First World War: Causes, Battles, Personalities etc... (2 Viewers)

[swalterh]

"Certainly the colonies enabled GB to tap large resources (even decisive amounts) of manpower and materials, once GB got organized on a war-footing and was able to take advantage of these resources. These resources also certainly enabled GB to carry on a long war and outlast Germany's more limited resources. All of these advantages would work towards victory once they were brought online, something that took a good while to gear up. I am more skeptical that all these advantages made GB any more prepared to fight when war finally did break out, with prepared obviously the key word. The nature of colonial warfare did provide GB and France alike, a certain proportion of men that had frontline experience and that had been under fire, something no training could provide, and the army of GB was certainly trained to a very high standard, especially with their weapons, which made them extremely effective in the opening campaign of the war, but I think the truth is that because of the initial time GB needed to build an army of equal size, the initial clash of arms was a matter of win or lose on what decisions were or weren't made and executed by the French and German armies. Had the French Army collapsed, been unable to rally at the Marne, GB would have been unable to do anything to influence the outcome and would have had to scramble, ala 1940, to save her army from the mainland. All this has nothing to do with GB's ability to wage or win the war in the long run, just her ability to influence land events initially, with such a small, albeit, professional force. -- Al"

OK Al,

You win, here's a Great War Thread to keep this line of discussion going.

So, given your highly detailed and insightful assessment, do you believe that Germany would've been better served to stay on the operational offensive on the western front following their initial setback at the Battle of the Marne (1914). Given the nature of the time frame it was going to take the British and French to get the resources of their respective empires on line, it seems the German General Staff should have kept the pressure on the western allies. I believe this complete failure to maintain the initiative can be directly attributed to the breakdown of the German General Staff system. What was once a highly professional and disciplined organization had been corrupted by heritage and patronage. This left some highly incapable individuals in positions of extreme responsibility and the German fighting formations suffered for it in the summer of 1914.

Another great post. I am thoroughly enjoying this conversation.

 

[lancer]

"Certainly the colonies enabled GB to tap large resources (even decisive amounts) of manpower and materials, once GB got organized on a war-footing and was able to take advantage of these resources. These resources also certainly enabled GB to carry on a long war and outlast Germany's more limited resources. All of these advantages would work towards victory once they were brought online, something that took a good while to gear up. I am more skeptical that all these advantages made GB any more prepared to fight when war finally did break out, with prepared obviously the key word. The nature of colonial warfare did provide GB and France alike, a certain proportion of men that had frontline experience and that had been under fire, something no training could provide, and the army of GB was certainly trained to a very high standard, especially with their weapons, which made them extremely effective in the opening campaign of the war, but I think the truth is that because of the initial time GB needed to build an army of equal size, the initial clash of arms was a matter of win or lose on what decisions were or weren't made and executed by the French and German armies. Had the French Army collapsed, been unable to rally at the Marne, GB would have been unable to do anything to influence the outcome and would have had to scramble, ala 1940, to save her army from the mainland. All this has nothing to do with GB's ability to wage or win the war in the long run, just her ability to influence land events initially, with such a small, albeit, professional force. -- Al"

OK Al,

You win, here's a Great War Thread to keep this line of discussion going.

So, given your highly detailed and insightful assessment, do you believe that Germany would've been better served to stay on the operational offensive on the western front following their initial setback at the Battle of the Marne (1914). Given the nature of the time frame it was going to take the British and French to get the resources of their respective empires on line, it seems the German General Staff should have kept the pressure on the western allies. I believe this complete failure to maintain the initiative can be directly attributed to the breakdown of the German General Staff system. What was once a highly professional and disciplined organization had been corrupted by heritage and patronage. This left some highly incapable individuals in positions of extreme responsibility and the German fighting formations suffered for it in the summer of 1914.

Another great post. I am thoroughly enjoying this conversation.

