British Guards (1 Viewer)

[FirstLegion]

...realized the 3 line formation was relatively worthless since the third rank was just a likely to hit its own men as the enemy if it fired and not very enthusiastic about giving up its muskets to reload for the second line. It does not seem the French used 3 lines in the Peninsula very much at all but you are correct that when they did, they effectively wasted one-third of their potential firepower.

As far as I'm aware, the french only ever used 3 rank lines when formed in line formation. And they were often formed in line as columns were used to move on the battlefield, but the regiments usually deployed into line when engaging the enemy. So we seem to agree that the British 2 rank line was an advantage for sure.

However, I would only reiterate that this distinction pales in significance against the relative French disadvantages in poorly or incorrectly leveling their muskets and firing too soon...

Ahh, but you make my point for me. Not leveling ones muskets properly and, even more so, firing too soon, is a tell tale sign of inexperienced troops. Experienced troops tend not to make these mistakes.

....but if you are suggesting that the Peninsula British were always fighting with the starters against the second string, I simply don't see the evidence for that.

On the contrary, I think there is plenty of evidence...In times of simultaneous conflict on both the Penninsula and the continent, where was Napoleon? Where was Davout and his most celebrated III Corps? The III corps (and later the I Corps in 1812) was the absolute creme of the French Army in in terms of corps leadership, divisional leadership, and quality of the line regiments. Where was Lannes? Where was Ney? Where was the Guard? Where were the Carabiniers? Where was Murat? I think this is evidence enough that the 'A' team was elsewhere....

The French had excellent Marshals, but as they all came up under Napoleon and Napoleon believed firmly in the principle of centralized command, few of the Marshals had any experience with Army level command. So Marshals such as Massena who were brilliant corps level commanders, weren't nearly as competent with independent command. So Wellington vs. pretty much anyone but Napoleon was the British A team against the French B team as Napoleon (and possibly Davout and Eugene) were the only French leaders truly capable of effectively leading an independent army.

just so long as you give me some running French to complete my dioramas of the typical outcome of the British / French encounters.

Fair enough, running French it is. Of course, on my battlefields they'll be charging. If you choose to face them round the other way on yours, that is entirely your perogative! (and probably very appropriate if you're recreating Penninsula battles!!)

In closing, there is an excellent article on this topic on the Napoleon Series. It's pretty short, but I couldn't agree with it more. It essentially talks about the column vs. line in the penninsula and gives the two biggest reasons as to why the French failed in the penninsula as:

a) Wellington's reverse slope tactics (i.e. tactical leadership)
b) Poor French troop quality

It pretty much highlights how little Oman understood french battlefield tactics as the French didn't fight in column, they moved in column and deployed into line. Give it a read, it's pretty interesting though certainly not definitive...

A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War

Thought provoking conversation as always Bill!

Best,

Matt

 

[Spitfrnd]

As far as I'm aware, the French only ever used 3 rank lines when formed in line formation. And they were often formed in line as columns were used to move on the battlefield, but the regiments usually deployed into line when engaging the enemy. So we seem to agree that the British 2 rank line was an advantage for sure.

I'll see if I can find the examples of the French 2 rank line for you.

Ahh, but you make my point for me. Not leveling ones muskets properly and, even more so, firing too soon, is a tell tale sign of inexperienced troops. Experienced troops tend not to make these mistakes.

Actually I am afraid you missed my point. The leveling practice was French doctrine, which was based on theoretical firing solutions, not actual practice. Even the most experienced soldiers (British or French) included an inadvertent flinch that caused the barrel to rise before firing. The British doctrine compensated for this; the French did not. Also firing too soon was not a practice of inexperienced French troops but nearly ALL French troops. Here French doctrine did call for withholding fire until the range was good but few units followed this doctrine in the field and when coming under fire even from artillery and skirmishers, the advancing French inevitably fired early. They did the same in defense. This was not a Peninsula practice but a common practice that plagued them throughout. It was however not a problem for most of their battles since their other opponents did exactly the same. The British did not, which seems to have as much to do with the difference in the timing for the motivational highpoint provoked by the British versus most of the other armies of the period, including the French. This is a most interesting difference which can be demonstrated in part by how the officers of the two nations behaved in combat; the French wildly demonstrating in front and the British reservedly calming from the rear.

On the contrary, I think there is plenty of evidence...In times of simultaneous conflict on both the Peninsula and the continent, where was Napoleon? Where was Davout and his most celebrated III Corps? The III corps (and later the I Corps in 1812) was the absolute creme of the French Army in in terms of corps leadership, divisional leadership, and quality of the line regiments. Where was Lannes? Where was Ney? Where was the Guard? Where were the Carabiniers? Where was Murat? I think this is evidence enough that the 'A' team was elsewhere....

You have played the Napoleon card several times already but this just doesn't do it for me. Mostly the Guard was used in reserve and to break an enemy already on the verge of defeat. That scenario was rather rare in battles against the British and in the one example we have, the Guard mattered little. The Guard was of course drawn from the most experienced line troops, which included those fighting in the Peninsula, which in turn included soldiers having fought in the major continental battles. There were no Carabiniers but there were certainly very experienced Cuirassier, Lancer, Hussar, Dragoon and Chasseur au Cheval units representing battle honors from the major European battles other than Russia. Moreover, the way the British managed their engagements, the cavalry had little opportunity for the breakthroughs they enjoyed in other battles. Even Napoleon knew that cavalry was best deployed when an enemy was out of position or already broken. Unfortunately for him, Ney seemingly did not so I am not sure his absence was a French disadvantage. As for infantry, if you look at the battle honors of the French units committed to the Peninsula, you will find they were much more experienced on average than their British opponents.

