Battle for North Africa (6 Viewers)

[Leadmen]

Brigadier John Strawson's book Battle for North Africa(1969-1977 printing has some interesting remarks by Rommel.On April 1941 Rommel had these comments about attacking fixed positions at Tobruk. Tobruk was quite a different thing from rapid, dispersed, encircling movements in the open desert. Rommel wrote these comments after losing 1200 men in assault on Tobruk.Rommel wrote:-- This shows how sharply the curve of casualties rises when one reverts from mobile to position warfare.In a mobile action, what counts is material, as the essential compliment to the soldier. The finest fighting man has no value in mobile warfare without tanks, guns and vehicles. The mobile force can be rendered unfit for action by the destruction of its tanks without loss of manpower. This is not the case in position warfare, where infantrymen with rifle and grenades has lost little of their value, provide he is protected by anti-tank guns or obstacles against the enemy's armor. For him enemy number one is the attacking infantryman. Hence, position warfare is always a struggle for the destruction of men- in contrast to mobile warfare, where everything turns on the destruction of enemy material.Rommel needed Tobruk to solve
his logistic problems. The capture of Tobruk became an obsession with Rommel. John

 

[swalterh]

Brigadier John Strawson's book Battle for North Africa(1969-1977 printing has some interesting remarks by Rommel.On April 1941 Rommel had these comments about attacking fixed positions at Tobruk. Tobruk was quite a different thing from rapid, dispersed, encircling movements in the open desert. Rommel wrote these comments after losing 1200 men in assault on Tobruk.Rommel wrote:-- This shows how sharply the curve of casualties rises when one reverts from mobile to position warfare.In a mobile action, what counts is material, as the essential compliment to the soldier. The finest fighting man has no value in mobile warfare without tanks, guns and vehicles. The mobile force can be rendered unfit for action by the destruction of its tanks without loss of manpower. This is not the case in position warfare, where infantrymen with rifle and grenades has lost little of their value, provide he is protected by anti-tank guns or obstacles against the enemy's armor. For him enemy number one is the attacking infantryman. Hence, position warfare is always a struggle for the destruction of men- in contrast to mobile warfare, where everything turns on the destruction of enemy material.Rommel needed Tobruk to solve
his logistic problems. The capture of Tobruk became an obsession with Rommel. John

So, one could say that Montgomery wins the operational argument because he won the campaign. But, we could argue that he had a more secure supply line and more support from his government for his operational theatre. I hope a couple of people elect to weigh in on this. So, who’s the superior tactician, Montgomery or Rommel? And just for kicks, who has the edge when commanding more mobile forces (i.e. tanks and APC’s) vs. more static forces (i.e. infantry and heavy artillery)?

I think Rommel has the edge in mobility. Montgomery with fixed positional warfare. I think if all things are equal Rommel takes superior tactician. Now I appreciate the internal frictions Monty experienced in the desert with his armoured commanders. In a few instances he seems to have had every right to remove some of them from command. IMO this complete lack of trust is part of the reason behind the slug fest that developed at El Alamein. Rommel, due in large part to the discipline inherent in the German officer corps experienced significantly fewer instances of reluctance to follow his directives on the part of his subordinates.

Toughest hombres were the 9th Aussie & 2nd Kiwi. The 51st Highland Division & 1st SA were pretty stout as well. The Desert Rats of 7th Arm. get all of the press and adulation, but the decisive battle of the campaign was El Alamein and it was the PBI (Poor Bloody Infantry) along the northern flank that got done.

 

[RPZ]

The Germans had developed and used mobile tactics from the getgo - blitzkrieg. About the only allied general who could have matched any of their "best" in these regards imo was Patton. Montgomery it seems was not much of a risk taker. Rommel's problems and "failure" can be linked directly to shortages; fuels, and materials in the form of armor and more importantly air support. Allied air dominance meant the inevitable defeat of the Germans in North Africa, and of course this was the case on all fronts and theatres of the war.

But in a simple straightforward comparison I would have to give it to Rommel over Montgomery.

