World War Two Politics and Command (2 Viewers)

DMN, are you guys going to blame Monty for all the mistakes in WWII :)

Actually I understand Montgomery was refering to the choice of tanks he had at the time. A slow Churchill, initially with 2-pounder later 6-pounder AT shell, or the Sherman with the multiporpose 75mm weapon. The 6 pounder was a good AT round, in fact the US used it as their standard anti tank weapon, but called it the 57mm to make it one of theirs :)

However the early Churchills were unreliable, nearly all those at Dieppe broke down on the beach. In addition the AT gun was of limited use in a tank designed for infantry support. Therefore it made sense to him to recommend the faster Sherman and its multi-purpose 75mm, which at the time was a reasonable descision as nothing else was available.

It's perhaps ironic that later Churchills fitted with a 75mm matched a good HE weapon with excellent armour making it a popular infantry support tank and with greater battle field survivability than the Sherman. I think Patton would have liked a few at Lorraine :D
 
Hi Oz,

I only threw the Monty note in as a bone for the Monty bashers here and to illustrate the issue the Allies were facing. We have to look at what it took to get the tanks from the drawing page to the front inorder to understand why the Sherman was the tank of choice by the US. There were a lot of side projects that wasted money, time and other valuable resources, like the M-7 which was scraped in the end after a vast sum of money was expended. Heck in 44 after we had hit the beaches and gone thru the Bulge fight there was a demand by many senior American Armor Division Officers for a better vehicle to deal with the Germans heavier Tanks from what they were calling the cat series. There was even a proposal for a 155mm armed tank but our designers were making these things so totally gigantic they would have been unuseable in the European Theater because the roads and bridges couldnt support them.
We should be looking at what went on IOT retool the factories and in the case of the Chrysler Tank Plant find the site purchase the land build the factory from scratch and begin churning out tanks by the score. Also incase some one was wondering the Sherman was made up of over 4500 seperate parts. Its mind blowing to imagine that we went from peace to a Total War effort so rapidly and were able to get vehicles out in such massive numbers.
And I agree with you that we would have benefited from a good infantry support tank. I guess we're going to have to happy with the fact that we had enough to do the job and make Hitler and his lot into tread grease.

Dave
 
Just for fun I went back over my references on the M6 series heavy tanks. There really isn't much in print, the best reference is "Firepower, A History of the American Heavy Tank" by R.P. Hunnicutt. The M6 did well from an automotive standpoint, although slow by US standards. Biggest problem was, as discussed, the users. The US Armored Force was founded most by ex-cavalry men. It was Chaffee himself (Adna R. Chaffee - considered "father" of the Armored Force) who wasn't even to big on medium tanks. His influence was that the original make up of an armored regiment was two battalions (6 companies) of light tanks to one battalion (3 companies) of mediums. Fortunately by the time US forces saw ground combat this had been reveresed to 2:1 mix of mediums over light. Still one can see that there was NO tolerance for a heavy tank from the beginning of the Armored Force. These gentlemen wanted to practice true blitzkrieg - "don't attack what you can go around". This approach worked well in the drive across France and the final drive into Germany. Normandy was a different proposition that the planners had foreseen. In the bocage the tank with thick frontal armor had an advantage on the defense as the Allies had to approach on a one-tank front. No tank had a perticular advantage in in the attack that terrain due to infantry AT weapons. By the way, the M6 offered no firepower advantage. It's 3" gun was exactly the same as that in the M10 tank destroyer, which was ballistically the same as the 76mm gun M-1 series. There was a prototype fitted with a 90mm gun, and a very late proposal to redesign the hull to allow for a 105mm gun in a turret.

M6 was sure a tall tank, even by US standards! The weight would have been against it in many operations. Near the end of the war the initial batch of T26E3 Pershings assigned to the 9th Armotred Division often travelled at the rear of the column because they were too heavy and wide for much of the Engineer's bridging equipment. The Army wanted to test some T26E3s on Okinawa and a ship was quickly loaded and set sail, however somebody forgot to tell the Navy, so the ship was delayed at Ulithi until called forward to Okinawa, then it was found that the heavy tanks couldn't be unloaded due to their weight. By the time the tanks could get unloaded, the combat on Okinawa was done. The lesson, the US would have not only had to change its armor doctrine much earlier in the war, but the Corps of Engineers and various logistics agencies would have had to adjust their arrangements to handle a heavy tank. One of the facts of life for any US planner was shipping space. The only time Germany had to move their heavies was to get some Tigers to North Africa, a little different than getting multiple battalions across the Atlantic or Pacific.
 