Very interesting question. I haven't made a study of the German high command system beyond knowing that the wrong people were in charge during the crucial opening campaigns. Indecisive would be the word. It is also a question of a two-front strategy. I believe the Germans thought their best chance to avoid a long, destructive, and potentially fatal two-front war (once the opening offensive failed to destroy France) was to knock Russia out of the war. They made the decision to stay on the defensive in the west while attempting to put Russia out. It is a strategy that payed well up until 1916. The German strategy was a matter of some comprimise between the 'westerners' and easteners' within the high command. In point of fact, I believe the Germans essentially got caught without a viable Plan B when the von Schlieffen plan failed, due mainly to pre-war tampering with the pure plan and the indecisive nature of von Moltke the Younger. Of course there were other important reasons that von Moltke failed, not the least of which were French recuperative powers, and the very unexpected rapid and successful initial advances by the Russians in the east. I would probably agree with your assessment that Germany's efforts might have best been expended in the west, before Allied war production and manpower capabilities became overwhelming, but I don't honestly know if German leaders and tactics in the 1914 and 1915 time periods would have proved any more inciteful or successful than Allied efforts were to prove. There was a learning curve for both sides and the Germans certainly couldn't have absorbed similar losses for as long as the Allies did in the west during these early years. Besides, the Allies, despite Russia's inadequacies, didn't have to deal with a partner like Austro-Hungary. Had the Germans been able to knock Russia out earlier than they did and been able to concentrate better their efforts in the west as a result, it could have been a much different war. Germany must have cursed the A-H empire on more than one occasion. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Very interesting question. I haven't made a study of the German high command system beyond knowing that the wrong people were in charge during the crucial opening campaigns. Indecisive would be the word. It is also a question of a two-front strategy. I believe the Germans thought their best chance to avoid a long, destructive, and potentially fatal two-front war (once the opening offensive failed to destroy France) was to knock Russia out of the war. They made the decision to stay on the defensive in the west while attempting to put Russia out. It is a strategy that payed well up until 1916. The German strategy was a matter of some comprimise between the 'westerners' and easteners' within the high command. In point of fact, I believe the Germans essentially got caught without a viable Plan B when the von Schlieffen plan failed, due mainly to pre-war tampering with the pure plan and the indecisive nature of von Moltke the Younger. Of course there were other important reasons that von Moltke failed, not the least of which were French recuperative powers, and the very unexpected rapid and successful initial advances by the Russians in the east. I would probably agree with your assessment that Germany's efforts might have best been expended in the west, before Allied war production and manpower capabilities became overwhelming, but I don't honestly know if German leaders and tactics in the 1914 and 1915 time periods would have proved any more inciteful or successful than Allied efforts were to prove. There was a learning curve for both sides and the Germans certainly couldn't have absorbed similar losses for as long as the Allies did in the west during these early years. Besides, the Allies, despite Russia's inadequacies, didn't have to deal with a partner like Austro-Hungary. Had the Germans been able to knock Russia out earlier than they did and been able to concentrate better their efforts in the west as a result, it could have been a much different war. Germany must have cursed the A-H empire on more than one occasion. -- Al

Al

Again you raise some interesting points. Your argument about the perceivable absence of a viable plan B is IMO very relevant and could explain some of the discombobulated operations attempted at the close of 1914-beginning of 1915. The continued offensive at Ypres only served to satiate Falkenhayen’s sense of pride and cost the German Army some of its best and most enthusiastic troops.

I appreciate how you pointed out that there existed a major struggle for influence amongst the high command once Falkenhayen had taken over direction of the General Staff. Ludendorff and Hindenburg were very aggressively outspoken about their opinions supporting a “Russia First” strategy following their victory at Tannenberg. I sometimes speculate that the disaster at Ypres was Falkenhayen’s attempt at gaining a cheap victory in order to counteract the bureaucratic leverage enjoyed by the Hindenburg-Ludendorff block. Regrettably for him the “Old Contemptibles” had other ideas.

On the two front strategy issue, Moltke the Elder was more inclined to believe that knocking Russia out of the war first and then focusing on France was the way to go. The Schlieffen Plan appeared to be the “official” operational framework from which the German Army was to prosecute the war, but given the support thrown behind the “easterners” one has to wonder how much “unofficial” support the Schlieffen Plan enjoyed amongst the German Officer Corps. Moltke the Younger’s less than enthusiastic execution of his predecessor’s designs lead me to believe that there may have been a lack of moral commitment on his part to the ideas and concepts espoused by Schlieffen. At the last minute, when faced with the decision of reinforcing the right wing moving into Belgium or shipping available forces to the eastern front to defend East Prussia, Moltke elected to side with his uncle rather than his tutor. As you mentioned, following the battle of the Marne, another reason behind the support for concentrating forces on the eastern front was the limited reliability that could be placed in Germany’s Austro-Hungarian allies.

 

[lancer]

Al

Again you raise some interesting points. Your argument about the perceivable absence of a viable plan B is IMO very relevant and could explain some of the discombobulated operations attempted at the close of 1914-beginning of 1915. The continued offensive at Ypres only served to satiate Falkenhayen’s sense of pride and cost the German Army some of its best and most enthusiastic troops.

I appreciate how you pointed out that there existed a major struggle for influence amongst the high command once Falkenhayen had taken over direction of the General Staff. Ludendorff and Hindenburg were very aggressively outspoken about their opinions supporting a “Russia First” strategy following their victory at Tannenberg. I sometimes speculate that the disaster at Ypres was Falkenhayen’s attempt at gaining a cheap victory in order to counteract the bureaucratic leverage enjoyed by the Hindenburg-Ludendorff block. Regrettably for him the “Old Contemptibles” had other ideas.

