Dan Sickles at Gettysburg (1 Viewer)

[Rob]

I think there is no doubt it was a bad decision. But as I mentioned earlier. He had done something similar 2 months earlier at Chancellorsville (advancing toward Catherine Furnace leaving the 11thCorp isolated). You can understand his decision to advance to the Peach Orchard and vicinity when you look at what happened to the 3 rd Corp when the withdrew from Hazel Grove to Fairview(maybe that was his thought process). The Peach Orchard and up the E-burg road provided a good artillery platform. (the confederates did you use it). If he had enough men. It might not have been a bad move. But the position was vastly undermanned and he did it without orders. The position was doomed to fail.

Quite right Brad, also judging by his private life he was not averse to taking risks or being the center of attention so perhaps his decision was par for his character, as well as fatal for many of his men.

Rob

 

[UKReb]

Did Sickles ever publish a good explanation as to why he moved and what did he say to try and pin the blame on Meade?

Terry

Gettysburg is viewed today as a great Union victory, however, it is worth remembering that at the time it was considered a huge disappointment in the North simply because Meade was unable to prevent Lee escaping back to Virginia. Lincoln was beside himself with anger that Meade had not pursued the Rebel army as it retreated. During Sickles recuperation in Washington his good friend Lincoln visited him many times and expressed his disappointment and Sickles helped reinforce Lincoln's displeasure by telling him he believed that Meade could have destroyed the retreating Confederates at Williamsport (how he could have known that lying in a hospital bed is anyone's guess). But there is no doubt that the North's disappointment- especially Lincoln's- led to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War's Gettysburg hearings in the spring of 1864.

The committee called all of Meade's senior officers to testify and their first witness was Sickles himself who was bitter that he had not been allowed back in the army and his beloved III Corps had been disbanded. One of the biggest criticisms was that Sickles- by abandoning Little Round Top- had jeopardised the entire Union line. Sickles repeatedly lied at the hearing by saying that he did occupy the position and supervised the placement of reinforcements there. He argued that Meade had approved his new position because he did not ask him to withdraw from it. He then threw in the most damaging comment against Meade that the Commander of the Union forces had in fact planned to retreat from Gettysburg on the second day before victory was won.

Sickles statement was based on a proposed meeting that Meade had called at 3.00pm on the second day with all of his Corps Commanders to discuss their next move. In preparation for this meeting he asked Gen Butterfield to put together a contingency retreat order. But the meeting never took place because Engineer Officer Gouverner Warren arrived with the shocking news that Sickles was out of line by nearly a half mile in front of the Cemetery Ridge line and Little Round Top was only occupied by a few signalmen. As Meade rode to Sickles and demanded an explanation, Longstreet's artillery opened up. Sickles lamely offered to withdraw but Meade made the questionable decision to leave him there and to reinforce him. Meade also made the mistake of not court martialling Sickles because if you read his battle report his rebuke of Sickles is quite mild by merely stating that it was an error of judgement to move his Corps forward.

However, Meade survived the enquiry but Lincoln never trusted him and when he brought Grant east he fully expected Grant to sack Meade and was surprised when he retained his services in the role of Commander of the Army of Potomac.

As for Sickles he would continue to lie about his actions at Gettysburg and that his advance forward by his III Corps had prevented Meade from abandoning Gettysburg. It was these continuous lies against Meade over the next five decades that has made Sickles a historical hated figure rather than just his incompetent actions on the second day


Bob

 

[Rob]

Gettysburg is viewed today as a great Union victory, however, it is worth remembering that at the time it was considered a huge disappointment in the North simply because Meade was unable to prevent Lee escaping back to Virginia. Lincoln was beside himself with anger that Meade had not pursued the Rebel army as it retreated. During Sickles recuperation in Washington his good friend Lincoln visited him many times and expressed his disappointment and Sickles helped reinforce Lincoln's displeasure by telling him he believed that Meade could have destroyed the retreating Confederates at Williamsport (how he could have known that lying in a hospital bed is anyone's guess). But there is no doubt that the North's disappointment- especially Lincoln's- led to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War's Gettysburg hearings in the spring of 1864.