 

[swalterh]

The Germans had developed and used mobile tactics from the getgo - blitzkrieg. About the only allied general who could have matched any of their "best" in these regards imo was Patton. Montgomery it seems was not much of a risk taker. Rommel's problems and "failure" can be linked directly to shortages; fuels, and materials in the form of armor and more importantly air support. Allied air dominance meant the inevitable defeat of the Germans in North Africa, and of course this was the case on all fronts and theatres of the war.

But in a simple straightforward comparison I would have to give it to Rommel over Montgomery.

I'd say you make a convincing argument. I concur with your assessment. I appreciate how you highlighted that the Germans had been committed to the concepts of mobile warfare from the beginning and the other belligerents were scrambling to "catch up" so to speak. I think that your comments regarding the logistical limitations of the DAK brings up an important point. Rommel wrote an account of the forth coming battle of El Alamein in his diary. In it he uses his professional knowledge to describe in detail the manner in which the British were going to defeat him. The Desert Fox would have preferred a more mobile encounter with the 8th Army. He pointed out that had he had more logistical advantages he would have had more tactical flexibility. But, since he was limited on supplies he positioned his troops and formulated a plan that he felt gave them the best chance for success fighting a more static style slug fest. He knew he was counting on the British to commit errors in order to win. Unfortunately for the DAK, Montgomery and the 8th Army performed well enough to thwart his efforts.

 

[jager7080]

I'd say you make a convincing argument. I concur with your assessment. I appreciate how you highlighted that the Germans had been committed to the concepts of mobile warfare from the beginning and the other belligerents were scrambling to "catch up" so to speak. I think that your comments regarding the logistical limitations of the DAK brings up an important point. Rommel wrote an account of the forth coming battle of El Alamein in his diary. In it he uses his professional knowledge to describe in detail the manner in which the British were going to defeat him. The Desert Fox would have preferred a more mobile encounter with the 8th Army. He pointed out that had he had more logistical advantages he would have had more tactical flexibility. But, since he was limited on supplies he positioned his troops and formulated a plan that he felt gave them the best chance for success fighting a more static style slug fest. He knew he was counting on the British to commit errors in order to win. Unfortunately for the DAK, Montgomery and the 8th Army performed well enough to thwart his efforts.

Shane ,

The logistical problems Rommel faced i believe are well known...What hasn't been mentioned is the fact Montgomery was not only well supplied but well informed on Rommel due to the fact he was receiving regular Enigma reports on Rommel's order of battle , dispositions & supply situation...
What i will say about Montgomery & why he succeeded where other's had not...He was clearly very methodical , he shows this by resisting Churchill , whom wanted quick action...There is a story about Montgomery coming by an artillery group...He ask's them what they think of the piece ?! They say something to the effect of don't really know haven't fired it...Montgomery then issued orders to have armament expended saying you cannot expect the men to be useful & comfortable with their equipment if they don't get to use it !
I believe he also boosted morale...Just like in sports , this was a battle of match-up's...Montgomery was the right commander given what he had at his disposal to deal with Rommel...
That being said could Montgomery have beaten Rommel or been as successful if he was leading the DAK ?!
I believe if all things were equal , that Rommel was clearly the better tactician IMO...

Joe

 

[swalterh]

Shane ,

The logistical problems Rommel faced i believe are well known...What hasn't been mentioned is the fact Montgomery was not only well supplied but well informed on Rommel due to the fact he was receiving regular Enigma reports on Rommel's order of battle , dispositions & supply situation...
What i will say about Montgomery & why he succeeded where other's had not...He was clearly very methodical , he shows this by resisting Churchill , whom wanted quick action...There is a story about Montgomery coming by an artillery group...He ask's them what they think of the piece ?! They say something to the effect of don't really know haven't fired it...Montgomery then issued orders to have armament expended saying you cannot expect the men to be useful & comfortable with their equipment if they don't get to use it !
I believe he also boosted morale...Just like in sports , this was a battle of match-up's...Montgomery was the right commander given what he had at his disposal to deal with Rommel...
That being said could Montgomery have beaten Rommel or been as successful if he was leading the DAK ?!
I believe if all things were equal , that Rommel was clearly the better tactician IMO...

