First World War: Causes, Battles, Personalities etc... (2 Viewers)

[Jack]

I read somewhere that the British Navy did not defeat Napoleon directly but its existence compelled Napoleon to pursue a course of action that materially contributed to his defeat. In this instance the article referenced the Continental System and the actions taken to enforce it, which was, from memory, one of the reasons for the invasion of Russia. Likewise, the Battle of Britain did not defeat Hitler, but it left him operating in the East with an undefeated Britain at his rear. Compelling an enemy to act in a manner that brings about his destruction is surely an achievement in anyone's language.

Perhaps the AEF's contribution might be understood in this light. With the impending arrival of millions of American soldiers, the Germans gambled with the March Offensive, which was their last hope for battlefield victory in the West. Its failure against the Allied armies, which in fairness, were still drawn primarily from the British Empire and France, (and Belgium) ensured that the best Germany could have hoped for would have been a negotiated settlement brought about by mutual exhaustion. The arrival of the AEF took the negotiated settlement off the table. So would it be fair to say that Germany might have held on into 1919 for a negotiated settlement without the AEF but that there was no real fear of an Allied defeat? So the AEF did not save the Allied cause but materially contributed to an earleir end to the war (looking at it in the least favourable light) and removed the possibility of a negotiated settlement (the most favourable).

 

[Jack]

I read somewhere that the British Navy did not defeat Napoleon directly but its existence compelled Napoleon to pursue a course of action that materially contributed to his defeat. In this instance the article referenced the Continental System and the actions taken to enforce it, which was, from memory, one of the reasons for the invasion of Russia. Likewise, the Battle of Britain did not defeat Hitler, but it left him operating in the East with an undefeated Britain at his rear. Compelling an enemy to act in a manner that brings about his destruction is surely an achievement in anyone's language.

Perhaps the AEF's contribution might be understood in this light. With the impending arrival of millions of American soldiers, the Germans gambled with the March Offensive, which was their last hope for battlefield victory in the West. Its failure against the Allied armies, which in fairness, were still drawn primarily from the British Empire and France, (and Belgium) ensured that the best Germany could have hoped for would have been a negotiated settlement brought about by mutual exhaustion. The arrival of the AEF took the negotiated settlement off the table. So would it be fair to say that Germany might have held on into 1919 for a negotiated settlement without the AEF but that there was no real fear of an Allied defeat? So the AEF did not save the Allied cause but materially contributed to an earleir end to the war (looking at it in the least favourable light) and removed the possibility of a negotiated settlement (the most favourable).

Mis-spelt 'earlier'!

 

[waynepoo]

Just a point that some are not aware of... of all the Armies of the Great War the Australian Imperial Force was the only totally all volunteer force...five divisions.
Also....The first offensive action under taken by A.E.F units was by 1,000 men (4 Companies from the 33rd Division A.E.F) serving with the Australian Imperial Force during the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918. This battle took place under the overall command of Australian Corps Commander Lt. General Sir John Monash and combined Artillery, Armour, Infantry and Air Support (Combined Arms), serving as a blueprint for all subsequent Allied attacks using ''Tanks''.
Wayne.

 

[swalterh]

I read somewhere that the British Navy did not defeat Napoleon directly but its existence compelled Napoleon to pursue a course of action that materially contributed to his defeat. In this instance the article referenced the Continental System and the actions taken to enforce it, which was, from memory, one of the reasons for the invasion of Russia. Likewise, the Battle of Britain did not defeat Hitler, but it left him operating in the East with an undefeated Britain at his rear. Compelling an enemy to act in a manner that brings about his destruction is surely an achievement in anyone's language.

Perhaps the AEF's contribution might be understood in this light. With the impending arrival of millions of American soldiers, the Germans gambled with the March Offensive, which was their last hope for battlefield victory in the West. Its failure against the Allied armies, which in fairness, were still drawn primarily from the British Empire and France, (and Belgium) ensured that the best Germany could have hoped for would have been a negotiated settlement brought about by mutual exhaustion. The arrival of the AEF took the negotiated settlement off the table. So would it be fair to say that Germany might have held on into 1919 for a negotiated settlement without the AEF but that there was no real fear of an Allied defeat? So the AEF did not save the Allied cause but materially contributed to an earleir end to the war (looking at it in the least favourable light) and removed the possibility of a negotiated settlement (the most favourable).

