First World War: Causes, Battles, Personalities etc... (1 Viewer)

[lancer]

Al

I agree that a negotiated peace is in no way a 'win' for the Allies but I must admit to never having considered that such a peace would have been a 'balanced' one. With Turkey out of the fray by October and Austria/Hungary on its last legs the Empire might well have then been able to ship the greater part of those forces to the Western Front and concentrate as Germany had done when the Russians called time. I always assumed - not with any evidence, just a 'vibe' - that Germany would have been compelled to return to the pre war borders and any deal making would have been with territories outside of Europe. This may have removed the stab in the back myth and the hatred of the Versailles Treaty which Hitler used to great effect although I am convinced that a second war would have occured with or without Hitler. This raises an interesting point for Australians, and by extension New Zealanders, given that Germany would have held her possessions in New Guinea. Perhaps the great benefit for my country when we consider the contribution of the AEF was not in 1918 but was in fact more keenly felt in 1942.

Jack

I see what you mean but any negotiated peace, even one where Germany returns to pre-war boundaries, fails to deal with the elephant in the room, Alsace-Lorraine, for which, I believe, France would gladly have continued the war in order to have returned to her. There is no way Germany, with armies still in the field, large areas of France under occupation, agrees to any deal that would return A-L. Why would they? A-L had been part of Germany for almost 50 years and would not have come under the heading of pre-war boundaries. As all European parties approached exhaustion, France was perhaps worst off of the Allies, but had the most reason to continue fighting. It was her country that had been occupied, lands devastated, population suffering under the Germans, and had suffered the heaviest casualties, yet she was not going to let the war end in a negotiated peace that left A-L to Germany. For France, it was win or die. I don't honestly see where the war goes without US participation but I don't see France negotiating peace either, not with Germany still on her soil, not without A-L being returned. Interesting to speculate on. -- Al

 

[Jack]

I see what you mean but any negotiated peace, even one where Germany returns to pre-war boundaries, fails to deal with the elephant in the room, Alsace-Lorraine, for which, I believe, France would gladly have continued the war in order to have returned to her. There is no way Germany, with armies still in the field, large areas of France under occupation, agrees to any deal that would return A-L. Why would they? A-L had been part of Germany for almost 50 years and would not have come under the heading of pre-war boundaries. As all European parties approached exhaustion, France was perhaps worst off of the Allies, but had the most reason to continue fighting. It was her country that had been occupied, lands devastated, population suffering under the Germans, and had suffered the heaviest casualties, yet she was not going to let the war end in a negotiated peace that left A-L to Germany. For France, it was win or die. I don't honestly see where the war goes without US participation but I don't see France negotiating peace either, not with Germany still on her soil, not without A-L being returned. Interesting to speculate on. -- Al

Al

You are quite right to mention the lost provinces. No negotiated peace for France without their return. Were they in possession of them in 1918? Hard to see either a French or German withdrawal in any case.

Perhaps they could have been split pending a better long term solution - like Ireland, Korea, Vietnam, Cyprus...{sm4}

Jack

 

[swalterh]

In a counter to the “blockade” argument allow me to posit an alternative view. Following the treaty of Brest Litovsk the Germans were going to gain possession of the “bread basket” of Czarist Russia (Ukraine). This new territory and its resources would in all likelihood have been able to sustain the German war effort had the conflict continued into 1919.

Man does not live on bread alone!{sm4}[/QUOTE]

Soldiers of many wars have done a pretty good job of making do on bread, cigarettes and some form of caffeinated beverage. So, I suppose you are correct.

 

[Jack]

Man does not live on bread alone!{sm4}

So, I suppose you are correct.

[/QUOTE]



I hope that didn't hurt too much!{sm4}

 

[swalterh]

Al

You are quite right to mention the lost provinces. No negotiated peace for France without their return. Were they in possession of them in 1918? Hard to see either a French or German withdrawal in any case.