The French had excellent Marshals, but as they all came up under Napoleon and Napoleon believed firmly in the principle of centralized command, few of the Marshals had any experience with Army level command. So Marshals such as Massena who were brilliant corps level commanders, weren't nearly as competent with independent command. So Wellington vs. pretty much anyone but Napoleon was the British A team against the French B team as Napoleon (and possibly Davout and Eugene) were the only French leaders truly capable of effectively leading an independent army.

Actually many Peninsula battles were Corps level conflicts as the British only had a few Divisions and the French only committed one or maybe two Corps to all but the later battles. Moreover, if you really examine the Peninsula battles you will find that, with the exception of Fuentes D'Onoro, there is not much Napoleon could have done differently to change the outcome.

Fair enough, running French it is. Of course, on my battlefields they'll be charging. If you choose to face them round the other way on yours, that is entirely your prerogative! (and probably very appropriate if you're recreating Peninsula battles!!)

Well at least we agree on that.

In closing, there is an excellent article on this topic on the Napoleon Series. It's pretty short, but I couldn't agree with it more. It essentially talks about the column vs. line in the peninsula and gives the two biggest reasons as to why the French failed in the peninsula as:

a) Wellington's reverse slope tactics (i.e. tactical leadership)
b) Poor French troop quality

It pretty much highlights how little Oman understood French battlefield tactics as the French didn't fight in column, they moved in column and deployed into line. Give it a read, it's pretty interesting though certainly not definitive...

A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War

Thought provoking conversation as always Bill!

Best,

Matt

Indeed it is and no one has all the answers but it is interesting to try and enhance one's understand by considering different ideas. Yes I have read that article, which as you note is interesting but all too short. I think you should read With Musket, Cannon And Sword: Battle Tactics Of Napoleon And His Enemies by Brent Nosworthy. He also debunks many of Oman's theories and is the source of many of my observations which he supports in persuasive detail.

 

[FirstLegion]

I'll see if I can find the examples of the French 2 rank line for you.

Here French doctrine did call for withholding fire until the range was good but few units followed this doctrine in the field and when coming under fire even from artillery and skirmishers, the advancing French inevitably fired early. They did the same in defense. This was not a Peninsula practice but a common practice that plagued them throughout. It was however not a problem for most of their battles since their other opponents did exactly the same.

You are obviously more thoroughly versed in the tactical doctrines of each combatant than I am so for the most part, I have to defer to your expertise on this. However, what I do know tells me that the more experienced the troops, the more likely they are to fire an effective volley.

The British did not, which seems to have as much to do with the difference in the timing for the motivational highpoint provoked by the British versus most of the other armies of the period, including the French. This is a most interesting difference which can be demonstrated in part by how the officers of the two nations behaved in combat; the French wildly demonstrating in front and the British reservedly calming from the rear.

No doubt you are correct on this point as well as the british were one of the only fully professional armies of the period and, as you've pointed out, were much more discliplined.

You have played the Napoleon card several times already but this just doesn't do it for me.

Well, it's called the "Napoleonic" period for a reason. I was merely emphasizing that if the French had their 'A' team in the penninsula, Napoleon himself would have been there. They didn't, they decidedly had their B roster in the Penninsula. I really think you should read more about the wars on the continent as you can't appreciate Napoleon as a general by studying the Penninsula.

Mostly the Guard was used in reserve and to break an enemy already on the verge of defeat. That scenario was rather rare in battles against the British and in the one example we have, the Guard mattered little.

Careful Bill! If you look at Waterloo, it's striking to see the difference the difference when the creme of the French Army faces an Anglo Allied army. Yes, the French were defeated, but only because the Prussians arrived. Without the Prussians, and very few if any historians argue this point, the French sweep the British and their allies away pretty handily. In fairness of course, much of the anglo allied army wasn't British. But the point is that the A class French Army at Waterloo vastly outclassed the Anglo Allied Army at Waterloo in all categories. And before you say that the outcome wasn't a sure thing without the Prussians, just remember that Napoleon had to commit 2 entire Corps of his army (nearly 35% of it) against the Prussians. Without the Prussian intervention, even with all of the French mishaps, Napoleon commits Lobaus corps and the young guard when La Haye Sainte falls and its all over. The final guard attack at Waterloo was only a small fraction of the imperial guard and really can't be used as a measuring stick of their effectiveness.

The Guard was of course drawn from the most experienced line troops, which included those fighting in the Peninsula, which included soldiers having fought in the major continental battles. There were no Carabiniers but there were certainly very experienced Cuirassier, Lancer, Hussar, Dragoon and Chasseur au Cheval units representing battle honors from the major European battles other than Russia.

I'm not saying that the penninsula consisted only of invalids! But after 1812, the French Army everywhere was very low quality, not just on the Penninula. However, the Penninsula was always a secondary theater and as such was always a lower priority in terms of troop deployment.

Even Napoleon knew that cavalry was best deployed when an enemy was out of position or already broken.

"Even" Napoleon?

Unfortunately for him, Ney seemingly did not so I am not sure his absence was a French disadvantage.

Oh, I agree with this! I only mentioned Ney because he was on Napoleon's A Team. He wouldn't have been on mine.

Actually many Peninsula battles were Corps level conflicts as the British only had a few Divisions and the French only committed one or maybe two Corps to all but the later battles. Moreover, if you really examine the Peninsula battles you will find that, with the exception of Fuentes D'Onoro, there is not much Napoleon could have done differently to change the outcome.

