RAF High Command in WW2 (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

Following on from another thread...........

The obstinacy of the high ranking bombing lobby in the RAF is outstanding IMO, even to the point of firing Dowding after he won the Battle of Britian. He proved they were wrong in saying, 'the bomber will always get through', against modern fighters with radar organised defence.

Why did they (and the USAAF) arguably just repeat the mistakes of the luftwaffe in 1940?

Operational reports showed much lower losses with much faster Mosquitos. So what if the slower and expensive heavies with 8 plus crew at 12,000 lb and up bomb load (lancs, halifax, B17, B24, etc) had all been replaced with cheaper and much faster mossies of 4,000 lb load and 2 crew? Would bomber command then have lost 60% of its men and the crews suffered so much?

The USAAF may have had mossie equivalent - what would that be? Or it could have built the mossie under license and from wood so less use of other vital war material.

 

[trooper]

To understand the policies of the time you must think in the mindset of that period. We have now had some seventy years during which time we have been subjected to a completely new way of thought. Men who were then considered heroes are now minutely dissected, their actions reviewed in comparison with the new thought and, by the level of the new thought, found wanting. At that time we were at war with Germany. By that I mean total war in the same way that Sherman regarded total war during the ACW. During the Blitz "Bomber" Harris famously said "They have sown the breeze, they will reap the whirlwind". All of Germany was involved in the war effort therefore all of Germany would be bombed, and the public were all for it. It didn't matter to us if the targets were military or not we wanted Germany bombed flat. Heavy bomber raids were invaluable in keeping up public morale. Modern thought is that bombing on such a scale was largely ineffective and did little to affect war production but at the time the newsreel scenes of multiple explosions had a huge effect on the audiences.
As to the hypothetical question as to the efficacy of Mosquito bombing over the heavies we shall never know. That is something for the "what if" department.

 

[panda1gen]

To understand the policies of the time you must think in the mindset of that period. We have now had some seventy years during which time we have been subjected to a completely new way of thought. Men who were then considered heroes are now minutely dissected, their actions reviewed in comparison with the new thought and, by the level of the new thought, found wanting. At that time we were at war with Germany. By that I mean total war in the same way that Sherman regarded total war during the ACW. During the Blitz "Bomber" Harris famously said "They have sown the breeze, they will reap the whirlwind". All of Germany was involved in the war effort therefore all of Germany would be bombed, and the public were all for it. It didn't matter to us if the targets were military or not we wanted Germany bombed flat. Heavy bomber raids were invaluable in keeping up public morale. Modern thought is that bombing on such a scale was largely ineffective and did little to affect war production but at the time the newsreel scenes of multiple explosions had a huge effect on the audiences.
As to the hypothetical question as to the efficacy of Mosquito bombing over the heavies we shall never know. That is something for the "what if" department.

After Coventry and the Blitz I doubt if anyone would not want to 'give some back' and it was the only available method to hit back. I also accept the huge damage wrought and defensive effort that bombing made Germany undertake, and therefore what resources in the air and on the ground were not in the front line as a result. I am therefore not questioning the bomber offensive per se.

I am referring more to the operational management and conservation of the lives of the bomber crews. I accept the huge problems, including using the 70 year 'retrospectosope', but that was not much of a defence for Haig in WW1.

I wonder if there was a bit more dogma and doctrine over developing operational effectiveness evaluation and innovation in this completely new area of war than in comparison with some other service areas?

For example, the Navy misused some of its assets and lost some in 1939/40, but changed doctrine very quickly, as it had in 1914 (with mines and subs). They also analysed operational results and learned relatively quickly on effective convoy escort. I accept that the Army was slow to learn in the desert, but it too developed new doctrines.

I also appreciate the terrible shortage of material and production facilities if anything though, this may have developed the mosquito argument - if it had ever been looked at when it was shown the mossie could bomb. After all, isn't this fast bomber concept what stalled the Me262 development?

I am not suggesting that bomber command did not tactically innovate with technology, clearly they did, but they did not seem to waver from the same general form of attack. Neither it seems did the USAAF, yet the luftwaffe stopped after heavy losses and never even tried to develop a strategic bomber force on anything like the same scale.

Every service had to absorb lessons and find new ways to fight, I am just not sure whether the top brass RAF attitude on winning the war through bombing alone - unproven dogma with completely new technology - impaired bomber command from being as flexible and innovative as it could have been?