Perhaps they could have been split pending a better long term solution - like Ireland, Korea, Vietnam, Cyprus...{sm4}

Jack

To answer your question regarding Alsace-Loraine. No, the allies were not in possession of the provinces when the armistice was agreed upon. The American Army under Pershing was in the process of formulating plans and organizing themselves for an operation against Metz following their success in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Let’s remember that Pershing had insisted on open warfare training for the fresh American soldiers who were learning their trade behind the lines. He wanted them to spend just as much time on mobile warfare techniques as they did on static (trench) warfare skills prior to committing them to the front lines. Pershing hoped that this extra training would prepare the American troops for the eventual breakout and subsequent follow-up operations that he envisaged would carry Allied operations into Germany. Unfortunately the British and French decided they had had enough in November 1918.

 

[swalterh]

Al

I agree that a negotiated peace is in no way a 'win' for the Allies but I must admit to never having considered that such a peace would have been a 'balanced' one. With Turkey out of the fray by October and Austria/Hungary on its last legs the Empire might well have then been able to ship the greater part of those forces to the Western Front and concentrate as Germany had done when the Russians called time. I always assumed - not with any evidence, just a 'vibe' - that Germany would have been compelled to return to the pre war borders and any deal making would have been with territories outside of Europe. This may have removed the stab in the back myth and the hatred of the Versailles Treaty which Hitler used to great effect although I am convinced that a second war would have occured with or without Hitler. This raises an interesting point for Australians, and by extension New Zealanders, given that Germany would have held her possessions in New Guinea. Perhaps the great benefit for my country when we consider the contribution of the AEF was not in 1918 but was in fact more keenly felt in 1942.

Jack

Following the Treaty of Versailles, I suppose the division of Germany’s colonial possessions in the Pacific between Australia-New Zealand and Japan may have made an eventual conflict between the two interest spheres inevitable.

 

[swalterh]

I hope that didn't hurt too much!{sm4}

No worries.

 

[waynepoo]

To answer your question regarding Alsace-Loraine. No, the allies were not in possession of the provinces when the armistice was agreed upon. The American Army under Pershing was in the process of formulating plans and organizing themselves for an operation against Metz following their success in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Let’s remember that Pershing had insisted on open warfare training for the fresh American soldiers who were learning their trade behind the lines. He wanted them to spend just as much time on mobile warfare techniques as they did on static (trench) warfare skills prior to committing them to the front lines. Pershing hoped that this extra training would prepare the American troops for the eventual breakout and subsequent follow-up operations that he envisaged would carry Allied operations into Germany. Unfortunately the British and French decided they had had enough in November 1918.[/QUOTE]

With the dead and wounded for the British Empire at 2,090,212 and 4,266,000 for the French one can not blame them for wanting to end it. Unfortunate? no, more like 'no more'.
Wayne.

 

[lancer]

The Germans expended a lot of combat power with their spring offensives that would’ve proven very useful defending any attempt by the allies (even with bolstered numbers from redeployed empire troops) to reclaim French and Belgian territory. Had the Americans not become involved, the Germans could and probably should have maintained the operational defensive on the Western Front and continued to allow the allies to expend manpower assaulting their lines. Not suggesting that the Germans could have entirely drained the British and Commonwealth forces, but would these numbers from the empire have been sufficient considering the French army was on the brink of utter exhaustion.

In a counter to the “blockade” argument allow me to posit an alternative view. Following the treaty of Brest Litovsk the Germans were going to gain possession of the “bread basket” of Czarist Russia (Ukraine). This new territory and its resources would in all likelihood have been able to sustain the German war effort had the conflict continued into 1919.

