First World War: Causes, Battles, Personalities etc... (2 Viewers)

[swalterh]

Baker's directive is very revealing in terms of the powers entrusted to Pershing but, as mentioned before, very light on specifics. Pershing certainly had wide reaching power to achieve what he felt would be neccesary. Obviously, the most crucial aspect is the maintaining of force integrity, which disappointed the French and British no end. I have not read Eisenhower's book but I do like his writing style. Will try to pick that one up. I always liked the Stallings classic 'The Doughboys'. -- Al

Stalling's "Doughboys" was my first read on the subject of American participation in the War. Wonderful account from someone who was there on the ground (Marine Corps Officer I think, WIA as well if I'm not mistaken).

 

[swalterh]

When the War began in 1914, aircraft were initially used for mapping out enemy positions and troop movements. When passing an enemy observation plane many times the pilots would exchange smiles and waves. This soon developed into an exchange of gunfire. What started out as primitive shots fired from hand held weapons, developed into a full-fledged arms race between the warring nations to produce the fastest and highest flying fighting machines armed with the latest weaponry.

During the early stages of the air war the Germans gained the initial advantage by being the first to implement the synchronized forward firing machine gun. Anthony Fokker was the first aircraft designer to employ this lethal weapons system to his Fokker E.I or “Eindecker.” The Fokker acquired a fearsome reputation throughout the early fall and winter months of 1915. Lt. Max Immelmann, who shot down a British BE2c on August 1, 1915, achieved the first victory for the Fokker E.I. Armed with this technological advantage, German pilots were able to shoot down huge quantities of allied aircraft. These planes were so effective that the allies referred to this period of German success as the “Fokker Scourge.”

​

The Germans enjoyed air superiority for much of the war, due mostly to the continuous technological improvements made to their aircraft and their growing force of elite pilots such as Werner Foss, Max Immelmann, and Manfred von Ricthofen (der Rote Baron). They also maintained a superior strategy of flying most of their missions in the morning and early afternoon and avoided combat missions in the evening. Why this was such a crucial strategy is because at the tactical level of aerial combat the sun is of vital importance. When a pilot has the sun to his back in relation to his opponent he can use the sun to hinder his opponent’s vision thereby enabling the attacking pilot to ambush his enemy. Since the Germans were flying to the frontline from the east it made more sense that they fly their missions in the morning while the sun would be behind them.

The balance of the war shifted in late 1917 as the allies began producing better aircraft that could contend with those of the Germans. Their pilots also began to gain more experience and were able to develop tactics that enabled them to out fly their German counterparts. By 1918, attrition began to take its toll as many of the Luftstreitkräfte’s top pilots had been killed in combat.

With the entry of the United States into the war, the Germans were forced to abandon many of their gains on the Western Front. This was due in large part to the ability of the allied air forces to establish air superiority over the Western Front. Once they had control of the skies, the allied commanders were able to plan and execute the coordinated air-ground operations that eventually pushed back the Germans.

What successes, if any, could the Germans have achieved if they had attempted to take advantage of their superiority in the air by being more aggressive on the Western Front?

 

[W T Allison II]

This puts it all in perspective in my opinion-The return of America's Unknown Soldier to The Washington Naval Yard by the USS Olympia now berthed at Philadelphia. Very interesting and informative thread. Tommy

 

[waynepoo]

The Great War was and is one of mankinds biggest tragedies, it certainly was for Australia and my family with a Grandfather and three Uncles KIA. 416,809 Australians, 13.43% of the white male population and probably about half those those eligible, enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force, and 330,770 embarked for service abroad. The majority, about 295,000 served in France.
63,163 or a little fewer than one man in five, died on active service. 152,422 were otherwise made casualties, including some later killed. Casualties therefore totalled 215,585, which was 64.98% of those who embarked with the A.I.F. 27,594 of these casualties were suffered on Gallipoli, 4851 in Sinai or Palestine, 179,537 in France or Belgium, and the remainder in England, Egypt, Malta or at sea. There were more occasions on which Australians reported sick (332,901) than there were Australians embarked, but only 4084 were taken prisoner, including 3848 captured in France.
About 2000 returned men were permanently hospitalised as a result of the war, 22,742 veterans were in hospital in 1926, and 49,157 in 1939, and 90,389 in 1940, and 70,462 disabled men were receiving pensions in 1940.
Wayne.
LEST WE FORGET.