And why dismiss Dowding?

Just a thought, not dogma from me, but if I am right that bomber command had the highest casualty rate of all the British forces, I wonder if the mindset of the top brass is worth a question?

 

[Spitfrnd]

I am curious why you would say the allied bombing campaign was ineffective. While there are some revisionists that may claim otherwise, the material I have read suggests it was indeed a major factor in shortening the war.

In summer 1943, allied bombers dropped 5,092 tons on 14 airframe plants that dramatically cut the German airframe production. The number of acceptances of aircraft (Me-109 and Fw-190) in July were 1050 and by December they were dropped to 560. The first attacks on Schweinfurt (ball-bearing factory) in August 1943 caused the production to be reduced by 65%. One of the most successful campaigns of the air war was against the oil plants of Germany. By June of 1944, the average production from German oil plants was reduced to 107,000 tons per plant, down dramatically from the pre-bombing 316,000 tons per plant average. The raids were continued and during September of 1944 the production was cut to an amazingly low number of 17,000 tons per plant. This had a major effect on German aviation gasoline. The production of German aircraft fuel in April of 1944 was 175,000 tons. The production was cut to an also amazingly low 5,000 tons in September. The attacks on oil caused the Germans to divert 350,000 men to repair the plants and began planning to rebuild them underground.

The success of this campaign can be observed from the direct effects on Germany's ability to conduct the war. After may 1944 the consumption of oil exceeded the production and by November the reserves were practically exhausted. One of the prime examples of the effects on German armor was during February and march of 1945. The Germans gathered 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead. The tanks were unable to move due to lack of gas and overran by the Russians.

The oil attacks were not just felt on the front lines. The attacks cut the production of many other facets of the wartime production. The same plants produced nitrogen and methane. A production of 75,000 tons of nitrogen was available in 1944 before raids, by the end of 1944 the production was reduced to 20,000 tons. Nitrogen was essential in both agriculture and explosives. The agricultural allocation for 1943-44 was 54% of the total production. Due to the shortages the 1944-45 allocation was planned to be 25%, but had to be later totally eliminated.

Another greatly successful aspect of the bombing campaign was the attacks on German transportation. For the whole Reich there were 900,000 freight cars in august 1944. The attacks on railways cut this number to 214,000 in March 1945. After March 1945 no statistics were kept because the numbers were so low. These attacks almost cut off coal supplies to southern Germany. This had such a great effect on the German economy that on March 16, 1945 German labor czar Albert Speer reported to Hitler, “ The German economy is heading for inevitable collapse within 4-8 weeks.”

No doubt allied bombing was brutally expensive in men and resourses but I find little evidence to suggest it was ill advised or that bomber commands did not learn from their mistakes. Perhaps they could have learned faster but without the pressure from allied bombing, I question whether the allied offensive would have been practical.

 

[Louis Badolato]

I agree with Kevin on this one. First of all, the bomber enthusiasts were dead wrong - fighters always dominated heavy bombers, except where the bombers were provided with fighter escort, and even then they took severe losses. Anyone who questioned the "bombers will always get through" theory in both the RAF (Dowding) and the USAAC (Claire Chenault) was sent packing by the higher ups for questioning this doctrine.

Meanwhile, in both the Luftwaffe and Imperial Japanese Navy, the understanding of the value of fighters placed them far ahead of the Allies early in the war. Had the Axis powers not wasted this advantage, (in the Pacific by means of the code breakers giving us the leg up at Midway, where the majority of Japan's irreplacable experienced airmen went down with the Hiryu, Soryo, and Akagi - in Europe by changing their objectives during the Battle of Britain from the airfields and the radar stations to civilian terror bombing), the outcome of the war might have been terribly different.

I also agree that Mossies, fast, lighter bombers with a 4,000 lb. payload, could have done the job of the heavies with far less loss of life. Again, I am not questioning the effectiveness of the bombing campaign in shortening the war, I am merely questioning, in light of an average 10% loss rate per mission (and as much as 60% on missions like Schweinfurt), whether the high command, instead of sitting on their collective arses and just sending the heavies out each day and night, could, and indeed should, have come up with a better means of waging the bombing campaign.