The occupation of the Ukraine could have been somewhat problematic. The Germans get food but also the problems of occupation. I read somewhere that the occupation would still require some one million German troops. That's a lot of men. I guess the tradeoff was neccesary for a starving Germany. -- Al

 

[lancer]

To answer your question regarding Alsace-Loraine. No, the allies were not in possession of the provinces when the armistice was agreed upon. The American Army under Pershing was in the process of formulating plans and organizing themselves for an operation against Metz following their success in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Let’s remember that Pershing had insisted on open warfare training for the fresh American soldiers who were learning their trade behind the lines. He wanted them to spend just as much time on mobile warfare techniques as they did on static (trench) warfare skills prior to committing them to the front lines. Pershing hoped that this extra training would prepare the American troops for the eventual breakout and subsequent follow-up operations that he envisaged would carry Allied operations into Germany. Unfortunately the British and French decided they had had enough in November 1918.[/QUOTE]

With the dead and wounded for the British Empire at 2,090,212 and 4,266,000 for the French one can not blame them for wanting to end it. Unfortunate? no, more like 'no more'.
Wayne.

Indeed. The Allies were more than willing, and deservedly so, to jump on the German peace feelers now that they, and not the Germans, had the upper hand militarily and would now be able to dictate terms from strength. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

With the dead and wounded for the British Empire at 2,090,212 and 4,266,000 for the French one can not blame them for wanting to end it. Unfortunate? no, more like 'no more'.
Wayne.

Wayne

With all this talk of casualties to justify the British and French decision to end the war, I posit that we add the casualties acquired by the countries involved in the Second World War to the eventual toll as well. IMO the British and French policy makers did not wish to become overshadowed by President Wilson at the Peace Table (in short, their decision was politically motivated). Continued combat operations would have invariably led to an increase in American responsibility for offensive operations and would have served to increase the level of prestige and political leverage for the American Peace legation.

Let us remember that upon American entrance into the war the British and French diplomats wished to convince the American government to allow American troops to enter into British and French units under the command of British and French officers. Pershing and the American military establishment vehemently opposed this line of thinking. The American Government determined that American troops would in deed serve in an American Army that would service American political interests. The American military and political establishment was gearing up for an eventual push into Germany in order to bring about its total defeat. I think we can all agree that ending the war when they did, the allies accepted an incomplete victory.

I mentioned in another thread that one of the reasons behind the staunch American isolationism during the Second World War was the prevailing attitude that the United States did not receive an adequate return on investment during the First World War. So yes, from the American perspective the premature end to hostilities was in fact an unfortunate disappointment.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

Indeed. The Allies were more than willing, and deservedly so, to jump on the German peace feelers now that they, and not the Germans, had the upper hand militarily and would now be able to dictate terms from strength. -- Al

Al

IMO the British & French governments used American combat power to service their own political ends and then pulled the plug once they had achieved what they needed and hadn’t yet reached the point where they were overshadowed by the men from the “new” world.

This action created staunch resentment in the United States.

Then at the Peace Table, the British and French overextended themselves when dictating unsustainable terms to the defeated powers.

These two factors alone served to set the stage for the eventual conflict that followed.

Shane

 

[lancer]

I would like to address the subject of war weariness in terms of casualties. I am going to use the French Army as my example because their participation was from the first day to the last, the fighting was mostly on their territory (Westfront), and the French nation suffered the most casualties of any belligerent nation, proportionate to population. To start with overall numbers:
France had a pre-war population of 39,000,000 -- 19,000,000 were male
She mobilized a total of 8,400,000 -- 22% of the total populance, 44% of the males
Total war casualties were 4,380,000 of which;
1,580,000 were KIA
2,800,000 were wounded -- 300,000 disabled (official total WIA is 3,594,000 but this includes men wounded multiple times)
These losses constituted 52% of the total people mobilized
18% of the total mobilized were KIA
4% of total population KIA - another 40,000 civilians also died
French KIA were heavyist in 1914 & 1915, By year KIA:
1914 - 300,000 dead (remember this is August thru Dec.) Average per day KIA - 2220
1915 - 430,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 1180
1916 - 361,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 990
1917 - 190,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 520
1918 - 306,000 dead (Jan. thru Nov.) .............................. " " " " - 970
This works out to an average of 1020 men KIA for each day of the war.
As a matter of record, the worst day the French Army suffered in terms of casualties was during the opening Battle of the Frontiers at Charleroi, on August 22, 1914. That day cost the French 67,000 casualties, of which 27,000 were KIA.

