OK back to the discussion for a bit here.
If we release a Wellington, perhaps you'll lift the "no generals" embargo!
Yes I will probably pick him up but no general is a priority for me.
Of course, no rule is hard and fast I don't think. But it was usually those armies that nailed themselves to a defensive position that fared best against the French. Doing so often eliminated the advantages the French had in maneuver. The advantage of the impulse system as Nosworthy calls it over the linear system was really only demonstrated in situations which required fluidity and reaction on the battlefield. If you nail yourself to your position, determined not to move from it, you minimize the situations which require fluidity to a developing tactical situation.
Perhaps but the impulse system also permitted movement of mixed forces to where and when they were most needed; which is a value even when your enemy is fixed.
Again, I don't disagree with the advantages the British had in this regard, I just don't think they were a major determining factor in victory or defeat. Perhaps they played a much larger role in the smaller engagements (the one in Italy was tiny was it not?), but in the large battles I disagree that methods of volley fire or musketry played much of a role in determining the overall outcome. Nosworthy's book was pretty revolutionary in this regard because he was looking at the micro-tactics such as this and using them (in part) to explain outcomes (if i remember correctly). I just don't agree with him in this regard.
So be it but I find I really do. Certainly I know they were very influential in the Peninsula and southern France battles and one can see similar effects at Waterloo. Of course any battle outcome is likely to have multiple causes and it is rather difficult to order the priority of their influence with such imperfect tools of reconstruction as we are left with for this period.
I am also not so such those advantages are micro tactics; they are more uniform tactical differences that just happen to be implemented at the battalion level since that was the most common unit of engagement.
By tactical parity I meant at a lower level than this (i.e a battalion = a battalion = a battalion no matter what nation it comes from). The departure from linear tactics was primarily grand tactical and organizational in nature, not specifically tactical. When one talks about linear tactics, there are really two levels to the discussion. ... It only matters when you see the aggregate effect, which is the ability of entire divisions to operate on their own axes of advance independently from other divisions and to remain flexible in their ability to react to developments at a grand tactical level. For "linear" armies, what is meant by this is really a grand tactical and organizational consideration. They were organized with divisions attached directly to the Army commander and they fought with one division directly adjacent to another division ALL with a single axes of advance or operation. The divisions in linear armies were relatively incapable of true independent action and what you see are entire wings of many divisions fighting as one body. The French departure of this was part and parcel of the corps system (i.e. each corps essentially it's own miniature army with infantry, cavalry, and artillery). Further, by using column more on the battlefield coupled with this organization structure, divisions now act completely independently from one another and can operate on different axes as independent bodies. This allows the French to react to developments on the battlefield much more efficiently than the much more rigid structures of the linear armies. Austerlitz is the best example I think.
OK, if you mean the French and Austrian soldiers fought essentially the same way, I think we all agree.
For the Napoleonic period, for the most part you really can't separate battles from the campaigns of which they are a part as the situation and maneuver leading up the to the battle play a huge role in the battle itself. The campaign alone isn't the complete story of course, but neither is the battle either. The Hundred Days is probably the best example of this - you can't really understand why Waterloo was fought the way it was without studying the entire campaign.
Never said otherwise but that does not mean that the campaign always dictates the outcome of the battles that result. As you observed, our difference here seems one of emphasis. I seem think the soldiers conduct in the battle is more influential on the outcome that you do.
And right back at you, I don't think I ever said Napoleon or leadership was the ONLY factor either. I just feel that the grand tactical, including leadership, has a bigger effect on the outcome than does the micro-tactical when looking at Napoleonic battles.
There is that difference again.
Ahh, so we've degenerated to NAME CALLING now! Moderator moderator Bill insulted Napoleon.
I thought I was just being descriptive.
Besides, compared to what he was called during his life time, my comment was barely worth noticing, even for one with his ego.
Actually, I agree 100% with Nosworthy's conclusions on the impulse system. Evolutions such as the impulse system and the organizational structure of the corps and the tactical evolution of using columns more frequently on the battlefield are part and parcel of the success of the French of the early empire of their adversaries. It has to be coupled with effective leadership of course as the impulse system was merely a tool that needed to be wielded like any other tool by someone with skill. So it is on this point that I agree with Nosworthy completely. It's the stuff about how one battalion fires or doesn't fire that, while I agree with factually what he's saying, I disagree that it plays much of a role in determining victory or defeat.
I am not sure you are remembering what he said completely and certainly I have only touched on it here. To be clear, it is not a question of how one battalion fires but rather how all battalions on each side tend to fire that is the issue. Nosworthy's points on this go to the difference in how the British and French tended to fire and what and when they charged and how they managed and expended their respective emotional inventories. These differences are noted and were experienced on an army wide basis.
I guess the best way I can explain my view on this would be as follows - Had the Austro-Russian Army at Austerlitz under the same command as it historically was using the same grand tactical linear system that it did but the firing methods, training, and doctrine at the battalion level of the British Army (or had all of the battalions actually BEEN British for the sake of argument), the result at Austerlitz wouldn't have changed. ..... So to me it matters not all what their firing practices were, when they volleyed and didn't, and who had a practice of firing high or too soon.
An interesting point. I have the impression the British did not follow the linear mold since I do no they did react well and did in fact move units rapidly on the battlefield to meet the need. So perhaps it is fair to say that those differences have a greater influence where the two opponents are using a similar, what you are calling, grand tactical approach.
In some cases, I think we are saying the same thing but assigning different labels. To me, when I say battles were decided at "higher levels" I'm talking about Grand Tactical considerations playing in a larger factor in victory or defeat than the the micro-tactical stuff such as firing methods. Further, it's not enough to have a superior grand tactical system, it must be put into use by superior leadership. Yes, at Austerlitz the French had the far better Grand tactical system but this in no way guaranteed them victory. Napoleon has the foresight to withdraw from the Pratzen heights in the face of a superior force essentially offering the better terrain to his opponents on a silver platter. ....just waiting for the Austro-Russian Army to commit to it's attack and expose it's center to the death blow. So yes, the French had the superior army in terms of grand tactical system of war and perhaps Napoleon's strategy is only possible because of this. But it was his individual decision making and grand tactical strategy alone which resulted in the victory. To me, these two elements in combination are far more important than anything micro-tactical.
As I have said, I think Napoleon does deserve great credit for much of the French success but I don't find him quite as indispensable as you do to any given battle. Not that there are not battles that he won that few, if any, of his marshals could have but rather than he was not the only reason the French won or lost most of their battles. Now about my Peninsula reinforcements.....