Glad you like them, I have a few hundred more ........
Shortly after the destruction of the Best Bridge, a 2/HCR scout
and armoured car appeared on the opposite bank. After bumping into the German position they withdrew a little and machine gunned the Germans, who withdrew.
Lt Wierzbowski stayed put
but faced the problem that the forest had many potentially aggressive groups of Germans.
The German forces around Best were some of Major General Walter Poppe’s 59th Infantry Division of the 15th Army. Taylor sent reinforcements, but the battle ceased when the night fell.
Also on the evening of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] Colonel Michaelis noted the developing threat to H Company in the Best area so he sent the remaining 2 companies of 3/502 to reinforce Captain Jones. They approached to within a mile of Best but both companies and Battalion HQ were forced to halt and dig in due to heavy artillery and mortar fire. HQ thought that 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] platoon was lost.
the paras were forced to halt and dig in
Sergeant Joe Ludwig reported, ‘During the night, we were getting the hell shot out of us’.
Four Wehrmacht units were also directed to the battle, these included a ‘battalion’ (of only 150 infantry) commanded by Major Klauck. He was taken off the road at Boxtel and sent to Best.
He later stated, ‘I was assured that these were the personal orders of General der Fallschirmtruppen Student and I had to obey. In the dark we took up positions outside of Best with difficulty. The night was not quiet. There was quite a bit of shooting, as artillery arrived and registered on the enemy.’
Two infantry gunners fix a tyre to get their gun into action
During the night of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] and early hours of the 18[SUP]th[/SUP], 2/502 PIR were acting as the Division reserve so were expecting to support 506 PIR in Eindhoven. Instead they were sent to support Lt Col Cole’s hard pressed 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion at Best. Lt Col Chappuis commanded the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion and was ordered to attack on 3/502 PIR’s northern right flank then swing south along the road to the bridge.
Cole would arrange fire support from machine guns and medium mortars, moving ammo by farm carts.
Against this, the Germans had 88’s, 105mm artillery and plenty of machine guns.
As 2/502 PIR were approaching, the battle intensified for 3/502 around dawn. The regimental report noted, ‘Action began at about 0520 on 18[SUP]th[/SUP] September, when the enemy opened fire with automatic weapons on the battalions’ positions on the front and left flank. It became heavier throughout the day, with artillery and mortar fire supporting and augmenting the fire of small arms and 20mm gunfire...... In the morning the enemy made two determined attacks supported by heavy artillery and mortar concentrations. These were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. However, during the morning, many casualties were caused by infiltrating and heavy concentrations of fire poured into the pine growths in which the battalion had taken up positions’.
The paratroopers of 3/502 PIR attempted to block the main road but were, ‘overrun by numerically superior enemy, causing them to withdraw to the SE’. Around 10.00 hours on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP], 2/502 PIR arrived on the right flank, which relieved some of the pressure for 3/PIR.
paratroopers advance cautiously along the road
contact!
numerically superior forces forced withdrawal to the SE
The newcomers advanced with three companies deployed in line. The ground they advanced in was flat and open. There were only a few farm buildings and clumps of trees.
The divisional history describes: ‘The Dutch had been haying and the fields ahead were full of piles of uncollected hay. That was the only concealment. From left to right the line rippled forward in perfect order and with perfect discipline, each group dashing to the next pile as their turn came. It was as if the piles were concrete. But machine gun fire cut into them, sometimes setting the hay afire, sometimes wounding or killing the men behind them. That did not stop anyone but the dead and the wounded.’
It was a remarkable feat of fire and manoeuvre, but the battalion was taking such heavy losses that Chappuis halted the advance and pulled them back, taking the wounded with them where possible. They then reorganized in line with 3/592 PIR.
taking cover where possible
Those wounded that were evacuated receive medical treatment behind the lines
The German Major Klauck viewed it as a counter attack. ‘The enemy advanced across the fields towards the road and we fired at them repeatedly. They came close and I had to send out Feldwebel Dorn to keep (our men) in position. The Americans stopped and withdrew. As we were still close, we could do little for the enemy wounded in front of us.’
About this time, mist had cleared over airfields in the west so air support from P47 Thunderbolts arrived.
A USAAF fighter airfield, no P47s visible
Unfortunately, they initially strafed 3/502 in situ on the edge of the wood. The paratroopers loosed off identifying smoke grenades and displayed orange air identification panels so the air attack was called off. Lt Col Cole stood up, hoping to get a better view of the situation, when he was hit in the head, reportedly from shot from an enemy house nearby. He was killed instantly, which shook his men as he was a highly regarded officer. Shortly afterwards, machine gunners killed a German running from the house.
