World War Two Politics and Command (1 Viewer)

[OzDigger]

I actually said the allied tanks mentioned (Sherman, Grant and Crusader) were fairly useless, particularly post El Alamein (Oct, 1942). They were designed as infantry support tanks therefore out of their league in a tank v tank battle against the German Mark IV F2 and larger Tiger which were used by the Afrika Korps. In addition the British and the US continued to use them poorly such as carrying out cavalary charges against entrenched AT, artillery and tanks.

The British moved on from the use of the Grant (shipped to the Asian theatre) and Crusader to superior infantry support tanks such as the Churchill. It had some undesirable problems at first but improved as the war progressed. It was slow at 8 mph, but then so are infantry. It had a good weapon in a large turret together with good armour and a low profile. In addition it had excellent cross country performance and could climb relatively steep inclines which was handy in the mountainous desert areas and later in Italy.

However the US continued with the medium Sherman. Yes it was an ok tank in 1942 and much appreciated at El Alamein. However the design was soon outclassed by later German tanks which had a larger turret/turret ring and could be easily up gunned as the war progresed. And as for a one on one action against a tiger, also used by the Afrika Korps, forget it. In addition the Sherman's suspension system was a poor design resulting in a higher than desired profile. Overall the Sherman had under powered weapons and poor armour, it's only advantages being numbers, reliability and perhaps speed.

The Sherman firefly (17lb) was the only Sherman design that proved effective against the later German tanks but the larger gun could only be fitted with difficulty and the dropping of one crew member. They were only issued to Commonwealth forces (the US didn't want em I guess) and in low numbers of one per troop of four tanks. In addition their long barrel made them very obvious on the battle-field and they were often the first tanks targeted in a battle, as was the Churchill Crocodile.

It was difficult for a medium Sherman to destroy a 'medium' Panther, and almost impossible to destroy the heavy Tiger and King Tiger tanks. US industries could not be attacked and there is no excuse for not giving their troops in the field the support they deserved. The US did produce a heavy tank early in the war ( M6 - 1942). However major production of this and subsequent heavy designs did not proceed as they continued with the faster but more vulnerable medium tank idea right up until the Battle of the Bulge. Which finally brought them to reality, resulting in the Pershing arriving late in the war.

Imo it was morally wrong to throw numerous medium Sherman tanks, and their crews, against the German heavies as long as the US leaders did. Even the so called 'madman' Hitler insisted on better weapons for his troops when required.

Btw, I'm not a German armour fan and certainly not a Nazi supporter. However I am objective enough to give credit where credit is due, and a kick in the pants where it's needed, irrespective of who's side is at fault. The right of free speach is useless if you don't apply free thought.

 

[OzDigger]

From what I've read the principal disadvantage of the Grants were they couldn't get in effective hull down position because of the way the 37 gun was placed in a Grant. In addition, the Sherman was considered a godsend and a tank that helped to level the playing field.

Brad, the upper turret had the small 37 mm weapon, the larger 75 mm canon was actually mounted in the hull and had limited traverse and it's possibly the calibre you were refering to. Btw the Grant proved very effective against the small Japanese tanks and provided good infantry support in the Asian theatre.

 

[jazzeum]

Yes, that's it. You're right; that's what I meant.

 

[binder001]

Trivia - if understand my Tables Of Organization correctly, the Afrika Korps did not have Tiger tanks. They came into theater with Panzer Armee Afrika of which the Afrika Korps was a made a subordinate part.