On the two front strategy issue, Moltke the Elder was more inclined to believe that knocking Russia out of the war first and then focusing on France was the way to go. The Schlieffen Plan appeared to be the “official” operational framework from which the German Army was to prosecute the war, but given the support thrown behind the “easterners” one has to wonder how much “unofficial” support the Schlieffen Plan enjoyed amongst the German Officer Corps. Moltke the Younger’s less than enthusiastic execution of his predecessor’s designs lead me to believe that there may have been a lack of moral commitment on his part to the ideas and concepts espoused by Schlieffen. At the last minute, when faced with the decision of reinforcing the right wing moving into Belgium or shipping available forces to the eastern front to defend East Prussia, Moltke elected to side with his uncle rather than his tutor. As you mentioned, following the battle of the Marne, another reason behind the support for concentrating forces on the eastern front was the limited reliability that could be placed in Germany’s Austro-Hungarian allies.

As you point out, I don't think the German High Command did trust the Schlieffen plan. The many 'tweaks' to the plan reinforce this belief, in particular the constant pre-war strengthening of the LEFT wing as opposed to the "Keep the right wing strong" mantra espoused by Schlieffen. Moltke just didn't trust the left wing, as layed out by Schlieffen, to hold back the French assaults. May have been a fatal tampering but I think another real problem, besides the fatal turn inside of Paris, was a lack of understanding about the strain that the wheeling far right flank had to deal with, both in terms of wear and tear on the men, but on the logistical system as well. The whole timetable was unrealistic from conception.
I have always been under the impression that the transfer of two Army Corps by the Germans to the east, during the invasion, was in response to the unexpectedly rapid advance of the Russians, and the resulting panic by Pritzwitz, rather than a deliberate choice to do so. Is this wrong? -- Al

 

[swalterh]

As you point out, I don't think the German High Command did trust the Schlieffen plan. The many 'tweaks' to the plan reinforce this belief, in particular the constant pre-war strengthening of the LEFT wing as opposed to the "Keep the right wing strong" mantra espoused by Schlieffen. Moltke just didn't trust the left wing, as layed out by Schlieffen, to hold back the French assaults. May have been a fatal tampering but I think another real problem, besides the fatal turn inside of Paris, was a lack of understanding about the strain that the wheeling far right flank had to deal with, both in terms of wear and tear on the men, but on the logistical system as well. The whole timetable was unrealistic from conception.
I have always been under the impression that the transfer of two Army Corps by the Germans to the east, during the invasion, was in response to the unexpectedly rapid advance of the Russians, and the resulting panic by Pritzwitz, rather than a deliberate choice to do so. Is this wrong? -- Al

Given the available evidence your view is the academically accepted one. I’m merely speculating that there could have been an underlying motive in Moltke the Younger’s decision making process that, without existing evidence, can’t be proven. I don’t mean to cloud the discussion with psycho analysis that can’t be backed up by anything substantial. I was just merely postulating that his uncle Moltke the elder was more of a proponent of the Russia First strategy. I’m suggesting the possibility that a certain segment of the officer corps may have been more loyal to his line of thinking than Schlieffens.

 

[lancer]

Given the available evidence your view is the academically accepted one. I’m merely speculating that there could have been an underlying motive in Moltke the Younger’s decision making process that, without existing evidence, can’t be proven. I don’t mean to cloud the discussion with psycho analysis that can’t be backed up by anything substantial. I was just merely postulating that his uncle Moltke the elder was more of a proponent of the Russia First strategy. I’m suggesting the possibility that a certain segment of the officer corps may have been more loyal to his line of thinking than Schlieffens.

I understand. Not having made a detailed study of the German High Command, I just wouldn't know about the various hidden motives that might have been in play. I'm at the mercy of the teachings of my former history prof and what I have read in relation to Schlieffen and the German war plans. I don't see why what you suggest might not be true. The Schleiffen plan certainly was altered quite a bit. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Since there aren’t many commanders from this conflict whom history holds in good standing, I’ll adjust a bit from Best/Favorite Commanders to most Notorious Commander.

So, who’s your most notorious WWI commander?

In my view the most notorious commander of the Great War is Erich von Falkenhayen in his role as Chief of the German General Staff. He had every possible advantage in the patronage department. He was a good friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II and was the military tutor of the Crown Prince. I find him grossly deficient in the attributes required for top level command. He allowed himself to become mired in petty bureaucratic squabbles with his rivals. This situation served to split the high command between an Eastern and Western faction with himself heading up the westerners. His failed offensives on the Western Front, referring mainly to 1st Ypres and Verdun, reek of an attempt to override the influential leverage gained by his rivals Ludendorff and Hindenburg from their victories on the Eastern Front?

At 1st Ypres, Falkenhayen refused to acknowledge the infeasibility of continued assaults against the British positions. In an effort to drive a wedge in the allied line he squandered elements of the Guard Corps and committed a large contingent of inexperienced university students to the fray. The result of the operations involving these young reservists was a complete disaster and has been given the somber sobriquet Kindermord bei Ypern (Literally: Death of the children at Ypres).

