British Guards (2 Viewers)

[FirstLegion]

Time for an update on this. Since as I noted, the Napoleonic series list frequently omitted the sizes of the forces involved and some limit seems appropriate for these purposes, I did obtain and review the Digby Smith Data Book and add all encounters with more than 10,000 total troops involved. I excluded what Smith calls skirmishes since they generally did not involve many troops or end with any significant result. I also tried to exclude seiges that did not include any storming attempts, battles without French forces and encounters where one side just surrendered without combat. Finally, I excluded the Revolutionary War period, at least for now, since it really has very many different characteristics than the subsequent 1805-1815 periods and is huge from a data perspective. I can say that from a limited review, it would simply make both the French and Napoleonic records look better since the French were very dominant in that period. With those assumptions I found the following thus far based on the results of 204 battles:

Main Continent Napoleonic Battles
French W/L/T Total: 74-46-8
Napoleon W/L/T: 28-9-3
French w/o Napoleon W/L/T: 46-37-5
French vs British: 0-8-1

Peninsula Napoleonic Battles
French W/L/T Total: 38-35-3
Napoleon W/L/T: 1-0-0
French w/o Napoleon W/L/T: 37-35-3
French vs British: 5-29-1

So this would seem to confirm the impression that relatively speaking Napoleon was the man to beat with a 75% win/loss record. That said, on the main continent at least, the French were still pretty impressive with a near 57% win/loss rate and over 61% with the British battles excluded.

That raises another point that started me down this analysis. The French have a truely awful record against the British, with or without Napoleon. In fact, in the Peninsula their record without the British would have been 33-6-2 or better than Napoleon's record overall.

So I reiterate my original point, if you want to fairly represent the Napoleonic period, you simply can't exclude the British and related battles, unless you want a Franco biased outcome.

This is certainly interesting data and it leads me to a few questions about it:

1. I was under the impression that Napoleon had fought in some 60+ battles. I'm quite surprised to see that according to your stats, his total is only 41.
2. In regards to Napoleon's defeats, I'd be interested to see them listed out.

It's quite interesting that the Penninsula totals 76 battles while through all of the many wars on the continent and the far more numerous campaigns there, there are only 128 battles. The most telling aspect of this statistic is that that the Penninsula battles clearly weren't as decisive in nature (i.e. they weren't such one sided defeats that they brought campaigns to a close). Further, and I will confess to knowing very little about the Penninsula War, it would seem that neither side had the strength (in the case of the British/Allies) or the committment (in the case of the French) to bring the war to close.

In regards to French win-loss record on the penninsula, first off, beating up on the Spanish and Portuguese Napoleonic armies is really a meaningless statistic I think. Further, another question that has to be looked into regarding the Penninsula battles are how many of those were fought in 1812, 1813, and 1814 when the French were heavily engaged on the continent and were not deploying their strength in the Penninsula. My guess is that a lot of defeats would fall in this period for sure. It seems to me that have you have a situation where the British are most active and most aggressive when the French are at their weakest. You don't see them hanging around much or engaging heavily when Napoleon ventures out there and turns his attention to the Penninsula in 1808.

So I guess I reiterate my point - if you want to represent the decisive theater of the Napoleonic Wars, you represent the battles on the continent. If you want to get British troops involved, then you represent the Penninsula. This in no way takes away from the interest of these battles from a tactical perspective of course and doesn't in anyway denegrate those who fought and died there, it's just that at no point was the Penninsula a decisive theater of the Napoleonic Wars, it was always a sideshow. I think a further interesting question is why are the British so conspicuously absent from the campaigns on the continent?

Regards,

Matt

 

[Spitfrnd]

What made the British so much better on the Peninsula? Was the majority of the quality in French Leadership on the Continent with Napoleon?

Quality of leadership would not seem to be a factor in the Peninsula since at various points in time, most of the most successful French marshals and generals were there. One could argue French troop quality, especially in 1812 since many of the superior troops from any sources were sucked into Napoleon's colossal blunder in Russia. After that, French troop quality was a problem everywhere, maybe more so on the continent.

Remember though, the British success is not limited to the Peninsula since they were 8-0-1 on the continent and 1-0-1 against Napoleon.

Massena is reputed to have said that the British soldiers just didn't know when they had lost, certainly that was the case in several Peninsula battles including Corruna, Badajoz, Cadiz and Fuentes de Onoro. No doubt Wellington was a factor although they did almost as well (certainly better than the French without Napoleon) when he was not in command it seems.

I am continuing to verify, elaborate and update these numbers as time permits.

 

[Spitfrnd]

This is certainly interesting data and it leads me to a few questions about it:

1. I was under the impression that Napoleon had fought in some 60+ battles. I'm quite surprised to see that according to your stats, his total is only 41.