 

[Louis Badolato]

The Great War was and is one of mankinds biggest tragedies, it certainly was for Australia and my family with a Grandfather and three Uncles KIA. 416,809 Australians, 13.43% of the white male population and probably about half those those eligible, enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force, and 330,770 embarked for service abroad. The majority, about 295,000 served in France.
63,163 or a little fewer than one man in five, died on active service. 152,422 were otherwise made casualties, including some later killed. Casualties therefore totalled 215,585, which was 64.98% of those who embarked with the A.I.F. 27,594 of these casualties were suffered on Gallipoli, 4851 in Sinai or Palestine, 179,537 in France or Belgium, and the remainder in England, Egypt, Malta or at sea. There were more occasions on which Australians reported sick (332,901) than there were Australians embarked, but only 4084 were taken prisoner, including 3848 captured in France.
About 2000 returned men were permanently hospitalised as a result of the war, 22,742 veterans were in hospital in 1926, and 49,157 in 1939, and 90,389 in 1940, and 70,462 disabled men were receiving pensions in 1940.
Wayne.
LEST WE FORGET.

The sheer scale of the tragedy is mindblowing.

 

[lancer]

When the War began in 1914, aircraft were initially used for mapping out enemy positions and troop movements. When passing an enemy observation plane many times the pilots would exchange smiles and waves. This soon developed into an exchange of gunfire. What started out as primitive shots fired from hand held weapons, developed into a full-fledged arms race between the warring nations to produce the fastest and highest flying fighting machines armed with the latest weaponry.

During the early stages of the air war the Germans gained the initial advantage by being the first to implement the synchronized forward firing machine gun. Anthony Fokker was the first aircraft designer to employ this lethal weapons system to his Fokker E.I or “Eindecker.” The Fokker acquired a fearsome reputation throughout the early fall and winter months of 1915. Lt. Max Immelmann, who shot down a British BE2c on August 1, 1915, achieved the first victory for the Fokker E.I. Armed with this technological advantage, German pilots were able to shoot down huge quantities of allied aircraft. These planes were so effective that the allies referred to this period of German success as the “Fokker Scourge.”

View attachment 120182​

The Germans enjoyed air superiority for much of the war, due mostly to the continuous technological improvements made to their aircraft and their growing force of elite pilots such as Werner Foss, Max Immelmann, and Manfred von Ricthofen (der Rote Baron). They also maintained a superior strategy of flying most of their missions in the morning and early afternoon and avoided combat missions in the evening. Why this was such a crucial strategy is because at the tactical level of aerial combat the sun is of vital importance. When a pilot has the sun to his back in relation to his opponent he can use the sun to hinder his opponent’s vision thereby enabling the attacking pilot to ambush his enemy. Since the Germans were flying to the frontline from the east it made more sense that they fly their missions in the morning while the sun would be behind them.

The balance of the war shifted in late 1917 as the allies began producing better aircraft that could contend with those of the Germans. Their pilots also began to gain more experience and were able to develop tactics that enabled them to out fly their German counterparts. By 1918, attrition began to take its toll as many of the Luftstreitkräfte’s top pilots had been killed in combat.

With the entry of the United States into the war, the Germans were forced to abandon many of their gains on the Western Front. This was due in large part to the ability of the allied air forces to establish air superiority over the Western Front. Once they had control of the skies, the allied commanders were able to plan and execute the coordinated air-ground operations that eventually pushed back the Germans.

What successes, if any, could the Germans have achieved if they had attempted to take advantage of their superiority in the air by being more aggressive on the Western Front?