I think you're missing the point of what made Napoleon great as a general. Sure, if you setup the exact same situation, perhaps the outcomes would be the exact same each time. The point is that Napoleon wouldn't have put himself in many of those positions. If you look at the 100 days as an example, what made Napoleon great was not how he conducted Ligny or what not, it was that he put his army in the position so that Ligny could be fought. He out manuevered far superior enemy forces with an inferior force, maintained the central position, prevented the superior force from concentrating, and placed the bulk of his army against one force while a smaller part of his army held off a larger force. Sure, D'erlon spends the day marching back and forth when he could have been decisive either at Ligny or at Quatre Bras (thanks again Ney), but the operational conception and execution of the campaign was brilliant...right up until the 17th of June when for whatever reason he doesn't stick a sword in the back of the Prussians...... So you're making the assumption that Napoleon would have found himself in the same situations, which I think entirely misses the point of what made him one of histories greatest commanders. You're also discounting the intangibles of great leaders such as Napoleon which, among other things, is their sense of timing (just a knack for making the right move at the right time) and the morale effect of their physcial presence on their armies.

I think you should read With Musket, Cannon And Sword: Battle Tactics Of Napoleon And His Enemies by Brent Nosworthy. He also debunks many of Oman's theories and is the source of many of my observations which he supports in persuasive detail.

I have read it, though that was some years ago right when it was first released. I like his views on what he calls the "impulse" system of french warfare during the period vs those of the ancien regime. Perhaps i need to read it again. Many people I know however think his views are pretty wrong. I'm not one of them, so if you got your firing doctrine information from that book, I'm inclined to believe it.

In closing, as a concession to your love for the British on the penninsula, here is an image of a conversion one of our customers did converting the British to what appears to be Kings German Legion. I figured you more than anyone else would appreciate appreciate this! I particularly like how he changed the leg of the figure on the ladder.

Ok, our conversation has been so stimulating that it's keep me up too late!

Best,

Matt

 

[thebritfarmer]

That is one talented modeller/collector Matt WOW !!!!

 

[DCN1898]

Off the subject a little, but that is an awesome conversion!

 

[Fubar]

KGL diorama is FANTASTIC!

FUB

 

[Spitfrnd]

....In closing, as a concession to your love for the British on the penninsula, here is an image of a conversion one of our customers did converting the British to what appears to be Kings German Legion. I figured you more than anyone else would appreciate appreciate this! I particularly like how he changed the leg of the figure on the ladder.

Ok, our conversation has been so stimulating that it's keep me up too late!

Best, Matt

Wow, I nearly dropped my laptop when I saw that photo thinking you were leaking a new British light infantry (which could be KGL) and building release. It is indeed a fine conversion and a particularly fine scene. In the spirit of your sharing this, I will defer further observations for now except to say that yes Nosworthy is my source for the firing doctrine observations which he seems to have very well documented. And with that a good night.

 

[Fusilier]

Really like that dio as well. Whoever did up that little gem should be very proud of his work!

Noah

 

[Spitfrnd]

OK, the cease fire is abated so time to go back to work here.

You are obviously more thoroughly versed in the tactical doctrines of each combatant than I am so for the most part, I have to defer to your expertise on this. However, what I do know tells me that the more experienced the troops, the more likely they are to fire an effective volley.

Well there were studies from the period that show that experienced troops were better shots when they were in effective range but in battle after battle, the French simply could not resist firing too soon when they in turn came under fire. The Prussians, Austrians and Russians all obliged them with their "quick fire" oriented mindsets. But for the very effective Impulse system the French developed and Napoleon's admittedly impressive tactical and strategic brilliance, they would have lost quite a bit. Of course those are two very, very significant differences.

Well, it's called the "Napoleonic" period for a reason. I was merely emphasizing that if the French had their 'A' team in the peninsula, Napoleon himself would have been there. They didn't, they decidedly had their B roster in the Peninsula. I really think you should read more about the wars on the continent as you can't appreciate Napoleon as a general by studying the Peninsula.

I thought it was called that because he started all the wars of that period. Seriously though, I do appreciate him and acknowledge that he was the best general, in his prime, of the period. Where we seem to differ perhaps is our view of the relative importance in any battle of a "commanding general" versus the general characteristics and performance of the rank and file soldier. No doubt tactical brilliance can win battles that otherwise would be lost but when it is offset by nearly equal tactical brilliance on the other side, as in the case of Wellington for example, I really think it comes down more to how the common soldier was trained and controlled and it fact did act in combat. Alexander would not have been a world conquerer without the elite fighting forces he helped fashion and controlled, nor would Caesar etc, etc. That is why it grates on me every time you suggest that the Peninsula battles were largely decided because the French didn't field their A team. I humbly suggest that is just not correct or justified simply because they didn't have Napoleon. Perhaps we can agree they didn't have their A coach.

Careful Bill! If you look at Waterloo, it's striking to see the difference the difference when the creme of the French Army faces an Anglo Allied army. Yes, the French were defeated, but only because the Prussians arrived. Without the Prussians, and very few if any historians argue this point, the French sweep the British and their allies away pretty handily. In fairness of course, much of the anglo allied army wasn't British. But the point is that the A class French Army at Waterloo vastly outclassed the Anglo Allied Army at Waterloo in all categories. And before you say that the outcome wasn't a sure thing without the Prussians, just remember that Napoleon had to commit 2 entire Corps of his army (nearly 35% of it) against the Prussians. Without the Prussian intervention, even with all of the French mishaps, Napoleon commits Lobaus corps and the young guard when La Haye Sainte falls and its all over. The final guard attack at Waterloo was only a small fraction of the imperial guard and really can't be used as a measuring stick of their effectiveness.

Ah, well this could go on a while for sure but let me begin with the short version. For starters, as you aptly note, far too much of this "coalition army" was not British. And guess which units performed the worst? And then of course we have the less than worthless Prince D'Orange. Apart from that and the business as usual loss of control of end of the Union Brigade cavalry charge, that initially was devastatingly effective, the British versus French encounters all ended with typical British success. That very much includes the blooding of the much vaulted Guard, no matter how many of them were committed so yes I think it is a reasonable example of their effectiveness against British troops.

