Yep, they are excellent books for any student of the Pacific War. I found that they provided depth to a time frame about which I had only superficial knowledge. That's pretty much the focus of the more popular or better-known books on the Pacific War. There was Pearl Harbor, then Coral Sea. I'd never read anything that went into more depth about the attempt to relieve Wake, for example, or the "morale raids" in the Central Pacific. They were indeed intended to boost morale and show that the Navy was doing something, but that was really secondary. We needed to probe the Japanese possessions and find out what was there. We had precious little intelligence about their bases in the Marshalls and Gilberts, for example. The raids had strategic value, too, to try to keep the Japanese off-balance while they were poised (we believed) to attack Australia or to move further to the West, into the Indian Ocean.
Lundstrom also takes a good, close look at the Navy's air arm, and to me, he shows that we weren't as bad off as the popular picture makes it. For example, the Zero was an excellent fighter, but we had already taken its measure, and the people in command of the fighter squadrons already knew how to beat it. Actions in the first four months confirmed their ideas. Our biggest problem was quantity. We were just not prepared to take on an enemy that could appear anywhere with little or no warning, across the entire Pacific. Not enough fighters, and not enough carriers.
I'm running on now, so I'll just say that I hope you enjoy the books as much as I have.
Prost!
Brad