The operational plan for Verdun consisted of nothing more inspirational than a battle of attrition. The idea was to bleed the French army white. Falkenhayen cunningly formulated his plan around the Crown Prince’s German 5th Army. This he used to gain support for the plan at court by providing the Prince a substantial opportunity to achieve martial glory. Unfortunately Falkenhayen got his wish, the French army suffered significant casualties. But, he didn’t count on the French inflicting just as much if not more damage on the German formations as they absorbed themselves. Before the offensive reached its conclusion, the Crown Prince himself began advocating for its cessation. The battle was an overwhelming defeat and gained little in terms of territory.

Falkenhayen was removed from his post shortly after the failed Verdun offensive and replaced by his rival Paul von Hindenburg. I’m sure that Falkenhayen, like many other commanders in this conflict gave the utmost of his abilities to his country. Unfortunately for the thousands of young Germans who fought and died while under his command, his performance in the top position was less than exemplary. It appears that many of his operational motives served to disarm his rivals in the East rather than fully commit to directing a winning war effort at the strategic level. The eventual result is that he was replaced by the seemingly more capable Hindenburg. I think that this situation exemplifies a senior level commander who was more concerned with his personal enemies within the organization rather than the real enemies without. In short, Erich von Falkenhayen took his eye off the ball and his country, and many German soldiers paid the price.

 

[swalterh]

I understand. Not having made a detailed study of the German High Command, I just wouldn't know about the various hidden motives that might have been in play. I'm at the mercy of the teachings of my former history prof and what I have read in relation to Schlieffen and the German war plans. I don't see why what you suggest might not be true. The Schleiffen plan certainly was altered quite a bit. -- Al

A great and I mean great source on pre-war Imperial Germany is Janet and Joe Robinson’s “Handbook of Imperial Germany.” An absolute must read when trying to understand the guys on the other side of no-man’s land.

It encompasses a lot of organizational & societal aspects regarding the Empire. Yes, the military stuff is in there too. Like recruitment and training. Daily life in the active service. How to become an officer etc... You'll find after reading a few pages that Imperial Germany was anything but a highly centralized society. I think we westerners get the misconception that because the Prussian Army was highly disciplined and professional that the entire "country" of Germany was like that too. In fact it was still a loose confederation of Kingdoms, Principalities, and Lesser States. One of the only centralized features of the Empire was the Army and there were still independent contingents such as the Saxon, Bavarian and Wurttemberg elements.

 

[Louis Badolato]

A great and I mean great source on pre-war Imperial Germany is Janet and Joe Robinson’s “Handbook of Imperial Germany.” An absolute must read when trying to understand the guys on the other side of no-man’s land.

It encompasses a lot of organizational & societal aspects regarding the Empire. Yes, the military stuff is in there too. Like recruitment and training. Daily life in the active service. How to become an officer etc... You'll find after reading a few pages that Imperial Germany was anything but a highly centralized society. I think we westerners get the misconception that because the Prussian Army was highly disciplined and professional that the entire "country" of Germany was like that too. In fact it was still a loose confederation of Kingdoms, Principalities, and Lesser States. One of the only centralized features of the Empire was the Army and there were still independent contingents such as the Saxon, Bavarian and Wurttemberg elements.

View attachment 118106

Another excellent book for understanding the German military leading up to WWI is "A Genius for War: The German Great General Staff" by Gudmunsen, a retired U.S. Marine Officer.

 

[lancer]

Since there aren’t many commanders from this conflict whom history holds in good standing, I’ll adjust a bit from Best/Favorite Commanders to most Notorious Commander.

So, who’s your most notorious WWI commander?

In my view the most notorious commander of the Great War is Erich von Falkenhayen in his role as Chief of the German General Staff. He had every possible advantage in the patronage department. He was a good friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II and was the military tutor of the Crown Prince. I find him grossly deficient in the attributes required for top level command. He allowed himself to become mired in petty bureaucratic squabbles with his rivals. This situation served to split the high command between an Eastern and Western faction with himself heading up the westerners. His failed offensives on the Western Front, referring mainly to 1st Ypres and Verdun, reek of an attempt to override the influential leverage gained by his rivals Ludendorff and Hindenburg from their victories on the Eastern Front?

At 1st Ypres, Falkenhayen refused to acknowledge the infeasibility of continued assaults against the British positions. In an effort to drive a wedge in the allied line he squandered elements of the Guard Corps and committed a large contingent of inexperienced university students to the fray. The result of the operations involving these young reservists was a complete disaster and has been given the somber sobriquet Kindermord bei Ypern (Literally: Death of the children at Ypres).