I can only tell you what I found from the various sources so far but remember that this only covers 1805 to 1815. From a cursory look at the Revolutionary War period I found 13 more for Napoleon for which he was 12-1-0. Perhaps the 60+ number includes this prior period, which makes sense given it includes some of his famous ones like the Pyramids and Lodi. Anyway, you can check when I send you the sheet.

2. In regards to Napoleon's defeats, I'd be interested to see them listed out.

Actually, I am going to send you my worksheet for review so you can send me any thoughts and maybe refer me to any missing battles you see. There is no doubt that my eyes started to glaze over on more that one occassion when going through all this data. I do like Digby's data compilation though; handy 'little' reference although I did not just use him as a source.

It's quite interesting that the Peninsula totals 76 battles while through all of the many wars on the continent and the far more numerous campaigns there, there are only 128 battles. The most telling aspect of this statistic is that that the Peninsula battles clearly weren't as decisive in nature (i.e. they weren't such one sided defeats that they brought campaigns to a close). Further, and I will confess to knowing very little about the Peninsula War, it would seem that neither side had the strength (in the case of the British/Allies) or the commitment (in the case of the French) to bring the war to close.

Well on the comparative numbers, see the assumptions. There were many, many skirmishes, sieges without action, capitulations and other small encounters that didn't make the cutoffs. Perhaps you are right about the commitment but at various times, the French had around 300,000 men in Spain, compared to maybe 50,000 British troops.

In regards to French win-loss record on the peninsula, first off, beating up on the Spanish and Portuguese Napoleonic armies is really a meaningless statistic I think. Further, another question that has to be looked into regarding the Peninsula battles are how many of those were fought in 1812, 1813, and 1814 when the French were heavily engaged on the continent and were not deploying their strength in the Peninsula. My guess is that a lot of defeats would fall in this period for sure. It seems to me that have you have a situation where the British are most active and most aggressive when the French are at their weakest. You don't see them hanging around much or engaging heavily when Napoleon ventures out there and turns his attention to the Peninsula in 1808.

I had much the same impression before I started reading more about this. It turns out though that the Spanish/Portuguese could beat the French when properly lead and did do so, often out numbered so they were not always a walkover. I will look at the ratio between periods but the British won consistently in all periods from what I can tell. As to Napoleon, unless the data is hiding somewhere, it seems he was only personally in command for one battle, which he won and in any event, just the end of one campaign so his impact there was indeed negligible.

So I guess I reiterate my point - if you want to represent the decisive theater of the Napoleonic Wars, you represent the battles on the continent. If you want to get British troops involved, then you represent the Peninsula. This in no way takes away from the interest of these battles from a tactical perspective of course and doesn't in anyway denigrate those who fought and died there, it's just that at no point was the Peninsula a decisive theater of the Napoleonic Wars, it was always a sideshow. I think a further interesting question is why are the British so conspicuously absent from the campaigns on the continent?

I humbly submit you should represent both.

 

[Andanna]

I was under the impression that Napoleon had fought in some 60+ battles. I'm quite surprised to see that according to your stats, his total is only 41.

The lower number does not reflect the domestic battles with a certain Joséphine de Beauharnais. I understand Napoleon lost all confrontations against her and all peace settlements were to her advantage.

 

[Spitfrnd]

The lower number does not reflect the domestic battles with a certain Joséphine de Beauharnais. I understand Napoleon lost all confrontations against her and all peace settlements were to her advantage.

A fair point, I didn't have data on those.

 

[FirstLegion]

I can only tell you what I found from the various sources so far but remember that this only covers 1805 to 1815. From a cursory look at the Revolutionary War period I found 13 more for Napoleon for which he was 12-1-0. Perhaps the 60+ number includes this prior period, which makes sense given it includes some of his famous ones like the Pyramids and Lodi. Anyway, you can check when I send you the sheet.

Yeah, I was definitely counting the period of the Revolutionary wars as well as they're all "The Napoleonic Wars" as far as I'm concerned. The only difference between the earlier period and 1805-1815 is that Napoleon was emperor during the latter period. Can't overlook the earlier period, some of Napoleon's finest battles and the ones that allowed him to become emperor.

Actually, I am going to send you my worksheet for review so you can send me any thoughts and maybe refer me to any missing battles you see. There is no doubt that my eyes started to glaze over on more that one occassion when going through all this data. I do like Digby's data compilation though; handy 'little' reference although I did not just use him as a source.

Quite a list! At first glance, there seems to be a few victories that are entered in as defeats. For example, Berezina is most certainly a French victory. I would say the same of Krasnoe and would even question whether Napoleon was "in command" as Krasnoe as it was much more a running disjointed battle. However, in both cases of Berezina and Krasnoe, the French Army should have been totally destroyed and in both cases (particularly Berezina) Napoleon miraculously escapes. Thus, at least Berezina and probably Krasnoe are French victories, though with Kranoe I don't know if I would credit Napoleon either way as each corps fought relatively independently.

