I am curious why you would say the allied bombing campaign was ineffective. While there are some revisionists that may claim otherwise, the material I have read suggests it was indeed a major factor in shortening the war.
In summer 1943, allied bombers dropped 5,092 tons on 14 airframe plants that dramatically cut the German airframe production. The number of acceptances of aircraft (Me-109 and Fw-190) in July were 1050 and by December they were dropped to 560. The first attacks on Schweinfurt (ball-bearing factory) in August 1943 caused the production to be reduced by 65%. One of the most successful campaigns of the air war was against the oil plants of Germany. By June of 1944, the average production from German oil plants was reduced to 107,000 tons per plant, down dramatically from the pre-bombing 316,000 tons per plant average. The raids were continued and during September of 1944 the production was cut to an amazingly low number of 17,000 tons per plant. This had a major effect on German aviation gasoline. The production of German aircraft fuel in April of 1944 was 175,000 tons. The production was cut to an also amazingly low 5,000 tons in September. The attacks on oil caused the Germans to divert 350,000 men to repair the plants and began planning to rebuild them underground.
The success of this campaign can be observed from the direct effects on Germany's ability to conduct the war. After may 1944 the consumption of oil exceeded the production and by November the reserves were practically exhausted. One of the prime examples of the effects on German armor was during February and march of 1945. The Germans gathered 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead. The tanks were unable to move due to lack of gas and overran by the Russians.
The oil attacks were not just felt on the front lines. The attacks cut the production of many other facets of the wartime production. The same plants produced nitrogen and methane. A production of 75,000 tons of nitrogen was available in 1944 before raids, by the end of 1944 the production was reduced to 20,000 tons. Nitrogen was essential in both agriculture and explosives. The agricultural allocation for 1943-44 was 54% of the total production. Due to the shortages the 1944-45 allocation was planned to be 25%, but had to be later totally eliminated.
Another greatly successful aspect of the bombing campaign was the attacks on German transportation. For the whole Reich there were 900,000 freight cars in august 1944. The attacks on railways cut this number to 214,000 in March 1945. After March 1945 no statistics were kept because the numbers were so low. These attacks almost cut off coal supplies to southern Germany. This had such a great effect on the German economy that on March 16, 1945 German labor czar Albert Speer reported to Hitler, “ The German economy is heading for inevitable collapse within 4-8 weeks.”
No doubt allied bombing was brutally expensive in men and resourses but I find little evidence to suggest it was ill advised or that bomber commands did not learn from their mistakes. Perhaps they could have learned faster but without the pressure from allied bombing, I question whether the allied offensive would have been practical.
I have watched this thread go a bit and kept out - I never said anything about the campaign being ineffective or that the RAF did not learn and use technology.
I merely referred to an apparently fixed adherence to a theoretical doctrine of the (untried) heavy bomber being able to single handedly win the war. This cost around 60% casualties in bomber command, the highest rate in British forces? Could and should they thought more about the men than the unproven doctrine?
Nobody said the attacks on the Somme in 1916 were unwise or a waste in that they drained the German Army too and helped save the French Army from collapse, but they are considered wasteful of Allied lives by the way in which they were carried out. Haig wasn't spared.
There are all sorts of spin off arguments here about the use the aircraft might have been elsewhere, just a few long range aircraft to coastal command, using more mossies rather than slow heavy bombers, supporting the army more etc etc I wasn't really going there either but think this is a debate, especially costal command v U-boats and the peril Britain was in for years.
A point about the diminishing performance of the bomber aircaft at longer ranges, firebombing of London, Coventry, Hamburg, Tokyo, Dresden etc was most effective (sic) so did the actual payload per plane matter too much if a high proportion of incendiaries were carried and far more aircaft and trained crews came back more often? The mossie, even if it was say a 2000lb load, would still pack a punch and if there were 4+ per heavy, more should survive for the next mission at their speed.
I realise this is all what if stuff, but the same AA guns and much more expensive and higher performance fighters would have been needed to stop mossies getting through and home again at 400mph than more easy to make 109s, 110s etc
I do think that binder 001 also has a good point about the Germans playing catch up, but they never did match the mossie did they?
It wasn't my idea this, just something I read that made me think and reading Oz's thread when he mentioned his relatives in bomber command. I also knew about Louis' lost relatives in B17s. None of this theoretical posing is meant to be any reflection on the crews and I am also not at all anti RAF before someone starts..........quite the reverse.