Binder,

Good points on the way things started in the early days of my branch. The big problem we had then and still have now is the Infantry mentality of mobile pill boxes. Now I will say that there is a reason to have Infantry support Tanks and other tanks to exploit the "cavalry missions" but its very difficult to push those sort of ideas through a heavily infantry oriented organization like most of the Army Staff was then and is now. Only now its worse because its the Airborne Infantry Mafia that runs things and has a lot of influence on the doctrine my branch has to deal with. I could go deeper but have to run and get the kids at school so I'll leave this one for some of you mull over and will write at depth later.

Dave
 
I'll just recap my earlier comments in point form.

* Forget any cavalry tank doctrine excuses you read. The US identified a need for a heavy tank by 1940 at the latest. The M6 was a good starting point and it could have been modified including being made lighter by ditching the 37mm gun etc.


* If they had reasonable numbers of heavy tanks earlier in the war then they would have made allowances to transport them in the subsequent liberty ships etc. The Germans had to transport their heavy tanks across vast distances in Russia which wasn't easy because of the poor road and rail network together with the different rail gauges. In fact its easier to tranport tanks by sea.

* You don't actually 'win' ground in warfare by going around a defended position, you simply postpone the battle. Patton was a glory seeker that just wanted to go further than any other General, especially Montgomery.

* Every battle is different and you can't keep using the same tactics and the same tank types over and over. For example in the Lorraine campaign Patton kept at his breakout tactics he had used earlier in France. This tactic only works against isolated defence postions such as Hitler fortress towns, but even then you are just postponing the inevitiable. And it certainly won't work against in depth defensive positions such as the German positions at Lorraine etc.

* The Sherman had reasonable mobility and an ok (just) all purpose gun. Its major problem was its lack of armor which wasn't really solved. The 'Ronson' exploding problem was partly solved by immersing the ammo in wet boxes below turret level. However to my way of thinking it would be better to modify a tank to stop the enemy rounds penetrating in the first place.

* With the same 3" gun I would rather be in an M6 than a M10 when people are firing at me :)
 
* Forget any cavalry tank doctrine excuses you read. The US identified a need for a heavy tank by 1940 at the latest. The M6 was a good starting point and it could have been modified including being made lighter by ditching the 37mm gun etc.

-- If there had been a "production M6 heavy, it owuld have NOT had the 37mm co-ax. That was decided fairly early in testing.

-- Who identified a need? The infantry types may have wanted one before the establishment of the Armored Force in 1940, but the decision makers who ran the Arnored Force wanted nothing to do with it. Remember that the Armored Force was only established in 1940, and quickly became dominated by the men who agreed with the cavalry philoshopy. We've been over this before. Ordnance was working on a tank the customer had no interest in. It's like Ordnance offered to build a van, but the customer wanted a sports car. I agree that the customer should have taken a more realistic view of their needs, but hindsight is 20/20.

* If they had reasonable numbers of heavy tanks earlier in the war then they would have made allowances to transport them in the subsequent liberty ships etc. The Germans had to transport their heavy tanks across vast distances in Russia which wasn't easy because of the poor road and rail network together with the different rail gauges. In fact its easier to tranport tanks by sea.

-- I can't speak for naval logistics, but that sure sounds wrong. Why did we bother seizing or establishing ports? If I had to get a tank off a flatcar I think of several ways to do it, but if you screw up unloading from a ship you will find out that tanks sink! After leaving the factory, a US tank had to go to one of several depots for waterproofing for its upcoming sea voyage, and had to be "unwrapped" at the other end.

* You don't actually 'win' ground in warfare by going around a defended position, you simply postpone the battle. Patton was a glory seeker that just wanted to go further than any other General, especially Montgomery.

