Washington Post Article on ACW (1 Viewer)

[jazzeum]

I have thought a lot for several years about the questions Rob poses and just in time for Rob's question and Bob's answer, with which I agree, is an article in today's New York Times in the Disunion blog (about which I post daily) by Edward Ayers, a Professor of History at the University of Richmond, called The Causes of the Civil War 2.0. The article can be accessed here. It's a fascinating read on the question of states rights v. slavery as the reason. He concludes the latter. He has written a fascinating book called "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War in the Heart of America" that's a must.

In the runup to war, it's also important to remember that many states in the South were divided as to whether to secede or not to. That is, for example, why we have a State of West Virginia; the Unionists in the western area of Virginia thought it was better to stay in the Union than outside of it. In Alabama, for example, the vote to secede was very close and many parts of Northern Alabama remained staunchly Unionist for years. An interesting sidelight is that the Judge who fought Governor George Wallace in the 1960s over the battle of integration, Frank Johnson, hailed from Winston County, a center of Unionism and his great grandfather had served as a Republican sheriff during Reconstruction. Also, in states like North Carolina, there were economic divisions between the lowlands and the highland that fueled disagreement as to whether be a Secessionist or a Unionist.

The more you probe into our history, the murkier it becomes and nothing is as it seems. That is why this history is so fascinating.

If you really want to find out more, I cannot recommend any book more highly than David Potter's the Impending Crisis, 1848-1860 and his Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis. Potter was a very balanced historian and these are classic works.

 

[lancer]

Many fail to mention that most of Lee's successes were greatly enhanced by the ineptness of the Union generals he opposed (i.e. McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, etc.).

That the Union fielded bad generals for years is indisputable but it takes a good general to recognize and take advantage of such things. If one doubts Lee's ability, just study the campaigns where Lee faced Grant and one will see that the two were well matched. Lee could hold his own, and then some, against the best the Union had to offer. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

That the Union fielded bad generals for years is indisputable but it takes a good general to recognize and take advantage of such things. If one doubts Lee's ability, just study the campaigns where Lee faced Grant and one will see that the two were well matched. Lee could hold his own, and then some, against the best the Union had to offer. -- Al

I hesitate to enter this debate, and I want to state as a disclaimer that I happen to think Bobby Lee was the best Napoleonic style general that ever lived, bar none (yes, I think he was even better than Wellington at this style of warfare). However, Lee never seemed to understand that except in defensive circmstances, by 1863 the technology of warfare (rifles, breech loaders, better cannon, even some repeating rifles the Union soldiers provided for themselves) had rendered those tactics obsolete. Lee did an excellent job when he was in a position to choose the ground and defend, and even could succeed on the attack when Jackson (the best infantry commander this nation ever produced) was left to his own devices, and could effectively employ more modern tactics to overwhelm inept Union commanders. That being said, when he divided his forces to attack at Antietam, any Union commander but that inept coward McClellan (who always imagined he was vastly outnumbered) would have annihilated him.

Regardless of his subordinates failures at Gettysburg, Lee is solely responsible, because a competent modern general would have realized the Army of Northern Virginia should never have engaged the Union on that ground of its choosing. Once Lee saw that ground the only acceptable course for a general with an understanding of modern warfare would be to disengage from the Union forces, move around them in the direction of Washington, D.C., and thereby force the Union to leave the ground of its choosing, pursue the ANV, and Lee could thus have chosen the ground to stand and enjoyed the almost insurmountable advantage of the defense.

People can debate until doomsday that if it had been Jackson rather than Ewell or Pickett, the Conferates might have been able to succeed at Gettysburg. So what? It would have been one more defeat for the Union in the East, but Lee would still have had to move his forces toward Washington and engage the retreating Union forces, again probably on ground of their choosing, and after the ANV took the horrendous losses succeeding at Gettyburg would have required. If you look to Lee's overall goal (forcing the Union to a negotiated peace which recognized the independence of the Confederacy), the only appropriate strategic decision would have been to disengage, move towards Washington and force the Union to pursue his forces and gain the advantage of defense.