I like this summing up. Would add that German air strategy was also effected by two other noteworthy influences on the Westfront. Their defensive tactics were in keeping with their being generally outnumbered, although they did shift forces in order to gain air superiority in certain sectors when offensives were planned. On the whole, being outnumbered, it was just smart to let their enemy come to them. This was also influenced by the wind conditions of the Westfront which saw the wind blowing from west (the Allied side) to East the vast majority of the time. This was a major factor when engaged because a damaged German aircraft could glide to their side of the lines whereas Allied aircraft had to fight the wind to regain their lines, something hard to do in a damaged aircraft. The wind also would push aircraft over the German lines and deeper into German territory while aircraft were fighting, something Allied airmen had to constantly be aware of as a fight progressed, both in terms of fuel consumption and possible damage. To take just two examples of the influence of the wind in air combat, both involving Manfred von Richthofen, one helped him, one got him killed. The first occurred in the famous dogfight between Richthofen and Lanoe Hawker. The dogfight lasted a long time, with the wind blowing the combattants deeper and deeper into German territory. At a given point, Hawker realised he had to get back to the British side of the lines as his fuel was running low. He was forced to break for home, allowing Richthofen to get on his tail. Richthofen shot him down. The second example occurred on a day when the wind was blowing from East to West (a relatively rare occurrence), and a disadvantage for the Germans. On this day, April 21, 1918, Richthofen engaged in an airfight that he became fixated on, and he suddenly found himself low over Allied lines, with the wind taking him deeper into Allied territory. He thus broke off his pursuit of the Allied aircraft, and turned for home. This low turn over Allied lines exposed him to a hail of ground fire which killed him.
The German defensive air strategy and their largely superior aircraft meshed with the Allied offensive strategy and their generally inferior aircraft (at least through mid-1917), resulted in large Allied losses. It was, however, French airmen who initially gained the advantage in the air war, before the Fokker's with their synchronized guns took control. The first true air-to-air victory was scored by a Russian, on August 26, 1914. He was in an unarmed plane and he rammed his opponent, thus killing the German and himself. The first air-to-air victory with a living victor was scored by France on October 26, 1914. The first 'Ace' of the air was the Frenchman Adolphe Pegoud, who from February, 1915, through July, 1915, scored 6 victories, before being KIA that August. It was another Frenchman, Roland Garros, along with aircraft designer Raymond Saulnier, who developed the first machine gun aircraft weapon to fire through the airscrew. This was done with a system of steel wedges attached to the propeller, directly in line of the MG barrel line of fire, that acted as deflectors for any bullet that might hit the prop. It wasn't a perfect system but it worked and it allowed Garros to terrorize German airmen as he shot down 3 German aircraft between April 1, 1915 and April 18, 1915. He then suffered engine failure on a later flight and came down in German territory and was captured. His secret weapon was exposed. The German High command commisioned Anthony Fokker to develope a similar weapon, which he did with a greatly improved advancement called synchronization, and the Fokker Scourge soon followed, but it was the early French flyers such as Pegoud, Garros, Navarre, Nungesser, and Guynemer who first controlled skies with their fighter tactics.
I believe the Germans did about as well as they could have in the skies of France, given their inferior numbers, their defensive startegy and tactics, and, as the war dragged on, their continuing decline in the raw materials needed to carry on a successful airwar, like oil, gas, and rubber. I just don't really see where being more aggressive would have helped, especially tactically, where their fighting methods brought them such success against the Allied airman. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