You are right, the Sherman wasn't designed as a tank-versus-tank vehicle. The Sherman was a "universal" medium tank to cover the two roles the British identified as "Cruiser" and "Infantry" tanks. Unfortunately the Army Ground Forces drew many wrong lessons from the Germans' early victories and adopted the "Tank Destoyer" concept to deal with enemy armor. Not only was the TD concept deeply flawed, but AGF adherence to the concept kept the Sherman as an "exploitation" weapon. Further unfortunately the US Army thought the Panther would be a limited-deployment tank like Tiger. The information that the Germans had a new medium tank that was to equip the Panzer Divisions was never read or never appreciated by the "powers that be". Fortunately German production never allowed for more than a 50% replacement. After the shock of the T34 and KV tanks the Germans started an immediate upgun/uparmor program to keep their tanks viable as anti-armor weapons. It wasn't that Germany was so far ahead in technology as they were in doctrine. That allowed them to apply their technology appropriately. One reason the M6 heavy tank was never pursued by the US was not only design problems, but the fact that no one in AGF new what to do with a heavy tank! Our doctrine was based only on armor exploiting a breach in the enemies lines. Note the lowly Sherman performed magnifently in its designed role such as the pursuit across France and the final drive into Germany. Despite a noted author's claims the Pershing wasn't even ready for the factory by DDay, let alone the 6-month lag time between factory and front line. You are right that the "Firefly" conversions were the right way to go. The British 17-pounder was about the equivalent on the Panther's 75mm at most battle ranges and was the best Allied AP weapon until the US deployed 90mm guns in the M36 TD and T26E3 Pershing. I often wonder what would have happened if the US had adopted the "Firefly" in time to get that gun into US production (like we used a version of the UK 6-pounder as our 57mm AT gun). The US might have even been able to develop a decent HE shell for the gun (one of the 17-pounder's weak points). By the way, the Sherman's 69-inch turret ring DID allow upgunning. Look at "Firefly", as well as the larger turret for the 76mm gun. The same turret race held a 90mm gun in the M36 (in fact the M36B1 was a limited production version using common M4A3 hulls). Post war the French asnd Israeli developed the M50 and M51 version carrying 75mm (that was reportedly developed by the French from the Panthers' 75mm) and 105mm guns respectively. There was one test prototype of an M4A3 with a 90mm gunned turret, but again, AGF had no interest so production was not authorized.

More trivia - the Sherman's high silhoutte wasn't from the suspension. It was designed around the use a of a large diameter aircraft-type radial engine and the drive shaft was routed forward causing the turret to be raised. Look at early T20-23 series of test tanks. They look like a Sherman with a much lower profile. The AGF might have gone with the T23, but Ordnance was so enamored of an electric transmission that held up any production or use of these tanks. So the Allies were stuck with an obsolescent design as their primary battle tank. Fortunately better tactical doctrine, better coordination of combined arms (infantry, artillery, armor and engineers working together) and air superiority along with many brave men prevailed.

 

[Eazy]

Trivia - if understand my Tables Of Organization correctly, the Afrika Korps did not have Tiger tanks. They came into theater with Panzer Armee Afrika of which the Afrika Korps was a made a subordinate part.

So the Afrika Korps was part of a larger Panzer Army Afrika.
Were there only 2 divisions that were actually Afrika Korps? These being 90th Light and 21st Panzer?

 

[OzDigger]

Panzerarmee Afrika, later just Panzerarmee, included the Italian contribution, whereas the Afrika Korps was purely German. The palm tree emblem being applied to some of the Tiger tanks in Africa is near enough for me to include them in the DAK.

Despite the Sherman's significant contribution to the war effort I can't understand why anyone would bother to defend it's reputation on the battlefield. It was undergunned, underarmoured and it's rare plus of being fast and manoeverable was limited by it requiring sixty feet to turn around, not handy in a built up area. Whereas most other tanks could spin around on their tracks. There were several types of engines used in the Sherman, the radial being only one variant. The engines were all rear mounted and the Sherman's hull was the lowest in that area. The main cause of its high profile was a combination of things including allowances for that radial, such as the previoulsy mentioned suspension and the front sprocket drive arrangement together with slab sides to allow faster construction.

Significant compromises were required to squeeze larger guns into the small turret, the firefly lost the hull mg and gunner to do this. Other large calibre weapons such as the 90mm required barrel shortening reducing shell velocity and hitting power and or tie down clamps to secure the gun when travelling. The Israeli's made the changes to their Shermans because they had few options.

The dislike for larger tanks in the US and UK army is well known, but at least they learnt eventually. Perhaps the coldest equation was by some genius that calculated four Shermans could be exported for one M 6 heavy tank because of the limited size of the liberty ships. The fact that several Shermans and their crews would be required to destroy each German heavy didn't seem to count for much in his calculations. C'est la guerre I guess.

 

[panda1gen]

Binder

The other problem with the doctrine was that the lessons were badly learned about AT guns - the germans and Rommel in particular saw the tanks as battlefield bully on soft targets, when they met enemy tanks they preferred to fall back through an AT gun screen which took out the tanks. They would of course fight when they had to but....

The British in particular tended to treat tanks as 'cavalry' and obligingly charge right into the AT screen with predictable results until a much maligned Monty ordered them to stop it at the early Alamein battles. He insisted on drawing the german tanks into soft sand to use up fuel and then pound them with heavy artillery or from the overwhelming air support then available. He stopped tank v tank.