Jack

I agree with this assessment, especially the portion of your argument describing the mere threat of American participation spurring the Germans into their Spring Offensives. I believe that the Germans wouldn’t have been able to completely defeat the allies, which is also consistent with your analysis. However, I also believe that it would have been very difficult for the British and French to convince the Germans to cede French and Belgian territory that they maintained under their militarily possession though. Following American entry into the war, the German high command deliberated about the prospects of a negotiated settlement and determined that they would not cede any territory that had been “conquered” during the earlier years of the conflict.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

Just a point that some are not aware of... of all the Armies of the Great War the Australian Imperial Force was the only totally all volunteer force...five divisions.
Also....The first offensive action under taken by A.E.F units was by 1,000 men (4 Companies from the 33rd Division A.E.F) serving with the Australian Imperial Force during the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918. This battle took place under the overall command of Australian Corps Commander Lt. General Sir John Monash and combined Artillery, Armour, Infantry and Air Support (Combined Arms), serving as a blueprint for all subsequent Allied attacks using ''Tanks''.
Wayne.

Wayne

Thanks for sharing this fascinating and informative story about the Australian Imperial Force. I think one of the more stimulating aspects about studying this conflict is that it contained the first occurrences of joint operations due to the introduction and development of weapons systems such as the tank and airplane. The American Expeditionary Force was also a big proponent of combined arms operations when it undertook its eventual offensives on the western front. It’s interesting to learn that the Aussies paved the way for such concepts with this action.

Thanks again for the great post.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

When dealing with a general history of the First World War many contemporary scholars overlook the importance of aviation over the battlefield. Aside from devoting minimal coverage to the topic they display a tendency to describe aviation’s influence on the outcome as minimal. This couldn’t be further from the truth, especially when analyzing the events that transpired on the Western Front. The belligerent nations of Europe gradually recognized that the battle for control of the skies over the Western Front was the pivotal struggle that would determine the outcome of the war.

Throughout the course of the war Britain, France and Germany each scrambled to develop a powerful air arm that could deliver the decisive results necessary to achieve victory. Each new technological or tactical improvement would immediately affect the dispute for air supremacy. The most fundamental contemporary military concept suggests that whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. IMO the airplane and its successful development as a military weapon were absolutely necessary to achieving victory on the Western Front during the First World War.

 

[lancer]

When dealing with a general history of the First World War many contemporary scholars overlook the importance of aviation over the battlefield. Aside from devoting minimal coverage to the topic they display a tendency to describe aviation’s influence on the outcome as minimal. This couldn’t be further from the truth, especially when analyzing the events that transpired on the Western Front. The belligerent nations of Europe gradually recognized that the battle for control of the skies over the Western Front was the pivotal struggle that would determine the outcome of the war.

Throughout the course of the war Britain, France and Germany each scrambled to develop a powerful air arm that could deliver the decisive results necessary to achieve victory. Each new technological or tactical improvement would immediately affect the dispute for air supremacy. The most fundamental contemporary military concept suggests that whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. IMO the airplane and its successful development as a military weapon were absolutely necessary to achieving victory on the Western Front during the First World War.

In the most basic form, the importance of aircraft in the First World War can be summed up by one action, defining everything that the airplane could be and would become. As the opening German offensive of 1914 approached Paris, French aircraft observed and reported the movement of the 1st and 2nd German Armies as they turned in a south-east direction. This movement would have the Germans moving inside of Paris, instead of outside and around Paris. This movement exposed the German right flank to the French garrison of Paris and gave Joffre the opening he needed to stand against and the opportunity he needed to counter-attack the German Army. The 'Miracle' of the Marne resulted. Aerial observation assisted in a large way in saving France at this very early date in the war. --Al

 

[jazzeum]

In the same vein as Shane's and Al's posts, how would you describe the influence of the tank. I'm not nearly as knowledgeable as them or others but it seems to me that the full extent if what tanks could do didn't become apparent until Poland in 1939 unlike the airplane in WW I.

 

[Louis Badolato]

In the same vein as Shane's and Al's posts, how would you describe the influence of the tank. I'm not nearly as knowledgeable as them or others but it seems to me that the full extent if what tanks could do didn't become apparent until Poland in 1939 unlike the airplane in WW I.

Actually, there were a few visionaries who saw the potential of the tank well prior to 1939. Heinz Guderian, who wrote "Achtung Panzer!" and British tactician Lidell Hart each published treatises about the way tanks should (and eventually would) be used. The British high command experimented a bit with mobile mechanized warfare in 1927, but failed to fully embrace Lidell Hart's modern approach, while, on the other hand, in Germany, Hitler embraced Guderian's theories. Hence the German advantage in the beginning of WWII.