-- Ever read Heinz Guderian's "Panzer Leader"? To many theorists in Germany, US and Britain, "proper" armored tactics involved striking deep into an enemys' rear area and bypassing heavily defended areas. These could be mopped up by the following infantry. This was the theory, it didn't always work that way. Patton was good at "blitzkrieg" and he had the right tools to do it. Patton may have felt he wanted to upstage Monty, but why did a Field Marshall in charge of an Army Group feel compelled to compete with a Lieutenant General commanding a field army? Patton was a natural leader at "broken field running", but he had reached his limits of command. Patton could not have run an Army Group, he just wasn't up to the logistical demands. Monty was no less a "glory seeker", he just wasn't as honest about it as Patton.
 
I have read a lot of military history including Guderian's 'Panzer Leader'. The first thing I noted was that you don't send cavalry after well trained enemy infantry (they just form squares and shoot the crap out of the cavalry). And you don't send poorly armoured tanks without infantry support against well equiped enemy infantry (the tanks get blasted with anti tank weapons).

The Germans were successful with blitzkreig tactics in early WWII because the Allies were still thinking WWI tactics and using WWI based weapons. Patton was only succesful when he faced depleted and retreating enemy forces, and they had little air cover.

Perhaps the most important aspect of blitzkreig is when you analyse where blitzkreig tactics won a war against a particular country. You will note that this only occured in countries that surrended without much of a fight, such as France, because the politician(s) in charge just gave in. Just imagine how useless blitzkreig would have been in Japan.

Also consider your War of 1812. The US 'captured' a fair bit of Canada but couldn't 'hold it' as the British soldiers returned from the Napolenic wars and kicked them out. Occupying land is not the same as defeating your enemy.

As for that US tank doctrine. Those that could have done something about the US Army tank doctrine back then were subsequently reluctant to admit to any mistakes for political or propaganda reasons, and they used a number of excuses for why they didn't. However, I'm sure they had plenty of time of private reflection to regret they didn't do more for the poor grunts that died purely because of their lack of action.
 
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Oz,

You offer some fairly interesting points and I will consede to you that there were many issues being delt with both politically and other. However, I disagree that the fight for France was a hollow fight for the Germans. That the French Army fell to pieces was more or less due to the reasons you stated they were practicing and basing their doctrine on WWI ideas. The Mobile Corps were about as mobile as rocks and they could not bring the right forces to bear against the Germans. The British AEF fight was a bit different and though they ended up poorly they did manage to inflict some serious casualties on a few German units using vastly inferior vehicles and arms.

On to the crux of the arguement the American Armored Froce was not truely a independent branch during the interwar years if you take a look at the insignia we wore it was a tank superimposed over crossed rifles of the infantry. The Cavalry was still mucking around with the Horse even though it was proved beyond a shadow of a doubt their era was over in the First War. Chaffee and Harmon and Patton et all were dealing with some really enormus issues while trying to bring the Armored Force together in the late 30s with the Lousianna Maneuvers. The equipment was new and in a lot of cases inferior to the what the Germans had on the drawing table due no doubt to their visits to our Armor Center at Ft Knox and watching our Force Development much the same as what they did with the Russians during this period. Of course the Russians were better at hiding important tank designs(T34) then we were. We had a very small corp of Officers that were developing the doctrine for our Armored Force by trying to combine what the grunts wanted and what the cavalry wanted to try and become the best of both. Sounds easy to us but its a vastly bigger can of worms than the really simplified version I have here.

There were many many powerful and influencial Infantry Leaders that wanted nothing but the mobile infantry support vehicles that had the armor to deal with whatever the enemy threw at it while it destroyed enemy bunkers/MG positions or basicly what the first tanks were developed for during the First War.

The Cavalry wanted what they always want a really fast light skinned vehicle that could maneuver around the enemy IOT(In Order To) hit the supplies in the rear. I'll tell you as a heavy Tanker there is no bigger thrill than when you break through an enemy line and stumble into their field trains it is a slaughter like nothingelse. But if these men hadnt done the work they did in the 30s we would be talking about this because it would be science fiction.