Joe

Joe

I think you bring up another great point regarding Montgomery’s intelligence edge. Your assessment on Montgomery’s practicality and leadership ability is spot on IMO. His character and professional integrity were traits that his colleagues in the British Army found difficult to match. I find it interesting that he was not of the nobility and therefore struggled to gain acceptance during his rise to command. Despite the fact that the commissioning system had been abolished in 1871, the British military still fiercely retained its tradition of favoring more socially established officers for certain branches of service and command positions. Despite this, he still maintained the moral courage to stand by his convictions (as you highlighted by describing his run-ins with Churchill). I believe that these were highly instrumental factors in his success.

Shane

 

[Mitch]

Interesting contrast between the two commanders. I would say (though I view Monty very highly indeed) that at that time and, with the overtly bold character of Rommel and the fact that the Germans were at that time pioneers of armoured warfare the edge, was in the hands of Rommel over Monty.

Monty however, galvanised an Army that was overtly in awe of the reputation of the DAK and, instilled a belief that they could be stopped and, importantly, beaten.

Was Tobruk an Obsession? I am not so sure that if there were more ports and a better supply line that Rommel would have expended as much material and time on it but, needs must as they say.

The importance of the theatre to Hitler has almost flippantly been addressed by some historians as if it was a side show. When one actually looks at what was sent to the area by the Germans its obvious that it was seen as rather important. The fact that most ended up at the bottom of the med from RN and RAF action should not detract from that.

Joe your point about changing roles is very interesting and, its arguable that had some German commanders commanded the resources the allies had they would have seen a similar enemy off in short time. Commanders like Rommel, Bittrich, Witt, Hausser, Manstein, were on the whole superior to allied commanders even with lesser materials.
Mitch

 

[jager7080]

Interesting contrast between the two commanders. I would say (though I view Monty very highly indeed) that at that time and, with the overtly bold character of Rommel and the fact that the Germans were at that time pioneers of armoured warfare the edge, was in the hands of Rommel over Monty.

Monty however, galvanised an Army that was overtly in awe of the reputation of the DAK and, instilled a belief that they could be stopped and, importantly, beaten.

Was Tobruk an Obsession? I am not so sure that if there were more ports and a better supply line that Rommel would have expended as much material and time on it but, needs must as they say.

The importance of the theatre to Hitler has almost flippantly been addressed by some historians as if it was a side show. When one actually looks at what was sent to the area by the Germans its obvious that it was seen as rather important. The fact that most ended up at the bottom of the med from RN and RAF action should not detract from that.

Joe your point about changing roles is very interesting and, its arguable that had some German commanders commanded the resources the allies had they would have seen a similar enemy off in short time. Commanders like Rommel, Bittrich, Witt, Hausser, Manstein, were on the whole superior to allied commanders even with lesser materials.
Mitch

Mitch ,

IMO , the reason historians felt Hitler ( Berlin ) regarded Afrika as a side show...You have to look at what was going on at the time Rommel was dispatched to Afrika...I am just shooting from the hip right now do not have any source material to look at...So , I believe before Mussolini even forced Grazziani to advance against the British in Egypt...That Hitler had dispatched Von Thoma to afrika to access the situation there...
From what i recall Von Thoma did not think much of the Italians as a fighting force nor did he believe that Berlin could supply more than a couple divisions in the desert considering the British Navy & RAF...IMO Hitler sent Rommel to the desert to bolster the Italians from collapse & keep them out of trouble more than sending Rommel down to afrika to sweep into the middle east...Hitler IMO , felt that once he had finished off Russia , it would eliminate Englands only possible ally on the mainland...I personally feel that if instead of attacking Russia , if Hitler would have seized the oppurtunity presented to him & sent Rommel a couple more divisions from the onset , he would have been able to seize the middle eastern oil fields & have access to more recruits , being that the arabs would have enlisted to fight the british as some did join the DAK...
Once Hitler set about the course of invading Russia the sheer weight of manpower & armor heading East , kept Rommel & Afrika as second fiddle !