 

[lancer]

I read somewhere that the British Navy did not defeat Napoleon directly but its existence compelled Napoleon to pursue a course of action that materially contributed to his defeat. In this instance the article referenced the Continental System and the actions taken to enforce it, which was, from memory, one of the reasons for the invasion of Russia. Likewise, the Battle of Britain did not defeat Hitler, but it left him operating in the East with an undefeated Britain at his rear. Compelling an enemy to act in a manner that brings about his destruction is surely an achievement in anyone's language.

Perhaps the AEF's contribution might be understood in this light. With the impending arrival of millions of American soldiers, the Germans gambled with the March Offensive, which was their last hope for battlefield victory in the West. Its failure against the Allied armies, which in fairness, were still drawn primarily from the British Empire and France, (and Belgium) ensured that the best Germany could have hoped for would have been a negotiated settlement brought about by mutual exhaustion. The arrival of the AEF took the negotiated settlement off the table. So would it be fair to say that Germany might have held on into 1919 for a negotiated settlement without the AEF but that there was no real fear of an Allied defeat? So the AEF did not save the Allied cause but materially contributed to an earleir end to the war (looking at it in the least favourable light) and removed the possibility of a negotiated settlement (the most favourable).

I believe, like you have stated, that the potential of the AEF and what the USA would eventually bring into the war in terms of material, is what forced the Germans hands in 1918. USA entry into the war did indeed take the looming specter of the negogiated settlement off the table. But I would argue that these reasons are the exact reason that the USA did save the Allied cause. Germany's rush to beat the US numbers build up led to the eventually disasterous offensives that burned through the last real reserves in manpower and material that Germany possessed. This helped the Allied counter-offensives to be the rousing success that they were. A continuation of the war without US involvement probably brings a negotiated peace, which in no way is a win for the Allied cause. A negotiated peace at this point would have been a practical victory for Germany. Germany would have been undefeated militarily, would have still been in occupation of large areas of France, including some of her most important industrial areas, not to mention Alsace-Lorraine. Germany knew that sitting on the defensive into 1919 would lead to defeat in 1919 once US numbers had grown.
I find it impossible to see how the Allies win without the AEF, whether things played out as they did, or whether the war goes into 1919. So I guess the whole question of victory or defeat for the Allies rests on whether a negotiated peace with an undefeated Germany is seen as a victory, and under that definition I would define a negotiated peace as a win for Germany as the Army remains in the field and large areas of France are still occupied, to be used in any negotiations. -- Al

 

[lancer]

Actually, there were a few visionaries who saw the potential of the tank well prior to 1939. Heinz Guderian, who wrote "Achtung Panzer!" and British tactician Lidell Hart each published treatises about the way tanks should (and eventually would) be used. The British high command experimented a bit with mobile mechanized warfare in 1927, but failed to fully embrace Lidell Hart's modern approach, while, on the other hand, in Germany, Hitler embraced Guderian's theories. Hence the German advantage in the beginning of WWII.

Agree. On the other hand, most failed to see the future for the tank as the few visionaries did. France, as a matter of docturne, drew the wrong conclusions, seeing the tank as a weapon for close support in the infantry assault. The Maginot Line was a direct repudiation of the potential for the mobile warfare that the tank might have represented. As it did in WW1, the tank would be used to help break through a trench system. It was not seen by the French as a way to avoid the trench war through the use of manuever. It is a sad fact that the fear of fighting another war like WW1, with it's resulting horrific casualties from large offensives designed to break through trenches, lead France down the road of static warfare in forts and fixed positions, that would guarantee the tragedy of May, 1940. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Agree. On the other hand, most failed to see the future for the tank as the few visionaries did. France, as a matter of docturne, drew the wrong conclusions, seeing the tank as a weapon for close support in the infantry assault. The Maginot Line was a direct repudiation of the potential for the mobile warfare that the tank might have represented. As it did in WW1, the tank would be used to help break through a trench system. It was not seen by the French as a way to avoid the trench war through the use of manuever. It is a sad fact that the fear of fighting another war like WW1, with it's resulting horrific casualties from large offensives designed to break through trenches, lead France down the road of static warfare in forts and fixed positions, that would guarantee the tragedy of May, 1940. -- Al

Doesn't the old adage go that a country is generally prepared to fight the last war, and thus unprepared to fight the next one?

 

[lancer]

Doesn't the old adage go that a country is generally prepared to fight the last war, and thus unprepared to fight the next one?