I like this summing up. Would add that German air strategy was also effected by two other noteworthy influences on the Westfront. Their defensive tactics were in keeping with their being generally outnumbered, although they did shift forces in order to gain air superiority in certain sectors when offensives were planned. On the whole, being outnumbered, it was just smart to let their enemy come to them. This was also influenced by the wind conditions of the Westfront which saw the wind blowing from west (the Allied side) to East the vast majority of the time. This was a major factor when engaged because a damaged German aircraft could glide to their side of the lines whereas Allied aircraft had to fight the wind to regain their lines, something hard to do in a damaged aircraft. The wind also would push aircraft over the German lines and deeper into German territory while aircraft were fighting, something Allied airmen had to constantly be aware of as a fight progressed, both in terms of fuel consumption and possible damage. To take just two examples of the influence of the wind in air combat, both involving Manfred von Richthofen, one helped him, one got him killed. The first occurred in the famous dogfight between Richthofen and Lanoe Hawker. The dogfight lasted a long time, with the wind blowing the combattants deeper and deeper into German territory. At a given point, Hawker realised he had to get back to the British side of the lines as his fuel was running low. He was forced to break for home, allowing Richthofen to get on his tail. Richthofen shot him down. The second example occurred on a day when the wind was blowing from East to West (a relatively rare occurrence), and a disadvantage for the Germans. On this day, April 21, 1918, Richthofen engaged in an airfight that he became fixated on, and he suddenly found himself low over Allied lines, with the wind taking him deeper into Allied territory. He thus broke off his pursuit of the Allied aircraft, and turned for home. This low turn over Allied lines exposed him to a hail of ground fire which killed him.
The German defensive air strategy and their largely superior aircraft meshed with the Allied offensive strategy and their generally inferior aircraft (at least through mid-1917), resulted in large Allied losses. It was, however, French airmen who initially gained the advantage in the air war, before the Fokker's with their synchronized guns took control. The first true air-to-air victory was scored by a Russian, on August 26, 1914. He was in an unarmed plane and he rammed his opponent, thus killing the German and himself. The first air-to-air victory with a living victor was scored by France on October 26, 1914. The first 'Ace' of the air was the Frenchman Adolphe Pegoud, who from February, 1915, through July, 1915, scored 6 victories, before being KIA that August. It was another Frenchman, Roland Garros, along with aircraft designer Raymond Saulnier, who developed the first machine gun aircraft weapon to fire through the airscrew. This was done with a system of steel wedges attached to the propeller, directly in line of the MG barrel line of fire, that acted as deflectors for any bullet that might hit the prop. It wasn't a perfect system but it worked and it allowed Garros to terrorize German airmen as he shot down 3 German aircraft between April 1, 1915 and April 18, 1915. He then suffered engine failure on a later flight and came down in German territory and was captured. His secret weapon was exposed. The German High command commisioned Anthony Fokker to develope a similar weapon, which he did with a greatly improved advancement called synchronization, and the Fokker Scourge soon followed, but it was the early French flyers such as Pegoud, Garros, Navarre, Nungesser, and Guynemer who first controlled skies with their fighter tactics.
I believe the Germans did about as well as they could have in the skies of France, given their inferior numbers, their defensive startegy and tactics, and, as the war dragged on, their continuing decline in the raw materials needed to carry on a successful airwar, like oil, gas, and rubber. I just don't really see where being more aggressive would have helped, especially tactically, where their fighting methods brought them such success against the Allied airman. -- Al

I’m surprised that the Germans didn’t devote more time to developing their combat air support functions in order to take advantage of the superior performance of their fighter organizations. It’s interesting to me that the German Air Service spent the majority of its time focusing on the air-to-air and reconnaissance missions and almost completely ignored the potential role of tactical air support and air interdiction. It seems that one of their only extensive uses of air-to-ground operations came in the spring offensives of 1918. By failing to effectively employ ground attack missions earlier in the war, the Germans were in violation of one the fundamental aspects of air power theory. This tenant holds that air power is primarily an offensive weapon.

I’m curious as to why the Germans did not seek to exploit their advantages in the air. For most of the war their fighter organizations were superior to that of the allies. IMO they should have been more aggressive by using attack aircraft more extensively in support of ground offensives. I find it interesting that even during the battle for Verdun, the German Air Service allowed the French aviators to enjoy a marked superiority over the combat area. By enabling the French pilots to provide better support for the troops on the ground the Germans violated another important tenant of modern air power theory, which is whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. By maintaining an inherently defensive posture the Germans allowed their adversaries to have more influence on the timing and location of encounters. I feel that by failing to utilize more coordinated air-ground operations, the Germans conceded many of the advantages gained by their fighter pilots.

I think this failure to fully exploit their aerial advantages can be directly attributed to the fact that many commanders in the upper echelons of the German Army were fiercely conservative individuals who did not fully grasp the potential capabilities of the air weapon. The airplane redefined the concept of mass by providing enhanced mobility and firepower that could be brought to bear just about anywhere within the aircraft’s operational range. The German high command seemed to focus almost exclusively on the intelligence role of aircraft and sought to deny this capability to the allies by destroying as many reconnaissance aircraft as possible. Not that this was a worthless pursuit, but IMO a more focused effort on tactical air support could have produced greater operational and strategic success for the German Army on the Western Front in the years 1915-17.