This is especially true if you accept that the modern commander's duty is to accomplish his goals with the minimum losses to his own forces. Lee appeared to be more concerned with his men's pride than he was with his overall goal and his men's wellbeing. For these reasons, in my opinion Jim Longstreet (the Confederate General with the best understanding of modern warfare) was 100% correct, and Lee's pigheaded refusal to accept and understand the realities of modern warfare cost the South the war on those 3 fateful days in early July, 1863.

And Al, while I certainly think that Lee was a better General than Grant (whom in my opinion was not the Union's best - I would give that nod to Sherman), Lee always had the advantage of being on the defensive in their battles, and in the end Grant's strategy of wearing Lee's forces down until Lee was forced to surrender succeeded.

 

[Jay]

I have thought a lot for several years about the questions Rob poses and just in time for Rob's question and Bob's answer, with which I agree, is an article in today's New York Times in the Disunion blog (about which I post daily) by Edward Ayers, a Professor of History at the University of Richmond, called The Causes of the Civil War 2.0. The article can be accessed here. It's a fascinating read on the question of states rights v. slavery as the reason. He concludes the latter. He has written a fascinating book called "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War in the Heart of America" that's a must.

In the runup to war, it's also important to remember that many states in the South were divided as to whether to secede or not to. That is, for example, why we have a State of West Virginia; the Unionists in the western area of Virginia thought it was better to stay in the Union than outside of it. In Alabama, for example, the vote to secede was very close and many parts of Northern Alabama remained staunchly Unionist for years. An interesting sidelight is that the Judge who fought Governor George Wallace in the 1960s over the battle of integration, Frank Johnson, hailed from Winston County, a center of Unionism and his great grandfather had served as a Republican sheriff during Reconstruction. Also, in states like North Carolina, there were economic divisions between the lowlands and the highland that fueled disagreement as to whether be a Secessionist or a Unionist.

The more you probe into our history, the murkier it becomes and nothing is as it seems. That is why this history is so fascinating.

If you really want to find out more, I cannot recommend any book more highly than David Potter's the Impending Crisis, 1848-1860 and his Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis. Potter was a very balanced historian and these are classic works.

Thank you for this link and the others. This is a great article. It should put to rest the slavery issue here for once and for all.
Sadly, it won't.

 

[lancer]

I hesitate to enter this debate, and I want to state as a disclaimer that I happen to think Bobby Lee was the best Napoleonic style general that ever lived, bar none (yes, I think he was even better than Wellington at this style of warfare). However, Lee never seemed to understand that except in defensive circmstances, by 1863 the technology of warfare (rifles, breech loaders, better cannon, even some repeating rifles the Union soldiers provided for themselves) had rendered those tactics obsolete. Lee did an excellent job when he was in a position to choose the ground and defend, and even could succeed on the attack when Jackson (the best infantry commander this nation ever produced) was left to his own devices, and could effectively employ more modern tactics to overwhelm inept Union commanders. That being said, when he divided his forces to attack at Antietam, any Union commander but that inept coward McClellan (who always imagined he was vastly outnumbered) would have annihilated him.

Regardless of his subordinates failures at Gettysburg, Lee is solely responsible, because a competent modern general would have realized the Army of Northern Virginia should never have engaged the Union on that ground of its choosing. Once Lee saw that ground the only acceptable course for a general with an understanding of modern warfare would be to disengage from the Union forces, move around them in the direction of Washington, D.C., and thereby force the Union to leave the ground of its choosing, pursue the ANV, and Lee could thus have chosen the ground to stand and enjoyed the almost insurmountable advantage of the defense.