The committee called all of Meade's senior officers to testify and their first witness was Sickles himself who was bitter that he had not been allowed back in the army and his beloved III Corps had been disbanded. One of the biggest criticisms was that Sickles- by abandoning Little Round Top- had jeopardised the entire Union line. Sickles repeatedly lied at the hearing by saying that he did occupy the position and supervised the placement of reinforcements there. He argued that Meade had approved his new position because he did not ask him to withdraw from it. He then threw in the most damaging comment against Meade that the Commander of the Union forces had in fact planned to retreat from Gettysburg on the second day before victory was won.

Sickles statement was based on a proposed meeting that Meade had called at 3.00pm on the second day with all of his Corps Commanders to discuss their next move. In preparation for this meeting he asked Gen Butterfield to put together a contingency retreat order. But the meeting never took place because Engineer Officer Gouverner Warren arrived with the shocking news that Sickles was out of line by nearly a half mile in front of the Cemetery Ridge line and Little Round Top was only occupied by a few signalmen. As Meade rode to Sickles and demanded an explanation, Longstreet's artillery opened up. Sickles lamely offered to withdraw but Meade made the questionable decision to leave him there and to reinforce him. Meade also made the mistake of not court martialling Sickles because if you read his battle report his rebuke of Sickles is quite mild by merely stating that it was an error of judgement to move his Corps forward.

However, Meade survived the enquiry but Lincoln never trusted him and when he brought Grant east he fully expected Grant to sack Meade and was surprised when he retained his services in the role of Commander of the Army of Potomac.

As for Sickles he would continue to lie about his actions at Gettysburg and that his advance forward by his III Corps had prevented Meade from abandoning Gettysburg. It was these continuous lies against Meade over the next five decades that has made Sickles a historical hated figure rather than just his incompetent actions on the second day


Bob

Excellent post Bob, good to have you on this thread mate.

I also wanted to ask your opinion of by far and away the most successful General at Gettysburg, Alfred Iverson, what was it that made him so good Bob????{eek3}:wink2:
Rob

 

[Phantom Warrior]

Gettysburg is viewed today as a great Union victory, however, it is worth remembering that at the time it was considered a huge disappointment in the North simply because Meade was unable to prevent Lee escaping back to Virginia. Lincoln was beside himself with anger that Meade had not pursued the Rebel army as it retreated. During Sickles recuperation in Washington his good friend Lincoln visited him many times and expressed his disappointment and Sickles helped reinforce Lincoln's displeasure by telling him he believed that Meade could have destroyed the retreating Confederates at Williamsport (how he could have known that lying in a hospital bed is anyone's guess). But there is no doubt that the North's disappointment- especially Lincoln's- led to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War's Gettysburg hearings in the spring of 1864.

The committee called all of Meade's senior officers to testify and their first witness was Sickles himself who was bitter that he had not been allowed back in the army and his beloved III Corps had been disbanded. One of the biggest criticisms was that Sickles- by abandoning Little Round Top- had jeopardised the entire Union line. Sickles repeatedly lied at the hearing by saying that he did occupy the position and supervised the placement of reinforcements there. He argued that Meade had approved his new position because he did not ask him to withdraw from it. He then threw in the most damaging comment against Meade that the Commander of the Union forces had in fact planned to retreat from Gettysburg on the second day before victory was won.

Sickles statement was based on a proposed meeting that Meade had called at 3.00pm on the second day with all of his Corps Commanders to discuss their next move. In preparation for this meeting he asked Gen Butterfield to put together a contingency retreat order. But the meeting never took place because Engineer Officer Gouverner Warren arrived with the shocking news that Sickles was out of line by nearly a half mile in front of the Cemetery Ridge line and Little Round Top was only occupied by a few signalmen. As Meade rode to Sickles and demanded an explanation, Longstreet's artillery opened up. Sickles lamely offered to withdraw but Meade made the questionable decision to leave him there and to reinforce him. Meade also made the mistake of not court martialling Sickles because if you read his battle report his rebuke of Sickles is quite mild by merely stating that it was an error of judgement to move his Corps forward.

However, Meade survived the enquiry but Lincoln never trusted him and when he brought Grant east he fully expected Grant to sack Meade and was surprised when he retained his services in the role of Commander of the Army of Potomac.