 

[lancer]

I’m surprised that the Germans didn’t devote more time to developing their combat air support functions in order to take advantage of the superior performance of their fighter organizations. It’s interesting to me that the German Air Service spent the majority of its time focusing on the air-to-air and reconnaissance missions and almost completely ignored the potential role of tactical air support and air interdiction. It seems that one of their only extensive uses of air-to-ground operations came in the spring offensives of 1918. By failing to effectively employ ground attack missions earlier in the war, the Germans were in violation of one the fundamental aspects of air power theory. This tenant holds that air power is primarily an offensive weapon.

I’m curious as to why the Germans did not seek to exploit their advantages in the air. For most of the war their fighter organizations were superior to that of the allies. IMO they should have been more aggressive by using attack aircraft more extensively in support of ground offensives. I find it interesting that even during the battle for Verdun, the German Air Service allowed the French aviators to enjoy a marked superiority over the combat area. By enabling the French pilots to provide better support for the troops on the ground the Germans violated another important tenant of modern air power theory, which is whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. By maintaining an inherently defensive posture the Germans allowed their adversaries to have more influence on the timing and location of encounters. I feel that by failing to utilize more coordinated air-ground operations, the Germans conceded many of the advantages gained by their fighter pilots.

I think this failure to fully exploit their aerial advantages can be directly attributed to the fact that many commanders in the upper echelons of the German Army were fiercely conservative individuals who did not fully grasp the potential capabilities of the air weapon. The airplane redefined the concept of mass by providing enhanced mobility and firepower that could be brought to bear just about anywhere within the aircraft’s operational range. The German high command seemed to focus almost exclusively on the intelligence role of aircraft and sought to deny this capability to the allies by destroying as many reconnaissance aircraft as possible. Not that this was a worthless pursuit, but IMO a more focused effort on tactical air support could have produced greater operational and strategic success for the German Army on the Western Front in the years 1915-17.

I agree with this, to a large extent, only allowing that the whole concept of the airplane as a weapon was brand new to all sides and that the strategic and tactical use was an on going learning experience. The French were the first to see the light in terms of using fighters in squadrons, rather than as a single pilot or plane within the recon or bombing squadrons. This first squadron was MS-12, under de Rose, who picked out the best and most aggressive pilots to fly the Morane-Saulnier L's. It was de Rose who was put in charge of the air units at Verdun and his further refining and seperation of duties by squadron, ie., fighter, recon, bombing, allowed the French to refine their skills and grab and hold air superiority over Verdun. The Germans eventually developed along these same lines but a little after the French and refined to their air service. The Germans may well have been slow on the uptake of tactical ground support via air, but as their whole posture on the Westfront was mainly one of defense, they had no real reason to develope these tactics until their 1918 offensives, at least not on a large scale. The Germans main concern, as you said, was one of destroying the enemy recon aircraft. In fact, this was the main mission of fighter aircraft on both sides, throughout the war. Air superiority was not allowing the enemy recon aircraft to carry out their missions. The flow of intelligence was primary and the fighter to fighter war, or the bombing war, was of secondary importance. There is little doubt that certain aspects of the German strategic and tactical vision was lacking, but this was due in part to their defensive stand on the ground and their view of what the air weapon was in those terms. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

I agree with this, to a large extent, only allowing that the whole concept of the airplane as a weapon was brand new to all sides and that the strategic and tactical use was an on going learning experience. The French were the first to see the light in terms of using fighters in squadrons, rather than as a single pilot or plane within the recon or bombing squadrons. This first squadron was MS-12, under de Rose, who picked out the best and most aggressive pilots to fly the Morane-Saulnier L's. It was de Rose who was put in charge of the air units at Verdun and his further refining and seperation of duties by squadron, ie., fighter, recon, bombing, allowed the French to refine their skills and grab and hold air superiority over Verdun. The Germans eventually developed along these same lines but a little after the French and refined to their air service. The Germans may well have been slow on the uptake of tactical ground support via air, but as their whole posture on the Westfront was mainly one of defense, they had no real reason to develope these tactics until their 1918 offensives, at least not on a large scale. The Germans main concern, as you said, was one of destroying the enemy recon aircraft. In fact, this was the main mission of fighter aircraft on both sides, throughout the war. Air superiority was not allowing the enemy recon aircraft to carry out their missions. The flow of intelligence was primary and the fighter to fighter war, or the bombing war, was of secondary importance. There is little doubt that certain aspects of the German strategic and tactical vision was lacking, but this was due in part to their defensive stand on the ground and their view of what the air weapon was in those terms. -- Al