Second Alamein was more akin to modern seige warfare, almost ww1 like but with ww2 weapons. The germans were behind miles of minefields and had concrete reinforced trenches and strongpoints laced with 88s. The tanks were mobile reserve and that was when they wwere taken on. The Africa Korps (Rommel was invalided out for much of the time) had its tanks drawn more to the South and was wrong footed.

It wouldn't matter what tank was drawn into that, it would hurt. The tanks that still had the puny 2pdr were at particular disadvantage though, I agree.

I also agree about the quantity v quality issue. If it hadn't been for a very vocal lobby there wouldn't even have been the 500 or so fireflys.

How many Jacksons or other 90mm US tank destroyers were there and when did they arrive? Was the M10 any good by DDay, except against some of the flimsy AT mockups the germans used, like Marders?

Consider the armour on Panthers, stugs and hetzers, were they much use? Against pz4 I presume the sherman was ok?

 

[binder001]

Significant compromises were required to squeeze larger guns into the small turret, the firefly lost the hull mg and gunner to do this.

- Actually the hull MG was lost due to ammo stowage considerations, not the gun or turret. The turret compromise on Firefly was having to move the radio to an armored box on the turret rear. Firefly was a technical compromise in trying to get a towed AT gun into a turret designed for a small weapon. As expedients go it was pretty good.

Other large calibre weapons such as the 90mm required barrel shortening reducing shell velocity and hitting power and or tie down clamps to secure the gun when travelling. The Israeli's made the changes to their Shermans because they had few options.

- Huh? Barrel shortening???? The test version with the 90mm had the SAME 90mm M3 gun as the M36 and the T26E3. Are you confusing this with the 105mm howitzer Shermans? This was a short barrel artillery weapon INTENDED to lob HE shell, NOT meant to kill tanks.

As far as the barrel clamps. Look at the front of a Panther, or the rear of a Firefly, etc. These are just to stabilize the gun tube during marches or administrative moves. It saves wear and tear on the elevating mechanism.

Yes, the Israelis used the Shermans because that's what they could get. HOWEVER they did take on Jordanian M48s, Egyptian T55s and even JSIII's. The better tankers prevailed with an adequate machine.

 

[binder001]

The engines were all rear mounted and the Sherman's hull was the lowest in that area. The main cause of its high profile was a combination of things including allowances for that radial, such as the previoulsy mentioned suspension and the front sprocket drive arrangement together with slab sides to allow faster construction.

Have you checked out the engine/transmission layouts of the German and Russian tanks of WW2? The engine is where? The rear. The transmission is where? The front! The layout wasn't the problem. Yes the M4 series had several other engines, but the initial hull design was based on the radial engine. That engine and its driveshaft is what contributed to the high hull.

Yes, the slab sides didn't help protection any. That was a compromise for production. Note that the original design was for the primary tank to have the cast hull (adopted as M4A1), but foundry limitations led to the welded hulls vastly outnumbering the cast ones.

 

[binder001]

The dislike for larger tanks in the US and UK army is well known, but at least they learnt eventually. Perhaps the coldest equation was by some genius that calculated four Shermans could be exported for one M 6 heavy tank because of the limited size of the liberty ships.

- It wasn't just the space on the ships, but the cargo handling cranes at the ports. Fortunately by the time the first Pershings and the test batch of Centurions came to Europe the Allies had the port of Antwerp to be able to unload them. An M26 barely fit on an LST.

The fact that several Shermans and their crews would be required to destroy each German heavy didn't seem to count for much in his calculations.

- Again, back to doctrine. The thinking in the Pentagon was that the tank destroyers were supposed to taking care of the German tanks leaving the M4s and M5s to exploit and maneuver. It never worked in practice because German tanks tended to show up inconvenient times and places and the TDs were used as assault guns distributed among the infantry instead of being massed against German tanks. As has been mentioned before, despite all the press about the Sherman versus Germany's "Big Cats" the major killers of US tanks late in the war were AT guns and hand-held AT weapons (Panzerfaust, etc.).

 

[OzDigger]

US tank doctrine: I know anyone can be a clever in hindsight. But the fact that the US continued for so long with the Medium M4/Sherman as their MBT was a major error imo. The M3 was a make do adaptation of the M2 and proved ok within its limitations, but why continue with that obsolete design for the M4. By the time the US entered the war they knew they would be facing Tigers (a heavy tank) so why bother with mediums.

To add insult to injury they intended to use tank destroyers against enemy tanks. Yet their tank destoyers were often open toped and had less armour than the humble M4. They could have used the heavy M 6 but didn't. The reasons I've read in references for shipping considerations etc, be they ship, crane or LCT, are poor excuses imo.