These casualties are staggering and very difficult to comprehend but are the explanation for the war-weariness. It could hardly have been otherwise. This is a perfectly valid reason why the French were eager to bring the war to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible when things finally broke their way in 1918. This is why the military victory was left incomplete on the field of battle. The French than attempted to complete the victory at the peace table, thus the harsh terms, and reparations, with little sympathy or understanding to what these terms might mean in the long run to a permanent peace. Again, maybe shortsighted, but because of the sacrifice needed to win the war, perfectly understandable. -- Al

 

[lancer]

About the USA and our entry into the war, we were late, no argument, but we also didn't want to get into what was perceived as a case of European fratricide. We were almost totally insular, having only delved into world politics on a very limited basis, mainly the Spanish-American War, which was handled with a small regular army supplemented by volunteers. Our army was really quite small as we approached war. As of April, 1917, when we declared war, the US Army consisted of 137,000 men, supplemented by a grossly undertrained National Guard of 181,000. Just for example, as the US declared war, the French Army was executing their Neville Offensive in April, and suffering 125,000 casualties in two weeks. The US had no reserve system prior to 1912, when the National Defense Act was passed. The Officer's Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, Reserve Officer's Training Corps, and the National Guard were all established only in June 1916. The US had very little to call on to build an army and what was coming in on a volunteer basis was raw, untrained or armed for modern war. Remember, nations in Europe like France, Germany, and Russia, had large, well-developed reserve systems and mobilazation plans that allowed them to put hundreds of thousands of men in the field very rapidly. The one thing that had been accomplished was done by Secretary of War Newton Baker when he authorized plans for a national draft to be developed, anticipating a declaration of war. As a result the draft was implemented rather rapidly in May, 1917, after the April declaration of war. Adding to all the problems of developing a huge army from nothing was President Wilson's rather 'hands-off' policy regarding his own army. Wilson and Pershing met ONE time before Pershing went overseas to run the army. Pershing received nothing in the way of instructions or guidance regarding the all-important aspects of his job such as what was the policy towards co-operation on a military basis with the Allies, or about strategy, recruitment, supplies, munitions, and most importantly, nothing on war aims, so he didn't even know whether he was to fight for a negotiated peace or unconditional surrender. At least Wilson's approach allowed Pershing freedom to operate as he saw fit. Our army, General Pershing in command, would go to war with almost no imput from the President of the United States. It ws going to take time to gear this country up and there was no short-cut. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

I would like to address the subject of war weariness in terms of casualties. I am going to use the French Army as my example because their participation was from the first day to the last, the fighting was mostly on their territory (Westfront), and the French nation suffered the most casualties of any belligerent nation, proportionate to population. To start with overall numbers:
France had a pre-war population of 39,000,000 -- 19,000,000 were male
She mobilized a total of 8,400,000 -- 22% of the total populance, 44% of the males
Total war casualties were 4,380,000 of which;
1,580,000 were KIA
2,800,000 were wounded -- 300,000 disabled (official total WIA is 3,594,000 but this includes men wounded multiple times)
These losses constituted 52% of the total people mobilized
18% of the total mobilized were KIA
4% of total population KIA - another 40,000 civilians also died
French KIA were heavyist in 1914 & 1915, By year KIA:
1914 - 300,000 dead (remember this is August thru Dec.) Average per day KIA - 2220
1915 - 430,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 1180
1916 - 361,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 990
1917 - 190,000 dead .................................................... " " " " - 520
1918 - 306,000 dead (Jan. thru Nov.) .............................. " " " " - 970
This works out to an average of 1020 men KIA for each day of the war.
As a matter of record, the worst day the French Army suffered in terms of casualties was during the opening Battle of the Frontiers at Charleroi, on August 22, 1914. That day cost the French 67,000 casualties, of which 27,000 were KIA.