So I doubt men like Chaffee who put it all on the line to develop the doctrine of the Modern Armored Force would agree they didnt do enough to save grunts because of Political issues. They were faced with a vastly different Army and Army mentality much the same as what the British and French faced with the stagnation of the western front and the lose of mobility due to the use of massed MGs Artillery and Barbed wire. The change was needed in both cases but took a lot longer in the first war to come about. You also have to remember the equipment was changing and there werent a lot of M4s around yet let alone Armored Cars or Half Tracks the close support artillery in use was the French 75 until right before the war kicked off for the US so we had a multitude of issues from the interwar era and developing new doctirne was only one of the problems heck even the Airborne was still a new branch with a lot of issues to grow through.

So I guess the bottom line is it wasnt as easy a problem to deal with as we may think from our Armchairs.

Dave
 
Dave, Back to "politics and command" - did you know that Patton, while NOW regarded as a great tanker was actually resented by the early armor community? It wasn't only his abrasive style, or the personal wealth that had he and Bea living high while other officers were just scraping by, it was that after his success in the infant Tank Corp of WW1, Patton left armor when the defense acts of 1920 put the tanks under the Infantry branch. He went back to Cavalry and didn't run the carreer risks of Chaffee, Vorhees and some of the others.
 
binder001 said:
Dave, Back to "politics and command" - did you know that Patton, while NOW regarded as a great tanker was actually resented by the early armor community? It wasn't only his abrasive style, or the personal wealth that had he and Bea living high while other officers were just scraping by, it was that after his success in the infant Tank Corp of WW1, Patton left armor when the defense acts of 1920 put the tanks under the Infantry branch. He went back to Cavalry and didn't run the carreer risks of Chaffee, Vorhees and some of the others.

I understand he always prefered cavalry over armor anyway, and in fact was against armor in the early stages as he just loved the romance of horses (so to speak).
 
Hi Guys,

Yes I knew that. All I can say is in the end he finally came back from the Dark Side and left his horses for a real ride!

Dave
 
DMNamiot said:
Oz,

You offer some fairly interesting points and I will consede to you that there were many issues being delt with both politically and other. However, I disagree that the fight for France was a hollow fight for the Germans. That the French Army fell to pieces was more or less due to the reasons you stated they were practicing and basing their doctrine on WWI ideas. The Mobile Corps were about as mobile as rocks and they could not bring the right forces to bear against the Germans. The British AEF fight was a bit different and though they ended up poorly they did manage to inflict some serious casualties on a few German units using vastly inferior vehicles and arms.

On to the crux of the arguement the American Armored Froce was not truely a independent branch during the interwar years if you take a look at the insignia we wore it was a tank superimposed over crossed rifles of the infantry. The Cavalry was still mucking around with the Horse even though it was proved beyond a shadow of a doubt their era was over in the First War. Chaffee and Harmon and Patton et all were dealing with some really enormus issues while trying to bring the Armored Force together in the late 30s with the Lousianna Maneuvers. The equipment was new and in a lot of cases inferior to the what the Germans had on the drawing table due no doubt to their visits to our Armor Center at Ft Knox and watching our Force Development much the same as what they did with the Russians during this period. Of course the Russians were better at hiding important tank designs(T34) then we were. We had a very small corp of Officers that were developing the doctrine for our Armored Force by trying to combine what the grunts wanted and what the cavalry wanted to try and become the best of both. Sounds easy to us but its a vastly bigger can of worms than the really simplified version I have here.

There were many many powerful and influencial Infantry Leaders that wanted nothing but the mobile infantry support vehicles that had the armor to deal with whatever the enemy threw at it while it destroyed enemy bunkers/MG positions or basicly what the first tanks were developed for during the First War.

The Cavalry wanted what they always want a really fast light skinned vehicle that could maneuver around the enemy IOT(In Order To) hit the supplies in the rear. I'll tell you as a heavy Tanker there is no bigger thrill than when you break through an enemy line and stumble into their field trains it is a slaughter like nothingelse. But if these men hadnt done the work they did in the 30s we would be talking about this because it would be science fiction.