So it appears that we both agree that the German High Command failed to truly grasp the importance of developing the multiple aspects of the air arm. IMO the Command and Control system employed by the Germans in the First World War was severely outdated for the challenges of 20th Century combat operations. The system that was used to great effect in the German Wars of Unification was highly centralized and rigid. This was adequate when the senior commander of the German General Staff was only responsible for one active campaigning theatre. The system broke down once confronted with the challenges of managing battles that were being fought on multiple fronts.

I think that the rigidity and high degree of centralization inherent in the German High Command can be considered the basis for why the aerial advantages, as well as others, were not more fully exploited. By denying subordinates the flexibility to seize the initiative when such advantages presented themselves, the German High Command severely handicapped the efforts of their combat formations.

The French and Germans were the leading military establishments to pioneer the tactical and organizational aspects of air power. But, it was the British and Americans who attempted to fully explore the operational and strategic advantages that could be achieved through the use of aircraft. In the final allied offensives, the air services of these two countries played important roles in the eventual success of their comrades on the ground.

In the case of the Americans, Pershing allowed men like Mitchell and Foulois an extended degree of latitude and flexibility to fully maximize the role of aircraft over the battlefield. Many of Mitchell’s concepts were derived with help from Hugh Trenchard of the RAF.

The Germans finally mastered the role of tactical air support during their Blitzkrieg operations (1939-41). Unfortunately for them, by this time the role of air power had progressed even further to encompass strategic bombing. This concept proved to be outside the scope of the German Luftwaffe as the organization found itself unprepared for such operations when it launched its air offensive against England during the Battle of Britain.

 

[lancer]

So it appears that we both agree that the German High Command failed to truly grasp the importance of developing the multiple aspects of the air arm. IMO the Command and Control system employed by the Germans in the First World War was severely outdated for the challenges of 20th Century combat operations. The system that was used to great effect in the German Wars of Unification was highly centralized and rigid. This was adequate when the senior commander of the German General Staff was only responsible for one active campaigning theatre. The system broke down once confronted with the challenges of managing battles that were being fought on multiple fronts.

I think that the rigidity and high degree of centralization inherent in the German High Command can be considered the basis for why the aerial advantages, as well as others, were not more fully exploited. By denying subordinates the flexibility to seize the initiative when such advantages presented themselves, the German High Command severely handicapped the efforts of their combat formations.

The French and Germans were the leading military establishments to pioneer the tactical and organizational aspects of air power. But, it was the British and Americans who attempted to fully explore the operational and strategic advantages that could be achieved through the use of aircraft. In the final allied offensives, the air services of these two countries played important roles in the eventual success of their comrades on the ground.

In the case of the Americans, Pershing allowed men like Mitchell and Foulois an extended degree of latitude and flexibility to fully maximize the role of aircraft over the battlefield. Many of Mitchell’s concepts were derived with help from Hugh Trenchard of the RAF.

The Germans finally mastered the role of tactical air support during their Blitzkrieg operations (1939-41). Unfortunately for them, by this time the role of air power had progressed even further to encompass strategic bombing. This concept proved to be outside the scope of the German Luftwaffe as the organization found itself unprepared for such operations when it launched its air offensive against England during the Battle of Britain.

Just to add, the French air arm, which was so inovative and on the cutting edge in terms of weapons and organization during the early and middle war years, had fallen off the pace by war's end. It was smaller in both personel and equipment by late 1918 than Britain and germany and the growing USAS. This falloff was due to several factors such as national manpower losses, financial and industrial shortfalls, and just plain failure at the top command levels to keep up with the fast moving developements as the war progressed. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

First I wish to apologize for the bayonet remark on the other thread. I can see how that and some of the other remarks could come across as a bit aggressive.

I would like to know if there are any from the Commonwealth (Australians, Canadians, etc…) who wish to comment on their views regarding their respective countries experiences in the Great War, particularly regarding the command and control situation. I’m curious to know if there is a sense of heartfelt loyalty and solidarity to the British officers, bureaucrats and politicians who commanded and administered the Commonwealth troops during WWI. Or do they view this situation as mismanaged?