Further, Heilsburg in 1807 was a draw I think, not a defeat, and Napoleon wasn't in command (he was there, but Lannes and Murat and such were pretty much running the show without consuting him - I was never really sure why he let this go on). I would move to this the draw category and I'm not sure if I would have Napoleon in command. He was there, so I guess technically he was, regardless of how uninvolved he was.

Finally, I would say that Eylau is technically a victory, though certainly a pyrric one at best. It is often viewed as a draw simply because the French up to that point has utterly destroyed everyone they had faced previously and it was the first setback of any kind. So because it wasn't a decisive victory it is often viewed as a draw. However, the French held the field at the end and though early in the day were getting roughly handled, came within 9,000 men of Lestoq's retreating Prussians appearing at the right place at the right time from utterly destroying the Russian army via Davout's flank attack. Thus at the end of the day, the French held the advantage. I guess, my rationale would be that as Apern Essling is a defeat, Eylau would be a victory using the rationale of who held the field wins the battle.

It's interesting to note that the this would make Napoleon's record (including the revolutionary period) about 44-7-3 which sounds a lot more correct. It is also interesting to note that several of these defeats came when he was massively outnumbered in 1814 when the strategic result was a foregone conclusion:

Laon - Outnumbered 2:1
La Rothiere - Outnumbered over 2:1
Arcis-Sur-Aube - Outnumbered almost 4:1

Though he sustained his highest numbers of defeats in 1814, most consider it (along with Italy in 1796) his finest campaign as a general.

Even at Leipzig he was outnumbered nearly 2:1 and put a good pasting on the allies before retreating. The destruction of the bridge turned a minor defeat into a catastrophe. It's really only at Waterloo that Napoleon has an army routed from the field.

Well on the comparative numbers, see the assumptions. There were many, many skirmishes, sieges without action, capitulations and other small encounters that didn't make the cutoffs. Perhaps you are right about the commitment but at various times, the French had around 300,000 men in Spain, compared to maybe 50,000 British troops.

I have always assumed that many of the French troops in Spain were depot troops. So each regiment would field say 5 battalions and 3 would take the field with the main french army and the other 2 (for example) would be stationed at various depots (i.e. garrison troops etc...). I assume that many of the French units in Spain fit this bill and were thus second rate troops. This is not always the case of course and less likely with the main active field army, but if 300,000 troops were stationed there at one point, my guess is 75% of them were depot troops.

I had much the same impression before I started reading more about this. It turns out though that the Spanish/Portuguese could beat the French when properly lead and did do so, often out numbered so they were not always a walkover.

Well, looking at your numbers, the French have a massive win loss advantage in the penninsula when not fighting the british. So the Spanish couldn't have done too well!

I will look at the ratio between periods but the British won consistently in all periods from what I can tell. As to Napoleon, unless the data is hiding somewhere, it seems he was only personally in command for one battle, which he won and in any event, just the end of one campaign so his impact there was indeed negligible.

Yes, the British most certainly did win consistently. I think some of this at least is the Wellington factor much like the French have the Napoleon factor. As for Napoleon's influence in Spain, it probably was pretty minor in terms of his direct involvement, but it was major in terms of how he prioritized the penninsula against other campaigns. When he got involved in Fall of 1808 he wins a battle and then captures Madrid. You see from that point for the next many months a string of french victory after French victory. If you notice, it's only around May of 1809 that you see the French start losing again. Coincidentally they had just gone to war with Austria in April/May of 1809. So you do the math - Napoleon is there, commits his troops, the French go on a huge win streak that lasts about 5 months with very few defeats. Napoleon then goes to war with Austria, take the best of his troops on that campaign, and the French start losing pretty consistently in the Penninsula. Its this type of activity that to me defines it clearly as a secondary theater of far less significance (at least to the Napoleon) and why I tend to view the Penninsula numbers with a little suspicion.

I humbly submit you should represent both.

No doubt. But you're already getting British - if you choose to use them on the Penninsula, well, what you do in the privacy of your home is your business!!!

 

[Dragoon]

Thank you gentlemen for that great discusion. My conclusion is that it's time for Matt to make some Austrians!

 

[petebuster1]

Wish i had the time look into things as deeply, all interesting stuff though.
Waterloo i know, but not so much of this threads battles etc so saves going through the books

 

[Spitfrnd]

Yeah, I was definitely counting the period of the Revolutionary wars as well as they're all "The Napoleonic Wars" as far as I'm concerned. The only difference between the earlier period and 1805-1815 is that Napoleon was emperor during the latter period. Can't overlook the earlier period, some of Napoleon's finest battles and the ones that allowed him to become emperor.