Firefly: Yes, the hull machine gun and gunner were removed because they needed the extra space for the larger 17lb ammuntion. But this was because of the larger gun taking up so much space in the turret. And even with this extra forward storage space a Firefly could only carry 42 rounds of 17-pounder ammo against 97 in the M4A3. The rear bussle on the turret also acted as a counter weight for the longer weapon (interior and exterior).

The accepted (wtf) method for British tankies to take on a German heavy was for some M4s in the troop to attract its attention in front, which was understandably the less popular job as it could be rather fatal. Meanwhile a Firefly and any spare M4s snuck around behind it. The fact that other M4/Shermans were destroyed in other ways has no bearing on the plain fact that the M4 lacked the armour and the firepower to do its job effectively and with relative safety for its crew.

Israel's continued use of the M4 because they had to story: Sorry, scratch the 90 mm, I did mean to say the 105 mm which was used in the M51 that they needed against the Soviet IS-3 heavy tanks. They had to chop 1.5 m off the barrel length of the French designed CN-105-F1 to fit in the M51 tank which they converted from the M4A1 chassis. This barrel shortening reduced muzzle velocity from 1000 mps to 800 mps. Following the 1967 war the M-51 tanks were replaced by more effective MBT's.

Relatively high profile of the M4: From the references I have read most list the suspension, and ease of production as the main culprit. I could find only one that mentioned the early radial engine with angled drive shaft to the front sprockets. However as the large radial engine did not enter into series production I can see no reason why the hull height wasn't subsequently reduced if this was the only reason. There were some changes in hull length (extra six inches) because of different engines but nothing about hull height. Perhaps another reason for the high hull is the need to fit five crew into a relatively narrow tank with a small turret - who knows. However I will say that the experimental M4s I have seen pictured with torsion bar suspension looked lower than all other types.

 

[binder001]

However as the large radial engine did not enter into series production I can see no reason why the hull height wasn't subsequently reduced if this was the only reason.

- The continental R-975 air-cooled radial engine was the engine that powered the M4 and M4A1 mediums, which were the standard issue medium tanks for the US Army through 1944 (when the M4A3 became available in larger numbers, becoming the Army's preferred tank, with the M4/M4A1 reduced to second choice). Radial engined Shermans served with the US Army's reserve components into the late 1950's.

US tank doctrine: I know anyone can be a clever in hindsight. But the fact that the US continued for so long with the Medium M4/Sherman as their MBT was a major error imo. The M3 was a make do adaptation of the M2 and proved ok within its limitations, but why continue with that obsolete design for the M4. By the time the US entered the war they knew they would be facing Tigers (a heavy tank) so why bother with mediums.

- Unfortunately the US entering the war late didn't give Army planners much insight to what they would face. The Germans had a huge shock in Russia when the T34 appeared in numbers. Overnight their entire tank fleet was obsolete! They started early in taking the gun/armor race seriously. To the US a tank wasn't supposed to fight other tanks, it was supposed to spread "shock and awe" through rear areas that had been penetrated - part of the old cavalry mission. Tiger 1 didn't get off the drawing board before the Sherman was in series production, so there wasn't an opportunity to use any lessons learned, plus as shown by the tank destroyer doctrine, the lessons were often interpreted poorly.

Again, a medium tank fit US doctrine for armor. As far as "why a medium tank"? Historically the heavy tank has been a failure. The Tigers and KVs seem to be the only ones that justified their expenses. All current tanks are descended from mediums and fill the same basic role. It just happens that current MBT's grew to the weight of the old heavies. Fortunately, engine power kept growing along with the guns and armor to give the current MBT more firepower and protection than previous heavy tanks, with the mobility of the old mediums.

Further - what tank would you have had the US use? The M6 heavy was not only too tall and underpowered, but it had the same turret ring as the Sherman. It was a dead-end design. There just wasn't a design waiting in the wings to be take the stage. The T24 (M24) light tank was a priority project and it didn't reach the battlefield until the end of 1944 - through the end of the war many US tanks were stuck with a light tank that was obsolete in 1941.

The quantity versus quality issue stems from the rapid growth of the US Army. Without getting into depression era budgets and isolationist politics, the US had a small army even on 7DEC41. The US Army grew 10-fold in just a few years. Yes, there was research into new and better equipment, but a major concern was getting enough to get our army into the field, plus the requiremt to arm our allies. One often looks at the rapid growth of the US Navy, but few remember that all the carriers, battleships and cruisers had been designed back in the 1930's, and many keels had been laid as part of the Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940.