The operational plan for Verdun consisted of nothing more inspirational than a battle of attrition. The idea was to bleed the French army white. Falkenhayen cunningly formulated his plan around the Crown Prince’s German 5th Army. This he used to gain support for the plan at court by providing the Prince a substantial opportunity to achieve martial glory. Unfortunately Falkenhayen got his wish, the French army suffered significant casualties. But, he didn’t count on the French inflicting just as much if not more damage on the German formations as they absorbed themselves. Before the offensive reached its conclusion, the Crown Prince himself began advocating for its cessation. The battle was an overwhelming defeat and gained little in terms of territory.

Falkenhayen was removed from his post shortly after the failed Verdun offensive and replaced by his rival Paul von Hindenburg. I’m sure that Falkenhayen, like many other commanders in this conflict gave the utmost of his abilities to his country. Unfortunately for the thousands of young Germans who fought and died while under his command, his performance in the top position was less than exemplary. It appears that many of his operational motives served to disarm his rivals in the East rather than fully commit to directing a winning war effort at the strategic level. The eventual result is that he was replaced by the seemingly more capable Hindenburg. I think that this situation exemplifies a senior level commander who was more concerned with his personal enemies within the organization rather than the real enemies without. In short, Erich von Falkenhayen took his eye off the ball and his country, and many German soldiers paid the price.

Good analysis of von Falkenhayn. Just an addition to his insidious nature, he kept the attrition aim of the Verdun offensive to himself. As far as he let the Crown Prince believe, it was to be a legitimate assault to capture Verdun. Falkenhayn knew stating attrition as the main point of the offensive would be, at the very least, bad for his commanders and men's morale. As far as preparations and planning went, it WAS a legitimate attempt to capture Verdun, only Falkenhayn's real wish was that it would take a long time to achieve because he hoped France would throw all her effort and manpower into saving Verdun, thus bringing the all important attrition aspect into play. Falkenhayn had no qualms about deceiving the Crown Prince as to his real intentions at Verdun. It was Falkenhayn's attempt to knock France out of the war, hoping she could not sustain either her morale or the casualties. As you state though, Falkenhayn failed to appreciate the double-edged sword aspect of the plan. In order to pin your enemy into a long, wasteful campaign, one also has to commit one's own army to the same. As the battle dragged on, and French and German casualties rose, Falkenhayn became more concerned with the coming Allied counter-offensive that he knew was coming on the Somme. He withheld needed troops and supplies from the Verdun campaign, (needed, that is, if a breakthrough was to be achieved), all the while letting the Crown Prince continue his efforts, believing that Falkenhayn still supported a break-through, when, in fact, Falkenhayn had now turned his attention to the Somme. Falkenhayn's whole plan at Verdun was for a bloodbath and it succeeded, except it hurt the German Army as much as it did the French Army. Although final casualties in the 10 month battle are disputed to this day, it is generally accepted that losses were only slightly less to the Germans in terms ofmanpower losses. The loss in terms of the German soldier's morale was much greater.
A very useful and interesting book on the subject is "German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916" by Robert Foley, published by Cambridge in 2005. -- Al

 

[lancer]

My favorite WW1 commander is Henri Petain, far and away. His reputation coming out of the slaughter of WW1 was possibly greater than any other commander other than Foch. Petain was ahead of the curve in that he had always believed that 'firepower kills', that artillery did the heavy work, with infantry following. He was a careful, methodical planner who, unlike many of contemporaries, did not charge headlong at the enemy. He was not a disciple of the all-out offensive that was in favor within the French military. Above all, he was careful with and cared for his men, something else his fellow commanders weren't noted for, thus he was called on to save the French Army from collapse due to mutiny following the disasterous Nivelle offensive of April-May 1917. It was the second time he was called on to save France in a moment of crisis. His first was at Verdun when he was brought in to save the situation when all looked lost. Petain stabilized the situation,and setting up a valid defensive plan, ensuring a steady supply of men and materials, and providing confidence to his men and the panicky politicians. When called on to replace Nivelle, he proceded to defuse the mutinies with a fair but firm hand. He visited the army, division by division, heard the complaints, and instituted changes that were of primary importance to his men, involving basic comforts, rights, and most importantly, a promise that their lives would no longer be wasted in large, bloody offensives. He had to use force to help bring the mutinies to an end, but he kept the executions to a minimum. He then proceded to get the army back into fighting form through the institution of the changes he promised, such as improving food and leave, and launching only small offensives with limited goals, thus restoring the confidence of the army. I don't think it is too much to say that without Petain, Frances loses the war. A bold statement, but no one else within the French High command could have done what he did at Verdun, much less stepping in and replacing Neville, with the French Army broken and in mutiny. Even someone like Foch would have failed in the mutiny situation. Foch was too offensive oriented and hadn't the reputation in the ranks to have pulled off what Petain did. Petain rose from the rank of Colonel to command of the French Army within a short 3+ years of war and saved his country in the process. -- Al

 

[Poppo]