As for Sickles he would continue to lie about his actions at Gettysburg and that his advance forward by his III Corps had prevented Meade from abandoning Gettysburg. It was these continuous lies against Meade over the next five decades that has made Sickles a historical hated figure rather than just his incompetent actions on the second day


Bob

Thanks Bob. Your post clears up all of the after battle intrigue I was curious about.

I'm still trying to understand why Sickles thought the peach orchard with it's slightly better elevation was a better strategic position than Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top when clearly it isn't. It seems Meade was partly to blame for reinforcing Sickles peach orchard position instead of ordering him back to Cemetery Ridge and for not rebuking Sickles more strongly. But did Sickles ever state a rational explanation for moving forward other than they saw I had moved so they must have approved? Why did he move forward in the first place to trade a small gain in elevation for a much worse strategic position with several obvious weaknesses. Weaknesses that were obvious to several other Union Generals and to a few Confederate generals too.

Terry

 

[Barksdale]

I have studied the battle of Gettysburg, particularly July 2nd. Dan Sickles has been slammed by many historians for brashly moving his corps forward...against orders no less. Many people see the utter decimation of his corps as reckless and a mistake. For many years I believed them. Once I actually started thinking about it, I realized they were wrong. If Sickles hadn't moved forward from his original position, he would've fallen into line to the south of the 2nd corps, covering the southern part of Cemetery Ridge and the northern slope of Little Round Top if not the whole hill itself. When Longstreet would've started his attack as planned, he simply would've rolled up Sickles flank and sent them running...probably followed by the 2nd corps and so on all the way to Cemetery Hill. Now, whether Sickles realized what was about to happen and moved his troops forward to protect the flank or he just preferred the ground in front of him...we'll never know for certain. Whatever the reason, I think the decision to move his corps forward against direct orders from Meade was a brilliant decision that saved the day! Chamberlain did a good thing saving Little Round Top from the rebels but you have to realize that they are both just a part of what happened on July 2nd. Sickles acted as a filter and took the brunt of the rebel assault. Chamberlain caught everything that came "through the filter." More credit needs to be given to Sickles for, one way or another, saving the entire left flank of the Army of the Potomac on the afternoon of July 2nd, 1863.:salute:::salute:::salute:::salute:::salute:::salute:::salute:::salute:::salute::

 

[UKReb]

Thanks Bob. Your post clears up all of the after battle intrigue I was curious about.

I'm still trying to understand why Sickles thought the peach orchard with it's slightly better elevation was a better strategic position than Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top when clearly it isn't. It seems Meade was partly to blame for reinforcing Sickles peach orchard position instead of ordering him back to Cemetery Ridge and for not rebuking Sickles more strongly. But did Sickles ever state a rational explanation for moving forward other than they saw I had moved so they must have approved? Why did he move forward in the first place to trade a small gain in elevation for a much worse strategic position with several obvious weaknesses. Weaknesses that were obvious to several other Union Generals and to a few Confederate generals too.

Terry

Terry

The problem with giving you an accurate answer of why Sickles moved forward is that Sickles was such a darn liar. In all my years of studying this and other ACW battles I have never been able to locate any reports from either of Sickles Divisional Commanders- Birney and Humphreys-both very capable soldier officers on exactly why they thought they were ordered to move forward. Now true orders from a Corps Commander must be obeyed especially in a battle situation but if it was seen- as you say- by a number of Union officers such as Hancock and Gibbon who watched in complete astonishment as III Corps advanced "in beautiful military style" saying to each other "What in Hell can that man Sickles be doing?" if they saw it then why didn't Birney or Humphrey's see that too. Maybe they did and just blindly followed orders but it doesn't fit their record as good officers.

Here's what I know- Early on the morning on the 2nd day Buford's cavalry were stationed on the immediate left wing of the Union line. Buford's boys who had fought most of the first day were tired and hungry and he asked to be relieved. Meade agreed, that left Sickles Corps as the immediate left wing and that made old Dan extremely nervous. Sickles told Meade he wanted to move his artillery forward to higher ground. Meade made it clear where he wanted him positioned and even pointed to LRT as the very visible anchor for Sickles line. He then asked if he was authorised to post his corps in a manner he thought suitable. Meade replied "Certainly within the limits of my general instructions that I have given you". Meade gave him Henry Hunt to help post the III Corps guns. Sickles showed Hunt the position which he wished to move his whole Corps too and asked Hunt for his authority-Hunt a very professional soldier refused but cautioned Sickles to reconnoitre the Pitzer's Woods beyond the Emmitsburg Road before he positioned his artlllery. He sent four companies of Sharpshooters into the woods where they immediately came across Reb pickets and began a fierce firefight. Reporting back to Sickles that there were numerous Rebels west of the Peach Orchard he took this to mean that the Peach Orchard line he wanted to occupy was about to be taken by the enemy. Sickles being a political rather than a West Point general seemed to believe corps-commander rank entitled him to considerable flexibility in obeying orders and he moved the whole III Corps forward. We know the outcome.