My interpretation of the situation is that it was an extreme misfortune that the ANZACs and Canadians were not led by their own countrymen in senior command positions (note: Canadian Corps eventually came under the command of Currie, a Canadian, in 1917). IMO the command situation during the Dardanelles Campaign serves as a prominent example of this ill-fated circumstance.

When the US joined the fight, the English and French attempted to convince the American government to commit their troops in a similar fashion and inject American soldiers directly into British and French units commanded by officers from these respective countries. American historians interpret this underlying political tone as the British and French seeking to treat the US as a colonial possession and not as an independent and allied nation.

Any literature commenting on the AEF’s experience in WWI pays particular attention to these political battles between the Wilson Administration and the Allied governments. The fight continued once the Americans arrived in France and was not completely settled until the First US Army was formed under the command of Pershing and committed to the St. Mihiel Offensive. This political victory was a major sticking point for the American government. I will point out that there were a number of American units that eventually served under British and French command, one of the most famous was the 369th IR the “Harlem Hellfighters” (an African-American unit that served with the French).

The US effort to maintain its military independence in WWI serves as the foundation from which the American government and military approach joint operations with allied nations. In the majority of conflicts since WWII, the US has striven to cooperate with allied governments and commanders as much as possible without jeopardizing operational effectiveness. Nominally serving under US command, the Australian contingent committed to the conflict in Vietnam was afforded its own operational sector and IMO performed brilliantly in its counter-insurgency role in Phuoc Tuy Province.

 

[jazzeum]

Not to distract from the potential conversation, but I noticed that you mentioned the 369th. I was wondering if you saw that Beau Geste just came out with two releases from the 369th.

Brad

 

[waynepoo]

The Australian Corps (the five divisions of the A.I.F) was formed in early 1918 and placed under the command of Australian Lt General John Monash. I quote below the words of Roland Perry from his Bio of Monash.
''Australian General Sir John Monash changed the way wars were fought and won. When the British and German High Commands of the First World War failed to gain ascendancy after four years of unprecedented human slaughter, Monash used innovative techniques and modern technology to plan and win a succession of major battles that led to the end of the Great War.''

After the battle of Amiens in August 1918 which was mainly Monashs plan (the A.I.F and Canadians played a major role in the battle) German General Ludendorff said ''August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through.....'' he knew then that the war could not be won by Germany.
It is a measure of the esteem that veterans of the A.I.F held for Monash that nearly one hundred thousand of them turn out for his funeral in 1931.
In regards to the A.I.F and the Empire at the time, perhaps the fact that A.I.F (over four hundred thousand of them) was the ONLY all volunteer army of the Great War speaks for itself.
Wayne.

 

[swalterh]

Just a point that some are not aware of... of all the Armies of the Great War the Australian Imperial Force was the only totally all volunteer force...five divisions.
Also....The first offensive action under taken by A.E.F units was by 1,000 men (4 Companies from the 33rd Division A.E.F) serving with the Australian Imperial Force during the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918. This battle took place under the overall command of Australian Corps Commander Lt. General Sir John Monash and combined Artillery, Armour, Infantry and Air Support (Combined Arms), serving as a blueprint for all subsequent Allied attacks using ''Tanks''.
Wayne.

The Australian Corps (the five divisions of the A.I.F) was formed in early 1918 and placed under the command of Australian Lt General John Monash. I quote below the words of Roland Perry from his Bio of Monash.
''Australian General Sir John Monash changed the way wars were fought and won. When the British and German High Commands of the First World War failed to gain ascendancy after four years of unprecedented human slaughter, Monash used innovative techniques and modern technology to plan and win a succession of major battles that led to the end of the Great War.''

After the battle of Amiens in August 1918 which was mainly Monashs plan (the A.I.F and Canadians played a major role in the battle) German General Ludendorff said ''August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through.....'' he knew then that the war could not be won by Germany.
It is a measure of the esteem that veterans of the A.I.F held for Monash that nearly one hundred thousand of them turn out for his funeral in 1931.
In regards to the A.I.F and the Empire at the time, perhaps the fact that A.I.F (over four hundred thousand of them) was the ONLY all volunteer army of the Great War speaks for itself.
Wayne.