Moreover, as you note about Napoleon, one measure of a general's talent is knowing when and where to fight. There is little doubt that Wellington would not have fought at Waterloo with the army he had if he had not expected to be assisted eventually by the Prussians. I know you give Wellington more credit than that.

I'm not saying that the peninsula consisted only of invalids! But after 1812, the French Army everywhere was very low quality, not just on the Peninsula. However, the Peninsula was always a secondary theater and as such was always a lower priority in terms of troop deployment.

It is a question of degree. I think that you will find that at various times it was a priority and despite the admitted withdrawals to patch up the decimated Grand Armee in 1813, all the good troops were not withdrawn. Again, just review the battle records of the troops assigned there.

"Even" Napoleon?

Indeed.

Oh, I agree with this! I only mentioned Ney because he was on Napoleon's A Team. He wouldn't have been on mine.

Ah, again we agree.

I think you're missing the point of what made Napoleon great as a general. Sure, if you setup the exact same situation, perhaps the outcomes would be the exact same each time. The point is that Napoleon wouldn't have put himself in many of those positions. If you look at the 100 days as an example, what made Napoleon great was not how he conducted Ligny or what not, it was that he put his army in the position so that Ligny could be fought. He out maneuvered far superior enemy forces with an inferior force, maintained the central position, prevented the superior force from concentrating, and placed the bulk of his army against one force while a smaller part of his army held off a larger force. Sure, D'erlon spends the day marching back and forth when he could have been decisive either at Ligny or at Quatre Bras (thanks again Ney), but the operational conception and execution of the campaign was brilliant...right up until the 17th of June when for whatever reason he doesn't stick a sword in the back of the Prussians...... So you're making the assumption that Napoleon would have found himself in the same situations, which I think entirely misses the point of what made him one of histories greatest commanders. You're also discounting the intangibles of great leaders such as Napoleon which, among other things, is their sense of timing (just a knack for making the right move at the right time) and the morale effect of their physical presence on their armies.

Actually I do appreciate your point on this and if Napoleon had committed himself to the Peninsula it would have definitely been more of a "close run thing." Indeed the British might have lost many more battles but if you give Wellington some credit for these same qualities, they might have canceled each other out and then we are back to some of those intrinsic differences about how the two armies fought, which just happened to favor the British.

 

[FirstLegion]

Alas, I think we could back and forth on this for years and not come to an overall agreement. We seem to agree on some basic elements, however, overall we find ourselves disagreeing on a few major points. We'll just have to agree to disagree about them.

One thing is for sure, we both have a basic flaw in our argument that at the same time somehow holds up as true - hence why the topic makes for such an interesting debate. I, for my part, make many assumptions based on what would have happened in situation X or Y, when the only example of what did happen shows otherwise. To me, my arguments are valid because of extenuating factors which make the actual historical result unique and not the norm. You, for your part, seem to be claiming a british military dominance in a period that was completely and utterly dominated militarily by France. Even the other continental powers dominated the period (on the battlefield) to a far greater level than Britain did. To you, your argument is valid because of the results primarily on the Penninsula and because of the results of battles with British troops involved. To me, however, that is looking too much through a microscope at merely those events and discounts all of the extenuating circumstances which made such events possible.

I will say this as a parting shot - Napoleon did commit the 'A' team to the Penninsula in 1808 and drove the British right off the continent. Had Napoleon committed the 'A' team again at any other point during the Penninsula war, it wouldn't have been a "close run thing" by any stretch. The British would have turned tail and ran again as they just didn't have the forces to stand up to France in major land campaigns - hence why they never engaged in the main theater of operations on the continent. So to even make the suggestion that Britain could have won the Penninsula war against a fully committed France is wholly flawed in my opinion. The Penninsula war, though often viewed as it's own war, was in fact just a small theater in a much larger ongoing conflict and one shouldn't forget that when studying it. To me, this is like saying the Germans lost in the desert because the British/Americans were better troops. How do we know they were better troops? Well, because they won the battles and campaign. In my view this line of thinking is flawed - the Germans lost because they were busy fighting much bigger and more decisive wars elsewhere and the defeat in the desert cannot be separated in anyway from events on battlefields in Russia. If there is no war in Russia, the Germans would certainly have driven the British completely from Africa. I see the war in the Penninsula as shadowing this to a very large extent.

Best,

Matt

 

[Spitfrnd]

Alas, I think we could back and forth on this for years and not come to an overall agreement. We seem to agree on some basic elements, however, overall we find ourselves disagreeing on a few major points. We'll just have to agree to disagree about them.

Well we may be closer that you think but I think the difference has more to do with the point of the observations as noted below.

One thing is for sure, we both have a basic flaw in our argument that at the same time somehow holds up as true - hence why the topic makes for such an interesting debate. I, for my part, make many assumptions based on what would have happened in situation X or Y, when the only example of what did happen shows otherwise. To me, my arguments are valid because of extenuating factors which make the actual historical result unique and not the norm. You, for your part, seem to be claiming a british military dominance in a period that was completely and utterly dominated militarily by France. Even the other continental powers dominated the period (on the battlefield) to a far greater level than Britain did. To you, your argument is valid because of the results primarily on the Penninsula and because of the results of battles with British troops involved. To me, however, that is looking too much through a microscope at merely those events and discounts all of the extenuating circumstances which made such events possible.

Actually I never said the French could not have won in the Peninsula if they had totally committed themselves to it in the way they did the rest of Europe. What I did say was that the technique and practices of the British soldier were superior in certain important respects to those of the French. For this conclusion, it is more than appropriate to use micro examples and for this purpose they are quite valid. Frankly, as I think we can both agree, the reason France was dominent militarily relative to Britain ON LAND for the period is because they had a superior population and commitment to their army. The commitment is most important since for the same reason, the British were dominant on the seas. The same is true to a lesser extent for the other continental powers except that obviously France had the benefit of Napoleon and its dramatic departure from linear tactics. I think you are trying to extrapolate too much from my observations and believe my points are much broader than intended.