Bob

Excellent post Bob, good to have you on this thread mate.

I also wanted to ask your opinion of by far and away the most successful General at Gettysburg, Alfred Iverson, what was it that made him so good Bob????{eek3}:wink2:
Rob

Rob
Are you sure you got the right general here? because in my book Iverson was a complete disaster at Gettysburg. One of his mortally wounded officers cursed "that imbecile Iverson" with his dying breath. Following the battle Lee made him a Provost Marshal-which was a polite way of removing him from field command.

Bob

 

[Rob]

Terry

The problem with giving you an accurate answer of why Sickles moved forward is that Sickles was such a darn liar. In all my years of studying this and other ACW battles I have never been able to locate any reports from either of Sickles Divisional Commanders- Birney and Humphreys-both very capable soldier officers on exactly why they thought they were ordered to move forward. Now true orders from a Corps Commander must be obeyed especially in a battle situation but if it was seen- as you say- by a number of Union officers such as Hancock and Gibbon who watched in complete astonishment as III Corps advanced "in beautiful military style" saying to each other "What in Hell can that man Sickles be doing?" if they saw it then why didn't Birney or Humphrey's see that too. Maybe they did and just blindly followed orders but it doesn't fit their record as good officers.

Here's what I know- Early on the morning on the 2nd day Buford's cavalry were stationed on the immediate left wing of the Union line. Buford's boys who had fought most of the first day were tired and hungry and he asked to be relieved. Meade agreed, that left Sickles Corps as the immediate left wing and that made old Dan extremely nervous. Sickles told Meade he wanted to move his artillery forward to higher ground. Meade made it clear where he wanted him positioned and even pointed to LRT as the very visible anchor for Sickles line. He then asked if he was authorised to post his corps in a manner he thought suitable. Meade replied "Certainly within the limits of my general instructions that I have given you". Meade gave him Henry Hunt to help post the III Corps guns. Sickles showed Hunt the position which he wished to move his whole Corps too and asked Hunt for his authority-Hunt a very professional soldier refused but cautioned Sickles to reconnoitre the Pitzer's Woods beyond the Emmitsburg Road before he positioned his artlllery. He sent four companies of Sharpshooters into the woods where they immediately came across Reb pickets and began a fierce firefight. Reporting back to Sickles that there were numerous Rebels west of the Peach Orchard he took this to mean that the Peach Orchard line he wanted to occupy was about to be taken by the enemy. Sickles being a political rather than a West Point general seemed to believe corps-commander rank entitled him to considerable flexibility in obeying orders and he moved the whole III Corps forward. We know the outcome.

Bob



Rob
Are you sure you got the right general here? because in my book Iverson was a complete disaster at Gettysburg. One of his mortally wounded officers cursed "that imbecile Iverson" with his dying breath. Following the battle Lee made him a Provost Marshal-which was a polite way of removing him from field command.

Bob

Yeah am just kidding mate, was just reading how is leaderless men went forward and the Union boys rose up from behind a wall and shot down the Rebs in almost perfect lines, it was heavy sarcasm on my part Bob.

Rob

 

[lancer]

Yeah am just kidding mate, was just reading how is leaderless men went forward and the Union boys rose up from behind a wall and shot down the Rebs in almost perfect lines, it was heavy sarcasm on my part Bob.

Rob

Got me on that one.:tongue: Iverson's brigade was shot to pieces, suffering over 65% casualties, and officer losses were so heavy that Captains were in command of 3 of Iverson's 4 NC regiments by the end of battle. -- Al

 

[Rob]

Got me on that one.:tongue: Iverson's brigade was shot to pieces, suffering over 65% casualties, and officer losses were so heavy that Captains were in command of 3 of Iverson's 4 NC regiments by the end of battle. -- Al

^&grin

Al, don't you and Bob read the smilies.....I thought you'd get the wink!^&grin

It was a disaster wasn't it, in fact didn't he at first condemn his men as cowards when he thought they were trying to surrender when in fact they were mostly dead or wounded?