No clearer example of the truth of that adage exists then that of France. Starting in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, after allowing herself to be defeated thru what was seen as too defensive a strategy in her major defeats, France went completely in the opposite direction to the point of the all-out offensive, without regard or concern as to the plans or capabilities of her enemy. As a national military policy, this leads to near disaster in the opening battles of WW1, and the continuing ghastly casualties of that war until it climaxes in the 1917 mutinies. After the phyrric victory of WW1, France looked for anyway to prevent the same kind of casualties in any future conflict, thus returning to a defensive military policy that not only made her treaties for self-defense worthless, but doomed her army to defeat in 1940. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

I believe, like you have stated, that the potential of the AEF and what the USA would eventually bring into the war in terms of material, is what forced the Germans hands in 1918. USA entry into the war did indeed take the looming specter of the negogiated settlement off the table. But I would argue that these reasons are the exact reason that the USA did save the Allied cause. Germany's rush to beat the US numbers build up led to the eventually disasterous offensives that burned through the last real reserves in manpower and material that Germany possessed. This helped the Allied counter-offensives to be the rousing success that they were. A continuation of the war without US involvement probably brings a negotiated peace, which in no way is a win for the Allied cause. A negotiated peace at this point would have been a practical victory for Germany. Germany would have been undefeated militarily, would have still been in occupation of large areas of France, including some of her most important industrial areas, not to mention Alsace-Lorraine. Germany knew that sitting on the defensive into 1919 would lead to defeat in 1919 once US numbers had grown.
I find it impossible to see how the Allies win without the AEF, whether things played out as they did, or whether the war goes into 1919. So I guess the whole question of victory or defeat for the Allies rests on whether a negotiated peace with an undefeated Germany is seen as a victory, and under that definition I would define a negotiated peace as a win for Germany as the Army remains in the field and large areas of France are still occupied, to be used in any negotiations. -- Al

Al

I find myself in total agreement with this well thought out and presented assessment.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

In the most basic form, the importance of aircraft in the First World War can be summed up by one action, defining everything that the airplane could be and would become. As the opening German offensive of 1914 approached Paris, French aircraft observed and reported the movement of the 1st and 2nd German Armies as they turned in a south-east direction. This movement would have the Germans moving inside of Paris, instead of outside and around Paris. This movement exposed the German right flank to the French garrison of Paris and gave Joffre the opening he needed to stand against and the opportunity he needed to counter-attack the German Army. The 'Miracle' of the Marne resulted. Aerial observation assisted in a large way in saving France at this very early date in the war. --Al

Al

I will also contend that the role of tactical air support and air interdiction in the final allied drives was of vital importance. Just looking at the combined land-air operations of the American Expeditionary Force during their major offensives demonstrates the significance of the aerial arm to operational and tactical success.

The US Air Service was able to establish air superiority over their portion of the front, first over St. Mihiel and then over Argonne-Meuse, enabling the American Army to (relatively) quickly defeat the Germans on the ground. In this argument I’m not attempting to discount the role of the tank or other ground forces in either of these successful operations, merely highlighting the achievement and contribution of air power.

Shane

 

[lancer]

Al

I will also contend that the role of tactical air support and air interdiction in the final allied drives was of vital importance. Just looking at the combined land-air operations of the American Expeditionary Force during their major offensives demonstrates the significance of the aerial arm to operational and tactical success.

The US Air Service was able to establish air superiority over their portion of the front, first over St. Mihiel and then over Argonne-Meuse, enabling the American Army to (relatively) quickly defeat the Germans on the ground. In this argument I’m not attempting to discount the role of the tank or other ground forces in either of these successful operations, merely highlighting the achievement and contribution of air power.

Shane

Once again, we are in agreement. Hard to overstate William Mitchell's central importance to all the success the USAS was able to achieve. We were very fortunate to have such a man of vision and will and I think he ranks pretty close to Pershing in importance to the US war effort. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Agree. On the other hand, most failed to see the future for the tank as the few visionaries did. France, as a matter of docturne, drew the wrong conclusions, seeing the tank as a weapon for close support in the infantry assault. The Maginot Line was a direct repudiation of the potential for the mobile warfare that the tank might have represented. As it did in WW1, the tank would be used to help break through a trench system. It was not seen by the French as a way to avoid the trench war through the use of manuever. It is a sad fact that the fear of fighting another war like WW1, with it's resulting horrific casualties from large offensives designed to break through trenches, lead France down the road of static warfare in forts and fixed positions, that would guarantee the tragedy of May, 1940. -- Al

Al

I believe your comments in this post regarding France’s concern over the possibility of another WWI style conflict highlights the fundamental reason why they suffered such a crushing defeat in 1940. Clausewitz posits that in order to be successful in combat one must not take council of their fears. I think you do an excellent job of describing the very fears that the French defense establishment took into council during the inter-war years that lead to the country’s eventual downfall.