So I doubt men like Chaffee who put it all on the line to develop the doctrine of the Modern Armored Force would agree they didnt do enough to save grunts because of Political issues. They were faced with a vastly different Army and Army mentality much the same as what the British and French faced with the stagnation of the western front and the lose of mobility due to the use of massed MGs Artillery and Barbed wire. The change was needed in both cases but took a lot longer in the first war to come about. You also have to remember the equipment was changing and there werent a lot of M4s around yet let alone Armored Cars or Half Tracks the close support artillery in use was the French 75 until right before the war kicked off for the US so we had a multitude of issues from the interwar era and developing new doctirne was only one of the problems heck even the Airborne was still a new branch with a lot of issues to grow through.

So I guess the bottom line is it wasnt as easy a problem to deal with as we may think from our Armchairs.

Dave

Dave, I really can't understand the need for speed doctrine some influential people in the US seemed to have at the time, and still do I guess, is it some American hangup :)

When in doubt I would always go for the extra armor rather than some minor gain in speed. At the end of the day an armored vehicle is meant to protect your soldiers not get you somewhere faster. Unfortunately the old US doctrine seems to continue to this day, but in terms of APC's rather than MBT's.

For example the latest trend towards wheeled APC's is a major mistake imo. Ok, they may be a bit faster than tracked versions and cause less impact on made roads (good old pc values again). However few of the modern wheeled military vehicles in US service can provide the cross country performance and protection the old tracked M-113s could offer. The US Army are once again starting to relearn the old doctrine lesson in Iraq it seems.
 
HI Oz,

I will first say that as a heritic in the Armor community I will get burned at the stake for agreeing with you that said I couldnt agree more the current trend for my branch is to pretend we are again part of the infantry and play nursemaid and support them with the Stryker. God stirke me down if I am wrong here but the Stryker is an infantry carrier not a tank.....

HMMM...., Maybe I'm on to something here? Well let me say that there is a time and a place for every thing but as a Tank purist I am deeply disturbed by the latest trend being swallowed by my branch by becoming that which we were 75 years ago a novelity weapon that should be used to support all things grunt like and destroy the bunkers of our enemies and since we dont want to destroy the infrastructure and it has to Airborne capable then we must give up armor and tracks and a main gun and our branch insignia and turn the clock back to the armored car branch. Arrggggg!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Crom want stick!!!!


I am very worried about the trend to no armor worth mentioning and wheels. I see us making the same mistake they made before the Tank made its debut on the field of battle in WWI because we have totally forgotten why we needed it to begin with HMMM what could it be? Thats right boys and girls Mobility, cross country Mobility to be precise and yes there are places where a wheeled vehicle is best and yes there are places where a bad a** tank with a nice selection of rounds from the armor piercing Sabot to the High Explosive Projectiles or a nice WP round for frying I mean marking bunkers. I guess we dont plan to ever fight anyone who has a tank or maybe a good set of Anti Tank Guns. Oh well if thats the case then I guess the tank is obsolete so I will go the way of the dodo...

Cant tell you might have touched a nerve here.

I am sorry if the grunts out there are offended but its not your branch that is playing truck driver with these tonka tanks. I have also asked countless vets from Iraq their opinions of the aforementioned Strykers and they have had good things and bad things to say but they all agreed on one thing and that was that when in need of bunker smashing or busting a house full of jihad joes the best thing for it was,..... wait for it..... The M1A1 Abrams Tank. I can only hope that the people in power finally see the error of their ways and this little project goes away.

Dave
 
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Don't worry Dave, I'm sure someone will come up with a light air transportable option to those politically incorrect and now 'useless' heavy tanks. I've got it, what about a light tank destroyer to supplement those metal plated trucks, sorry, Light Armoured Vehicles.

Hey, it would be just like the good old days in WWII when the US Army used Tank Destoyers and M3 White Scout Cars, now weren't they both good ideas :)

As they say: "the more things change, the more they stay the same".
 
Over the easter holidays I borrowed a few library books to keep me occupied. One is called 'The Lonely Leader: Monty 1944-1945' written by Alistar Horne with David Montgomery.

I haven't read much about Montgomery but this is one of the best books I've read so far. And it doesn't pull any punches despite being co authored by his son. It's amazing how much Allied politics and personalities played in that war, and others no doubt.

Here are a few tidbits:

* Montgomery planned the Dieppe raid and only escaped sacking because of its failure as he was sent to Africa a few days before the raid.