And as far as the effectiveness of the bombing campaign, I think that its single greatest effect was drawing up the luftwaffe to attempt to fend off the bombers, thereby ensuring its destruction by the Allied bomber escorts. Once the luftwaffe had been so weakened that the Allies enjoyed air supremecy (really a function of both bombers and fighters acting in concert) the war was all but won.

These were facts that "Bomber Harris" refused to acknowledge. Indeed, the Air Marshals even fought Ike when the ground forces needed the bombers' cooperation for oeprations Overloard, Goodwood and Cobra. He had to threaten to resign to get the control he needed. Whether or not 70 years have passed, it is evident that there was something sadly lacking in bomber command when they had to be forced to cooperate with the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

 

[Spitfrnd]

The Mosquito was a fabulous aircraft but more limited in range than the heavy bombers and it is doubtful to me that the numbers necessary for comparable payloads could have been as effective in virtually shutting down the German war machine. Extraopations from the specialized missions it flew, which were designed to take advantage of its characteristics, cannot so easily be made. Its strenght was its speed and manuverability which is great if you are bombing in small numbers and with minimum warning but less useful for the very long flights into Germany required to cause serious damage to Germany industry. I would be interested to see any detailed analysis suggesting it could have replaced the B-17 and Lancaster.

I also think that if you look a Luffwaffe fighter losses you will find that it was not the bomber escorts that had the biggest effect. No doubt though the bombing program diverted the Luffwaffe's attention from other pressing matters.

 

[OzDigger]

I agree with Kevin on this one. First of all, the bomber enthusiasts were dead wrong - fighters always dominated heavy bombers, except where the bombers were provided with fighter escort, and even then they took severe losses. Anyone who questioned the "bombers will always get through" theory in both the RAF (Dowding) and the USAAC (Claire Chenault) was sent packing by the higher ups for questioning this doctrine.

Meanwhile, in both the Luftwaffe and Imperial Japanese Navy, the understanding of the value of fighters placed them far ahead of the Allies early in the war. Had the Axis powers not wasted this advantage, (in the Pacific by means of the code breakers giving us the leg up at Midway, where the majority of Japan's irreplacable experienced airmen went down with the Hiryu, Soryo, and Akagi - in Europe by changing their objectives during the Battle of Britain from the airfields and the radar stations to civilian terror bombing), the outcome of the war might have been terribly different.

I also agree that Mossies, fast, lighter bombers with a 4,000 lb. payload, could have done the job of the heavies with far less loss of life. Again, I am not questioning the effectiveness of the bombing campaign in shortening the war, I am merely questioning, in light of an average 10% loss rate per mission (and as much as 60% on missions like Schweinfurt), whether the high command, instead of sitting on their collective arses and just sending the heavies out each day and night, could, and indeed should, have come up with a better means of waging the bombing campaign.

And as far as the effectiveness of the bombing campaign, I think that its single greatest effect was drawing up the luftwaffe to attempt to fend off the bombers, thereby ensuring its destruction by the Allied bomber escorts. Once the luftwaffe had been so weakened that the Allies enjoyed air supremecy (really a function of both bombers and fighters acting in concert) the war was all but won.

These were facts that "Bomber Harris" refused to acknowledge. Indeed, the Air Marshals even fought Ike when the ground forces needed the bombers' cooperation for oeprations Overloard, Goodwood and Cobra. He had to threaten to resign to get the control he needed. Whether or not 70 years have passed, it is evident that there was something sadly lacking in bomber command when they had to be forced to cooperate with the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

I agree with Kevin and Louis, for example as Russia forced the German land forces back, the loss of resources such as oil fields in Romania was a far greater blow to the German war economy than the allied bombing. Up until 1944 the allied bombing had little impact on German morale or their economy, the bombing effectiveness did improve in the late months of the war, but the land war was the deciding factor, not the bombing.

 

[uksubs]

After Coventry and the Blitz I doubt if anyone would not want to 'give some back' and it was the only available method to hit back. I also accept the huge damage wrought and defensive effort that bombing made Germany undertake, and therefore what resources in the air and on the ground were not in the front line as a result. I am therefore not questioning the bomber offensive per se.

I am referring more to the operational management and conservation of the lives of the bomber crews. I accept the huge problems, including using the 70 year 'retrospectosope', but that was not much of a defence for Haig in WW1.