My favorite WW1 commander is Henri Petain, far and away. His reputation coming out of the slaughter of WW1 was possibly greater than any other commander other than Foch. Petain was ahead of the curve in that he had always believed that 'firepower kills', that artillery did the heavy work, with infantry following. He was a careful, methodical planner who, unlike many of contemporaries, did not charge headlong at the enemy. He was not a disciple of the all-out offensive that was in favor within the French military. Above all, he was careful with and cared for his men, something else his fellow commanders weren't noted for, thus he was called on to save the French Army from collapse due to mutiny following the disasterous Nivelle offensive of April-May 1917. It was the second time he was called on to save France in a moment of crisis. His first was at Verdun when he was brought in to save the situation when all looked lost. Petain stabilized the situation,and setting up a valid defensive plan, ensuring a steady supply of men and materials, and providing confidence to his men and the panicky politicians. When called on to replace Nivelle, he proceded to defuse the mutinies with a fair but firm hand. He visited the army, division by division, heard the complaints, and instituted changes that were of primary importance to his men, involving basic comforts, rights, and most importantly, a promise that their lives would no longer be wasted in large, bloody offensives. He had to use force to help bring the mutinies to an end, but he kept the executions to a minimum. He then proceded to get the army back into fighting form through the institution of the changes he promised, such as improving food and leave, and launching only small offensives with limited goals, thus restoring the confidence of the army. I don't think it is too much to say that without Petain, Frances loses the war. A bold statement, but no one else within the French High command could have done what he did at Verdun, much less stepping in and replacing Neville, with the French Army broken and in mutiny. Even someone like Foch would have failed in the mutiny situation. Foch was too offensive oriented and hadn't the reputation in the ranks to have pulled off what Petain did. Petain rose from the rank of Colonel to command of the French Army within a short 3+ years of war and saved his country in the process. -- Al

Cared with his men? Well, all french and italian generals were butchers of their men, the french and italian command was rather criminal....Italian and french soldiers had almost more to fear from their officiers than from the enemy....

 

[lancer]

Cared with his men? Well, all french and italian generals were butchers of their men, the french and italian command was rather criminal....Italian and french soldiers had almost more to fear from their officiers than from the enemy....

Yes, careful with his men, especially when compared to other contemporary commanders, of whatever nationality. Petain's commands, be they regimental, divisional, corp or army level, were consistently well prepared. Often, Petain's command reached their objectives while those units around him did not. I'm not saying he didn't suffer casualties, heavy at times, I'm saying his commands, within the framework of the given orders, were able to accomplish things other commands could not. Remember, until given command of the French Army after the Neville offensive in spring 1917, Petain had to take orders from his commander and execute those orders, just like any other subordinate, whatever they be. Petain was cognizent of casualties and did what was within his power to minimize losses. Condemning all WW1 commanders with the same label of butcher is hardly useful, or accurate. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Cared with his men? Well, all french and italian generals were butchers of their men, the french and italian command was rather criminal....Italian and french soldiers had almost more to fear from their officiers than from the enemy....

Poppo

Please don’t take this as being overly critical, IMO you have contributed many great posts to our discussions (you actually deserve a lot of the credit for getting the ball rolling due to the popularity of your ACW thread). But, I find it interesting that you have continued to apply blanket assessments for certain topics and have left little room in your arguments for exceptions. I think what Al is trying to do here is present an argument that highlights an exception to the traditionally accepted view regarding the performance of individuals exercising command responsibilities during the Great War.

Not to discount your assessments and opinions, because you raise valid points. I just believe that some room should be left in your positions to account for the instances that may not entirely fall under the auspices of your arguments.

 

[swalterh]

My favorite WW1 commander is Henri Petain, far and away. His reputation coming out of the slaughter of WW1 was possibly greater than any other commander other than Foch. Petain was ahead of the curve in that he had always believed that 'firepower kills', that artillery did the heavy work, with infantry following. He was a careful, methodical planner who, unlike many of contemporaries, did not charge headlong at the enemy. He was not a disciple of the all-out offensive that was in favor within the French military. Above all, he was careful with and cared for his men, something else his fellow commanders weren't noted for, thus he was called on to save the French Army from collapse due to mutiny following the disasterous Nivelle offensive of April-May 1917. It was the second time he was called on to save France in a moment of crisis. His first was at Verdun when he was brought in to save the situation when all looked lost. Petain stabilized the situation,and setting up a valid defensive plan, ensuring a steady supply of men and materials, and providing confidence to his men and the panicky politicians. When called on to replace Nivelle, he proceded to defuse the mutinies with a fair but firm hand. He visited the army, division by division, heard the complaints, and instituted changes that were of primary importance to his men, involving basic comforts, rights, and most importantly, a promise that their lives would no longer be wasted in large, bloody offensives. He had to use force to help bring the mutinies to an end, but he kept the executions to a minimum. He then proceded to get the army back into fighting form through the institution of the changes he promised, such as improving food and leave, and launching only small offensives with limited goals, thus restoring the confidence of the army. I don't think it is too much to say that without Petain, Frances loses the war. A bold statement, but no one else within the French High command could have done what he did at Verdun, much less stepping in and replacing Neville, with the French Army broken and in mutiny. Even someone like Foch would have failed in the mutiny situation. Foch was too offensive oriented and hadn't the reputation in the ranks to have pulled off what Petain did. Petain rose from the rank of Colonel to command of the French Army within a short 3+ years of war and saved his country in the process. -- Al