Well it seems some historians separate the periods and others do not so it may be largely a personal choice. One rationale for separating would appear to be the significant difference in the relative advantage in tactics, professionalism and resolve enjoyed by the French between the earlier and later periods. Of course, the deciding factor for me in not including them yet was the extra few weeks time it would take to sift through the additional data.

Quite a list! At first glance, there seems to be a few victories that are entered in as defeats. For example, Berezina is most certainly a French victory. I would say the same of Krasnoe and would even question whether Napoleon was "in command" as Krasnoe as it was much more a running disjointed battle. However, in both cases of Berezina and Krasnoe, the French Army should have been totally destroyed and in both cases (particularly Berezina) Napoleon miraculously escapes. Thus, at least Berezina and probably Krasnoe are French victories, though with Krasnoe I don't know if I would credit Napoleon either way as each corps fought relatively independently.

Further, Heilsburg in 1807 was a draw I think, not a defeat, and Napoleon wasn't in command (he was there, but Lannes and Murat and such were pretty much running the show without consulting him - I was never really sure why he let this go on). I would move to this the draw category and I'm not sure if I would have Napoleon in command. He was there, so I guess technically he was, regardless of how uninvolved he was.

Finally, I would say that Eylau is technically a victory, though certainly a pyrrhic one at best. It is often viewed as a draw simply because the French up to that point has utterly destroyed everyone they had faced previously and it was the first setback of any kind. So because it wasn't a decisive victory it is often viewed as a draw. However, the French held the field at the end and though early in the day were getting roughly handled, came within 9,000 men of Lestoq's retreating Prussians appearing at the right place at the right time from utterly destroying the Russian army via Davout's flank attack. Thus at the end of the day, the French held the advantage. I guess, my rationale would be that as Apern Essling is a defeat, Eylau would be a victory using the rationale of who held the field wins the battle.

It's interesting to note that this would make Napoleon's record (including the revolutionary period) about 44-7-3 which sounds a lot more correct.

Those all seem like plausible points to me. I am sure that a number of the wins and losses could be and are debated for various reasons. I can say that all of the ones on my list were confirmed by at least two and often all four of the sources noted. I suppose you never had this kind of debate over at the Napoleon series.

It is also interesting to note that several of these defeats came when he was massively outnumbered in 1814 when the strategic result was a foregone conclusion:

Laon - Outnumbered 2:1
La Rothiere - Outnumbered over 2:1
Arcis-Sur-Aube - Outnumbered almost 4:1

Though he sustained his highest numbers of defeats in 1814, most consider it (along with Italy in 1796) his finest campaign as a general.

Even at Leipzig he was outnumbered nearly 2:1 and put a good pasting on the allies before retreating. The destruction of the bridge turned a minor defeat into a catastrophe. It's really only at Waterloo that Napoleon has an army routed from the field.

I did note that and it is impressive. Of course there were significant differences in troop quality and/or leadership in some of those cases but it is impressive nonetheless. Interestingly, much the same can be said of Wellington, especially prior to 1814. Perhaps being grossly outnumbered evokes tactical brilliance.

I have always assumed that many of the French troops in Spain were depot troops. So each regiment would field say 5 battalions and 3 would take the field with the main French army and the other 2 (for example) would be stationed at various depots (i.e. garrison troops etc...). I assume that many of the French units in Spain fit this bill and were thus second rate troops. This is not always the case of course and less likely with the main active field army, but if 300,000 troops were stationed there at one point, my guess is 75% of them were depot troops.

Certainly some number of them were likely more in that nature but from what I have read, most battles with the British featured a significant number of quality troops so I suspect 75% is a bit too high. Naturally for sieges the defenders were usually garrison troops but they had other advantages like superior firepower, fortifications, protection and concealment and traps, as evidenced in Wellington’s expensive capture of Badajoz.

Well, looking at your numbers, the French have a massive win loss advantage in the peninsula when not fighting the British. So the Spanish couldn't have done too well!

On the numbers alone that seems all too true. Looking at the commentaries, it seems that many of the Spanish losses involved mismatched forces (such as recently armed peasants) or such poor leadership as to be nearly criminal. When properly trained, equipped and trained I am not sure they did much worse than the Austrians or Prussians prior to 1812.

Yes, the British most certainly did win consistently. I think some of this at least is the Wellington factor much like the French have the Napoleon factor. As for Napoleon's influence in Spain, it probably was pretty minor in terms of his direct involvement, but it was major in terms of how he prioritized the peninsula against other campaigns. When he got involved in Fall of 1808 he wins a battle and then captures Madrid. You see from that point for the next many months a string of French victory after French victory. If you notice, it's only around May of 1809 that you see the French start losing again. Coincidentally they had just gone to war with Austria in April/May of 1809. So you do the math - Napoleon is there, commits his troops, the French go on a huge win streak that lasts about 5 months with very few defeats. Napoleon then goes to war with Austria, take the best of his troops on that campaign, and the French start losing pretty consistently in the Peninsula. Its this type of activity that to me defines it clearly as a secondary theater of far less significance (at least to the Napoleon) and why I tend to view the Peninsula numbers with a little suspicion.