People can debate until doomsday that if it had been Jackson rather than Ewell or Pickett, the Conferates might have been able to succeed at Gettysburg. So what? It would have been one more defeat for the Union in the East, but Lee would still have had to move his forces toward Washington and engage the retreating Union forces, again probably on ground of their choosing, and after the ANV took the horrendous losses succeeding at Gettyburg would have required. If you look to Lee's overall goal (forcing the Union to a negotiated peace which recognized the independence of the Confederacy), the only appropriate strategic decision would have been to disengage, move towards Washington and force the Union to pursue his forces and gain the advantage of defense.

This is especially true if you accept that the modern commander's duty is to accomplish his goals with the minimum losses to his own forces. Lee appeared to be more concerned with his men's pride than he was with his overall goal and his men's wellbeing. For these reasons, in my opinion Jim Longstreet (the Confederate General with the best understanding of modern warfare) was 100% correct, and Lee's pigheaded refusal to accept and understand the realities of modern warfare cost the South the war on those 3 fateful days in early July, 1863.

And Al, while I certainly think that Lee was a better General than Grant (whom in my opinion was not the Union's best - I would give that nod to Sherman), Lee always had the advantage of being on the defensive in their battles, and in the end Grant's strategy of wearing Lee's forces down until Lee was forced to surrender succeeded.

Some good points, Louis. But as you might guess, I don't agree with them all. I do agree that the decision to give battle at Gettysburg, after the first day, was faulty, but not totally bad. The battle could have been won on either the first or second day. I believe, and this is just my opinion and a huge what if, that had Jackson been there, the Union Army would have been chased from the hills at the close of the first day. A Confederate victory that wasn't hugely costly in casualties and a Union Army in retreat, again. Everything changes. As I said, just a what if. Longstreet may have indeed been correct in his not wanting to give battle at this location but once the decision to stay and fight had been made, he owed Lee his best effort, and I don't think he gave it. No question that Lee made the decision to fight and it is his responsibility. He was just that aggressive. Perhaps Lee felt that engaging the Union forces was preferable to trying to disengage in the face of the enemy, in foreign territory, without any knowledge of what Union dispositions were. Lack of recon info from his missing cavalry could have been a critical part of this decision. I just don't think the decision was as pig-headed as you believe. Lee wasn't perfect, no argument, but the decision to fight at Gettysburg could have ended very differently on either the first or second day. Lee never blamed anyone but himself for the third day defeat and the overall defeat of the campaign, a some what rare quality in defeated generals. -- Al

 

[Rutledge]

Thank you for this link and the others. This is a great article. It should put to rest the slavery issue here for once and for all.
Sadly, it won't.

The "issue" of slavery was put to rest over 100 years ago. Why some come on here and feel the need to make moral judgements about others who are long dead and buried and thus for which there is no "recall" I have no idea. Unless its just a need to sow discord in the present day from the safe anonanimity of a distant computer screen.

 

[Rob]

I have thought a lot for several years about the questions Rob poses and just in time for Rob's question and Bob's answer, with which I agree, is an article in today's New York Times in the Disunion blog (about which I post daily) by Edward Ayers, a Professor of History at the University of Richmond, called The Causes of the Civil War 2.0. The article can be accessed here. It's a fascinating read on the question of states rights v. slavery as the reason. He concludes the latter. He has written a fascinating book called "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: The Civil War in the Heart of America" that's a must.

In the runup to war, it's also important to remember that many states in the South were divided as to whether to secede or not to. That is, for example, why we have a State of West Virginia; the Unionists in the western area of Virginia thought it was better to stay in the Union than outside of it. In Alabama, for example, the vote to secede was very close and many parts of Northern Alabama remained staunchly Unionist for years. An interesting sidelight is that the Judge who fought Governor George Wallace in the 1960s over the battle of integration, Frank Johnson, hailed from Winston County, a center of Unionism and his great grandfather had served as a Republican sheriff during Reconstruction. Also, in states like North Carolina, there were economic divisions between the lowlands and the highland that fueled disagreement as to whether be a Secessionist or a Unionist.