From the information you provide, it sounds like Monash was a sound operational planner and tactician. It appears to me that the Australian use of combined arms during the Battle of Hamel offers further testimony that highlights the reputation of Australian Commanders and soldiers as tactical innovators. Similarly, the Aussie infantrymen’s dogged defense of Tobruk against the German’s mechanized formations was legendary. I find it little wonder that the port did not fall until the majority of Australian troops had been withdrawn for rest and refit. Likewise, the Australian anti-guerrilla tactics employed during Vietnam were very effective in pacifying their operational sector of VC.

I’m interested in learning more details about the Australian experience in the Great War. What books would you recommend? I’m particularly intrigued by Monash. He seems like he deserves more recognition as one of the leading figures in the war, especially for his role in integrating new techniques for mechanized warfare. I wonder if he and other subordinate commanders in the British and Commonwealth forces get discounted because of Douglas Haig’s less than stellar reputation and political connections.

In any event, it is my belief that English historians don’t do an adequate job of giving the participants from the Commonwealth their due for their contributions to the eventual victories in WWI or WWII.

I know I’ve been pretty adamant in my arguments pertaining to the importance of the US military’s small, but vital contribution to the ultimate victory in WWI. I’m beginning to see that similar arguments can be made for the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces as well. I’m curious to know what percentage of Commonwealth troops made up the composition of British ground forces in the final offensives during 1918.

 

[waynepoo]

From the information you provide, it sounds like Monash was a sound operational planner and tactician. It appears to me that the Australian use of combined arms during the Battle of Hamel offers further testimony that highlights the reputation of Australian Commanders and soldiers as tactical innovators. Similarly, the Aussie infantrymen’s dogged defense of Tobruk against the German’s mechanized formations was legendary. I find it little wonder that the port did not fall until the majority of Australian troops had been withdrawn for rest and refit. Likewise, the Australian anti-guerrilla tactics employed during Vietnam were very effective in pacifying their operational sector of VC.

I’m interested in learning more details about the Australian experience in the Great War. What books would you recommend? I’m particularly intrigued by Monash. He seems like he deserves more recognition as one of the leading figures in the war, especially for his role in integrating new techniques for mechanized warfare. I wonder if he and other subordinate commanders in the British and Commonwealth forces get discounted because of Douglas Haig’s less than stellar reputation and political connections.

In any event, it is my belief that English historians don’t do an adequate job of giving the participants from the Commonwealth their due for their contributions to the eventual victories in WWI or WWII.

I know I’ve been pretty adamant in my arguments pertaining to the importance of the US military’s small, but vital contribution to the ultimate victory in WWI. I’m beginning to see that similar arguments can be made for the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces as well. I’m curious to know what percentage of Commonwealth troops made up the composition of British ground forces in the final offensives during 1918.

Shane,
You will forgive my pro Australian bias in regards to the Great War, as to the percentage of Dominion and colonial troops who served with the B.E.F.. I could only guess and I'm sure other more knowlegeable members could enlighten us, but those troops included Australians, NewZealanders, Canadians, South Africans, Indians and many from almost all of the Empires many colonial outposts with Scots, Welsh and troops from Ireland the percentage would be large. Unfortunately many historians in the past have lumped them all together as 'British' or 'Imperial troops'.
I recommend these two books for an Australian prospective of the Great War (if can you find them). 'THE GREAT WAR' by Les Carlyon......'MONASH The outsider who won a war' by Roland Perry.

 

[swalterh]

Shane,
You will forgive my pro Australian bias in regards to the Great War, as to the percentage of Dominion and colonial troops who served with the B.E.F.. I could only guess and I'm sure other more knowlegeable members could enlighten us, but those troops included Australians, NewZealanders, Canadians, South Africans, Indians and many from almost all of the Empires many colonial outposts with Scots, Welsh and troops from Ireland the percentage would be large. Unfortunately many historians in the past have lumped them all together as 'British' or 'Imperial troops'.
I recommend these two books for an Australian prospective of the Great War (if can you find them). 'THE GREAT WAR' by Les Carlyon......'MONASH The outsider who won a war' by Roland Perry.

Thanks Wayne,

I'll start trying to track down the titles you suggested.