Speaking of tank design, where were the British? They had two years more combat experience than the US and they never did manage to put out a real "winner" until Comet (not deployed until 1945) and Centurion (barely reached ETO before war's end). Both were developed from Cruiser (medium) tanks. Churchill was adequate for infantry support, but was really just a modernized WW1 design. The turret was barely able to accept a 75mm gun, which was balistically the same as the US 75mm M3 gun.

 

[OzDigger]

Hey Binder, I didn't know they kept producing the early series M4's. I guess its the same as US Army tank doctrine: we know it's wrong, but we're still doing it

And you can't compare US tank development to British on equal terms as the US weren't getting bombed most nights. The Tiger went into combat in 1942 and there is no excuse for the US not to adapt to the changing battlefield requirements. Russia could do it while fighting the Germans on their own turf, why couldn't the US big and safe in their isolated country?

 

[binder001]

Again, it wasn't that the US could not produce a better tank, or upgrade the M4-series earlier, but the "ivory tower" mentality about how tanks "should" fight crippled the direction of developments. Ordnance produced the tanks that Army Ground Forces wanted, they couldn't force a design onto an unwilling user. The first 300 M4A1s upgraded with 76mm guns arrived in England prior to DDay, but they were prompted placed in storage because NO using unit wanted them! Only after meeting the German Panthers face-to-face in close country (the bocage) did the call go out for a better gun. The M4A1 76's were dusted off and rushed to the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions for Operation Cobra. It was then discovered that the Ordnance claims about the 76 being able to pierce a Panther were based on erroneous testing! (Ooops!).
By the way, the US forces faced very few Tigers in Normandy, most of those were facing the British forces. Once the breakout occurred the M4 was in its element (as a breakout and pursue tank) and the hue and cry about tanks died down. As stated in an earlier post, look at the Lorraine campaign. The US 4th Armored Division massacred three German Panther brigades (WITHOUT a five to one loss ratio), using mostly basic M4 and M4A1 (with 75mm guns) and a few with 76mm's. Shermans worked just fine against the retreating Germans, so the urgency for a new tank died down. When the fall slowdown came and the weather turned poor the losses rose again. The earlier M4 suspension had narrow track and he wetter weather meant more mud, which meant poorer floatation for the Shermans. The M4A3s with revised suspension (HVSS) didn't arrive until the Battle of the Bulge, so US tankers often operated without the "mobility edge" that the Sherman was famous for.

Before Normandy the 75mm on the Sherman worked just fine in most instances in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. Tigers were met rarely and Panthers appeared in small numbers. It seemed silly to screw up tank production just the meet a few "specialized" German tanks. The Sherman's "customers" were generally satisfied with it. Normandy was the real wake up call for US armor.

Only two times did the US forces in the ETO deal with massed Panzer divisons, the Mortain counter offensive and the Ardennes offensive. In both cases the tank destroyer doctrine failed miserably. The TDs were built open-topped and lightly armored so they could gather rapidly to mass fires on an attacking force, but in the ETO they were often parceled out to the infantry as assault guns. There was never a true massed tank destroyer force gathered against the Germans. One can imagine the effect of many battalions (with 36 guns each) in a coordinated ambush of an attacking force, but that ideal never came to pass.

Remember that even in the best of circumstances it took about 6 months for a new vehicle to be produced in quantity and shipped to the ETO. Your "wonder tank" would have to be in the factories by December of 1943 to be available in quantities to affect the Normandy campaign.

 

[OzDigger]

My "wonder tank" Surely you don't think I'm the only person that realises the US army tank doctorine was wrong, it's widely known, at least by those with an objective point of view. The British gave the US good advice on what was required as well as access to better fire power such as the 17-pounder. The US chose to go their own way which caused a greater loss of life and materiel than was necessary.

Further more, the US Armies on the Southern flank advancing towards the Rhineland were fortunate as the better German equipment and infantry were facing the British in the Northen sector and the Russians on the Eastern front. The rare encounters and even rarer successes of US M4's against the medium Panther was often when they faced green or worn out German troops with poor leadership.

Of course it would be foolish to attempt to take on a Panther head-on because of its thick sloped frontal armor. Therefore most succesful attacks occured from the sides or rear. As for the Lorraine 'campaign', you would have to name a particular battle for me to asses the 'actual' effectiveness of the M4 v Panther encounters in them. Usually the M4's were in hull down defensive positions often with artillery and air support. Several successful M4 v Panther encounters occured in poor weather conditions where distances were short. In addition, by that late stage in the war the Germans had little heavy artillery and virtually nil air support, both were a major part of earlier German victories.