These casualties are staggering and very difficult to comprehend but are the explanation for the war-weariness. It could hardly have been otherwise. This is a perfectly valid reason why the French were eager to bring the war to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible when things finally broke their way in 1918. This is why the military victory was left incomplete on the field of battle. The French than attempted to complete the victory at the peace table, thus the harsh terms, and reparations, with little sympathy or understanding to what these terms might mean in the long run to a permanent peace. Again, maybe shortsighted, but because of the sacrifice needed to win the war, perfectly understandable. -- Al

Al

Based on the evidence and your analysis I have to agree with your conclusions. As you suggest, at the time of the armistice the French were worn out and were scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of both material resources and manpower. Your commentary on this subject makes it very difficult to find fault with the French Government’s decision to seek an immediate peace.

Given the circumstances, once the French were in a position to accomplish their immediate war aims, it is only logical that they would want to wrap things up as quickly as possible. Any continuation of hostilities, which would have followed the puncture of the main German defensive line, risked the possibility of a German recovery that could have upset the momentum gained by the allied offensives.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

About the USA and our entry into the war, we were late, no argument, but we also didn't want to get into what was perceived as a case of European fratricide. We were almost totally insular, having only delved into world politics on a very limited basis, mainly the Spanish-American War, which was handled with a small regular army supplemented by volunteers. Our army was really quite small as we approached war. As of April, 1917, when we declared war, the US Army consisted of 137,000 men, supplemented by a grossly undertrained National Guard of 181,000. Just for example, as the US declared war, the French Army was executing their Neville Offensive in April, and suffering 125,000 casualties in two weeks. The US had no reserve system prior to 1912, when the National Defense Act was passed. The Officer's Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, Reserve Officer's Training Corps, and the National Guard were all established only in June 1916. The US had very little to call on to build an army and what was coming in on a volunteer basis was raw, untrained or armed for modern war. Remember, nations in Europe like France, Germany, and Russia, had large, well-developed reserve systems and mobilazation plans that allowed them to put hundreds of thousands of men in the field very rapidly. The one thing that had been accomplished was done by Secretary of War Newton Baker when he authorized plans for a national draft to be developed, anticipating a declaration of war. As a result the draft was implemented rather rapidly in May, 1917, after the April declaration of war. Adding to all the problems of developing a huge army from nothing was President Wilson's rather 'hands-off' policy regarding his own army. Wilson and Pershing met ONE time before Pershing went overseas to run the army. Pershing received nothing in the way of instructions or guidance regarding the all-important aspects of his job such as what was the policy towards co-operation on a military basis with the Allies, or about strategy, recruitment, supplies, munitions, and most importantly, nothing on war aims, so he didn't even know whether he was to fight for a negotiated peace or unconditional surrender. At least Wilson's approach allowed Pershing freedom to operate as he saw fit. Our army, General Pershing in command, would go to war with almost no imput from the President of the United States. It ws going to take time to gear this country up and there was no short-cut. -- Al

Al

I have one minor contention with some of the commentary in this post. If there were no US war aims, then why was Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication part of President Wilson’s 14 points? I’ll have to crack open a few books and review the deliberations over US strategy and war aims because at the moment the information is not fresh in my mind.

I’m pretty sure that Wilson attempted to mediate a peace settlement prior to US entry into the conflict. I believe that this is when he began conceptualizing his 14 Points.

I’m also pretty sure that there was at least the genesis of a US strategy that revolved around the concept of an eventual invasion of Germany. I agree that Wilson did leave much of the organizing and planning to Pershing and the rest of the military establishment (The US did possess a General Staff at this time that was formulated following the Spanish-American War).