Lt Col Cole
A German was seen running from a nearby house
To return to the regimental report: ‘.... aircraft strafed and bombed the enemy at very close quarters as the enemy had advanced to within 100 yards of our battalion lines. This support, which was the first that the battalion had received, resulted in the enemy attack being repulsed with heavy losses in troops and equipment.’
Around 1450 hours a large scale glider landing was made, wave after wave carrying the Division’s support elements, in fields just out of sight of the front line, but a view enjoyed in full by 2/502 PIR’s command post. The Germans made no more attacks. Klauck reported later that moral was hit to some extent, as they felt they could not win the battle when they saw the huge wave of gliders come in. The two sides were still close in the woods though and low level actions were still fought by patrols.
At 17.00 hours Colonel Michaelis ordered 2/502 to attack the bridge again – he was unaware of its destruction at 11.00 hours. Chappuis advanced around 1000 yards, clearing some enemy who had been harassing 3/502 for most of the day. They were stopped short by 88mm guns firing from the opposite bank.
.... not again
Both sides were exhausted so halted for the night.
A German soldier takes advantage of the cessation of fire to collect some hot food for his mates
The two other bridges that the 506th Regiment were originally to secure, had been blown up several days earlier, before the Market-Garden assault. As discussed earlier, Eindhoven, which according to the plan had to be taken by the 506[SUP]th[/SUP] on the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] day, the 17[SUP]th[/SUP], was not reached until the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] because of the delays due to the blown Son Bridge.
As the battle for Best developed on the evening of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP], XXX Corps had only covered 7 miles (11 km) due to the ambushes on the road by troops using close range Panzerfausts in close cover and by StuGs, AT guns and 88’s in the more open areas.
Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours, but by last light of the first day, XXX Corps’ spear point, the Irish Guards, had only reached the town of Valkenswaard (see posts around #1330).
In the south, the main XXX Corps force was held up by German resistance in Aalst on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP],(see from around post #1344). Therefore, the XXX Corps operation was already starting to fall behind schedule,
On the road to Eindhoven
but in Valkenswaard, engineers were moved up to construct a 190 foot (58 m) Class 40 Bailey Bridge over a stream, which was completed within the relatively short time of 12 hours.
I have already described how the 506th Regiment was dropped on Zone 'C' on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] and marched on towards Eindhoven on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP], overcoming infantry supported by 88-mm artillery guns on the outskirts of Eindhoven. The Americans approached the city from different sides and the guns were put out of action. The bridges across the Dommel were taken without any major fight and the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] set up road blocks. The 327th Glider Regiment reinforcements landed on Zone 'W' on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] and supplies were dropped by American Liberators, but only half were recovered.
101st in Eindhoven
Around noon of the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] some armoured cars of the Household Cavalry entered Eindhoven and the first contact between the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Market) and the British XXX Corps (Garden) was made. These cars had approached Eindhoven from the west. (See posts around #1350 for the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] attack on Eindhoven and subsequent 107[SUP]th[/SUP] Panzer Brigade counter attacks).
'Stable boys' link up with 'Feathered Friends'
British infantry deploy
Engineers built the Bailey bridge at Son starting on the evening of the 18th, which was ready at 0600 hours on the 19[SUP]th[/SUP] allowing the Guards to advance up Hell’s Highway.
The Best battle had sucked in enemy reinforcements from all over the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] Divisional area and had therefore indirectly assisted the capture of Eindhoven and Son.
Although 502 PIR did not realise it yet, by closing the Boxtel – Eindhoven road and forcing the destruction of Best Bridge, they specifically prevented reinforcement of Eindhoven at a crucial time.
If the town had been reinforced in any strength, the Guards may not have taken it for some time.
As the Guards discovered, (see earlier posts around #1341 ), bypassing it would have been impossible as they could not find any side routes with bridges that could support armour over the many small waterways.
halted at a collapsed bridge
So, by the last light on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] September, the main body of the Guards Armoured Division had closed up to the Wilhelmina Canal and other 101[SUP]st[/SUP] objectives were secure. As a result, General Taylor could plan to reinforce 2/502 at Best with more paratroopers and British tanks.
The Best battle had escalated by Tuesday 19[SUP]th[/SUP] September to the point where Taylor ordered Brigadier General Higgins to take control. His orders were, ‘to clear up once and for all the Best situation’. Reinforcement came with him, glider troops from 2/327 and 3/327 GIR ....
..... and armour, Cromwell tanks of B and C Squadrons 15/19 Hussars, closely followed by a battery of SP Artillery from 86[SUP]th[/SUP] (Hertfordshire Yeomanry) Field Regiment RA.