I will say this as a parting shot - Napoleon did commit the 'A' team to the Penninsula in 1808 and drove the British right off the continent. Had Napoleon committed the 'A' team again at any other point during the Penninsula war, it wouldn't have been a "close run thing" by any stretch. The British would have turned tail and ran again as they just didn't have the forces to stand up to France in major land campaigns - hence why they never engaged in the main theater of operations on the continent. So to even make the suggestion that Britain could have won the Penninsula war against a fully committed France is wholly flawed in my opinion. The Penninsula war, though often viewed as it's own war, was in fact just a small theater in a much larger ongoing conflict and one shouldn't forget that when studying it. To me, this is like saying the Germans lost in the desert because the British/Americans were better troops. How do we know they were better troops? Well, because they won the battles and campaign. In my view this line of thinking is flawed - the Germans lost because they were busy fighting much bigger and more decisive wars elsewhere and the defeat in the desert cannot be separated in anyway from events on battlefields in Russia. If there is no war in Russia, the Germans would certainly have driven the British completely from Africa. I see the war in the Penninsula as shadowing this to a very large extent.

Again I am talking battles and you are talking campaigns. It is not a slight to the French to note the British tactical advantages I observed; rather it is simply a rational explanation of the outcomes that is much more robust than the explanation that Napoleon wasn't there. I have to run now but I will be happy to elaborate later if useful.

 

[FirstLegion]

What I did say was that the technique and practices of the British soldier were superior in certain important respects to those of the French. For this conclusion, it is more than appropriate to use micro examples and for this purpose they are quite valid.

Perhaps you are correct about this. But there is another school of thought that believes that there was essentially low level tactical parity between the various nations so the outcomes of battles were not determined at a very low tactical level, but were determined at a much higher level than that of the individual battalions. Namely the organizational structure of the armies, the quality of leadership, and their operational and grand tactical methods. If you notice, it was the armies that remained doggedly and steadfastly on the on the defense that fared the best against the French. I think the British may fall into this category as well. If you look at the French Battles against the Russians when the Russians stayed on a determined defense (i.e. fixed themselves in position) the Russians fared quite well against them as well. And it is pretty certain that the Russians had by far and way the worst musketry principles of any army of the period. I think where we may disagree is that I put much more weight on the higher level factors than I do the lower level factors.

I think you are trying to extrapolate too much from my observations and believe my points are much broader than intended.

You may be correct about this!

Again I am talking battles and you are talking campaigns.

But to me, you can't really separate the two. To take a battle and view it outside of the context of it's campaign doesn't tell the whole story. One major innovation of warfare during the Napoleonic period was the fusing of campaigns and battles into one continuous act. Previously, the battles and the campaigns were totally distinct phases from one another. How can one possibly view waterloo, for example, without viewing the campaign as a whole?

It is not a slight to the French to note the British tactical advantages I observed; rather it is simply a rational explanation of the outcomes that is much more robust than the explanation that Napoleon wasn't there.

See, this is one major point we disagree on. The continental powers defeated the French with much greater frequency when Napoleon wasn't there. So much so, that in 1813 the allies agreed as a campaign strategy never to engage the French when Napoleon was present. In large part the strategy worked because they handed his subordinates who were in independent commands defeat after defeat negating Napoleon's victories. And we know that they didn't possess the tactical advantages of the British, so how were they successful? To me, it's rational to view the quality of the leadership, Napoleon in particular relative to the French, as a major factor.

I'm not saying that the tactics don't play a role - at a micro level every factor plays some role. I just don't think that battles are decided by the sum of all of the micro tactical engagements. Rather, the micro engagements are possibly decided from the top down. I tend to lend more weight to perhaps different factors than you do in determining the outcomes of battles. I do apply the reverse as well by the way - perhaps the British were so successful because Wellington was better than those he fought against. Personally, I think this played a larger role than their tactical fire doctrines did. Was it more important that the British fired using a certain technique or was it more important that Wellington put them on a reverse slope? To me the latter is more decisive than the former.

This conversation is refreshing my memory of what I thought of Nosworthy. I recall agreeing fully with his interpretation of the impulse system of warfare. I also recall not putting too much stock in his low level tactical analysis in terms of its importance on the overall results. Sure, in a one battlion vs one battalion battle it's important. When 100,000 men face off against 100,000 other men, there are other factors at play that in my mind are far more important. When you roll up all of those micro level details to the highest level, their individual impact gets lost. One caveat that I'll add to this and it may be quite relevant to the Penninsula and our discussion as a whole, is that the smaller the engagement the more heavily the micro tactical weighs on the outcome and the less the higher level factors weigh on the outcome.

Back to you Bill...interesting as always!

To others, hope we're not boring everyone and feel free to jump in. I'm curious what others might think if they're inclined to share.

Best,

Matt

 

[Spitfrnd]

Perhaps you are correct about this. But there is another school of thought that believes that there was essentially low level tactical parity between the various nations so the outcomes of battles were not determined at a very low tactical level, but were determined at a much higher level than that of the individual battalions. Namely the organizational structure of the armies, the quality of leadership, and their operational and grand tactical methods. If you notice, it was the armies that remained doggedly and steadfastly on the on the defense that fared the best against the French. I think the British may fall into this category as well. If you look at the French Battles against the Russians when the Russians stayed on a determined defense (i.e. fixed themselves in position) the Russians fared quite well against them as well. And it is pretty certain that the Russians had by far and way the worst musketry principles of any army of the period. I think where we may disagree is that I put much more weight on the higher level factors than I do the lower level factors.

