American civil war: the first modern war in history (1 Viewer)

Brad, I am embarrased to say that I cannot recall the name of the ACW prof that I had. I can remember my 2 Russian Revolution/RCW profs, and my outstanding and very influential WW1 and WW2 prof, Gordon Prange, but for some reason I have forgotton the names of all my American history profs. I'm not sure what that says about me.:rolleyes2::redface2: -- Al

Al, it says we're old! My family says I can't remember anything anyway.

Brad
 
As we have arrived to the reasons of the civil war start: "


"My ultimate goal in this struggle is to save the Union, and did not stop or save slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do it again. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union;" Abraham Lincoln

The reasons of the war were A LOT: the situation was very difficult between the northern and the southern sections, in the 40ies everything divided them: The question of the " freesoilers" and "fronteersmen" to which give for free or not the new western lands; the important question of protectionism for which the south had to buy less quality things made in north instead of better quality and better prices ones made in Europe; the developpement of the Union itself, the direction of the future railways, everything divided the 2 sections, so that the level of the discussion fell to the level of HONOUR and to the QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLES....No more place for negociation was left....


Louis,

I don' t agree about what you said about the northern and southern leaders convincing poor people on both sides. This was true in Europe and for the 1 world war, but not for the "war between states": the poor rednek rebels loved their land and their freedom , and were proud of their agricultural way of living, and wanted to preserve this, they were not obliged....They hated the discipline, they even came back home to take care of their piece of land during the quiet moments, but were back for the fighting when needed....Believe me, quite a different attitude from the french and italian soldiers in the trenches who wondered why they were sent to be killed in a young age!!
the unionist soldiers also fought with great determination and courage.

Instead, I would compare the confederates attitude to the russians during " the great patriotic war"....
 
As we have arrived to the reasons of the civil war start: "


"My ultimate goal in this struggle is to save the Union, and did not stop or save slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do it again. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union;" Abraham Lincoln

The reasons of the war were A LOT: the situation was very difficult between the northern and the southern sections, in the 40ies everything divided them: The question of the " freesoilers" and "fronteersmen" to which give for free or not the new western lands; the important question of protectionism for which the south had to buy less quality things made in north instead of better quality and better prices ones made in Europe; the developpement of the Union itself, the direction of the future railways, everything divided the 2 sections, so that the level of the discussion fell to the level of HONOUR and to the QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLES....No more place for negociation was left....


Louis,

I don' t agree about what you said about the northern and southern leaders convincing poor people on both sides. This was true in Europe and for the 1 world war, but not for the "war between states": the poor rednek rebels loved their land and their freedom , and were proud of their agricultural way of living, and wanted to preserve this, they were not obliged....They hated the discipline, they even came back home to take care of their piece of land during the quiet moments, but were back for the fighting when needed....Believe me, quite a different attitude from the french and italian soldiers in the trenches who wondered why they were sent to be killed in a young age!!
the unionist soldiers also fought with great determination and courage.

Instead, I would compare the confederates attitude to the russians during " the great patriotic war"....
"Poor rednek rebels"?!? I think I should be offended on behalf of my Southern roots. {eek3} -- Al
 
Poppo,

You may be right about the poorer Confederates constituting the vast majority of the Confederate troops not being mislead by their wealthy, slave owning leaders, and fighting out of love for their freedom (I remain skeptical of your assessment), but I find it hard to believe that the majority of Union troops were true believers in the Union, particular since a substantial percentage of these troops were Irish immigrants literally right off the boat, so could hardly have a longstanding love for the United States as constituted since the War of Independence.
 
"Poor rednek rebels"?!? I think I should be offended on behalf of my Southern roots. {eek3} -- Al



{sm4} I said in comparison with the" southern wealthy aristocracy"....You can ' t think I would offend the southerns, I hope!!! And there must be an italian to defend the southern honour...Unbelievable but true!!!!
 