No doubt the majority of the best troops were with Napoleon but from what I have read, there were a respectable number of experienced and committed troops in the Peninsula as well. Even the British wins were very hard fought with the majority of casualties taken from the front and there seemed to have been no great proportion of routs than for the continent. One factor for the British success rate I have seen noted by tactical analysts like Muir and Nosworthy is the better training with live firing employed by the British. Several of the sources I have read suggest that even the French seldom fired their weapons except in combat whereas the British practiced doing so with great regularity. There is a big difference in executing the manual of arms with and without firing, especially for those weapons.

No doubt. But you're already getting British - if you choose to use them on the Peninsula, well, what you do in the privacy of your home is your business!!!

Indeed and much appreciated; any releases that can be used for the Peninsula will be very enthusiastically and gratefully received.

 

[FirstLegion]

Just a few quick points for clarification...

I suppose you never had this kind of debate over at the Napoleon series.

Actually we most certainly did! Quality of troops in particular was a big hot button debate point. Interestingly enough, I found that the general sentiment on the Napoleon Series was anti-French with many people feeling that troops were troops were troops and, the French Imperial Guard in particular used to take a bit of a pounding over there as "highly overrated."

Of course there were significant differences in troop quality and/or leadership in some of those cases but it is impressive nonetheless. Interestingly, much the same can be said of Wellington, especially prior to 1814. Perhaps being grossly outnumbered evokes tactical brilliance.

Remember, in 1813 Young Guard is basically the quality of regular French Line Infantry and the 1813 French Line infantry are basically depot troops and new draftees (i.e. the Marie Louises). In terms of smaller numbers leading to tactical brilliance, don't laugh, I think there is something to that. Napoleon's best campaigns, 1796 and 1814 came when we was commanding less than 50,000 troops and was outnumbered. I think that the best will shine in these circumstances because they have to maximize their resources.

Certainly some number of them were likely more in that nature but from what I have read, most battles with the British featured a significant number of quality troops so I suspect 75% is a bit too high.

Just to clarify, I meant that 75% of the total troops deployed in Spain were probably depot troops. Troops in the field army in Spain would have a much higher proprotion of first class line infantry them. Really, I don't think this is any different than any army of occupation throughout history.

it seems that many of the Spanish losses involved mismatched forces (such as recently armed peasants) or such poor leadership as to be nearly criminal. When properly trained, equipped and trained I am not sure they did much worse than the Austrians or Prussians prior to 1812.

Good point. Nodoby did worse than the Prussians prior to 1812. Hmm...Napoleonic Spanish = WWII Italians? (i.e. the troops are much maligned, but in reality they're just poorly equipped and horribly led?)

One factor for the British success rate I have seen noted by tactical analysts like Muir and Nosworthy is the better training with live firing employed by the British. Several of the sources I have read suggest that even the French seldom fired their weapons except in combat whereas the British practiced doing so with great regularity. There is a big difference in executing the manual of arms with and without firing, especially for those weapons.

This would certainly make a big difference and is a very good point. I still think that the 2 rank line plays a big role in this as well. Lots of firepower in a 2 rank line.

 

[Spitfrnd]

Some time has passed since our last discussion on the British / French battle subject and I wanted to add a few new points.

.....The most telling aspect of this statistic is that that the Peninsula battles clearly weren't as decisive in nature (i.e. they weren't such one sided defeats that they brought campaigns to a close). Further, and I will confess to knowing very little about the Peninsula War, it would seem that neither side had the strength (in the case of the British/Allies) or the commitment (in the case of the French) to bring the war to close.

It is true that the British lacked the troop strength for decisive engagements for more than half of the Peninsula period. With the French, I think it was less the commitment than the logistics. While the Spanish Army was beaten, the country clearly was not and the French had to allocate significant resources just to keep their couriers alive. In fact one or two dragoon squadrons would usually escort a single courier and supply trains were a nightmare. When in Portugal, the French were left with no food other than what they could drag in through Spain. They might have managed a decisive victory against the British had Wellington been a less careful or tactically skilled commander.

.....In regards to French win-loss record on the Peninsula, first off, beating up on the Spanish and Portuguese Napoleonic armies is really a meaningless statistic I think. Further, another question that has to be looked into regarding the Peninsula battles are how many of those were fought in 1812, 1813, and 1814 when the French were heavily engaged on the continent and were not deploying their strength in the Peninsula. My guess is that a lot of defeats would fall in this period for sure. It seems to me that have you have a situation where the British are most active and most aggressive when the French are at their weakest. You don't see them hanging around much or engaging heavily when Napoleon ventures out there and turns his attention to the Peninsula in 1808.