I don't know why you have such a problem with the 76 mm weapon as its AP round could penetrate 1" more armor than the 75 mm. While the HE round, although not quite as effective as the 75's, was more than adequate for enemy troops and soft skinned vehicles. The 76 mm was well liked by the US tankers that used it, and it could penetrate Panthers etc better than the 75 mm.

At Mortain the US forces were largely saved by the RAF and their Typhoons, and that in itself should have convinced any doubters that US tank doctrine was wrong.

The Panther is recognised as being the best medium tank in WWII in an even tank v tank situation, and the T-34/85 as the best overall medium tank. Both had pros and cons but they were still much better than the M4. Yes the Russians and other allies used the Sherman, but they were hardly in a position to refuse additional weapons even if it wasn't as good as it should have been.

 

[binder001]

First, don't get me wrong. I cannnot defend US armor doctrine and policy in WW2. It was very short sighted and very unrealistic. Here's where we get back to the thread topic "WW2 politics and command". You had old officers who basically infantry and artillery types trying to approve doctrine for the use of tanks and armored forces and the defense against same. They didn't seem to want to pull in all the available information from our allies. There was also a bit of "if you had WON at Dunkirk, we might listen to you" state of mind, also causing resistance to British advice.

When I refer to a "miracle tank", I am placing myself in a 1940's frame of mind. We have the M4 in series production at 11 factories and we need every tank to equip our expanding forces, plus requests from our allies It's early 1943 before any US unit comes up against a Tiger or even a "Mark IV Special" (PzKFW IV F2). Even if the alarms went off that spring, where were we to go? The T20-23 series was the best bet, but development people in Ordnance wanted to go with a gas-electric drive train which proved to be a failure and a source of delay. Someone high up in Army Ground Forces would have to be able to step up and state that we need a new tank NOW! That man didn't exist. As I understand, it took personal intervention from Hitler to get the PzIII up-gunned, and the Panther into production, over the objections of some of his generals, so the US Army wasn't unique in being hidebound.

As far as the 76mm gun, M1-series; it was a fine weapon. With HVAP (British name = APCR) ammunition it could hurt a Panther at battle ranges (except the glacis). Problem is that HVAP ammo was rare in tank units in the ETO. Shermans with 76mm guns readily handled T34/85s in Korea. The feeling at the time was that nobody wanted to take on an anti-armor weapon for tanks versus the general purpose gun then in use. Another case of flawed doctrine.

The biggest problem (IMHO) was the darned tank destroyer philosphy. Their existance kept US officers from seeing the tank as the primary anti-armor weapon on the battlefield. The Germans and British didn't have this major distraction, and even with a conservative general staff they went to upgunned tanks. The US was so sidetracked on the TDs, which were strongly supported by GEN Leslie McNair - the head of AGF, that better German tanks simply caused the US to look at upgunning their tank destroyers. That's why the T71 (adopted as M36) with a 90mm gun was ready to go into immediate series production, someone had already done the R&D work. Even then, the M36 didn't get to the troops until the fall of 1944. Another problem with the TDs - over specialization. The tank destoyer was optimized as a hunter, the open top allowed great visibilty, the light armor improved speed to allow the guns to gather in ambush, the only MG fitted was set up for AA use. In the field the TDs never really worked as planned. The Germans rarely massed their armor so the TDs were dispersed as infantry assault guns, but the open top and lack of MGs made that very dangerous work unless they developed a supern relationship with a specific infantry unit (rare, because the TD units were reassigned frequently).

My opinion would like to have seen the AGF intervene more directly in the T23 program. THey weren't great tanks, but they offered a lower profile, slightly better protection and the 76mm gun, while keeping many components that had proven successful in the M4. Some of these could have been produced, tested, and have units trained to use them in time to participate in the Normandy fighting. As the US absorbed lessons from that battle, the 90mm gunned T23s could have possibly been in the hands of combat units by the Battle of the Bulge. The other approaches would be to produce more than 254 M4A3E2 up-armored "assault" tanks. The ones that were available proved very useful and quite popular, but there were never enough available. The 17-pounder conversion could also have been taken seriously by the US, but that would put different parts and ammo into the system. IF the US had gotten interested in the 17-pounder early enough, perhaps it could have been produced in the US, AND US Ordnance may have been able to delop a better HE shell for it. Now change my flock of T23s to a batch of T23s with 17-pounders and the Germans would have had a few rude surprises of their own. Keep some M4s around to deal with infantry, etc. Add a batch of M4A3E2 equivalents to the GHQ tank battalions supporting the infantry and the survivability of US tank crews would be much improved, although parts and ammo supply would be harder.