The more you probe into our history, the murkier it becomes and nothing is as it seems. That is why this history is so fascinating.

If you really want to find out more, I cannot recommend any book more highly than David Potter's the Impending Crisis, 1848-1860 and his Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis. Potter was a very balanced historian and these are classic works.

Thanks for posting this Brad, interesting to see what part of the population thinks States rights the bigger reason and who thinks Slavery was the main reason as many books and films have centered on in the years gone by, interesting to see how differing age groups give different perspectives.Slavery and states rights and the deisre to leave the Union are all fascinating subject. This conflict and the drivers behind it I think will cause discussion and debate for a long time to come, these next four years should throw up some great discussions. The wonderful thing about an interest in History is asking questions and starting debate, so many experts on here and its a pleasure to get their views.

Rob

 

[Louis Badolato]

Some good points, Louis. But as you might guess, I don't agree with them all. I do agree that the decision to give battle at Gettysburg, after the first day, was faulty, but not totally bad. The battle could have been won on either the first or second day. I believe, and this is just my opinion and a huge what if, that had Jackson been there, the Union Army would have been chased from the hills at the close of the first day. A Confederate victory that wasn't hugely costly in casualties and a Union Army in retreat, again. Everything changes. As I said, just a what if. Longstreet may have indeed been correct in his not wanting to give battle at this location but once the decision to stay and fight had been made, he owed Lee his best effort, and I don't think he gave it. No question that Lee made the decision to fight and it is his responsibility. He was just that aggressive. Perhaps Lee felt that engaging the Union forces was preferable to trying to disengage in the face of the enemy, in foreign territory, without any knowledge of what Union dispositions were. Lack of recon info from his missing cavalry could have been a critical part of this decision. I just don't think the decision was as pig-headed as you believe. Lee wasn't perfect, no argument, but the decision to fight at Gettysburg could have ended very differently on either the first or second day. Lee never blamed anyone but himself for the third day defeat and the overall defeat of the campaign, a some what rare quality in defeated generals. -- Al

Al, also good points, but if Jackson was there, he never would have disobeyed Lee's direct order not to engage the Union forces, and Lee would not have been in the position of having to decide whether to disengage. Then we would see what Lee would have chosen to do under those circumstances. Without his men's pride at stake, I imagine he probably would have moved around the Union and enagaged them on ground of his chosing.

You make another good point about JEB Stuart and the cavalry. How did Stuart go galavanting off like that? I imagine if Stuart and his men had been doing their job, Lee might have made other decisions during those three fateful days.

 

[UKReb]

Al, also good points, but if Jackson was there, he never would have disobeyed Lee's direct order not to engage the Union forces, and Lee would not have been in the position of having to decide whether to disengage. Then we would see what Lee would have chosen to do under those circumstances. Without his men's pride at stake, I imagine he probably would have moved around the Union and enagaged them on ground of his chosing.

You make another good point about JEB Stuart and the cavalry. How did Stuart go galavanting off like that? I imagine if Stuart and his men had been doing their job, Lee might have made other decisions during those three fateful days.

Louis

Yours and Al's posts both raise all the valid and revelant points of this decisive fight which no doubt historians and buffs have discussed for eons. My take on JEB Stuart's absence also aligns with Al's, however, he was-so he thought-obeying Lee's orders to disrupt the Army of Potomac's communication lines, capture any stores and then to link up with Ewell's advance vanguard. He hit two problems, one he found the Union army, which was now on the march north, between himself and Lee's army and when he finally reached his rendezvous with Ewell, found he wasn't there having being recalled by Lee to get back to Gettysburg. That is why Stuart didn't arrive until late on the second day

I believe if he had not taken Lee's orders so literally and had, like any good cavalry commander, ensured his Commanding Officer received regular and accurate intelligence we all would indeed be discussing a completly different battle today. Suffice to say after Gettysburg, Stuart never, ever left Lee blind again in the field.