Yes, careful with his men, especially when compared to other contemporary commanders, of whatever nationality. Petain's commands, be they regimental, divisional, corp or army level, were consistently well prepared. Often, Petain's command reached their objectives while those units around him did not. I'm not saying he didn't suffer casualties, heavy at times, I'm saying his commands, within the framework of the given orders, were able to accomplish things other commands could not. Remember, until given command of the French Army after the Neville offensive in spring 1917, Petain had to take orders from his commander and execute those orders, just like any other subordinate, whatever they be. Petain was cognizent of casualties and did what was within his power to minimize losses. Condemning all WW1 commanders with the same label of butcher is hardly useful, or accurate. -- Al

Al

These are some great posts that highlight an often overlooked subject. Which is, the commanders of the Great War who actually did their jobs and did them well. Your remarks about Petain are interesting and extensive. I’d wonder if you’d be so kind as to give a similar assessment on Poppa Joffre.

It is my understanding (based on my limited knowledge of WWI) that the French war plan, Plan XVII, initially left him little operational flexibility. At the beginning of hostilities the French Army, very much like its opponent, began a systematized response to the coming German invasion. The French Army suffered some nasty thrashings along the frontier during their initial offensives into Loraine.

IMO Joffre deserves a substantial amount of credit for recognizing the German intentions, taking it upon himself to formulate a new plan of action to counteract the Schlieffen Plan and then having the fortitude to impose his will on his offensively oriented and indoctrinated subordinates during the retreat towards the French interior. I think it also important to point out that Joffre demonstrated superb leadership and persuasion skills when he met with Sir John French and encouraged him to reconstitute the BEF for a counter-attack against the Germans at the Battle of the Marne.

 

[lancer]

Al

These are some great posts that highlight an often overlooked subject. Which is, the commanders of the Great War who actually did their jobs and did them well. Your remarks about Petain are interesting and extensive. I’d wonder if you’d be so kind as to give a similar assessment on Poppa Joffre.

It is my understanding (based on my limited knowledge of WWI) that the French war plan, Plan XVII, initially left him little operational flexibility. At the beginning of hostilities the French Army, very much like its opponent, began a systematized response to the coming German invasion. The French Army suffered some nasty thrashings along the frontier during their initial offensives into Loraine.

IMO Joffre deserves a substantial amount of credit for recognizing the German intentions, taking it upon himself to formulate a new plan of action to counteract the Schlieffen Plan and then having the fortitude to impose his will on his offensively oriented and indoctrinated subordinates during the retreat towards the French interior. I think it also important to point out that Joffre demonstrated superb leadership and persuasion skills when he met with Sir John French and encouraged him to reconstitute the BEF for a counter-attack against the Germans at the Battle of the Marne.