* It's well known that Montgomery hated smoking. Eisenhower was a chain smoker and at their first meeting in Montgomery's office Monty told him he didn't allow smoking in his presence. What Montgomery didn't explain to him was that he had been shot thru one lung in WWI and had pneumonia in the other. Therefore to much cigarette smoke made him violently ill. Montgomery was to vain to explain this to Ike, who took the refusal to smoke comment as a personal insult and a challenge to his authority.

* A more humurous story was when Monty first met Churchill. He told Churchill he neither smoked nor drank and was 100% fit. To which Churchill replied he both smoked and drank and therefore 200% fit.

* The British 3.7" anti aircraft gun was superior to the German 88 mm but it was rarely used as an anti tank weapon because of infighting between the various departments.
 
Is this the right room for an argument?

Question: In 1914-1918 why have tanks? Because firepower was supreme in the defence and the ground was churned up so badly that tracks were needed to cross. Armour required to stop bullets and shrapnel. About 8-10mm and speed around walking? What about doctine - wholly mobilised economy to buy them, mass attack, localised overwhelming force with combined arms - then over to the light tanks and cavalry (LOL) to exploit. Cambrai - well almost. Developed more in ww2 but also became a seige engine (79th British Armoured Div).

Question: Why have tanks now?

1. For defensive use against massed armour from...... :confused:

2. For defensive use against RPGs, missiles, sticks, stones, cocktails and cameras in ...........(fill in the blanks) :confused:

3. Offensive use against a fixed defence line at.......?

4. Or is the tank an offensive weapon for use against .....:confused:

The answer: Ask the purchasing politician what he/she would want their son to ride in to ............(fill in the blanks) - assuming politicians have sons and let them serve at the sharp end.....Bet they chose a tank - MBT - I would for good protection, excellent mobility and hard hitting firepower.

Then buy the cheapest - 'voila' - a wheeled AFV - or perhaps an unarmed hummvee or land rover with a GPMG - the 1919 and post ww1 light tank and armoured car debate reborn. Or does the 'dreadnought' against the torpedo and aircraft start to sound resonant? Plus ca change.:(

PS agree about Monty - but was he lucky?
 
"Is this the right room for an argument?"

I believe it is panda :) A few of us have had some good 'discussions' here over the past few months haven't we. I've learnt a lot from the posts but it has taken me a lot of time and effort to read websites and check my reference books etc to make sure I had at least some of the info correct. Binder, Louis, Dave et al, will soon point out any errors in a post as they are right into military history.

I've 'read' thousands of military books over the years but I've forgotten most of the information as I mainly just looked at the pretty pictures of the tanks etc. And it doesn't help that my memory isn't what it used to be. I'm not sure if it's just middle age kicking in, or a combination of the alcohol, drugs (not many honest) and accidental electric shocks I've had over the years. Whatever the cause, it's a real bugger walking into a room and thinking, now what the hell was I supposed to do when I got there :)

Now before you guys blame me for yet another boring Montgomery discussion, don't forget the following is all panda's fault for asking if Monty was lucky :)

Wasn't it Napoleon that wanted 'lucky' Generals? As for Monty being lucky, all Generals make mistakes, and much depends upon how many soldiers are involved in the battle and the number killed. In addition, some Generals are good at covering up their mistakes, or have people that recognise their use to the war effort and support them.

Montgomery would have been sacked early in WWII if not for the support of General (later Field Marshal) Alan Brooke, and Patton would have been sent home in disgrace early on if not for Eisenhower. And it's ironic to think that Montgomery and Patton are considered to be the best or worst Generals of WWII depending upon your country of origin and the amount of propaganda you have been exposed to. We can't get away from politics can we.

Montgomery lived and breathed the military and was in that way much like Patton. Montgomery saw first hand the success of the German storm trooper and tank penetration tactics of late WWI being an early type of blitzkreig. Despite his efforts after WWI he lacked the personality and old boy network to make any significant changes to established British doctrine that concentrated on infantry and artillery in defensive positions. Therefore unlike Patton he had little to do with tanks throughout most of his career.