Rob

 

[lancer]

^&grin

Al, don't you and Bob read the smilies.....I thought you'd get the wink!^&grin

It was a disaster wasn't it, in fact didn't he at first condemn his men as cowards when he thought they were trying to surrender when in fact they were mostly dead or wounded?

Rob

LOL. Rob, I can be smiley challenged when I haven't eaten. Time to go get a sandwich.^&grin -- Al

 

[Rob]

LOL. Rob, I can be smiley challenged when I haven't eaten. Time to go get a sandwich.^&grin -- Al

^&grin

I hear you on that one mate!

Rob

 

[Phantom Warrior]

Thanks Bob. That's the best explanation of Sickles action I have heard. Still some unanswered questions that look like they will remain unanswered by history. Who knows what he was thinking. But reading biographical material on Sickles, it was completely within his character to act out of turn and be reckless. But I still can't see how he thought the advance would gain him anything. He pestered for permission to advance and after being repeatedly told no, perhaps hhe had lost sight of the why to advance and was just being bloody minded, or drunk, or both.

Terry

 

[lancer]

Just throwing this out there but I think there is a possibility that Sickles didn't trust his superiors to make a correct decision in terms of his Corps placement. What I mean is that Sickles finds himself assigned to a line of defense where HE can't see properly and that HE, being on site and the High Command not on site, had the right to correct his troop alignment. Let's face it, the Army of the Potomac hadn't had a lot of success to this point in the war, so it is not too far beyond the realm of possibility that certain field commanders had less than full trust in command decisions and might trust their own decisions, made on the spot, a lot more than decisions and commands coming from the rear. From what I know of Sickles, this sounds like a likely sequence of thought, to me. Of course it is impossible to read minds and this is just my speculation but 2 years of being outfoxed by General Lee had to play on the thought processes and moral of the Union commanders. Sickles didn't have the line of sight he wanted, he was on the spot, so he decided to correct the 'problem'. The results are a perfect example of being careful of what you wish for. -- Al

 

[Phantom Warrior]

One consideration I had was he wanted to move the artillery to the high ground to prevent any Confederate movement across his front to the south and around his flank. To make up for the time he was not allowed to stop a similar movement by Stonewall Jackson who passed across and routed the union right at ??? It could be the gamble he was willing to take by moving forward at Gettysburg to prevent himself from being outflanked while misjudging the extreme peril moving forward would put him in. But then he never gave an explanation like that.

Terry

 

[swalterh]

This seems like a great discussion going on so far.

As Bob mentioned, early on July 2nd the 1st and 2nd USSS were deployed forward of the 3rd Corps position to reconnoiter and were eventually engaged in a minor firefight with the leading elements of Longstreet’s Corps on Seminary Ridge.

IMHO, it is more than reasonable for an aggressively minded 19th Century Corps Commander, even one who was not formally trained such as Sickles, to maneuver his troops towards the “sound of the guns” in the true Napoleonic tradition. Especially after receiving reports that the leading elements of his own force had made contact with the enemy.

As Al mentioned, at this particular point in the Civil War the Union Army of the Potomac had suffered through some good thrashings at the hands of Bobby Lee and his invincible Army of Northern Virginia. This created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust amongst the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. Sickles would not have been immune to this. I think Al’s explanation describing Sickles probable attitude towards his superiors is a more than reasonable assessment.

As was also mentioned earlier in the discussion, just a few months earlier Sickles was ordered to abandon his position at Hazel Grove during the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates occupied the position shortly after forcing Sickles’ rear guard out of the Grove. The Confederates then transformed the position into a powerful artillery platform that wrought terrific destruction upon the Union forces throughout the remainder of the battle.

To clarify, I’m not a Sickles fan. I despise his personal character and have little regard for his abilities as a soldier. But, in this particular case his movement forward, although disastrous for his command and himself (as this action resulted in wounds to his person, pride and reputation) actually produced some positive results from a strictly military perspective. And when the full back-story of his wartime experience leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg is analyzed, the reasoning behind his decision to advance his troops on July 2nd becomes more clear and understandable.