Yes I think that is a good summary of where we disagree. As a former "lower level" participant in military "adventures", I very much do put more weight on those factors. Perhaps that is why I have such warm feelings for the big brass. Grand strategy is all fine and well but at the end of the day, it was the company and battalion (now squad and platoon or in my case, flight) that had to perform to make them work. I suppose you can even see my perspective on this in what I chose to collect. You know how many figures I have of yours but I have yet to purchase ANY generals.

Yes defensive tactics were perhaps more often successful against the French but that is a bit too much of a generalization. Many continental armies fought defensive battles and lost badly and the British fought offensive battles and won. Also please note that neither Nosworthy or I have said that superior musketry was the only factor favoring the British. It was as much the timing and followup of British volleys that was decisive in so many of their battles against the French. This can be observed, AT THE BATTALION LEVEL, from Italy, to the Peninsula to Waterloo. I think Nosworthy makes his case well here that this in turn was not only NOT the product of grand strategic decisions but rather the result of a grass roots acceptance of company and battalion practices that worked.

Putting aside the British, I personally reject the notion that the other armies of Europe had tactical parity with the French. In fact, France's dramatic departure from the linear battle tactics retained by the other European powers can be well observed and is difficult to dismiss as a major factor in the French success in so many of their battles. This is a tactical practice that is very much applied at the division and even battalion/regiment level.

But to me, you can't really separate the two. To take a battle and view it outside of the context of it's campaign doesn't tell the whole story. One major innovation of warfare during the Napoleonic period was the fusing of campaigns and battles into one continuous act. Previously, the battles and the campaigns were totally distinct phases from one another. How can one possibly view waterloo, for example, without viewing the campaign as a whole?

I think it is as simple as the soldier's view of a battle. There is no doubt that each soldier is affected by what happened to him prior to the battle and how he got there but when it starts, it is only the moment that matters. Undoubtedly the outcome of some battles are dictated by the factors that led to them but to say that is true for every battle or that understanding the campaign will tell the complete story is perhaps much more incorrect that failing to consider the impact of the campaign.

See, this is one major point we disagree on. The continental powers defeated the French with much greater frequency when Napoleon wasn't there. So much so, that in 1813 the allies agreed as a campaign strategy never to engage the French when Napoleon was present. In large part the strategy worked because they handed his subordinates who were in independent commands defeat after defeat negating Napoleon's victories. And we know that they didn't possess the tactical advantages of the British, so how were they successful? To me, it's rational to view the quality of the leadership, Napoleon in particular relative to the French, as a major factor.

Well that is some progress. I think you will note that I never said Napoleon could not be a major factor but rather he was certainly not the only factor or even in general the deciding factor. But then I appreciate that is a difficult notion for the true devotees of the Little Corporal.

I'm not saying that the tactics don't play a role - at a micro level every factor plays some role. I just don't think that battles are decided by the sum of all of the micro tactical engagements. Rather, the micro engagements are possibly decided from the top down. I tend to lend more weight to perhaps different factors than you do in determining the outcomes of battles. I do apply the reverse as well by the way - perhaps the British were so successful because Wellington was better than those he fought against. Personally, I think this played a larger role than their tactical fire doctrines did. Was it more important that the British fired using a certain technique or was it more important that Wellington put them on a reverse slope? To me the latter is more decisive than the former.

Yes you are correct that we differ completely on that. I strongly hold the "lower level" soldier's idea that soldiers more often win battles in spite of their generals, not because of them.

This conversation is refreshing my memory of what I thought of Nosworthy. I recall agreeing fully with his interpretation of the impulse system of warfare. I also recall not putting too much stock in his low level tactical analysis in terms of its importance on the overall results. Sure, in a one battalion vs one battalion battle it's important. When 100,000 men face off against 100,000 other men, there are other factors at play that in my mind are far more important. When you roll up all of those micro level details to the highest level, their individual impact gets lost. One caveat that I'll add to this and it may be quite relevant to the Peninsula and our discussion as a whole, is that the smaller the engagement the more heavily the micro tactical weighs on the outcome and the less the higher level factors weigh on the outcome.

Well I frankly suggest that the impulse system is a lower level factor really since it has to do with the movement of units when and where they are needed in battles. I respectfully suggest you are doing Nosworthy a disservice in summarily dismissing the importance of the factors he identifies as critical. I will close this chapter with a nod to the "For want of a nail.....the battle was lost" proverb, which has a well established following ironically among the French military. I guess I subscribe to view that permitting some small undesirable situation will allow gradual and inexorable worsening or "The Butterfly Effect" and the "Chaos Theory" ideas presented involving sensitive dependence on initial conditions.

 

[DCN1898]

This is a fascinating discussion to me and I am learning a lot. I just wish that I was was in the room with you two enjoying a single malt!
I have had discussions like this before, but the subject was Lee vs Grant. Like I said before, I am learning a lot on this forum.
Dave

 

[DCN1898]

If I may interject, I think that you two gentlemen are debating two sides of the same coin. The sign of a good commander, is to get his forces into a position to exploit the enemy's weakness and enhance his army's strengths. Both Napoleon and Wellington did that very well. Once the armies were in place, it was a soldier's battle to win or lose. The British army was a different creature from the French. Whether it was the extreme discipline and the lash, or volunteer vs conscript, (This could be another subject for discussion). The French Soldier was doing his service for his country, The British Soldier was a cast off from society who had nothing in which to belong, except the Army. Two different mind sets. I wonder if you could make the point that the British soldier was in a similar to situation to later French Legionaires? (The Legion is my home.)
The British Army, because of the volunteer system, had less soldiers available.

 

[Spitfrnd]

Thanks so much for joining our discussion. It is always interesting to hear a new perspective and I am very glad you have been enjoying our repartee; I know we have.