Just as an aside whilst talking about Gettysburg, playing around with my figures in the last episode of the diaries to try and depict what was practically the last battle of the war- Five Forks- I was suddenly struck with the irony that two of the "heroes" of Gettysburg were relieved of their commands during that last fight.

After Pickett took off for his mis-timed lunch-Lee sacked him. Likewise, Warren-he who first noticed that Little Round Top was completely undefended and rushed back to tell Meade was also sacked by Sheridan for arriving late with his V Corps.

The real irony is that Warren actually arriving late enabled Sheridan to breach the Confederate lines and grab a victory -as Brad has stated- a fascinating war.

Bob

 

[lancer]

Al, also good points, but if Jackson was there, he never would have disobeyed Lee's direct order not to engage the Union forces, and Lee would not have been in the position of having to decide whether to disengage. Then we would see what Lee would have chosen to do under those circumstances. Without his men's pride at stake, I imagine he probably would have moved around the Union and enagaged them on ground of his chosing.

You make another good point about JEB Stuart and the cavalry. How did Stuart go galavanting off like that? I imagine if Stuart and his men had been doing their job, Lee might have made other decisions during those three fateful days.

Hi Rob. I suspect a large part of Stuart's neglect of mission had to do with his bruised ego from the recent Brandy Station fiasco (in the sense that Stuart and his men were caught off guard). Stuart took a very public beating via the media of the time and I would bet he was out to show that he was still the best cavalry leader around. Brandy Station was a brutal wake up call for the Confederate cavalry and Stuart. As to Jackson, I agree about him not initiating the initial engagement. Still, it is possible that it could still have been taken out of even Jackson's hands by Heth, just as actually happened. Troop disposition by the Confederate forces probably would have been different under the old two corp organization, but someone had to be out front and Stuart wasn't there. -- Al

 

[lancer]

Hi Rob. I suspect a large part of Stuart's neglect of mission had to do with his bruised ego from the recent Brandy Station fiasco (in the sense that Stuart and his men were caught off guard). Stuart took a very public beating via the media of the time and I would bet he was out to show that he was still the best cavalry leader around. Brandy Station was a brutal wake up call for the Confederate cavalry and Stuart. As to Jackson, I agree about him not initiating the initial engagement. Still, it is possible that it could still have been taken out of even Jackson's hands by Heth, just as actually happened. Troop disposition by the Confederate forces probably would have been different under the old two corp organization, but someone had to be out front and Stuart wasn't there. -- Al

I did, of course, mean to address this to Louis. Got confused catching up on the thread. :redface2: -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis

Yours and Al's posts both raise all the valid and revelant points of this decisive fight which no doubt historians and buffs have discussed for eons. My take on JEB Stuart's absence also aligns with Al's, however, he was-so he thought-obeying Lee's orders to disrupt the Army of Potomac's communication lines, capture any stores and then to link up with Ewell's advance vanguard. He hit two problems, one he found the Union army, which was now on the march north, between himself and Lee's army and when he finally reached his rendezvous with Ewell, found he wasn't there having being recalled by Lee to get back to Gettysburg. That is why Stuart didn't arrive until late on the second day

I believe if he had not taken Lee's orders so literally and had, like any good cavalry commander, ensured his Commanding Officer received regular and accurate intelligence we all would indeed be discussing a completly different battle today. Suffice to say after Gettysburg, Stuart never, ever left Lee blind again in the field.

Just as an aside whilst talking about Gettysburg, playing around with my figures in the last episode of the diaries to try and depict what was practically the last battle of the war- Five Forks- I was suddenly struck with the irony that two of the "heroes" of Gettysburg were relieved of their commands during that last fight.

After Pickett took off for his mis-timed lunch-Lee sacked him. Likewise, Warren-he who first noticed that Little Round Top was completely undefended and rushed back to tell Meade was also sacked by Sheridan for arriving late with his V Corps.