Interestingly I am now persuaded that the British success against the French had less to do with Wellington and Napoleon than certain key factors about the way the soldiers for the two nations fought. The British largely fought a defensive campaign and picked very favorable terrain for their engagements. They also were extremely disciplined in withholding their fire until the French were very close, usually within 20-40 yards (the old whites of their eyes doctrine) so when they fired, their volleys tended to be very accurate and very devastating to the attacking masses. This in turn was a perfect set up for the bayonet attack when the enemy was at its most shocked and demoralized state. The British were also quite good at leveling their muskets to a point dependent on distance and hence tended to waste fewer shots than most other armies of the time. Interestingly enough, the French official doctrine approved by Napoleon called for exactly what the British did. More often that not however, it simply was not followed in the field and not just in the Peninsula or when Napoleon was not present. Once under fire, the attackers simply wanted to fire back so they often started shooting when engaged by the skirmishers or the artillery, despite their own usually strong skirmisher screen. Also, they were not very consistent with leveling and when they did do it, their points were set without due regard for the old black power flinch, which usually caused them to waste their shots high.

As to when the British wins occurred, basically throughout the Peninsula period. The British did move to the attack in 1813 and there were relatively more battles following that point but the French troop quality was still pretty high and they were never outnumbered by British troops alone. In fact, the battles with the greatest British casualties were fought in this period.

..... I think a further interesting question is why are the British so conspicuously absent from the campaigns on the continent?

It is interesting that the British chose to wait until Wellington recaptured Spain to fight on the continent but their were several factors encouraging that path. Relatively speaking Britain's military might was in its Navy and it simply didn't have the standing army necessary to engage in the size of battles that took place on the continent. Also, Britain remained concerned about invasion and wanted to keep a healthy part of its army home. Wellington had to beg, borrow and steal for troops and support for most of his time in Portugal and Spain. Parliament was not very keen on sending any troops even to Spain until the war was virtually won. Wellington knew all too well that he needed to be very stingy with his troops since he was not likely to get many more and replacements were in fact hard to come by until the last few years in Spain.

Food for thought.

 

[DCN1898]

I didn't go back through all of the old posts, Bernard Cornwell in his books, like to make the point that the British army was the only army that used live ammunition during practice. If true (I have no reason to doubt it.) it makes a huge difference in the drill of the troops.

 

[Spitfrnd]

I didn't go back through all of the old posts, Bernard Cornwell in his books, like to make the point that the British army was the only army that used live ammunition during practice. If true (I have no reason to doubt it.) it makes a huge difference in the drill of the troops.

It is apparently true and indeed was a factor. I only mentioned here the reasons for British success that had not been previously mentioned in the thread, like the two deep line (which ironically Napoleon favored) and the British reserve, which stemmed from the British management of their troops emotional reserves, as contrasted with the French practice of committing their total passion to the initial attack.

 

[Gebhard]

It is apparently true and indeed was a factor. I only mentioned here the reasons for British success that had not been previously mentioned in the thread, like the two deep line (which ironically Napoleon favored) and the British reserve, which stemmed from the British management of their troops emotional reserves, as contrasted with the French practice of committing their total passion to the initial attack.

Great point as i think there was a Great difference between the motivation of say the French who were fighting for an ideal (the Revolution) and the Brits who if you listen to Wellington were for fighting for altogether different reasons . Which could lead to the reason the Commanders committed their forces in the manor they chose to get the most out of them . All the best Gebhard

 

[Spitfrnd]

Great point as i think there was a Great difference between the motivation of say the French who were fighting for an ideal (the Revolution) and the Brits who if you listen to Wellington were for fighting for altogether different reasons . Which could lead to the reason the Commanders committed their forces in the manor they chose to get the most out of them . All the best Gebhard

Perhaps but I am not sure the French were still fighting for the revolution after 1805 or maybe even earlier. I favor the view that it was a conscious difference in approach for motivating their soldiers that had served the French well against their continental opponents who favored the same style. It worked great so long as the initial attack did not stall but if it did, the empty emotional tank created a serious vulnerability that was well exploited by the British tactic of withholding fire until close range quickly followed by a bayonet counter charge.

 

[FirstLegion]

Interestingly I am now persuaded that the British success against the French had less to do with Wellington and Napoleon than certain key factors about the way the soldiers for the two nations fought.

I agree with this to some extent. The British success against the French on the battlefield itself was most definitely due in large part to all of the reasons you cite. I would add to this their use of the 2 rank line of battle which meant that 33% more men were firing or that they could use 33% less men to cover the same amount of defensive frontage with the same amount of firepower. So you are definitely correct on these points. All this being said, Napoleon was effective not so much due to his tactical ability on the battlefield, Napoleon was successful because of his operational ability to manage a campaign and setup a favorable situation for himself on the battlefield. A battle like Austerlitz was in essence over before the first shot was ever fired as it was a strategic ambush of sorts. So I definitely think that had Napoleon himself been present on the Penninsula, the British wouldn't have enjoyed such success.