 

[binder001]

As for the Lorraine 'campaign', you would have to name a particular battle for me to asses the 'actual' effectiveness of the M4 v Panther encounters in them. Usually the M4's were in hull down defensive positions often with artillery and air support. Several successful M4 v Panther encounters occured in poor weather conditions where distances were short. In addition, by that late stage in the war the Germans had little heavy artillery and virtually nil air support, both were a major part of earlier German victories.

Best reference is Steve Zaloga's "The Lorraine Campaign, Patton versus Manteufel" in the Osprey campaign series. Only about $16-18USD and readily available.

 

[OzDigger]

I agree, the T-23 and T-25 series would have been handy upgraded mediums. However their development was late in the war and we should remember the US army had already indentified a need for a heavy tank in 1940. I picked on the M6 as it was in production in 1942, but being a heavy tank in a cavalry doctrine environment it didn't get the attention it deserved imo. Its main armament was based on a 3" anti aircraft gun rather than a howitzer/field gun as in the M4, and it had a 37 mm coaxial gun. In 1941 they planned to produce 5,500, reduced to 115 in 1942 and in the end only 40 were made, these remained in the US. It had some problems such as weight (remove the 37 mm for starters), but imo it would have made an adequate stop gap heavy until something better came along.

And the something better would have been soon to come if someone was thinking correctly, being a US tank destoyer gun (76.2 mm or 90 mm) mounted in an enclosed turret with thicker armor all round. The US had some excellent tank destroyers but most lacked crew protection as they relied on the shoot and scoot method. You need a balance of armour, armament and speed to make an effective AFV. Against a Tiger the Sherman only had speed while many tank destroyers such as the M-18 had the speed (55 mph) and the armament to handle a Tiger. Why didn't someone think of some decent armor and crew protection, it's not rocket science this stuff.

The Germans took up the challenge and moved to larger turrets to contain these higher calibre AA weapons (e.g. 88 mm) together with decent armor relatively early in the war. However for a variety of reasons they couldn't get the powerplants and or transmissions to be adequate or reliable - lucky for us.

Of course the open tank destroyer type of design wasn't used strictly by the US in WWII and it does have its niche on the battlefield. Which is as an ambush weapon in defence to replace towed anti tank guns and also as artillery back up. And this is what most allied TDs ended up doing in WWII, the British Archer with its 17lb being particularly handy from 1943 as it faced backwards allowing a quick getaway I guess the British recalled encountering the Italian Semonvente M.41M da 90/53 tank destroyer earlier in Africa. It was apparently more powerful than the German 88 mm and could give British tankies a real bad hair day - who said the Italians only had crap stuff in WWII

 

[DMNamiot]

HI guys,

I have been reading this little thread for a while and have decided to dive in. I am not going to talk Tank Doctrine now because in WWII it was still in its infancy for the US. But you guys have only really touched on the problems facing the US and Great Britian during the war. We still were very isolated and because of this mentality during the interwar years of 1919 to 1938 we (America) developed 18 different types of tanks but never got any of them to production. This rather dubious record only rivals the British. But the real issue about the Sherman was its vulnerabilities and firepower as we all know but with regard to the Tigers being sent to Russia, we didnt get much intel from old Stalin and his gang of thugs so you will have to take the arguement that we should have known more about them in early 42 and toss it. We didnt get a good look at the Tiger until we hit North Africa and captured a couple and brought them back to the US to take apart. And not to rain on the parade further but in November of 42 Field Marshall Montgomery sent a cable to the War Office stating the following:"The 75mm gun is all we require" Of course this is a really misleading statement unless you take a look at the rational behind it. The reason pure and simple was the need to deal with AT guns at long ranges and the need to break up german armored formations with an HE round. This dual purpose gun was only available in the Sherman and the Grant with the HE and Shot round mixes needed to deal with the German formations. This little note would have lasting effect and the result was Cromwells in Normandy armed with what thats right you guessed it the 75mm gun because Monty said so. Fortunatley the British did develop a great gun that would help a lot in late 44 and early 45 the 17 pounder.
Now on to the T26 which had a lot of problems when it was first brought forth as an experimental design in 43 and did not have all of the bugs ironed out until late in 44 at which time the T26E3 went into production This is lightning fast for the world of procurement and design of a weapon system! (This process usually take years not months.) There were 310 of them in Theater by VE day with 200 actively in action making what could be seen as a step in the right direction but alas were far to late to be effective. The truely criminal issue with the American Tank Design in WWII was they saw he need for a better gun to deal with the Germans 88mm early on but no one ever approached the issue of what to do about it from the perspective of we have a ton of tanks with a crappy gun what we needed was a better gun not a better tank. They should have designed a 90mm gun to fit the turret of the Sherman. This would have been a lot better and with a bigger gun you gain stand off that allows you to negate the disadvantage of poorer armor.