The real irony is that Warren actually arriving late enabled Sheridan to breach the Confederate lines and grab a victory -as Brad has stated- a fascinating war.

Bob

Bob and Al,

Thanks for the calm and educated discussion of this subject. Its nice to talk about this area of history without the discussion devolving into a shouting match. I respect both of your opinions, as you have both obviously spent a lot of time studying the subject.

What do you gentleman think about my premise about the technology in 1863 rendering Napoleonic style offensive tactics obsolete?

 

[Terp152]

Bob and Al,

Thanks for the calm and educated discussion of this subject. Its nice to talk about this area of history without the discussion devolving into a shouting match. I respect both of your opinions, as you have both obviously spent a lot of time studying the subject.

What do you gentleman think about my premise about the technology in 1863 rendering Napoleonic style offensive tactics obsolete?

Louis, hope you don't mind if I interject in the discussion. Many battles support your premise, ie Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, Franklin, Kennesaw Mtn, etc. But Lee knew the ANV would be doomed in the long run if he only fought defensive battles, as ultimately happened. Second Manassas and Seven Days showed what he hoped to accomplish with offensive tactics. The ANV was on the defensive both tactically and strategically from the fall of 1864 on and lost. Nathan Forrest and Dick Taylor employed offensive tactics, "Napoleonic style" against supposedly overwhelming odds with great success. Chris

 

[Rob]

Bob and Al,

Thanks for the calm and educated discussion of this subject. Its nice to talk about this area of history without the discussion devolving into a shouting match. I respect both of your opinions, as you have both obviously spent a lot of time studying the subject.

What do you gentleman think about my premise about the technology in 1863 rendering Napoleonic style offensive tactics obsolete?

Would have to agree with you here Louis. Whatever subject Al is talking about I always find his posts interesting and well stated, and Bob is without doubt the most knowledgeable person on the ACW I have ever had the pleasure to talk to. If anyone ever had a previous life, Bob was in that Wheatfield at Gettysburg all those years ago. I'm not saying he looks that old you understand:wink2:

Its guys like these that make the discussions on this forum fascinating, keep it up guys.

Finally can I add that it really was very much not my intention to start a shouting match on here, I am interested in all areas of this conflict, however I do understand the slavery question is still a very sensitive subject, so whilst it may come up again I will not get involved in any arguments, this subject is too interesting to spoil.

Rob

 

[lancer]

Bob and Al,

Thanks for the calm and educated discussion of this subject. Its nice to talk about this area of history without the discussion devolving into a shouting match. I respect both of your opinions, as you have both obviously spent a lot of time studying the subject.

What do you gentleman think about my premise about the technology in 1863 rendering Napoleonic style offensive tactics obsolete?

Hi Louis. I agree with the premise. The rifled musket/Minie ball combination was the death knell for the massed formation warfare of the ACW type. It is a classic case of weapons once again being ahead of tactics. With every infantryman now capable of long range and accurate fire, (in the past, only specialized units would have rifles), slaughters such as Malvern Hill, Fredricksburg, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor, Franklin, etc., were inevitable. It was a hard learned lesson though and often was not heeded as massed formations didn't disappear overnight, as the Franco-Prussian War and WW1 would prove. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis, hope you don't mind if I interject in the discussion. Many battles support your premise, ie Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, Franklin, Kennesaw Mtn, etc. But Lee knew the ANV would be doomed in the long run if he only fought defensive battles, as ultimately happened. Second Manassas and Seven Days showed what he hoped to accomplish with offensive tactics. The ANV was on the defensive both tactically and strategically from the fall of 1864 on and lost. Nathan Forrest and Dick Taylor employed offensive tactics, "Napoleonic style" against supposedly overwhelming odds with great success. Chris