By advancing his corps to the elevated terrain in and around the Peach Orchard, Sickles temporarily seizes the initiative away from the Confederates and forces them to abandon their original attack plan and adjust to this new Yankee threat. In true “Army of Northern Virginia Fashion” Hood and McLaws waste no time recognizing the opportunity and quickly engage the poorly placed advanced elements of the 3rd Corps. Admittedly, the initial encounters in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den are overwhelmingly favorable for the Confederates. Any military assessment of the situation concerning the salient created by Sickles movement will lead to the conclusion that the positions held by his troops were completely untenable.

But, by forcing the Confederate Divisions to fight for these positions, “Sickles Folly” bought critical time that allowed other Union formations to react to the threat. This resulted in Meade dispatching elements from the 2nd and 5th Corps to the scene. During the initial fighting in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den, Sickles Corps is tying down both of Longstreet’s available divisions. (Remember Pickett’s Division had not yet arrived)

Without sufficient Confederate reserves, the net result of the engagements between Longstreet’s and Sickles’ forces was to drain away the Confederate combat power on minor preliminary objectives (i.e. Devil’s Den, Peach Orchard, Wheat Field) instead of allowing them to concentrate the bulk of their force against their primary objectives of Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge.

By the time the surviving elements of Longstreet’s Corps reached their primary objectives, the Union army already had sufficient forces in place to insure the defense of these vital terrain features.

Did Sickles’ decision to advance his corps result in the eventual successful Union defense of the key positions that came under attack during the second day? Yes.

Was it pretty? (i.e. by the book) No.

Did a lot of people die as a result of his decision? Yes.

So, the question will undoubtedly arise, “Could the Union Army still have held Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge if Sickles would have obeyed his orders and stayed put?”

 

[braddinpa]

Also, if anyone is interested in reading an excellent book on Sickles at Gettysburg. There is a book called "Sickles at Gettysburg" by James Hessler. A licensed GB battlefield tour guide. A very good book. Oh, publisher is Savas

 

[Terp152]

This seems like a great discussion going on so far.

As Bob mentioned, early on July 2nd the 1st and 2nd USSS were deployed forward of the 3rd Corps position to reconnoiter and were eventually engaged in a minor firefight with the leading elements of Longstreet’s Corps on Seminary Ridge.

IMHO, it is more than reasonable for an aggressively minded 19th Century Corps Commander, even one who was not formally trained such as Sickles, to maneuver his troops towards the “sound of the guns” in the true Napoleonic tradition. Especially after receiving reports that the leading elements of his own force had made contact with the enemy.

As Al mentioned, at this particular point in the Civil War the Union Army of the Potomac had suffered through some good thrashings at the hands of Bobby Lee and his invincible Army of Northern Virginia. This created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust amongst the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. Sickles would not have been immune to this. I think Al’s explanation describing Sickles probable attitude towards his superiors is a more than reasonable assessment.

As was also mentioned earlier in the discussion, just a few months earlier Sickles was ordered to abandon his position at Hazel Grove during the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates occupied the position shortly after forcing Sickles’ rear guard out of the Grove. The Confederates then transformed the position into a powerful artillery platform that wrought terrific destruction upon the Union forces throughout the remainder of the battle.

To clarify, I’m not a Sickles fan. I despise his personal character and have little regard for his abilities as a soldier. But, in this particular case his movement forward, although disastrous for his command and himself (as this action resulted in wounds to his person, pride and reputation) actually produced some positive results from a strictly military perspective. And when the full back-story of his wartime experience leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg is analyzed, the reasoning behind his decision to advance his troops on July 2nd becomes more clear and understandable.

By advancing his corps to the elevated terrain in and around the Peach Orchard, Sickles temporarily seizes the initiative away from the Confederates and forces them to abandon their original attack plan and adjust to this new Yankee threat. In true “Army of Northern Virginia Fashion” Hood and McLaws waste no time recognizing the opportunity and quickly engage the poorly placed advanced elements of the 3rd Corps. Admittedly, the initial encounters in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den are overwhelmingly favorable for the Confederates. Any military assessment of the situation concerning the salient created by Sickles movement will lead to the conclusion that the positions held by his troops were completely untenable.