Joe

 

[swalterh]

So far, there have been a couple of references to the allied advantage in airpower during the portion of the campaign in N. Africa when Montgomery was involved. I think it pertinent to point out that Montgomery was one of the first allied commanders to fully appreciate the role of tactical air support on the modern battlefield. It is interesting that he did much to promote cooperation between the two services not least of which was locating his own personal HQ within close proximity to that of the RAF HQ.

This cultivated relationship paid dividends during the pursuit of Rommel’s defeated forces following the Battle of El Alamein. The RAF was able to effectively strafe and harass the German and Italian formations as they withdrew from contact with the 8th Army.

 

[jager7080]

So far, there have been a couple of references to the allied advantage in airpower during the portion of the campaign in N. Africa when Montgomery was involved. I think it pertinent to point out that Montgomery was one of the first allied commanders to fully appreciate the role of tactical air support on the modern battlefield. It is interesting that he did much to promote cooperation between the two services not least of which was locating his own personal HQ within close proximity to that of the RAF HQ.

This cultivated relationship paid dividends during the pursuit of Rommel’s defeated forces following the Battle of El Alamein. The RAF was able to effectively strafe and harass the German and Italian formations as they withdrew from contact with the 8th Army.

Shane ,

I agree...Montgomery took full advantage of the RAF at his disposal & IMO fully appreciated the use of combined arms as the germans so effectively showcased to the world in their exploits at that point in time !

Joe

 

[Mitch]

Joe..

You make some good points had the larger Italian army been able to deal with the substantially smaller Brit force then, maybe no troops in Africa for Germany. In that sense it was and could be seen as a side show. However, once there the strategic importance of Egypt and, the Suez Canal was probably one of the most important sectors (apart from the Atlantic) for the continuation of the British Empire at that time. The loss of that would have been catastrophic to the Britain and, it was realised probably to late with the OKW although, Rommel was aware of it early on.

There has been talk of the DAK having achieved that objective supporting the drive on the Caucasus now, whether that was an option is debatable in its own right but, the threat of a German Army coming from the underbelly would have caused the Russians all sorts of issues and, the threat alone could have changed the outcome of that sector.

I also agree with the comments that in the conditions the desert offered air power was strategically of massive importance.

Some interesting historical threads at the moment
Mitch

Mitch ,

IMO , the reason historians felt Hitler ( Berlin ) regarded Afrika as a side show...You have to look at what was going on at the time Rommel was dispatched to Afrika...I am just shooting from the hip right now do not have any source material to look at...So , I believe before Mussolini even forced Grazziani to advance against the British in Egypt...That Hitler had dispatched Von Thoma to afrika to access the situation there...
From what i recall Von Thoma did not think much of the Italians as a fighting force nor did he believe that Berlin could supply more than a couple divisions in the desert considering the British Navy & RAF...IMO Hitler sent Rommel to the desert to bolster the Italians from collapse & keep them out of trouble more than sending Rommel down to afrika to sweep into the middle east...Hitler IMO , felt that once he had finished off Russia , it would eliminate Englands only possible ally on the mainland...I personally feel that if instead of attacking Russia , if Hitler would have seized the oppurtunity presented to him & sent Rommel a couple more divisions from the onset , he would have been able to seize the middle eastern oil fields & have access to more recruits , being that the arabs would have enlisted to fight the british as some did join the DAK...
Once Hitler set about the course of invading Russia the sheer weight of manpower & armor heading East , kept Rommel & Afrika as second fiddle !

Joe

 

[RPZ]

Jager7080,

Yes, I forgot about Ultra. The allied command was often getting that intelligence before the intended German recipients of transmissions received them.

 

[jager7080]

Jager7080,

Yes, I forgot about Ultra. The allied command was often getting that intelligence before the intended German recipients of transmissions received them.

Yes , had to be mentioned as Montgomery was fully aware of Rommel's situation in thanks to Ultra...

Joe

 

[jager7080]

Joe..