I also think that to remove the factor of Wellington is incorrect as well. He was better than anyone he faced on the Penninsula and in addition to the reasons you've cited, I'm sure this played a large role in the British success there.

The British did move to the attack in 1813 and there were relatively more battles following that point but the French troop quality was still pretty high and they were never outnumbered by British troops alone. In fact, the battles with the greatest British casualties were fought in this period.

I disagree with the troop quality aspect of this. Napoleon stripped the creme of what was in Spain immediately after the defeat in Russia to form the nucleus of the reconstituted Grande Armee. The threat in 1813 clearly came from Russia/Prussia/Austria, not from the Penninsula.

It is interesting that the British chose to wait until Wellington recaptured Spain to fight on the continent but their were several factors encouraging that path. Relatively speaking Britain's military might was in its Navy and it simply didn't have the standing army necessary to engage in the size of battles that took place on the continent. Also, Britain remained concerned about invasion and wanted to keep a healthy part of its army home. Wellington had to beg, borrow and steal for troops and support for most of his time in Portugal and Spain. Parliament was not very keen on sending any troops even to Spain until the war was virtually won. Wellington knew all too well that he needed to be very stingy with his troops since he was not likely to get many more and replacements were in fact hard to come by until the last few years in Spain.

All of this is true no doubt. The British decided to move their army to the continent only when it became apparent that Napoleon was defeated so that they would have a physical presence to represent their political interests (i.e. to make sure they got their share of the spoils and to defend their acquired territory).

 

[DCN1898]

Both commanders had a genius for using terrain to its' full potential. Napoleon vs Wellington on the Peninsula is a fascinating "what if".

 

[Spitfrnd]

I agree with this to some extent. The British success against the French on the battlefield itself was most definitely due in large part to all of the reasons you cite. I would add to this their use of the 2 rank line of battle which meant that 33% more men were firing or that they could use 33% less men to cover the same amount of defensive frontage with the same amount of firepower. So you are definitely correct on these points.....

I had mentioned the line versus column much earlier in this discussion but it should be noted the French used line and mixed formations as well so it was not always the distinquishing difference between the two forces. When it was, the difference in fire power was often devastating to the French.

All this being said, Napoleon was effective not so much due to his tactical ability on the battlefield, Napoleon was successful because of his operational ability to manage a campaign and setup a favorable situation for himself on the battlefield. A battle like Austerlitz was in essence over before the first shot was ever fired as it was a strategic ambush of sorts. So I definitely think that had Napoleon himself been present on the Penninsula, the British wouldn't have enjoyed such success.

I also think that to remove the factor of Wellington is incorrect as well. He was better than anyone he faced on the Penninsula and in addition to the reasons you've cited, I'm sure this played a large role in the British success there.....

Well I did not say these leaders were no factor, just perhaps not the primary factors. I know you think the great "N" walks on water and no doubt Wellington was also a brilliant commander but the facts are that both armies won battles without these two and the British in particular were almost as successful with commanders like Graham, Hill and even some relative unknowns.

I disagree with the troop quality aspect of this. Napoleon stripped the creme of what was in Spain immediately after the defeat in Russia to form the nucleus of the reconstituted Grande Armee. The threat in 1813 clearly came from Russia/Prussia/Austria, not from the Penninsula....

Again it is a question of degrees. Yes Napoleon took many experienced troops from Spain but whether he took the creme is somewhat debatable. What is clear is that he also left many battle hardened veterens in Spain and there were more than enough to present a fair contest to the British.

 

[FirstLegion]

I had mentioned the line versus column much earlier in this discussion but it should be noted the French used line and mixed formations as well so it was not always the distinquishing difference between the two forces. When it was, the difference in fire power was often devastating to the French.

I'm not talking about the difference between line and column, I'm talking about the British practice of using a 2 rank line vs. the French practice of using a 3 rank line. The British doctrine of a 2 rank line provides greater firepower advantages and better economy of force.

Well I did not say these leaders were no factor, just perhaps not the primary factors. I know you think the great "N" walks on water and no doubt Wellington was also a brilliant commander but the facts are that both armies won battles without these two and the British in particular were almost as successful with commanders like Graham, Hill and even some relative unknowns.

Well, the commanders definitely play a role at some point and I think they may perhaps be one of the primary factors. If you look at Napoleon's early battles when the French were using new doctrine against the linear armies of the continental powers, you see the Napoleon win crushing victories. Napoleon played a role no doubt, but also there is the fact that the French armies were more flexible in tactics and organization. Then later in the period when the continental powers modified their tactics and organization to match the french tactics and command structure, essentially providing parity between the two armies, Napoleon is still victorious in the overwhelming majority of battles. It's more of a slugging match then previously, but he still wins.