I wonder if there was a bit more dogma and doctrine over developing operational effectiveness evaluation and innovation in this completely new area of war than in comparison with some other service areas?

For example, the Navy misused some of its assets and lost some in 1939/40, but changed doctrine very quickly, as it had in 1914 (with mines and subs). They also analysed operational results and learned relatively quickly on effective convoy escort. I accept that the Army was slow to learn in the desert, but it too developed new doctrines.

I also appreciate the terrible shortage of material and production facilities if anything though, this may have developed the mosquito argument - if it had ever been looked at when it was shown the mossie could bomb. After all, isn't this fast bomber concept what stalled the Me262 development?

I am not suggesting that bomber command did not tactically innovate with technology, clearly they did, but they did not seem to waver from the same general form of attack. Neither it seems did the USAAF, yet the luftwaffe stopped after heavy losses and never even tried to develop a strategic bomber force on anything like the same scale.

Every service had to absorb lessons and find new ways to fight, I am just not sure whether the top brass RAF attitude on winning the war through bombing alone - unproven dogma with completely new technology - impaired bomber command from being as flexible and innovative as it could have been?

And why dismiss Dowding?

Just a thought, not dogma from me, but if I am right that bomber command had the highest casualty rate of all the British forces, I wonder if the mindset of the top brass is worth a question?

The RAF were at the forefront of the electric war in the air with Hs2 + Oboe & you just have to look at the raids that 617sq did on the u boat pens & v1/v2 sites to show what a great impact they had on the war , what other bomber could carry a 22000 bomb ?

 

[uksubs]

I agree with Kevin on this one. First of all, the bomber enthusiasts were dead wrong - fighters always dominated heavy bombers, except where the bombers were provided with fighter escort, and even then they took severe losses. Anyone who questioned the "bombers will always get through" theory in both the RAF (Dowding) and the USAAC (Claire Chenault) was sent packing by the higher ups for questioning this doctrine.

Meanwhile, in both the Luftwaffe and Imperial Japanese Navy, the understanding of the value of fighters placed them far ahead of the Allies early in the war. Had the Axis powers not wasted this advantage, (in the Pacific by means of the code breakers giving us the leg up at Midway, where the majority of Japan's irreplacable experienced airmen went down with the Hiryu, Soryo, and Akagi - in Europe by changing their objectives during the Battle of Britain from the airfields and the radar stations to civilian terror bombing), the outcome of the war might have been terribly different.

I also agree that Mossies, fast, lighter bombers with a 4,000 lb. payload, could have done the job of the heavies with far less loss of life. Again, I am not questioning the effectiveness of the bombing campaign in shortening the war, I am merely questioning, in light of an average 10% loss rate per mission (and as much as 60% on missions like Schweinfurt), whether the high command, instead of sitting on their collective arses and just sending the heavies out each day and night, could, and indeed should, have come up with a better means of waging the bombing campaign.

And as far as the effectiveness of the bombing campaign, I think that its single greatest effect was drawing up the luftwaffe to attempt to fend off the bombers, thereby ensuring its destruction by the Allied bomber escorts. Once the luftwaffe had been so weakened that the Allies enjoyed air supremecy (really a function of both bombers and fighters acting in concert) the war was all but won.

These were facts that "Bomber Harris" refused to acknowledge. Indeed, the Air Marshals even fought Ike when the ground forces needed the bombers' cooperation for oeprations Overloard, Goodwood and Cobra. He had to threaten to resign to get the control he needed. Whether or not 70 years have passed, it is evident that there was something sadly lacking in bomber command when they had to be forced to cooperate with the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

From what I read the bombing Caen & Monte cassino did nothing to help the land battles

 

[Louis Badolato]

From what I read the bombing Caen & Monte cassino did nothing to help the land battles

Bombing in Caen and Monte Cassino merely created more rubble for the defenders to hide behind. However, in operation Cobra, when the allies finally broke out of Normandy, the bombing was extremely effective, cutting off, isolating and virtually annihilating a large section of the German hedgerow defenses and letting the ground forces drive right through.

Also, with the exception of Omaha Beach, where the bombers dropped their bombs behind the defenses, the preparatory bombing the night before and morning of D-Day knocked the daylights out of the Atlantic Wall defenders, greatly reducing the losses from the landings on Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword.