If I may interject, I think that you two gentlemen are debating two sides of the same coin. The sign of a good commander, is to get his forces into a position to exploit the enemy's weakness and enhance his army's strengths. Both Napoleon and Wellington did that very well. Once the armies were in place, it was a soldier's battle to win or lose.

A fair point and I am pleased to accept my part of the opposite side of this coin. I am not sure about my friend here.

The British army was a different creature from the French. Whether it was the extreme discipline and the lash, or volunteer vs conscript, (This could be another subject for discussion). The French Soldier was doing his service for his country, The British Soldier was a cast off from society who had nothing in which to belong, except the Army. Two different mind sets. I wonder if you could make the point that the British soldier was in a similar to situation to later French Legionaries? (The Legion is my home.)
The British Army, because of the volunteer system, had less soldiers available.

I certainly agree they were different but I think the reasons are more related to the underlying societal differences and the different ways they were taught and led, as does Nowsworthy. I frankly thing the lash was a small part of it and it was more often used by inferior commanders that probably should not have been leading in the first place. I do agree with you that the British army was often home for these lads since their enlistments were so long and many had so few alternatives at home. I am not so sure about the French. They were conscripted and I think more often fighting for plunder than any sense of duty to home. Of course plunder was indeed a strong motivation for most soldiers of that period.

It is also true that the British army was much smaller but that was not just a function of the volunteer system. The British population was also much smaller and Parliament didn't seem to want to support a larger army; in fact they often didn't want to support the army they had. Just ask Wellington.

 

[FirstLegion]

You know how many figures I have of yours but I have yet to purchase ANY generals.

If we release a Wellington, perhaps you'll lift the "no generals" embargo!

Yes defensive tactics were perhaps more often successful against the French but that is a bit too much of a generalization.

Of course, no rule is hard and fast I don't think. But it was usually those armies that nailed themselves to a defensive position that fared best against the French. Doing so often eliminated the advantages the French had in maneuver. The advantage of the impulse system as Nosworthy calls it over the linear system was really only demonstrated in situations which required fluidity and reaction on the battlefield. If you nail yourself to your position, determined not to move from it, you minimize the situations which require fluidity to a developing tactical situation.

Also please note that neither Nosworthy or I have said that superior musketry was the only factor favoring the British. It was as much the timing and followup of British volleys that was decisive in so many of their battles against the French. This can be observed, AT THE BATTALION LEVEL, from Italy, to the Peninsula to Waterloo.

Again, I don't disagree with the advantages the British had in this regard, I just don't think they were a major determining factor in victory or defeat. Perhaps they played a much larger role in the smaller engagements (the one in Italy was tiny was it not?), but in the large battles I disagree that methods of volley fire or musketry played much of a role in determining the overall outcome. Nosworthy's book was pretty revolutionary in this regard because he was looking at the micro-tactics such as this and using them (in part) to explain outcomes (if i remember correctly). I just don't agree with him in this regard.

Putting aside the British, I personally reject the notion that the other armies of Europe had tactical parity with the French. In fact, France's dramatic departure from the linear battle tactics retained by the other European powers can be well observed and is difficult to dismiss as a major factor in the French success in so many of their battles. This is a tactical practice that is very much applied at the division and even battalion/regiment level.

By tactical parity I meant at a lower level than this (i.e a battlion = a battalion = a battalion no matter what nation it comes from). The departure from linear tactics was primarily grand tactical and organizational in nature, not specifically tactical. When one talks about linear tactics, there are really two levels to the discussion. There is first that the individual battalion starts the battle out on column and moves in column and only deploys into line when about to engage the enemy. At the level of a single battalion this evolution means nothing (i.e. if a battle had one French Battalion against one Austrian battalion for example, this changes means absolutely nothing). It only matters when you see the aggregate effect, which is the ability of entire divisions to operate on their own axes of advance independently from other divisions and to remain flexible in their ability to react to developments at a grand tactical level. For "linear" armies, what is meant by this is really a grand tactical and organizational consideration. They were organized with divisions attached directly to the Army commander and they fought with one division directly adjacent to another division ALL with a single axes of advance or operation. The divsions in linear armies were relatively incapable of true indepent action and what you see are entire wings of many divisions fighting as one body. The French departure of this was part and parcel of the corps system (i.e. each corps essentially it's own miniature army with infantry, cavalry, and artillery). Further, by using column more on the battlefield coupled with this organization structure, divisions now act completely independently from one another and can operate on different axes as independent bodies. This allows the french to react to developments on the battlefield much more efficiently than the much more rigid structures of the linear armies. Austerlitz is the best example I think.

Undoubtedly the outcome of some battles are dictated by the factors that led to them but to say that is true for every battle or that understanding the campaign will tell the complete story is perhaps much more incorrect that failing to consider the impact of the campaign.

For the Napoleonic period, for the most part you really can't separate battles from the campaigns of which they are a part as the situation and maneuver leading up the to the battle play a huge role in the battle itself. The campaign alone isn't the complete story of course, but neither is the battle either. The Hundred Days is probably the best example of this - you can't really understand why Waterloo was fought the way it was without studying the entire campaign.

Well that is some progress. I think you will note that I never said Napoleon could not be a major factor but rather he was certainly not the only factor or even in general the deciding factor.

And right back at you, I don't think I ever said Napoleon or leadership was the ONLY factor either. I just feel that the grand tactical, including leadership, has a bigger effect on the outcome than does the micro-tactical when looking at Napoleonic battles.

But then I appreciate that is a difficult notion for the true devotees of the Little Corporal.

Ahh, so we've degenerated to NAME CALLING now! Moderator moderator Bill insulted Napoleon.

Well I frankly suggest that the impulse system is a lower level factor really since it has to do with the movement of units when and where they are needed in battles.