On crossing the Son Bridge at 11.00 on the 19[SUP]th[/SUP], the British had come under General Taylor’s command.
Meanwhile, 2/502 PIR resumed their attack on the bridge.
The Germans were dug in on the East side of the highway and F company 2/502 was about 150 yards east and parallel to the highway running north from the canal to Best.
It was still dark and they were waiting for the order to attack, when Germans came out of a building on the west side, causing them to open fire along the line.
PFC Parmley of F Company reported that he had already fired three clips when the order was finally given to attack.
The Son Bridge had already been blown on the 17[SUP]th[/SUP] and with this strong resistance at Best, followed by the destruction of the bridge on the morning of the 18[SUP]th[/SUP], instead of two bridges Taylor was left with no bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal.
XXX Corps was already delayed a day from Arnhem.
Thank you Matt. I have a lot more like those to show, I hope you enjoy.
Meanwhile.......
As 2/502 PIR advanced they came under heavy fire from the bridge area and the south side of the canal.
They took what little cover they could, then, noticed that the bridge had been blown. There was a pause while they waited to receive new orders (which were to pull back to their original positions).
However, a surprise (company strength) German counter attack came through the area they had just vacated and caught G Company 3/502 in the flank. Close quarter fighting followed, but G Co held their positions until 2/502 returned and drove the Germans off.
2/502 reoccupied their positions and successfully defended them twice more.
There were some confused actions in this battle on the 19th, for example, Lt Col Allen of 3/327 GIR had moved out his men and was looking for the 502 PIR CP when he met around 200 Germans marching south to Best. He escaped to his Battalion Column to deploy it in position to destroy the enemy.
Some of the Germans were recently back from the Eastern front and have captured weapons.
3/327 GIR try to cut them off.
However, the Germans hurried as fast as they could, leading to three contacts with 3/327, all too late to stop the Germans, although around 75 stragglers were captured.
Higgins force was eventually assembled. The 2/327 GIR was to clear the forest, westward to 502 PIR’s positions, thus destroying them between the two.
2/327 GIR start to clear the forest.
The Germans resist.
In the centre, 502 PIR, with B Sqdn 15/19 Hussars in support, would attack the bridge.
On the northern flank, 3/327 GIR would expand LZ W for a landing at 15.00 hrs and prevent Germans in Best attacking 502 PIR in the rear.
C Sqdn 15/19 Hussars were to support them: they noted, ‘co-operation with the Americans was not easy, there had been little time to get together beforehand and naturally each of us found the methods of the other not easily intelligible. But this strangeness wore off during the next two days.’
PFC Richard Ladd with HQ 502 PIR reported, ‘Around noon we became conscious of a sound of armour approaching from the DZ. Enemy fire abruptly slackened. A lone British major (OC B Squadron) with a scarlet cloth cap on his head and a white lanyard running to his sidearm, strode into the woods and enquired loudly as to the location of the regimental CO. Someone shouted, ‘he’s in that hole’. The strange officer appeared to be seven feet tall from my humble vantage point. A brief conference with Colonel Michaelis was followed by a throaty roar as six Cromwells and one Challenger tank advanced along the road parallel to the wood line.’
Major Klauck also heard them. ‘Officers had been sent forward to repair morale and to lead attacks on the Americans....
the sound of panzers coming from the east was a blow we could not recover from, as we all knew that they must be yours and that it was all over for us. Soldiers were looking to their rear and we had radio reports from forward elements, telling us that the front was breaking and soldiers were surrendering.’
As B Sqdn deployed between the forest and the road, the paratroopers began to move. PFC Parmley, in the front line with 2/502 PIR, ‘When the English Cromwells reached our lines, it seemed everyone leaped out of their holes as if ejected by some force at the same time.
We were all yelling and were going to charge, but the tank commander was a very calm person and said, “Let’s not be hasty lads, perhaps we can give Jerry something to think about”.
He fired the big gun. It looked like an airburst just in front of the building on the highway. There were a few white flags but not many.
He fired again. This brought results. The Germans on the left started surrendering ......
....... as the tank moved across our front to the right of the trees that ran down to the highway and fired again.... They started surrendering all up and down the line....’
Company F log recorded, ’14.30... Enemy starts surrendering in bunches, running across open fields to our position. Some were machine gunned by their own troops.’
Major Klauck, ‘ I left my command post to go forward and hold the men.
Across the road tanks were moving south towards the canal.
Then more tanks appeared at the corner of the wood and opened fire on my positions.
We replied with machine guns but platoons to the left and the right started to run or surrender as your tanks and infantry came close. I ran to stop them surrendering but it was too late and I was taken prisoner.’ Around 500 to 600 prisoners were taken by around half as many paratroopers.
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