But, by forcing the Confederate Divisions to fight for these positions, “Sickles Folly” bought critical time that allowed other Union formations to react to the threat. This resulted in Meade dispatching elements from the 2nd and 5th Corps to the scene. During the initial fighting in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den, Sickles Corps is tying down both of Longstreet’s available divisions. (Remember Pickett’s Division had not yet arrived)

Without sufficient Confederate reserves, the net result of the engagements between Longstreet’s and Sickles’ forces was to drain away the Confederate combat power on minor preliminary objectives (i.e. Devil’s Den, Peach Orchard, Wheat Field) instead of allowing them to concentrate the bulk of their force against their primary objectives of Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge.

By the time the surviving elements of Longstreet’s Corps reached their primary objectives, the Union army already had sufficient forces in place to insure the defense of these vital terrain features.

Did Sickles’ decision to advance his corps result in the eventual successful Union defense of the key positions that came under attack during the second day? Yes.

Was it pretty? (i.e. by the book) No.

Did a lot of people die as a result of his decision? Yes.

So, the question will undoubtedly arise, “Could the Union Army still have held Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge if Sickles would have obeyed his orders and stayed put?”

Good analysis, but I would counter that the destruction of III Corps was too high a price to pay. This included what was considered the best division in the army, Kearny's former command. Sickle's advance made possible the near collapse of the Union center and loss of the field of battle. Chris

 

[lancer]

Also, if anyone is interested in reading an excellent book on Sickles at Gettysburg. There is a book called "Sickles at Gettysburg" by James Hessler. A licensed GB battlefield tour guide. A very good book. Oh, publisher is Savas

Anyone who reads and collects books on the ACW should be aware of the many excellent books that Savas Beatie are publishing. They are turning out a lot of them. -- Al

 

[Phantom Warrior]

This seems like a great discussion going on so far.

As Bob mentioned, early on July 2nd the 1st and 2nd USSS were deployed forward of the 3rd Corps position to reconnoiter and were eventually engaged in a minor firefight with the leading elements of Longstreet’s Corps on Seminary Ridge.

IMHO, it is more than reasonable for an aggressively minded 19th Century Corps Commander, even one who was not formally trained such as Sickles, to maneuver his troops towards the “sound of the guns” in the true Napoleonic tradition. Especially after receiving reports that the leading elements of his own force had made contact with the enemy.

As Al mentioned, at this particular point in the Civil War the Union Army of the Potomac had suffered through some good thrashings at the hands of Bobby Lee and his invincible Army of Northern Virginia. This created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust amongst the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. Sickles would not have been immune to this. I think Al’s explanation describing Sickles probable attitude towards his superiors is a more than reasonable assessment.

As was also mentioned earlier in the discussion, just a few months earlier Sickles was ordered to abandon his position at Hazel Grove during the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates occupied the position shortly after forcing Sickles’ rear guard out of the Grove. The Confederates then transformed the position into a powerful artillery platform that wrought terrific destruction upon the Union forces throughout the remainder of the battle.

To clarify, I’m not a Sickles fan. I despise his personal character and have little regard for his abilities as a soldier. But, in this particular case his movement forward, although disastrous for his command and himself (as this action resulted in wounds to his person, pride and reputation) actually produced some positive results from a strictly military perspective. And when the full back-story of his wartime experience leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg is analyzed, the reasoning behind his decision to advance his troops on July 2nd becomes more clear and understandable.

By advancing his corps to the elevated terrain in and around the Peach Orchard, Sickles temporarily seizes the initiative away from the Confederates and forces them to abandon their original attack plan and adjust to this new Yankee threat. In true “Army of Northern Virginia Fashion” Hood and McLaws waste no time recognizing the opportunity and quickly engage the poorly placed advanced elements of the 3rd Corps. Admittedly, the initial encounters in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den are overwhelmingly favorable for the Confederates. Any military assessment of the situation concerning the salient created by Sickles movement will lead to the conclusion that the positions held by his troops were completely untenable.