Concerning the nature of Wilson’s efforts at Versailles I’ll cite wiki: “Wilson was concerned with rebuilding the European economy, encouraging self-determination, promoting free trade, creating appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, creating a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace. He opposed harsh treatment of Germany but was outmaneuvered by Britain and France. He brought along top intellectuals as advisors, but his refusal to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation made his efforts partisan and risked political defeat at home.” From (John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2011) pp 454-505)

We know that the US Senate never did officially ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

This might provide some insight into portions of the American public's views regarding the treaty. Again wiki: “Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the German Americans were intensely opposed to the Treaty, saying it favored the British.” From (John B. Duff, "The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans," Journal of American History Vol. 55, No. 3 (Dec., 1968), pp. 582-598)

As to the victory being incomplete, again wiki: French major general Ferdinand Foch—who felt the restrictions on Germany were too lenient—declared (quite accurately), “This is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years.” From (R. Henig, Versailles and After: 1919–1933 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 52.)

Again I reiterate my argument that strictly from the military (i.e. professional soldier’s) perspective, the war was ended prematurely. Foch and Pershing were of similar mind in regards to this issue. So the opinion can not be seen as an exclusively American opinion, but instead a professional military opinion.

 

[lancer]

Al

I have one minor contention with some of the commentary in this post. If there were no US war aims, then why was Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication part of President Wilson’s 14 points? I’ll have to crack open a few books and review the deliberations over US strategy and war aims because at the moment the information is not fresh in my mind.

I’m pretty sure that Wilson attempted to mediate a peace settlement prior to US entry into the conflict. I believe that this is when he began conceptualizing his 14 Points.

I’m also pretty sure that there was at least the genesis of a US strategy that revolved around the concept of an eventual invasion of Germany. I agree that Wilson did leave much of the organizing and planning to Pershing and the rest of the military establishment (The US did possess a General Staff at this time that was formulated following the Spanish-American War).

Concerning the nature of Wilson’s efforts at Versailles I’ll cite wiki: “Wilson was concerned with rebuilding the European economy, encouraging self-determination, promoting free trade, creating appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, creating a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace. He opposed harsh treatment of Germany but was outmaneuvered by Britain and France. He brought along top intellectuals as advisors, but his refusal to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation made his efforts partisan and risked political defeat at home.” From (John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (2011) pp 454-505)

We know that the US Senate never did officially ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

This might provide some insight into portions of the American public's views regarding the treaty. Again wiki: “Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the German Americans were intensely opposed to the Treaty, saying it favored the British.” From (John B. Duff, "The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans," Journal of American History Vol. 55, No. 3 (Dec., 1968), pp. 582-598)

As to the victory being incomplete, again wiki: French major general Ferdinand Foch—who felt the restrictions on Germany were too lenient—declared (quite accurately), “This is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years.” From (R. Henig, Versailles and After: 1919–1933 (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 52.)

Again I reiterate my argument that strictly from the military (i.e. professional soldier’s) perspective, the war was ended prematurely. Foch and Pershing were of similar mind in regards to this issue. So the opinion can not be seen as an exclusively American opinion, but instead a professional military opinion.

As to the last point, I heartily agree. Foch and Clemenceau were fire-breathers, but France had reached her limits. As to a lack of war-aims, I was just specifically referring to Pershings meeting with Wilson and the complete lack of direction that Pershing received at that one and only meeting prior to Pershing going to France. The lack of civilian direction was a very unusual situation and one that was not repeated again. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

As to the last point, I heartily agree. Foch and Clemenceau were fire-breathers, but France had reached her limits. As to a lack of war-aims, I was just specifically referring to Pershings meeting with Wilson and the complete lack of direction that Pershing received at that one and only meeting prior to Pershing going to France. The lack of civilian direction was a very unusual situation and one that was not repeated again. -- Al

Al

This is a very true statement.

Although I will acknowledge that FDR did a fairly good job of staying out of the way of his professionals (military and civilian) and allowing them to do their work. He and his advisors were masters at imposing their will in a very diplomatic manner though.