Poppo,

You may be right about the poorer Confederates constituting the vast majority of the Confederate troops not being mislead by their wealthy, slave owning leaders, and fighting out of love for their freedom (I remain skeptical of your assessment), but I find it hard to believe that the majority of Union troops were true believers in the Union, particular since a substantial percentage of these troops were Irish immigrants literally right off the boat, so could hardly have a longstanding love for the United States as constituted since the War of Independence.

I think you will find that in many wars immigrants are the most staunch defenders of their newly adopted country. In the Civil War, Germans were staunch defenders of the Union.

No disrespect intended but if you read soldiers' accounts, you can see how important the concept of their country in all its abstract forms meant to them, be they Confederate or Union. In today's age of indulgence we have trouble understanding that but back then it was honorable to sacrifice yourself for a great cause, for the greater good.
 
Hi Chris. I believe that the majority of the enlistees probably had no clear idea of what they were going to war over, other than vague slogans about saving the Union, free the slaves, or repel the invaders. Certainly a large proportion, on both sides, enlisted with no more knowledge than that, trusting in what they were reading and being told by their newspapers or whatever, thus being duped by those agendas. I have no doubt that many enlisted with the best intentions and that they heartily agreed with the slogans and what-have-you but that most would have been broadly ignorant of the underlying economic reasons and interests. I also would not discount the large numbers that would have enlisted just for the adventure, for the change in their dull factory or farming lives. The slogans certainly would have provided them with a ready excuse for joining. Ignorance and being duped go hand in hand. -- Al

Hi Al, I can agree with that assessment. While not understanding the economic issues, I think the majority in the North thought they were, in part, fighting to save the Union. Many were opposed to slavery, probably including many Democrats. A sense of adventure would be a reason for many, as you state. For the southerners, it would be to fight northern agression. Slogans may beguile, but not all are false. Chris
 
I think you will find that in many wars immigrants are the most staunch defenders of their newly adopted country. In the Civil War, Germans were staunch defenders of the Union.

No disrespect intended but if you read soldiers' accounts, you can see how important the concept of their country in all its abstract forms meant to them, be they Confederate or Union. In today's age of indulgence we have trouble understanding that but back then it was honorable to sacrifice yourself for a great cause, for the greater good.

Brad,

You certainly know a great deal more about the Civil War than I do. I will defer to your assessment of the motivation of the troops involved. Having seen the Battlefield at Gettyburg, and walked the hallowed ground where the courageous Americans fighting on both sides attacked and defended, I can certainly believe that these men did so in honorable sacrifice to what they perceived as a great cause. I can only hope that faced with a similar great cause, we (and the other members of our generation) would act as honorably.
 
As we have arrived to the reasons of the civil war start: "


"My ultimate goal in this struggle is to save the Union, and did not stop or save slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do it again. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union;" Abraham Lincoln

The reasons of the war were A LOT: the situation was very difficult between the northern and the southern sections, in the 40ies everything divided them: The question of the " freesoilers" and "fronteersmen" to which give for free or not the new western lands; the important question of protectionism for which the south had to buy less quality things made in north instead of better quality and better prices ones made in Europe; the developpement of the Union itself, the direction of the future railways, everything divided the 2 sections, so that the level of the discussion fell to the level of HONOUR and to the QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLES....No more place for negociation was left....

In this discussion about the causes of the American Civil War I’m surprised to see little to no mention of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).

First time since Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the SC found an Act of Congress to be Unconstitutional.

Holding:
1. Persons of African descent cannot be, nor were ever intended to be, citizens under the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff is without standing to file a suit.
2. The Property Clause is only applicable to lands possessed at the time of ratification (1787). As such, Congress cannot ban slavery in the territories. Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional.
3. Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from freeing slaves brought into federal territories.