I'm not sure how applicable this is with the British, however, as the British and French always used different tactics. I use it merely as an example that in situations of parity, the better general nearly always won and generals as great as Napoleon or Alexander or Caesar were seldom defeated even in situations of non-parity with them on the short end. You can't undestimate the role that the individual plays in not only shaping the army but wielding it and without Napoleon, the French never subdue the continent in the way that they did. Of course, it probably would have been best for France if Napoleon had a heart attack and died in 1811, but who's counting.

Again it is a question of degrees. Yes Napoleon took many experienced troops from Spain but whether he took the creme is somewhat debatable.

I really don't think this is debatable at all. Napoleon absolutely drew upon the experienced cadre of what was in Spain to rebuild the grande armee in 1813. He also took the best of what was there, including himself, to fight Austria in 1809. We'll just have to agree to disagree on this point! Such is the ongoing debate between the Napoleonic Francophile and Napoleonic Anglophile! On some issues, never the two shall meet!

 

[Spitfrnd]

I'm not talking about the difference between line and column, I'm talking about the British practice of using a 2 rank line vs. the French practice of using a 3 rank line. The British doctrine of a 2 rank line provides greater firepower advantages and better economy of force.

Ah sorry if I missed your point. Actually I am not sure how much of a difference that really was relative to the British. Napoleon as well as a number of other senior French commanders realized the 3 line formation was relatively worthless since the third rank was just a likely to hit its own men as the enemy if it fired and not very enthusiastic about giving up its muskets to reload for the second line. It does not seem the French used 3 lines in the Peninsula very much at all but you are correct that when they did, they effectively wasted one-third of their potential firepower. However, I would only reiterate that this distinction pales in significance against the relative French disadvantages in poorly or incorrectly leveling their muskets and firing too soon. For example, that later tendency was a major reason many of their squares were broken while no British square every was. Interestly, this was not probematic for them against their other opponents who largely suffered from the same tendencies.

Well, the commanders definitely play a role at some point and I think they may perhaps be one of the primary factors. If you look at Napoleon's early battles when the French were using new doctrine against the linear armies of the continental powers, you see the Napoleon win crushing victories. Napoleon played a role no doubt, but also there is the fact that the French armies were more flexible in tactics and organization. Then later in the period when the continental powers modified their tactics and organization to match the French tactics and command structure, essentially providing parity between the two armies, Napoleon is still victorious in the overwhelming majority of battles. It's more of a slugging match then previously, but he still wins.

I'm not sure how applicable this is with the British, however, as the British and French always used different tactics. I use it merely as an example that in situations of parity, the better general nearly always won and generals as great as Napoleon or Alexander or Caesar were seldom defeated even in situations of non-parity with them on the short end. You can't underestimate the role that the individual plays in not only shaping the army but wielding it and without Napoleon, the French never subdue the continent in the way that they did. Of course, it probably would have been best for France if Napoleon had a heart attack and died in 1811, but who's counting.

Agreed that great commanders win even when they shouldn't and are often the deciding factor in battles, especially in this period. Fear not, I am not trying to deprive Napoleon or Wellington of their dues but merely noting that there is solid research to suggest that there were other institutional factors to explain the relative disparity of French victories against other continental opponents versus their very poor record against the British. Of course, there are insufficient examples to provide a statistically valid review of Napoleon's potential influence on this record but there is little doubt that the commanders he sent to Spain did win battles without him and that some of the battles he won would have been won without his tactic or logistical brilliance. Similarly, while Wellington did do better than any other single British commander, he was certainly not the only British commander to win against the French. So that leaves one to wonder how a battle like Waterloo might have turned out had neither been present.

I really don't think this is debatable at all. Napoleon absolutely drew upon the experienced cadre of what was in Spain to rebuild the grande armee in 1813. He also took the best of what was there, including himself, to fight Austria in 1809. We'll just have to agree to disagree on this point! Such is the ongoing debate between the Napoleonic Francophile and Napoleonic Anglophile! On some issues, never the two shall meet!

And when they do meet, the British win. Sorry I couldn't resist such a setup. Yes Napoleon took SOME of the best units from Spain in 1809 and to a greater extent in 1813 but if you are suggesting that the Peninsula British were always fighting with the starters against the second string, I simply don't see the evidence for that. If you examine the units and their experience remaining in Spain at any time you will find many veterans with many battle honors that in number were greater than their British equivalents for every period prior to 1814. In fact, in the early Peninsula battles, the British were not only dramatically outnumbered but vastly over matched in the experience of their respective units. Yet still they won; it is really that simple. But of course you know that I completely respect your right to a contrary, albeit Frankophile, opinion; just so long as you give me some running French to complete my dioramas of the typical outcome of the British / French encounters.