The French Plan XVII was more a plan of mobilization in terms of troop concentration and initial deployment, more than it was a plan of war. The mobilization put 4 French armies into positions along the German, Luxembourg, and Belgian frontiers, with a 5th army in reserve, that was supposed to allow flexibility to react to whatever might occur. Ther were two key factors in French docturne that really restricted what Joffre could do. One was the long avowed goal of getting Alsace and Lorraine back after their loss because of the Franco-Prussian War debacle. The importance of this one factor alone tied France into an offensive war. There was also France's obligation to Russia which REQUIRED French offensive action no later than 11 days after mobilization. These two factors and the neccessity of preserving Belgian neutrality limited Joffre's options. Joffre kind of expected a German move through Belgian but had no concrete proof and also underestimated German capabilities by assuming that since French reservest troops were not of the highest quality, that German reserves would not play a large part in any opening offensive. Joffre therefore didn't believe Germany had the capability to pose a mortal threat by coming through Belgian. Major error. Joffre's war plan was to pin the German left through offensive action in Alsace, and launch a major offensive in the center, causing a breakthrough that would then isolate any German move through Belgium, on the right. Not a bad plan, but unrelated to reality as things developed. First, the French offensives began on August 14, launched into Alsace. They made progress initially but soon bogged down against the Germans. Remember that Moltke had strengthened the German left over the years, part of his alterations to the Schlieffen Plan. Secondly, and more important, the French advances in the center ran headlong into the massively large German offensive that was in full swing through Belgium and the Ardennes. The sheer size, in numbers and scope, of the German advance shocked and surprised the French and negated the French offensives. The resulting Battle of the Frontiers was all but a complete disaster for Joffre. In the collision, French forces were thrown back along all fronts, with massive losses. In the days from August 20-23, French losses included 40,000 KIA, with 27,000 KIA on August 22 alone. On August 24, Joffre went over to the defensive, even so, by August 29, total French losses had reached 260,000 (73,000 KIA). These horrific losses hid the fact that the French Army remained intact in retreat with many, as yet, uncommitted troops. Joffre also managed to keep his freedom of maneuver by breaking contact and not getting pinned, crucial to any plans for counter-attack. Joffre had kept his cool while his initial offensives crumbled and while he came to recognize the size, scope, and intention of the German advance. It was this ability to stay unpanicked and his decisiveness in formulating his counter-attack, and in such matters as dismissing commanders who failed to perform, that led to the 'Miracle of the Marne' and saved France in the first weeks of the war. As neither an original thinker or startegist, his ability came up short in 1915 when his many disasterous offensives cost France 1,549,000 casualties with nothing to show for the losses. His belief that all was going well, that his offensives were actually working towards a positive outcome, combined with being badly surprised by the German offensive at Verdun in February 1916, which reduced the French numbers committed to the Anglo-French plans for a war-winning offensive on the Somme, and above all, the seemingly endless casualties for little perceived gain, all combined to see Joffre relieved and replaced by Neville in December 1916. Without Joffre's sang-froid in the face of disaster in 1914, France loses the war, but bringing victory in the war proved far beyond his ability. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Without Joffre's sang-froid in the face of disaster in 1914, France loses the war, but bringing victory in the war proved far beyond his ability. -- Al

Al

The same could be said for all of the European commander in this war. It was in fact the AEF that tipped the scales. I realize the degree of the American impact will be continuously debated by amateur and professional historians alike (I'm sure this post will likely raise such a debate here). But, the fact remains that without the AEF on the Western Front, the outcome of the war would have been different. And IMO would have resulted in a German Victory.

Shane

 

[lancer]

Al

The same could be said for all of the European commander in this war. It was in fact the AEF that tipped the scales. I realize the degree of the American impact will be continuously debated by amateur and professional historians alike (I'm sure this post will likely raise such a debate here). But, the fact remains that without the AEF on the Western Front, the outcome of the war would have been different. And IMO would have resulted in a German Victory.

Shane

It is disputed by some, but what you say is very true. No AEF, no Allied victory. No matter how one wants to spin it, the very threat of massive US participation forced the Germans into action on the Western front to try and force the issue before the overwhelming numbers of fresh, enthusiastic US troops hit the field. Without the AEF, the German spring offensives sure might have had a more interesting conclusion, good or bad, but the following Allied offensives sure would have been problematic. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

The German East African Campaign of World War One is considered by many historians and military enthusiasts to be one of the greatest military endeavors of all time. The German Army that operated in the region was the only German force of the entire First World War to remain undefeated in combat.

Much of the credit for the success of the campaign goes, deservedly so, to the military commander of Germany’s East African Colony, Oberst (Colonel) Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck. But, the credit for this extraordinary effort must also be shared with his courageous and skilled soldiers who performed magnificently under the harshest of conditions.

At the outset of the war von Lettow-Vorbeck’s force was composed of roughly 216 German officers and non-commissioned officers and about 2,540 Askari, or native Africans in colonial service. The numbers of effective troops fluctuated over the course of the war but never exceeded 20,000 men. The entire force was known collectively as the Schutztruppe or protection force. Their opposition was comprised of approximately 350,000 men from Britain, India, South Africa and the Askari from the Belgian Congo. Often times under-equipped and always outnumbered, the men of the Schutztruppe outperformed their counterparts in every aspect of the military arts.

 

[swalterh]

It is disputed by some, but what you say is very true. No AEF, no Allied victory. No matter how one wants to spin it, the very threat of massive US participation forced the Germans into action on the Western front to try and force the issue before the overwhelming numbers of fresh, enthusiastic US troops hit the field. Without the AEF, the German spring offensives sure might have had a more interesting conclusion, good or bad, but the following Allied offensives sure would have been problematic. -- Al

Al

I agree with your thoughts.

It seems that modern historians and historical television programs neglect and even dismiss American involvement in the war. Contending that the American military’s contribution to the Great War was minimal and that the only substantial assistance the American Army supplied for the battered British and French armies was that of numerical superiority. An opinion statement written by Great War Society President Sal Compagne opposes this view stating, “In minimizing the value of the AEF on the battlefield historians and commentators fail to analyze what its absence would have meant. Without General Pershing's forces on the Western Front, Germany would have won the World War!”

Again I tend to agree with Mr. Compagne's opinion.

Shane