In comparison, it does appear that Wilson was much more of an academic and chose to focus his energies on the statecraft of the job and did not wish to become overly involved in the military aspects of the position.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

As to the last point, I heartily agree. Foch and Clemenceau were fire-breathers, but France had reached her limits. As to a lack of war-aims, I was just specifically referring to Pershings meeting with Wilson and the complete lack of direction that Pershing received at that one and only meeting prior to Pershing going to France. The lack of civilian direction was a very unusual situation and one that was not repeated again. -- Al

Al

I realize that for some this might seem trivial, but I cracked open John S. D. Eisenhower’s “Yanks” and stumbled across some info regarding Pershing instructions for directing the AEF in France.

The commentary you gave about the single meeting between President Wilson and General Pershing prior to Pershing’s departure for France is accurate. It was mainly formality. Following the meeting Pershing was issued a written directive that was issued to him by Secretary of War Newton Baker.

The author only provides some pieces of the directive, but from it we can derive the nature of Pershing’s mission and delegated authority.

-The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached for service there with the Army.

-You are invested with the authority and duties devolved by the laws, regulations, orders and customs of the United States upon the commander of an army in the field in time of war…

-You will establish, after consultation with the French War Office, all necessary bases, lines of communications, depots, etc., and make all the incidental arrangements essential to active participation at the front.

-In military operations against the Imperial German Government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to when your command, or any parts, is ready for action is confided to you.

In this communiqué Pershing is given broad executive powers as the chief military representative of the United States Federal Government in Europe and Britain (very similar to the powers entrusted to Eisenhower in WWII). He is directed to cooperate with the Allies when conducting combat operations, but he is clearly instructed to maintain the integrity of the American Army as a separate entity.

My interpretation of these instructions clearly delineates that the Americans were in fact taking a junior partnership role in the conduct of the war leaving it to the French and British to sort out who would take the effectual lead role in the partnership. I believe that by agreeing to the elevation of Foch to the top position of the allied high command, both the American and British Governments were in effect entrusting the overall direction of the war to the French.

I think that the nature of France's leading role in the alliance and your analysis regarding France's exhausted state clearly explains why the choice to call for an armistice was made.

Shane

 

[lancer]

Al

I realize that for some this might seem trivial, but I cracked open John S. D. Eisenhower’s “Yanks” and stumbled across some info regarding Pershing instructions for directing the AEF in France.

The commentary you gave about the single meeting between President Wilson and General Pershing prior to Pershing’s departure for France is accurate. It was mainly formality. Following the meeting Pershing was issued a written directive that was issued to him by Secretary of War Newton Baker.

The author only provides some pieces of the directive, but from it we can derive the nature of Pershing’s mission and delegated authority.

-The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached for service there with the Army.

-You are invested with the authority and duties devolved by the laws, regulations, orders and customs of the United States upon the commander of an army in the field in time of war…

-You will establish, after consultation with the French War Office, all necessary bases, lines of communications, depots, etc., and make all the incidental arrangements essential to active participation at the front.

-In military operations against the Imperial German Government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to when your command, or any parts, is ready for action is confided to you.

In this communiqué Pershing is given broad executive powers as the chief military representative of the United States Federal Government in Europe and Britain (very similar to the powers entrusted to Eisenhower in WWII). He is directed to cooperate with the Allies when conducting combat operations, but he is clearly instructed to maintain the integrity of the American Army as a separate entity.

My interpretation of these instructions clearly delineates that the Americans were in fact taking a junior partnership role in the conduct of the war leaving it to the French and British to sort out who would take the effectual lead role in the partnership. I believe that by agreeing to the elevation of Foch to the top position of the allied high command, both the American and British Governments were in effect entrusting the overall direction of the war to the French.

I think that the nature of France's leading role in the alliance and your analysis regarding France's exhausted state clearly explains why the choice to call for an armistice was made.

Shane

Baker's directive is very revealing in terms of the powers entrusted to Pershing but, as mentioned before, very light on specifics. Pershing certainly had wide reaching power to achieve what he felt would be neccesary. Obviously, the most crucial aspect is the maintaining of force integrity, which disappointed the French and British no end. I have not read Eisenhower's book but I do like his writing style. Will try to pick that one up. I always liked the Stallings classic 'The Doughboys'. -- Al