrong reasons.

"Interpretation was not outstanding" - we were told outright lies. This was one we were sold on. The intelligence on this was suspect from the beginning with a great many people pointing out the problems with what was being told to us.

I hate to bring this up, but if we did the right thing for the wrong reason in Iraq, we could do the right thing with several situations unfolding right now but we're not.

It's a terrible state of affairs right now.

 

[theBaron]

It's been mentioned already in a couple of places in this thread, but I'll emphasize it again, a common factor in almost all of these is a failure to interpret the information correctly. It's one thing not to capture the info, but it's another to look at the available data and not be able to think outside the box, for want of a better term. We say hindsight is 20-20, but it's usually because after the fact, the patterns are obvious, so the question is, "How could you not see this?" And I think that inability to see the patterns is something that lies with our psychology, and is supra-cultural, and that's why it happens again and again. It is interesting to look at these cases and see how that happens.

Prost!
Brad

 

[lancer]

It's been mentioned already in a couple of places in this thread, but I'll emphasize it again, a common factor in almost all of these is a failure to interpret the information correctly. It's one thing not to capture the info, but it's another to look at the available data and not be able to think outside the box, for want of a better term. We say hindsight is 20-20, but it's usually because after the fact, the patterns are obvious, so the question is, "How could you not see this?" And I think that inability to see the patterns is something that lies with our psychology, and is supra-cultural, and that's why it happens again and again. It is interesting to look at these cases and see how that happens.

Prost!
Brad

Good points, Brad. One sees what one wants to see. -- Al

 

[Rob]

Good points, Brad. One sees what one wants to see. -- Al

And how about a big mention for the guy who thought it a good idea to bring that lovely big Trojan Horse in through the gates!:wink2::salute::

Rob

 

[Rob]

cough,cough, cough, Charge of the Light Brigade, cough cough!

Rob

 

[lancer]

And how about a big mention for the guy who thought it a good idea to bring that lovely big Trojan Horse in through the gates!:wink2::salute::

Rob

LOL. I can just hear the guy yelling, " Hey everyone, toga party!". -- Al

 

[Mitch]

That must have stung!!
Mitch

cough,cough, cough, Charge of the Light Brigade, cough cough!

Rob

 

[Currahee Chris]

It's been mentioned already in a couple of places in this thread, but I'll emphasize it again, a common factor in almost all of these is a failure to interpret the information correctly. It's one thing not to capture the info, but it's another to look at the available data and not be able to think outside the box, for want of a better term. We say hindsight is 20-20, but it's usually because after the fact, the patterns are obvious, so the question is, "How could you not see this?" And I think that inability to see the patterns is something that lies with our psychology, and is supra-cultural, and that's why it happens again and again. It is interesting to look at these cases and see how that happens.

Prost!
Brad

This is a good post buddy. "Intelligence" has several sub branches- HUMINT- Deals with the cloak and dagger (at times) operational retrieval of information. SIGINT- Deals with the interpretation of signals and data. There are others as well and I won't belabor the point.

The intelligence chain goes through several different reviews and there are "screens" which intercept intel as actionable/ warning or not significant. As you mention the inflated RAF numbers by the Luftwaffe- not sure that was an intel failure per se but failure of the chain to report it. It can be very interesting to read how intel can be skewed based on the agendas of those who screen it.

At the end of the day, a decision has to be made by the top leaders- Hitler, Tojo, etc- to name a few. If they are being fed bad data assessments, then they are going to fail in their decision making process- barring some kind of megalomania bend. The nazis, with all their wonderful toys, were woefully ill equipped to deal with intel and that, imo, was one of the biggest reasons they failed. Look at any failed government and you will see a terrible intelligence arm.

Of course, the Germans were up against the greatest smokescreen leader the world has probably ever seen- Mr. Churchill himself. The guy was a mastermind in deception- it would be very scary if the Axis had anyone who was close to emulating him in creativity and sheer brass.