Once the skies cleared during the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied Bombers and ground attack fighters like Tiffies and Thunderbolts wrought havoc on the advancing German forces.

Without local air supremecy or bad weather preventing air cover, offensive ground operations during WWII were very difficult to accomplish.

 

[binder001]

Unfortunately you have to look at thie issue more as a religious one than a matter of cost effectiveness. The disciples of Douhet, et al who recited "the bomber will always get through" even night before bed were dead serious. They believed that they were on the forefront of changing warfare forever (and in many ways they did). The bomber barons actually believed that the application of airpower would make the ground war obsolete, thereby saving thousands of "our guys" while being able to punish "them" for making war in the first place. They had been pushing hard for the bigger club to do it with, now they had to justify the money and effort. They were SURE that the theories would be proven, Germany would break and the war would be over. When Germany didn't break, they were SURE that they just needed that bigger club to apply more pressure - so more bombers, bases, men, etc. The idea that I can never understand is the adversity to escorted bombers. The Mustang is heralded as the technical solution to the escort problem, but the real "problem" was that no air generals of the time wanted fighter escorts! They were dead set against it. Eaker, etc had believed their own press reports about the "Flying Fortress". What fool could survive the massed fires of 130 heavy machine guns in each bomb group? Unfortunately the Luftwaffe proved that they could. Gunners came home enthusiastically saying that they had shot down dozens or hundreds of enemy interceptors, where in fact the kills were about 1/10th of the claims. The fighter was defensive - bombers take the war to the enemy! According to the old barroom quote;"fighter pilots make movies, bomber pilots make history". The bomber barons also believed their own PR about the accuracy and effectiveness of the bombing. In August, 1945 the bomber boys finally got a big enough club! Even then the famous atomic bombings hastened the end of the war, but Japan was already teetering. The big bombs did get the emperor's attention so that he said it was time to end the party.

Unfortunately, the bomber barons sons and grandsons haven't gotten rid of the air war fantasy. "North Viet Nam won't get ouut of the South? We'll send in a few Marines and punish them from the air!" That one worked out really well didn't it? "Some Muslims want to do terror bombing - we'll just punish them from the air!" A few cruise missles were tossed at suspected training camps, Al Queda changed their tactics and decided to punish us from the air.

Louis, as far as a US equivalent to the Mosquito, about the closest would be the A20 Havoc. Not as fast or long ranged as Mossie. That's why some of the USAAF photo recon groups that planned the strikes for the heavies were flying Mosquito recon aircraft. In some missions the P38 could also be compared to Mosquito.

As far as the Axis realizing the value of the fighter, I don't think that's quite right. The US and Britain saw lots of value in the fighter, the Axis just had their new generation ready first. You can't compare the Japanese Navy to the US 8th Air Force - totally different roles and mission.

Lastly, a reminder that when the Allied air forces intervened in the Battle of the Bulge, their big effect was to screw up transportation and shoot up supply vehicles. The actual air kills against armor were a small fraction of what were claimed by the pilots.

 

[uksubs]

Bombing in Caen and Monte Cassino merely created more rubble for the defenders to hide behind. However, in operation Cobra, when the allies finally broke out of Normandy, the bombing was extremely effective, cutting off, isolating and virtually annihilating a large section of the German hedgerow defenses and letting the ground forces drive right through.

Also, with the exception of Omaha Beach, where the bombers dropped their bombs behind the defenses, the preparatory bombing the night before and morning of D-Day knocked the daylights out of the Atlantic Wall defenders, greatly reducing the losses from the landings on Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword.

Once the skies cleared during the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied Bombers and ground attack fighters like Tiffies and Thunderbolts wrought havoc on the advancing German forces.

Without local air supremecy or bad weather preventing air cover, offensive ground operations during WWII were very difficult to accomplish.