The impulse system is grand tactical in nature, not tactical. Tactics (as I read them) is whether a battalion fights in line or column and the evolutions they use to change from one to the other. Grand tactics is the maneuver of divisions and corps on the battlefield. The impulse system was most definitely a grand tactical evolution as it allowed for divisions to fight truly indepenently of one another. I think we're in agreement on this point, we're just labelling it differently.

I respectfully suggest you are doing Nosworthy a disservice in summarily dismissing the importance of the factors he identifies as critical.

Actually, I agree 100% with Nosworthy's conclusions on the impulse system. Evolutions such as the impulse system and the organizational structure of the corps and the tactical evolution of using columns more frequently on the battlefied are part and parcel of the success of the French of the early empire of their adversaries. It has to be coupled with effective leadership of course as the impulse system was merely a tool that needed to be wielded like any other tool by someone with skill. So it is on this point that I agree with Nosworthey completely. It's the stuff about how one battalion fires or doesn't fire that, while I agree with factually what he's saying, I disagree that it plays much of a role in determining victory or defeat.

I guess the best way I can explain my view on this would be as follows - Had the Austro-Russian Army at Austerlitz under the same command as it historically was using the same grand tactical linear system that it did but the firing methods, training, and doctrine at the battalion level of the British Army (or had all of the battalions actually BEEN british for the sake of argument), the result at Austerlitz wouldn't have changed. Once the Austro-Russian Army launched their attack with their left wing, the battle was all over. Their grand tactical linear system of war really meant that once this attack was launched, that was it, there was no stopping it or changing it and they were incapable of reacting to the French attack on their center because their system of war wasn't equipped to make such maneuvers. The entire attack was essentially operating on a single axes as a single body. So to me it matters not all what their firing practices were, when they volleyed and didn't, and who had a practice of firing high or too soon.

In some cases, I think we are saying the same thing but assigning different labels. To me, when I say battles were decided at "higher levels" I'm talking about Grand Tactical considerations playing in a larger factor in victory or defeat than the the micro-tactical stuff such as firing methods. Further, it's not enough to have a superior grand tactical system, it must be put into use by superior leadership. Yes, at Austerlitz the French had the far better Grand tactical system but this in no way guaranteed them victory. Napoleon has the foresight to withdraw from the Pratzen heights in the face of a superior force essentially offering the better terrain to his opponents on a silver platter. He purposely feigns weakness and leaves his right flank extremely weakly defended (knowing full well that Davout, some 30 miles away, is closing in to reinforce this part of the line) thus baiting the Austro-Russian Army to attack his right. He then has an entire corps buried in a fold in the ground in the center out of view just waiting for the Austro-Russian Army to commit to it's attack and expose it's center to the death blow. So yes, the French had the superior army in terms of grand tactical system of war and perhaps Napoleon's strategy is only possible because of this. But it was his individual decision making and grand tactical strategy alone which resulted in the victory. To me, these two elements in combination are far more important than anything micro-tactical.

 

[FirstLegion]

If I may interject, I think that you two gentlemen are debating two sides of the same coin. The sign of a good commander, is to get his forces into a position to exploit the enemy's weakness and enhance his army's strengths. Both Napoleon and Wellington did that very well. Once the armies were in place, it was a soldier's battle to win or lose. .

By all means. You make an excellent point.

I think and to some extent Bill and I aren't so much disagreeing as we might be assigning a different amount of weight to various factors. I think we agree on the basic concept of what those factors were, I think we just view them as different in their level of importantance. The discussion is made all the more challenging, though possibly more educational for us both, because my background is through primarily a detailed study of the campaigns on the continent where his background is through a detailed study of the campaigns on the Penninsula. So no doubt this colors our opinions on things. In the end, perhaps their were different factors that determined the outcomes in these different theaters.

At the core of this discussion, though it has wandered to and fro from related topics, is why were the British so successful against the French when many other nationalities weren't. Bill has pointed to a big factor in this being the training and firing methods of the British. I feel, while those are factors no doubt particularly in smaller engagements, that they aren't the critical factors. To me, the critical factors are more the superior leadership and troop quality of the British in the Penninsula brought about because for the British this was their primary theater and thus where they had their best troops and leaders, but for the French it was a secondary theater and thus where they deployed their B team as compared to the quality of their leaders and troops engaged on the continent. One could also add to this the issue that the French were operating in rugged hostile territory which surely played a factor as well.

In the end, all of this plays a role of course. I think our biggest difference, however, is that when it comes to the Napoleonic period, one of us is an admitted anglophile and one of us an admitted Francophile and never the two shall meet.

Best,

Matt

 

[DCN1898]

In the end, all of this plays a role of course. I think our biggest difference, however, is that when it comes to the Napoleonic period, one of us is an admitted anglophile and one of us an admitted Francophile and never the two shall meet.

Best,

Matt

I should have realized that this was a Anglo/Franco debate! I was a Civil War Re-enactor/buff. You substitute Anglo/Franco with Union/Confederate and you have the grist for endless debate. It sure is fun though!
I had one other point regarding the respective soldiers. I don't think that plunder was a driving force for the French. (Most soldiers irrespective of country did plunder.) It was their chore for the empire.
In war, when you are facing death every day from disease, starvation and the enemy, societal prohibitions against theft, rape and murder lose their significance. If an Army doesn't keep a tight leash on their troops, these things happen more. Wellington dealt harshly with criminals and it still happened in the British Army.
I was thinking that the British soldiers were akin to the French Foreign Legion, in that the army was their home. They were society's dregs, but belonged to the regiment. My example is the 27th Inniskillings dying in square at Waterloo rather than breaking and running in spite of the threat from cavalry.

 

[Spitfrnd]

I'll be back!!!