 

[Rob]

That must have stung!!
Mitch

^&grin

Mitch, on this here forum I have debated with my friends the merits and faults of both Haig and Monty, but if I were to start trying to defend the Command chain at the Charge, Louis would be not only be justified in having me certified insane and thrown into a padded cell, but it would be his moral duty as well!:wink2::salute::

Rob

 

[MCKENNA77]

Yeah have to admit that the whole weapons of mass destruction ordeal in Iraq is a pretty terrible blunder that has cost lives in both US service people and Iraqi citizens. To me, war should be looked at as a total and complete last resort versus a gung-ho approach.

I also think that the intelligence on North Vietnam's intentions during that conflict was way off the mark.

Not sure the above are the worst in history but would think most believe that theyre pretty bad.

Keep it silly

 

[Mitch]

Just jesting as with our military heritage its not easy to admit we could do such stuff
Mitch

^&grin

Mitch, on this here forum I have debated with my friends the merits and faults of both Haig and Monty, but if I were to start trying to defend the Command chain at the Charge, Louis would be not only be justified in having me certified insane and thrown into a padded cell, but it would be his moral duty as well!:wink2::salute::

Rob

 

[binder001]

There's "intelligence assessment" and "wishful thinking" and the line between the two gets blurry when human beings are involved. Hitler was guilty of wishful thinking when he declared war on the US right after Pearl Harbor. He assumed that the USA was soft and wouldn't want to fight. The Germans had to have a certain amount of wishful thinking involved to not realize that their entire spy network in Britain had been compromised and had been turned against them. There was a lot of wishful thinking in Imperial Japan. They wargamed Midway before the operation, the admiral that was acting as "USN commander" placed his carriers similar to how Nimitz actually did it. The game had the Japanese ambushed and losing four carriers. The game's umpires quickly conferred and "refloated" two of the destroyed ships. Funny enough, a couple weeks later at the real battle the carriers stayed sunk! Wishful thinking might also cover the President's advisors convincing him that the Iraqi people were ready to change over to Western style democracy as soon as their dictator was removed. That and the lack of appreciation for the local politics was a far worse mistake than the actual invasion.

Gary B.

 

[trooper]

cough,cough, cough, Charge of the Light Brigade, cough cough!

Rob

Definitely an unmitigated disaster, Rob, but not strictly an intelligence blunder. More of a mistake by an elderly general who didn't realise that the troops in the valley couldn't see what he could see up on the heights. Trooper/I]

 

[breslau]

Failure of German Intelligence to know about the French Army mutinies in mid-1917 on the Western Front after the 2nd Battle of the Aisne. The Germans failed to take advantage of the collapse of French morale and exploit the opportunities for an offensive.

 

[lancer]

Failure of German Intelligence to know about the French Army mutinies in mid-1917 on the Western Front after the 2nd Battle of the Aisne. The Germans failed to take advantage of the collapse of French morale and exploit the opportunities for an offensive.

See post #4. Great minds...^&grin -- Al

 

[breslau]

See post #4. Great minds...^&grin -- Al

Forgive me for not noticing your original post and I also think your other 3 remarks spot on as well. Great minds indeed!

 

[theBaron]

Of course, the Germans were up against the greatest smokescreen leader the world has probably ever seen- Mr. Churchill himself. The guy was a mastermind in deception- it would be very scary if the Axis had anyone who was close to emulating him in creativity and sheer brass.

That reminds me of the story of the phony invasion plans that were planted on the body of a deceased British officer; I remember reading a book about it called, "The Man Who Never Was". I'll have to look that one up again, but I think it was fake plans for an invasion of Southern France, to help confuse the Germans about the eventual invasion of Normandy.

 

[lancer]

Forgive me for not noticing your original post and I also think your other 3 remarks spot on as well. Great minds indeed!

Breslau, no forgiving needed. I was just glad to see someone else thinking WW1 France with me.^&cool:salute:: -- Al

 

[Mitch]

Was also done into a rather good movie of the same title
Mitch

That reminds me of the story of the phony invasion plans that were planted on the body of a deceased British officer; I remember reading a book about it called, "The Man Who Never Was". I'll have to look that one up again, but I think it was fake plans for an invasion of Southern France, to help confuse the Germans about the eventual invasion of Normandy.