The more the merrier, Chris. I thought Nathan Bedford Forrest was an irregular light cavalry commander who used very modern "guerrilla" type hit and run tactics to great effect. I was not aware that he employed traditional Napoleonic charges with lances or sabres. Were their mitigating circumstances to Forrest and Taylor's uses of Napoleonic tactics? I can't imagine a frontal assault on a prepared defensive position would work when addressing rifles with far greater ranges than traditional smooth bore muskets, especially of the rifles were breech loaders or repeaters.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Hi Louis. I agree with the premise. The rifled musket/Minie ball combination was the death knell for the massed formation warfare of the ACW type. It is a classic case of weapons once again being ahead of tactics. With every infantryman now capable of long range and accurate fire, (in the past, only specialized units would have rifles), slaughters such as Malvern Hill, Fredricksburg, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor, Franklin, etc., were inevitable. It was a hard learned lesson though and often was not heeded as massed formations didn't disappear overnight, as the Franco-Prussian War and WW1 would prove. -- Al

I've always found it fascinating that none of the European powers paid any attention to what was so painfully and repeatedly demonstrated during the U.S. Civil war on a very large scale fully 50 years earlier: that you cannot hope to successfully make a frontal assault against a prepared defensive position where the defenders are armed with accurate rifles and have an open field of fire. Add machine guns and modern artillery into the mix, and the tactics employed throughout WWI are even more perplexing. This is especially true for the British, who as recently as 1898 had employed machine guns and repeating rifles to wipe out a numerically superior force of Madhists making a frontal assault on them at the Battle of Omdurman. Didn't any of the officers who served under Kitchener at Omderman learn anything about the devestating effect of machine guns and modern rifles?^&confuse

 

[lancer]

Would have to agree with you here Louis. Whatever subject Al is talking about I always find his posts interesting and well stated, and Bob is without doubt the most knowledgeable person on the ACW I have ever had the pleasure to talk to. If anyone ever had a previous life, Bob was in that Wheatfield at Gettysburg all those years ago. I'm not saying he looks that old you understand:wink2:

Its guys like these that make the discussions on this forum fascinating, keep it up guys.

Finally can I add that it really was very much not my intention to start a shouting match on here, I am interested in all areas of this conflict, however I do understand the slavery question is still a very sensitive subject, so whilst it may come up again I will not get involved in any arguments, this subject is too interesting to spoil.

Rob

Thanks Rob. Right back at you.^&grin I love the discussions on this forum, as well. Sometimes subjects are just naturally hot-button topics, such as slavery. I much prefer the military side of the ACW and will not participate in the slavery discussions. It just tends to get too heated. Keep asking questions though, I learn quite a bit from the answers from all involved. -- Al

 

[Rob]

Thanks Rob. Right back at you.^&grin I love the discussions on this forum, as well. Sometimes subjects are just naturally hot-button topics, such as slavery. I much prefer the military side of the ACW and will not participate in the slavery discussions. It just tends to get too heated. Keep asking questions though, I learn quite a bit from the answers from all involved. -- Al

Thanks Al, I appreciate you answering my post. Yep life is too short for arguments and if slavery is too hot a topic I'll stick to the Military ACW, it is as you say more interesting. Al my friend I am sure as the anniversaries approach I will have lots of questions for you and Bob. :wink2:. I am going to read two books as recommended by Bob and Brad and also get some Osprey books to get a brief overview of the main Battles before I delve in deeper, its such a huge and interesting subject that I'm quite excited!.

Bob will be pleased to hear he's helped get me away from Green Tanks and Spitfires for a while!^&grin:wink2:

Rob

 

[jazzeum]

Thanks Rob. Right back at you.^&grin I love the discussions on this forum, as well. Sometimes subjects are just naturally hot-button topics, such as slavery. I much prefer the military side of the ACW and will not participate in the slavery discussions. It just tends to get too heated. Keep asking questions though, I learn quite a bit from the answers from all involved. -- Al

I find the military discussions interesting (although the politics is my thing) but you really can't separate the cause, the reason, from the battle. They're inseparable. After all what was each side fighting for anyway? Without the strong beliefs that each side had, it never would have gotten to this.