As for the doctrine we were employing I will talk about it later.

 

[OzDigger]

The Lorraine Campaign that Binder raised provides an appropriate return to true Politics and Command, although there was certainly a good deal of politics involved in the US army tank doctorine.

General Patton's 3rd Army race across France against a hastily retreating German army was widely promoted in contempory newspapers and has been well documented since. However, like most history the interpretation has depended very much on the author's view point and the intended audience. Consequently many of the negative aspects of Patton's involvement have been over looked.

The Lorraine Capaign matched the US 3rd Army, which included the 4th Armored Division, against the hastily raised 5th Panzer Army under General Manteuffel and elements of the 1st Army. Many of the German commanders were very capable however they were severly limited by Hitler and his strange plans and politics. The campaign lasted from September to December 1944 when patton had to turn North to relieve Bastogne. The Lorraine campaign cost 50,000 US casualties, being about one third of its total casualties in the entire European theatre.

The Lorraine campaign is often held up as 'proof' that Eisenhower favoured Montgomery over Patton in the provision of gasoline and other materiel. Many Americans feel that if not for Montgomery's delay and waste of material at Arnhem (operation Market-Garden), Patton could have swept through Lorraine and on to the Rhineland with minimal resistance.

This belief is flawed for many reasons, the most notable being:

* By August 1944 General Model had at last convinced Hitler to allow German troops to carryout fighting withdrawals to the West Wall aka the Sigfreid Line and other lines of defence closer to Germany. Prior to this Hitler had refused to allow any retreat in France etc which caused large numbers of men and materiel to be captured when they were over whelmed.

Hitler insisted on placing troops in fortified areas such as towns, islands, major cross roads etc where they were supposed to hold the enemy. Patton simply skirted these heavily defended areas and raced on to 'capture' new country. But of course many of these out flanked men were often subsequently able to escape to fight later in other areas.

* By late August the red ball express that was resupplying Patton's 3rd Army had reached its limit of effective logistics supply prior to Patton reaching the Lorraine area. In addition the British/Commonwealth and other US troops still needed supplies even when they weren't carrying out 'operations'.

The entire front had to be resupplied via the infrastructure at the Normandy beaches and some had been destroyed in storms adding to the severe beach bottleneck. In simple terms by August-September the entire front, especially the more distant 3rd Army, had gone as far as it could go. They needed to wait for a build up of reserves both of materiel and men.

The capture of intact deep water ports closer to the front (including Antwerp) did not and could not eventuate in the short term because the Germans simply destroyed the necessary wharves, cranes etc. In any-case at that stage a resupply line directly behind and across the entire allied front to Patton's 3rd Army would have been easier for the Germans to interdict.

* The arrival of Fall and subsequent Winter conditions caused ever increasing reductions in the availability of air support that Patton's fast advance had relied upon. Lorraine is not good country for tanks particulary in wet weather, which is common there. Therefore it was difficult for the narrow tracked M4 to retain its movement advantage.

* Patton underestimated the German's ability to bounce back particulary as the US forces advanced closer Germany. It should be remembered that many Germans considered Lorraine to be part of Germany, and indeed it had been mainly resettled by German people in the early stages of WWII. Previously Patton's army had received good support from civilians, this did not happen from Lorraine onwards.

* Patton was not experienced in attacking fixed defences and in hindsight a poor commander for the job. The US forces had a difficult time at Lorraine and subsequent defended positions. Until then Patton and his troops had encountered minimal and isolated resistance and had underestimated the German's ability to stand and fight in a defined line of defence.

During WWII the west wall had been increasingly degraded as much of its material and weapons had been removed and reinstalled in the Atlantic wall (Fortress Europa). Despite this the Germans were still able to put up a strong defence there, giving the US forces a tatse of what was to come. For example the Hurtgen Forest, was another hastily defended German postion and even worse tank country than Lorraine.

Other links: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/customer-reviews/1841760897/104-6422071-2264712

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1574887823/104-6422071-2264712?v=glance&n=283155