You make some good points had the larger Italian army been able to deal with the substantially smaller Brit force then, maybe no troops in Africa for Germany. In that sense it was and could be seen as a side show. However, once there the strategic importance of Egypt and, the Suez Canal was probably one of the most important sectors (apart from the Atlantic) for the continuation of the British Empire at that time. The loss of that would have been catastrophic to the Britain and, it was realised probably to late with the OKW although, Rommel was aware of it early on.

There has been talk of the DAK having achieved that objective supporting the drive on the Caucasus now, whether that was an option is debatable in its own right but, the threat of a German Army coming from the underbelly would have caused the Russians all sorts of issues and, the threat alone could have changed the outcome of that sector.

I also agree with the comments that in the conditions the desert offered air power was strategically of massive importance.

Some interesting historical threads at the moment
Mitch

Mitch ,

After reading your post , this thought popped into my head...Say Molotov was receptive to Hitler's suggestions of dividing the region...I don't believe Russia meant to attack for some time !? POP , comes the Afrika situation...Hitler & the general staff sink themselves into the situation...Send Rommel enough resources & divisions to overwhelm british command in the desert...Rommel makes his way into the middle east & causes an arab uprising against the british empire...Having a german Army just south of the Caucasus would have been a major tactical advantage , not to mention the oil available to Hitler...An outbreak of war with Russia after the DAK had managed to arrive south of the caucasus would have russia at a huge disadvatge !

Joe

 

[swalterh]

Joe..

You make some good points had the larger Italian army been able to deal with the substantially smaller Brit force then, maybe no troops in Africa for Germany. In that sense it was and could be seen as a side show. However, once there the strategic importance of Egypt and, the Suez Canal was probably one of the most important sectors (apart from the Atlantic) for the continuation of the British Empire at that time. The loss of that would have been catastrophic to the Britain and, it was realised probably to late with the OKW although, Rommel was aware of it early on.

There has been talk of the DAK having achieved that objective supporting the drive on the Caucasus now, whether that was an option is debatable in its own right but, the threat of a German Army coming from the underbelly would have caused the Russians all sorts of issues and, the threat alone could have changed the outcome of that sector.

I also agree with the comments that in the conditions the desert offered air power was strategically of massive importance.

Some interesting historical threads at the moment
Mitch

Mitch

I find myself agreeing entirely with your points and conclusions regarding the importance of the African theatre to the British War effort. This was their primary operational theatre and they committed the crème of their men, material and command talent to this sector. If they had lost control of the vital logistical link that was the Suez Canal it would have made it almost impossible to carry on any type of effective operations against the Japanese in India and the Pacific.

I believe that, as you mentioned, Rommel recognized this in addition to the prize that was the ME oil fields beyond Egypt. His success in the region provided him enhanced influential leverage to heighten the importance of the German operations in Africa with the OKW. I don’t believe that the African operations were ever going to play as heavily on the German high command’s focus and planning as the struggle occurring on the Eastern Front. The invasion of Russia was one of the primary objectives laid out in Hitler’s political treatise. His commitment in Africa started out as a mere diplomatic show of good faith to his ally Mussolini and then snowballed because of the tactical and operational successes achieved by one of his favorite commanders.

Not trying to take anything away from what was accomplished by the 8th Army, but one could argue that one of the major underlying reasons for the British success in N. Africa is that they simply wanted it more than their Axis opponents. And who could blame them, Egypt was the life line to the entire Empire in the Pacific region. The biggest threat for the Germans however was the Russian Bear that was beginning to recuperate from the initial shock of Barbarossa.

 

[Mitch]

Joe/Shane...

Some good points. I think if the germans had managed to get passed the 8th army Egypt at some point, probably Cairo would have been the British Empires Stalingrad. As mentioned the importance of this area was enourmous and, the loss of the suez would have allowed the Japanese to run riot unfettered by any response. As Joe mentioned the threat of a German army in that area would have undoubtedly meant that Russian reinforcements used elsewhere would have had to be positioned in the south allowing Army group centre and North to capitalise in their own areas.