But, by forcing the Confederate Divisions to fight for these positions, “Sickles Folly” bought critical time that allowed other Union formations to react to the threat. This resulted in Meade dispatching elements from the 2nd and 5th Corps to the scene. During the initial fighting in the Peach Orchard and Devils Den, Sickles Corps is tying down both of Longstreet’s available divisions. (Remember Pickett’s Division had not yet arrived)

Without sufficient Confederate reserves, the net result of the engagements between Longstreet’s and Sickles’ forces was to drain away the Confederate combat power on minor preliminary objectives (i.e. Devil’s Den, Peach Orchard, Wheat Field) instead of allowing them to concentrate the bulk of their force against their primary objectives of Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge.

By the time the surviving elements of Longstreet’s Corps reached their primary objectives, the Union army already had sufficient forces in place to insure the defense of these vital terrain features.

Did Sickles’ decision to advance his corps result in the eventual successful Union defense of the key positions that came under attack during the second day? Yes.

Was it pretty? (i.e. by the book) No.

Did a lot of people die as a result of his decision? Yes.

So, the question will undoubtedly arise, “Could the Union Army still have held Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge if Sickles would have obeyed his orders and stayed put?”

Or Sickles could simply have occupied the position on Cemetary Ridge , Devils Den and Little Round Top as he had been ordered to do. No need to destroy III Corps just to delay a Confederate attack when LTR could havebeen a formidable position with artillery.

Terry

 

[swalterh]

Good analysis, but I would counter that the destruction of III Corps was too high a price to pay. This included what was considered the best division in the army, Kearny's former command. Sickle's advance made possible the near collapse of the Union center and loss of the field of battle. Chris

Or Sickles could simply have occupied the position on Cemetary Ridge , Devils Den and Little Round Top as he had been ordered to do. No need to destroy III Corps just to delay a Confederate attack when LTR could havebeen a formidable position with artillery.

Terry

For the sake of discussion, I will contend that even if Sickles had maintained his original positions, in accordance with his superiors’ directives, there is no guarantee that III Corps still wouldn’t have been wiped out.

The men of III Corps were under the command of Dan Sickles and would still have been subject to their commander’s tactical skill and C3I (command, control, communications & intelligence) abilities.

Also, they still would have been facing the same rebel units and commanders that ended up ejecting them from the Peach Orchard, Devil’s Den and the Wheat Field. IMHO it is reasonable to assume that Hood and McLaws could have enjoyed similar success against Sickles on LTR and Cemetery Ridge.

Given these unfortunate circumstances there is also no guarantee that the Union army would have been able to resist the assault launched by Longstreet’s Corps had Sickles and III Corps occupied the positions that Meade and his staff originally ordered.

The focal point of my argument on this particular subject is combat power.

Combat Power: Definition: (DOD, NATO)
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a Military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

Based on the fighting that occurred on July 2, 1863, we know that it took the III Corps and elements from two other Union Corps to eventually halt the Confederate attacks against the Union left. Additionally, the Confederates were denied the attainment of their primary objectives by the narrowest of margins. The eventual outcome of the second days fighting came down to a few pivotal decisions and actions executed by junior officers at decisive moments.

The key here is whether or not we believe that the difference in terrain and position gained by occupying Cemetery Ridge and LTR would have enabled the III Corps to sustain an effective defense against the potential combat power that the Confederates of Longstreet’s Corps were capable of projecting in their assault against the Union left. And if not, then could the other senior level Union commanders (i.e. Meade, Hancock, Sykes etc…) have reacted to the developments in such a manner that would have allowed the Army of the Potomac to either properly support III Corps and repel the rebel attack or to expel the Confederates from their captured positions (Cemetery Ridge and LTR) with a timely and coordinated counter-attack.

When we look at what actually occurred, we know that Sickles’ maneuver immediately focused the attention of his peers and superiors on the decisive point of the fighting on the Second Day. His Corps successfully drained enough of the Confederate’s combat power before the rebels could reach Cemetery Ridge and LTR. This allowed the Federal Army’s reinforcing units that eventually occupied these positions to effectively hold against what little combat power the Confederates had left to throw at them.

Also, by forcing the Confederates to fight well in advance of the key terrain features that dominated this portion of the battlefield, Sickles and III Corps bought valuable time for the Union command team to appropriately react to the situation. The end result of the fighting on the Union left flank was that all of the forces involved (US & CS) took a severe pounding and that the Union Army still retained control over the key terrain features.

So, the question remains, “Could the Union Army still have held Little Round Top and Cemetery Ridge if Sickles would have obeyed his orders and stayed put?”