Problem is most of the operation you talk about were carried out by the tactical air force of the RAF & USA not the 8th air force or bomber commend

 

[uksubs]

Unfortunately you have to look at thie issue more as a religious one than a matter of cost effectiveness. The disciples of Douhet, et al who recited "the bomber will always get through" even night before bed were dead serious. They believed that they were on the forefront of changing warfare forever (and in many ways they did). The bomber barons actually believed that the application of airpower would make the ground war obsolete, thereby saving thousands of "our guys" while being able to punish "them" for making war in the first place. They had been pushing hard for the bigger club to do it with, now they had to justify the money and effort. They were SURE that the theories would be proven, Germany would break and the war would be over. When Germany didn't break, they were SURE that they just needed that bigger club to apply more pressure - so more bombers, bases, men, etc. The idea that I can never understand is the adversity to escorted bombers. The Mustang is heralded as the technical solution to the escort problem, but the real "problem" was that no air generals of the time wanted fighter escorts! They were dead set against it. Eaker, etc had believed their own press reports about the "Flying Fortress". What fool could survive the massed fires of 130 heavy machine guns in each bomb group? Unfortunately the Luftwaffe proved that they could. Gunners came home enthusiastically saying that they had shot down dozens or hundreds of enemy interceptors, where in fact the kills were about 1/10th of the claims. The fighter was defensive - bombers take the war to the enemy! According to the old barroom quote;"fighter pilots make movies, bomber pilots make history". The bomber barons also believed their own PR about the accuracy and effectiveness of the bombing. In August, 1945 the bomber boys finally got a big enough club! Even then the famous atomic bombings hastened the end of the war, but Japan was already teetering. The big bombs did get the emperor's attention so that he said it was time to end the party.

Unfortunately, the bomber barons sons and grandsons haven't gotten rid of the air war fantasy. "North Viet Nam won't get ouut of the South? We'll send in a few Marines and punish them from the air!" That one worked out really well didn't it? "Some Muslims want to do terror bombing - we'll just punish them from the air!" A few cruise missles were tossed at suspected training camps, Al Queda changed their tactics and decided to punish us from the air.

Louis, as far as a US equivalent to the Mosquito, about the closest would be the A20 Havoc. Not as fast or long ranged as Mossie. That's why some of the USAAF photo recon groups that planned the strikes for the heavies were flying Mosquito recon aircraft. In some missions the P38 could also be compared to Mosquito.

As far as the Axis realizing the value of the fighter, I don't think that's quite right. The US and Britain saw lots of value in the fighter, the Axis just had their new generation ready first. You can't compare the Japanese Navy to the US 8th Air Force - totally different roles and mission.

Lastly, a reminder that when the Allied air forces intervened in the Battle of the Bulge, their big effect was to screw up transportation and shoot up supply vehicles. The actual air kills against armor were a small fraction of what were claimed by the pilots.

Great post

 

[uksubs]

Bombing in Caen and Monte Cassino merely created more rubble for the defenders to hide behind. However, in operation Cobra, when the allies finally broke out of Normandy, the bombing was extremely effective, cutting off, isolating and virtually annihilating a large section of the German hedgerow defenses and letting the ground forces drive right through.

Also, with the exception of Omaha Beach, where the bombers dropped their bombs behind the defenses, the preparatory bombing the night before and morning of D-Day knocked the daylights out of the Atlantic Wall defenders, greatly reducing the losses from the landings on Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword.

Once the skies cleared during the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied Bombers and ground attack fighters like Tiffies and Thunderbolts wrought havoc on the advancing German forces.

Without local air supremecy or bad weather preventing air cover, offensive ground operations during WWII were very difficult to accomplish.

Don't forget that in Normandy on operation Cobra the 8th Air force bombed there own troops killing 100 & wounding 500 GI

 

[Louis Badolato]

Problem is most of the operation you talk about were carried out by the tactical air force of the RAF & USA not the 8th air force or bomber commend

Actually, no. Both Cobra and the D-Day preparation involved 8th Airforce and Bomber command.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Don't forget that in Normandy on operation Cobra the 8th Air force bombed there own troops killing 100 & wounding 500 GI

Yes, but that is a drop in the bucket when you compare the loss of life trying to take the Hedgerows from the Germans each day throughout June, July and August, 1944.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis, as far as a US equivalent to the Mosquito, about the closest would be the A20 Havoc. Not as fast or long ranged as Mossie. That's why some of the USAAF photo recon groups that planned the strikes for the heavies were flying Mosquito recon aircraft. In some missions the P38 could also be compared to Mosquito.

As far as the Axis realizing the value of the fighter, I don't think that's quite right. The US and Britain saw lots of value in the fighter, the Axis just had their new generation ready first. You can't compare the Japanese Navy to the US 8th Air Force - totally different roles and mission.