At that time with bleak news all over the Atlantic going poorly the victory in Alamein was pivotal and, he knew well the importance when he spoke afterwards of its importance.
Mitch

 

[bradleyl30]

I always hate to refer to the Discovery Channel or History Channel as I know that their shows are only for entertainment purposes, and that there is absolutely know quality control. This was confirmed by two friends at Discovery. Still, they had a show that talked about the North African campaign and they identified two major, although mundane problems that Germany had in North Africa that are substantiated by Hans von Luck in "Panzer Commander."

The Germans were not prepared to fight a desert campaign and did not know how to feed themselves or dig proper latrines. As you read commentaries or memoirs on the desert campaign they constantly refer to "desert fever." This has been attributed to the poor quality rations and uncovered latrines, as opposed to the Brits and their allies who had been fighting in the desert for long periods of time and knew the importance of this. Hitler rebuffed the calls for improved rations since he believed "the National Socialist zeal" (stolen from von Manstein's "Lost Victories") would overcome the soldiers physical woes. So, the desert fever was dysentery carried by flies feeding on the uncovered latrines and then landing on troops suffering from malnutrition and their rancid food. During many of the key battles later in the campaign, essential staff and personnel were either missing as they recovered back in Europe or were bedridden (as was Rommel at the Second Battle of El Alamein.)

 

[bradleyl30]

Joe

I think you bring up another great point regarding Montgomery’s intelligence edge. Your assessment on Montgomery’s practicality and leadership ability is spot on IMO. His character and professional integrity were traits that his colleagues in the British Army found difficult to match. I find it interesting that he was not of the nobility and therefore struggled to gain acceptance during his rise to command. Despite the fact that the commissioning system had been abolished in 1871, the British military still fiercely retained its tradition of favoring more socially established officers for certain branches of service and command positions. Despite this, he still maintained the moral courage to stand by his convictions (as you highlighted by describing his run-ins with Churchill). I believe that these were highly instrumental factors in his success.

Shane

I am a US Army "brat" and definitely grew up in a Monty-bashing environment, but recently have had my views slowly begin to shift.

In fact, some of that shift happened last night as I was reading Major General Reynold's book "Steel Inferno." He was describing the structural problems within the British and Commonwealth armies that made true mobile warfare almost impossible for the British, and that Monty was an outspoken critic (though often behind closed doors because he did not want to ruin his troops morale and undermine their confidence.) He talks about the inability of the tank arm and the infantry to directly communicate by wireless because the heads of each arm did not want to make changes such as adding additional radios to tanks and lessoning ammo loads, or reducing "bayonet strength" by having another soldier carry a radio just for joint tank/infantry comms. He describes other issues of this nature as well, including the fact that most tank units never trained with infantry even if they were in the same "armored division!" This results in an army that might start infantry and tank attacks together, but could not coordinate them. And this was not in North Africa, but the situation in Normandy! It was only the Monty-led North African divisions that were able to sustain coordinated attacks because of their long history together in the desert, but even these paled in comparison to the tight coordination between the German combat arms.

Reynolds also lists quotes from German sources where they were shocked to watch British tanks leave infantry behind, or to see British infantry with rifles slung and smoking cigarettes strolling behind the tanks.

So, if you accept this as the state of British mobile warfare capabilities, then Monty's decision not to fight Rommel's strength is a pretty brilliant tactical move. He knew that he could not match the DAK in open warfare, plus he knew he could beat the Desert Fox based on air power, artillery (the unsung hero of WWII where the allies truly had the numerical and innovation edge over Germany) and logistics.

Lastly, there are some analysts who think Rommel was overrated as a Corps commander and Field Marshal. Often his subordinates could not find him at critical moments because he was too far forward. There are some analysts who really think it was his staff (bayerlein, bismark, etc.) who deserve most of the credit. No time to add references... got to get back to my day job.

 

[jager7080]

I am a US Army "brat" and definitely grew up in a Monty-bashing environment, but recently have had my views slowly begin to shift.