He again saw the value of tank and infantry penetration when in France where the Germans used improved bltizkreig tactics to force the retreat at Dunkirk. He noted the early failures in Africa where the British squandered their tanks in pell mell attacks against German defensive positions. He learnt from early mistakes and ordered the tank officers not to do such things again. However in subsequent battles British tank commanders sometimes still got carried away with cavalry type charges causing needless losses up to the end of the war. But no doubt both are to blame for a variety of reasons.

Montgomery understood that the defender always has the upper hand and tried to lure his opponent into attacking wherever possible and subsequently bleed them dry. His greatest hero was Wellington and used many of his ideas which were based on infantry and artillery rather than cavalry.

German Generals (like the Americans) were trained to be attacking Generals. Therefore many German Generals such as Rommel often took the bait resulting in lost battles such as El Alamein. Relatively small numbers of dug in determined troops can hold a defensive position against superior forces as was evidenced by the Australian 9th Division at Tobruk. Earning them the (Desert) Rat description that Rommel gave them as an intended insult.

However Generals can't always have the benefit of a defensive position and when the enemy won't come to you, you must go to them. And this is where politics plays a large part in wars. Montgomery was preparred to sit on his backside and let the Germans bleed dry. The Germans were finding it even more difficult to replace men and equipment than the British who had the considerable support of the American production lines as well as their men. And lets not forget the Russians.

However, static battles do not look good in the press, and the people, and in turn, their President or Prime Minister want to see gains in ground - the larger the better. And when the British and American forces made these 'required' attacks on the defending German forces that's when most allied losses occured, mainly because you can't always just go around an obstacle. This was especially evident towards the end of the war when Hitler allowed the German army to withdraw to defensive lines rather than isolated fortresses as I mentioned earlier.

So once again we come back to the politics and command problem in war. All Generals make mistakes, soldiers loose there lives and Generals loose command. But the President or Prime Minister that caused the problem can usually find someone else to blame and will go to great lengths to remain in power.

Montgomery and Patton both made personal and professional errors of judgement and their pros and cons will continue to be discussed for many years to come. However few could argue that both didn't provide a considerable boost to their respective country's morale by being positive and energetic heros when their country's most needed one (Dunkirk and Kasserine Pass). They may both have been lucky on occassions but we were certainly lucky to have them when we needed them.
 
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A question for OzDigger

Of the 2 Generals Patton or Montgomery which did the Germans fear the most?

How did Montgomery's troops feel about him?

How did Patton's troops feel about him?

In Patton case from what I've read, it was a love hate relationship.
I don't know about the English troops
 
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Chuck Harris said:
A question for OzDigger

Of the 2 Generals Patton or Montgomery which did the Germans fear the most?

How did Montgomery's troops feel about him?

How did Patton's troops feel about him?

In Patton case from what I've read, it was a love hate relationship.
I don't know about the English troops

Hi Chuck, firstly I should advise my own personal opinion. I agree with Louis in that imo both of them pretty well sucked as a person, and to a lesser degree as Generals.

Who did the Germans fear most. There can be no doubt that the Germans feared the Russians more than Montgomery or Patton. But between those two Generals. Considering the influence of popular culture and hollywood movies most people would say the Germans feared Patton more throughout the war. But how accurate is this?

In the early stages both Patton and Montgomery had inflicted losses on the Germans and were fairly even in German eyes I guess. However in the build up to D-Day there was a great deal of allied missinformation making out that Patton was to lead a huge army to invade in the Calais area. Hitler always believed an invasion would take place at Normandy but he was eventually sidetracked by his senior generals that Calais was the target. Therefore at that stage prior to D-Day I guess it would be fair to say they feared Patton more.

However after the landings when you examine the actual amount and quality of the divisions and equipment the Germans matched against the Commopnwealth and American Armies in Europe it appears the Germans feared Montgomery more. Or at least considered Montgomery's army to be in the most threatening position as far as the Germans were concerned. And this continued until the end of the European war which allowed an element of freedom to Patton. This made Patton something of a loose canon in more ways than one, so perhaps the Germans did fear where he may strike next, as at least they knew where Montgomery was most of the time.