Shane

 

[Jack]

I believe, like you have stated, that the potential of the AEF and what the USA would eventually bring into the war in terms of material, is what forced the Germans hands in 1918. USA entry into the war did indeed take the looming specter of the negogiated settlement off the table. But I would argue that these reasons are the exact reason that the USA did save the Allied cause. Germany's rush to beat the US numbers build up led to the eventually disasterous offensives that burned through the last real reserves in manpower and material that Germany possessed. This helped the Allied counter-offensives to be the rousing success that they were. A continuation of the war without US involvement probably brings a negotiated peace, which in no way is a win for the Allied cause. A negotiated peace at this point would have been a practical victory for Germany. Germany would have been undefeated militarily, would have still been in occupation of large areas of France, including some of her most important industrial areas, not to mention Alsace-Lorraine. Germany knew that sitting on the defensive into 1919 would lead to defeat in 1919 once US numbers had grown.
I find it impossible to see how the Allies win without the AEF, whether things played out as they did, or whether the war goes into 1919. So I guess the whole question of victory or defeat for the Allies rests on whether a negotiated peace with an undefeated Germany is seen as a victory, and under that definition I would define a negotiated peace as a win for Germany as the Army remains in the field and large areas of France are still occupied, to be used in any negotiations. -- Al

Al

I agree that a negotiated peace is in no way a 'win' for the Allies but I must admit to never having considered that such a peace would have been a 'balanced' one. With Turkey out of the fray by October and Austria/Hungary on its last legs the Empire might well have then been able to ship the greater part of those forces to the Western Front and concentrate as Germany had done when the Russians called time. I always assumed - not with any evidence, just a 'vibe' - that Germany would have been compelled to return to the pre war borders and any deal making would have been with territories outside of Europe. This may have removed the stab in the back myth and the hatred of the Versailles Treaty which Hitler used to great effect although I am convinced that a second war would have occured with or without Hitler. This raises an interesting point for Australians, and by extension New Zealanders, given that Germany would have held her possessions in New Guinea. Perhaps the great benefit for my country when we consider the contribution of the AEF was not in 1918 but was in fact more keenly felt in 1942.

Jack

 

[swalterh]

Al

I agree that a negotiated peace is in no way a 'win' for the Allies but I must admit to never having considered that such a peace would have been a 'balanced' one. With Turkey out of the fray by October and Austria/Hungary on its last legs the Empire might well have then been able to ship the greater part of those forces to the Western Front and concentrate as Germany had done when the Russians called time. I always assumed - not with any evidence, just a 'vibe' - that Germany would have been compelled to return to the pre war borders and any deal making would have been with territories outside of Europe. This may have removed the stab in the back myth and the hatred of the Versailles Treaty which Hitler used to great effect although I am convinced that a second war would have occured with or without Hitler. This raises an interesting point for Australians, and by extension New Zealanders, given that Germany would have held her possessions in New Guinea. Perhaps the great benefit for my country when we consider the contribution of the AEF was not in 1918 but was in fact more keenly felt in 1942.

Jack

The Germans expended a lot of combat power with their spring offensives that would’ve proven very useful defending any attempt by the allies (even with bolstered numbers from redeployed empire troops) to reclaim French and Belgian territory. Had the Americans not become involved, the Germans could and probably should have maintained the operational defensive on the Western Front and continued to allow the allies to expend manpower assaulting their lines. Not suggesting that the Germans could have entirely drained the British and Commonwealth forces, but would these numbers from the empire have been sufficient considering the French army was on the brink of utter exhaustion.

In a counter to the “blockade” argument allow me to posit an alternative view. Following the treaty of Brest Litovsk the Germans were going to gain possession of the “bread basket” of Czarist Russia (Ukraine). This new territory and its resources would in all likelihood have been able to sustain the German war effort had the conflict continued into 1919.

 

[Jack]

In a counter to the “blockade” argument allow me to posit an alternative view. Following the treaty of Brest Litovsk the Germans were going to gain possession of the “bread basket” of Czarist Russia (Ukraine). This new territory and its resources would in all likelihood have been able to sustain the German war effort had the conflict continued into 1919.[/QUOTE]

Man does not live on bread alone!{sm4}