In fact, some of that shift happened last night as I was reading Major General Reynold's book "Steel Inferno." He was describing the structural problems within the British and Commonwealth armies that made true mobile warfare almost impossible for the British, and that Monty was an outspoken critic (though often behind closed doors because he did not want to ruin his troops morale and undermine their confidence.) He talks about the inability of the tank arm and the infantry to directly communicate by wireless because the heads of each arm did not want to make changes such as adding additional radios to tanks and lessoning ammo loads, or reducing "bayonet strength" by having another soldier carry a radio just for joint tank/infantry comms. He describes other issues of this nature as well, including the fact that most tank units never trained with infantry even if they were in the same "armored division!" This results in an army that might start infantry and tank attacks together, but could not coordinate them. And this was not in North Africa, but the situation in Normandy! It was only the Monty-led North African divisions that were able to sustain coordinated attacks because of their long history together in the desert, but even these paled in comparison to the tight coordination between the German combat arms.

Reynolds also lists quotes from German sources where they were shocked to watch British tanks leave infantry behind, or to see British infantry with rifles slung and smoking cigarettes strolling behind the tanks.

So, if you accept this as the state of British mobile warfare capabilities, then Monty's decision not to fight Rommel's strength is a pretty brilliant tactical move. He knew that he could not match the DAK in open warfare, plus he knew he could beat the Desert Fox based on air power, artillery (the unsung hero of WWII where the allies truly had the numerical and innovation edge over Germany) and logistics.

Lastly, there are some analysts who think Rommel was overrated as a Corps commander and Field Marshal. Often his subordinates could not find him at critical moments because he was too far forward. There are some analysts who really think it was his staff (bayerlein, bismark, etc.) who deserve most of the credit. No time to add references... got to get back to my day job.

Bradley,

I just wanted to comment on your assesment on Rommel...While it is true about Rommel getting caught up at the front & being involved in localized clashes i would say no better example than in his " Dash to the Wire " ; There are inumerable advantages in this behavior...Years back when visiting a friend of mine who is Italian , he had company one day his uncle from Argentina , just so happens his uncle was part of the italian army attached to Rommel in North Afrika...He gave me some of his personal insight to Rommel that day...It goes along these lines , The Italian soldiers did not very much like their own officers
& morale was low before Rommel arrived...The Italian soldiers could not believe their eyes to see a german general up at the front with his men...Being shot at & coming under artillery fire...Eating with his troops & Italian troops at the front...Italian generals would never be caught doing these things...It generated an admiration for Rommel that i could see animated this old soldier still some 45 years later...
In a day & age where everybody wants to run companies & be in charge from the privacy of a golf course & pent-house office , There is something to be said for that ! What you ask ?! His men gave him everything they had , they belived in him & loved him...That is the intangible of this !
In a desert enviornment which is harsh , Rommel exemplified guile & daring & his push forth mentality really made the desert war the story it is...
I do agree with you that his subordinates were great officers in their own rite & their professionalism & smarts were no doubt great assests to Rommel...
But to say Overrated...You may have your opinion , but i am sorry i do not agree...

Joe

 

[swalterh]

From our discussion, I think the consensus is that the role of allied airpower was one of the key factors leading to the axis defeat. The RAF not only provided tactical air cover for the troops on the ground, but they also provided a significant operational advantage by inflicting a considerable amount of damage on axis supply ships bound for N. Africa.

I think that the situation on the Russian Front undoubtedly played heavily on the German high command when the issue of continued support for Rommel and his desert operations was taken into consideration. Another major problem facing the OKW after February 1942 (Area Bombing Directive issued by Bomber Command) was the threat of continuous allied air attacks against the German Homeland. Under these circumstances the Luftwaffe was forced to consolidate its resources in preparation for defense of the Reich. This left few replacement aircraft, pilots and maintenance crews available to make good on losses sustained in the desert. The Luftwaffe was also forced to drastically reduce the amount of active air units committed to the support of the DAK.

As was mentioned, the conditions in the desert were harsh and affected all ranks in the Axis forces that faced the British 8th Army. But, the role of allied airpower in this campaign cannot be understated and the factors affecting the Luftwaffe’s decisions regarding air asset allocation should remain in the consciousness of anyone seeking to understand the reasons that led to the eventual allied success during the campaign in N. Africa.