Lastly, a reminder that when the Allied air forces intervened in the Battle of the Bulge, their big effect was to screw up transportation and shoot up supply vehicles. The actual air kills against armor were a small fraction of what were claimed by the pilots.

The U.S. could have built mossies under license from the British, like Packard built Merlin engines. There was, after all, a war on.

And if the Axis didn't appreciate the value of the fighter earlier, why were the Axis bombers escorted by fighters in 1940 at the Battle of Britain and in 1941 at Pearl Harbor?

Whether the kills on armor were exagerated, a tank cannot do too much without fuel and ammunition, so shooting up supply vehicles accomlished the same goal. And by the way, Pattons claims of armor kills made the pilots exaggerations look minor. Read Patton's journal some time. He claims more Tiger and Panther tanks destroyed in a 4 month period than the Germans ever produced.

 

[binder001]

And if the Axis didn't appreciate the value of the fighter earlier, why were the Axis bombers escorted by fighters in 1940 at the Battle of Britain and in 1941 at Pearl Harbor? QUOTE]

re: Pearl Harbor - don't confuse naval aviation with strategic bombing aviation. They both had wings and there most similarities stop. Each has a different role, mission, training, philosophy and aircraft. The Zero had "long legs" but that range and maneuverability came with a hefty price tag. The Zero had no pilot protection and the design had no growth potential. Naval aviation realized early on that their targets would be defended by other aircraft and fighters were early on the list for most countries. The British experience shows what happens when a bomber-oriented RAF was given control of naval aviation. Fine ships and brave men but barely adequate airplanes for the job. Notice that later in the war the RN used a lot of USN carrier airplane types.

The Germans over Britain represented a tactical airforce. The Luftwaffe really wasn't oriented to true strategic bombing. They ended up using medium bombers to do area terror bombing after they stopped hitting airfields.

GB

 

[Spitfrnd]

The U.S. could have built mossies under license from the British, like Packard built Merlin engines. There was, after all, a war on.

And if the Axis didn't appreciate the value of the fighter earlier, why were the Axis bombers escorted by fighters in 1940 at the Battle of Britain and in 1941 at Pearl Harbor?

Whether the kills on armor were exagerated, a tank cannot do too much without fuel and ammunition, so shooting up supply vehicles accomlished the same goal. And by the way, Pattons claims of armor kills made the pilots exaggerations look minor. Read Patton's journal some time. He claims more Tiger and Panther tanks destroyed in a 4 month period than the Germans ever produced.

Sure they could but dispite the enthusiastic debate on this topic on various warbird forums, I still have seen no convincing evidence that the Mosquito could have replaced the heavy bomber and produced the same results. Yes there are many comparative numbers posted but the fact remains that when you loaded a Mosquito for maximum range and payload, it lost much of its edge. Also, it was designed and successful in small aircraft sized missions and surprise raids. It is a much different thing to send them in masse where they would have been much more vulnerable. I agree with Gary that the real bomber command error was to cling to the notion of unescorted bomber strikes for so long. The early results demonstrated soon enough that that was a bad idea and they didn't need the Mustang to do it.

 

[uksubs]

Sure they could but dispite the enthusiastic debate on this topic on various warbird forums, I still have seen no convincing evidence that the Mosquito could have replaced the heavy bomber and produced the same results. Yes there are many comparative numbers posted but the fact remains that when you loaded a Mosquito for maximum range and payload, it lost much of its edge. Also, it was designed and successful in small aircraft sized missions and surprise raids. It is a much different thing to send them in masse where they would have been much more vulnerable. I agree with Gary that the real bomber command error was to cling to the notion of unescorted bomber strikes for so long. The early results demonstrated soon enough that that was a bad idea and they didn't need the Mustang to do it.

You say when the Mosquito loaded up it lose much of it edge but you can say that about any plane , take the P 51 Mustang if it had it full fuel load it was a dangerous plane to fly till it used up the 85 gallon fuel tank behind it seat but after that it was still a top plane , the Luftwaffe set a special squadron of high performance Me 109 to try to shoot down photo rec Mosquito & were having the same problem at night trying to shoot down Mosquitos bombing Berlin with 4000 pound cookie bombs so I don't know where it lost it edge
It would be interesting to see what bomb load a Lancaster & B17 could carry to Berlin