How did their troops feel about them?
Even those that knew Montgomery, and hated him, admited that his ability to train troops and raise their moral through his pep talks was nothing short of extraordinary. Prior to D-Day Montogomery was the only General that visited all the Allied troops, including the Americans. He did not have an imposing physical statue as he was short and slim and couldn't pronounce his 'r's.

However he must have given the soldiers he visited (over a million) the impression that he was one of the few Generals that actually knew what had to be done and how to do it. Most allied Generals were keen on using canteens and px's etc for lifting moral, but Montgomery's main morale boosting message to them was that he wouldn't waste their lives. Which I think every soldier wants to hear from a General but seldom experiences.

He also used to dress in a similar fashion to his troops in regular army uniform with either an Australian slouch hat or a beret. Following the pre D-Day speeches he was apparently so popular with the troops of both armies that the other Generals and Leaders were becoming jealous, and of course Montgomery became even more arrogant. These things came against him following his military set backs later in the war, when his popularity wained, especially with the Americans.

Patton was a larger man that could also inspire confidence with his oratory, although his high pitched voice didn't help his image and he tended to swear a lot in his speaches. I think the fact that he usually over-dressed by wearing a shiny helmet and riding breaches with those ivory handled pistols tended to estrange him from the average soldier.

However on balance I think both men enjoyed a love hate relationship with their troops, and superiors, because they were arrogant and aggressive men that lacked political ability.
 
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panda1gen said:
Is this the right room for an argument?

Question: In 1914-1918 why have tanks? Because firepower was supreme in the defence and the ground was churned up so badly that tracks were needed to cross. Armour required to stop bullets and shrapnel. About 8-10mm and speed around walking? What about doctine - wholly mobilised economy to buy them, mass attack, localised overwhelming force with combined arms - then over to the light tanks and cavalry (LOL) to exploit. Cambrai - well almost. Developed more in ww2 but also became a seige engine (79th British Armoured Div).

Question: Why have tanks now?

1. For defensive use against massed armour from...... :confused:

2. For defensive use against RPGs, missiles, sticks, stones, cocktails and cameras in ...........(fill in the blanks) :confused:

3. Offensive use against a fixed defence line at.......?

4. Or is the tank an offensive weapon for use against .....:confused:

The answer: Ask the purchasing politician what he/she would want their son to ride in to ............(fill in the blanks) - assuming politicians have sons and let them serve at the sharp end.....Bet they chose a tank - MBT - I would for good protection, excellent mobility and hard hitting firepower.

Then buy the cheapest - 'voila' - a wheeled AFV - or perhaps an unarmed hummvee or land rover with a GPMG - the 1919 and post ww1 light tank and armoured car debate reborn. Or does the 'dreadnought' against the torpedo and aircraft start to sound resonant? Plus ca change.:(

PS agree about Monty - but was he lucky?



Ok Guys been stewing on this reply for a while and will pick it apart in my own slow way. Not trying to be personal on any of this stuff Panda1gen,

First and foremost I dont want to compare apples with orages but thats whats happening here. The Cost issue isnt a very good argument since the Tanks cost only slightly more than the Stryker with the costs being 2.8 Million and 1.9 Million per. So that wont wash for me especially in the contracting world for the federal government which is always full of cost over runs and since the Stryker is still in the early phases of production the cost will probably creep up some more.

The Tanks will remain the big boys on the field for quite some time and are needed for when (not if) we get into it with the NK Commies and the CHI Coms eventually. Being an optimist I will say this is going to happen there is also India which has its own tank and tank development program and is also one of the big players out there that we in the west conviently forget about unless of course Pakistan is being surly in Kashmir. So they will be required again.

Mobility was and is the key issue the wheels are great for roads and some cross country stuff but they dont compare to the tanks for the cross country mobility. Urban vs Rural yes they have a place in each fight and are not the be all end all replacement. RPGs and other AT weapons both vehicles have vulnerabilities that can be exploited the Stryker however is more likely to have a bad time in this environment than the Tank and thats all there is too it. As far as defensive lines there arent any in Iraq and Afgahanistan thats part of the issue in the latest evolution of Combat when you roll out of the FOB your in indian country and thats the way it is, sure there are safer places but the IED knows no boundry.

I hope you all can see where I'm coming from.

Dave
 

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