Chief Justice:
Roger B. Taney

Majority:
Taney (Dem.- MD), joined by Wayne (Dem.- GA), Catron (Dem.- TN), Daniel (Dem.- VA), Nelson (Dem.- NY), Grier (Dem.- PA) & Campbell (Dem.- AL)

Dissenting:
McLean (Whig/Rep.- OH), Curtis (Whig- MA.)

Many contemporary accounts of the Dred Scott Decision conveniently ignore the intense partisanship inherent in this case.

Shane
 
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In this discussion about the causes of the American Civil War I’m surprised to see little to no mention of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).

First time since Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the SC found an Act of Congress to be Unconstitutional.

Holding:
1. Persons of African descent cannot be, nor were ever intended to be, citizens under the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff is without standing to file a suit.
2. The Property Clause is only applicable to lands possessed at the time of ratification (1787). As such, Congress cannot ban slavery in the territories. Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional.
3. Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from freeing slaves brought into federal territories.

Chief Justice:
Roger B. Taney

Majority:
Taney (Dem.- MD), joined by Wayne (Dem.- GA), Catron (Dem.- TN), Daniel (Dem.- VA), Nelson (Dem.- NY), Grier (Dem.- PA) & Campbell (Dem.- AL)

Dissenting:
McLean (Whig/Rep.- OH), Curtis (Whig- MA.)

Many contemporary accounts of the Dred Scott Decision conveniently ignore the intense partisanship inherent in this case.

Shane

As Poppo mentioned earlier, the ruling of Scott v. Sanford left little negotiating room between (not necessarily north & south, but) the Republicans and Democrats, as the Supreme Court effectively stripped Congress' Constitutional authority to legislate on the slavery issue in the territories.

Let’s remember that in his initial run for the Presidency, Lincoln’s platform included leaving slavery alone where it existed, but the Republicans were firmly opposed to its further expansion. This position was very appealing to the abolitionists in the north-east. This SC decision opened the door politically for the Republicans to make a play for disaffected northern Democrats who were opposed to the further expansion of slavery. When the Democratic justices (from both north & south) supported the eventual decision they enabled the Republican Party to put together an effective platform that saw them successfully take the White House in 1860.

Even though the party split between a northern and southern faction during the 1860 Presidential run, the Democrats of the north were not by any stretch of the imagination enthusiastic supporters of the policies of the Lincoln administration or the Union war effort. Anti-war groups such as the Copperheads sprouted up in many areas of the north. One of their members (I can’t place his name) actually ran for and eventually lost the governorship of Ohio from Canada as he had been living there in exile. Probably the most obvious example of northern Democrat resistance to the war effort was General George B. McClellan’s Presidential platform (1864) of opening up peace negotiations with the Confederacy.

I remember someone (I think Brad) asking about the fairness of McClellan’s unfavorable portrayal from a historical perspective. My answer to this is that as a general, McClellan was the right man for the job when the army needed to be organized and trained. Unfortunately from the civilian-military relations stand point, many Republicans among the administration and Congress were suspicious of his loyalty and commitment to their war aims. Many speculated that he was seeking to use his position as effectual Army CNC as a platform from which to run for the Presidency in 1864. His lack of success on the field of battle served to severely heighten these negative views and Lincoln was under almost constant pressure from varying sections within the Republican establishment to remove him from command. McClellan’s eventual Presidential run IMO sealed his fate and eventual reputation as the “failure” that he has been portrayed to be. Is this unwarranted? Yes, and IMO very politically motivated. His contribution to the Union cause can’t in all academic honesty be ignored. For all the glory and success that the men serving in the Union Army of the Potomac achieved while under the direction of Meade and Grant, it can’t be forgotten that it was “Little Mac” that provided them with the skills and confidence to meet the challenges of combat.

I wrote an essay on the Dred Scott decision for a Constitutional Law course a few years back that had a similar tone as what I’ve described here (minus the opinion on McClellan). It was probably a bit more concise and extensive since the material was still fresh in my mind at the time.
 
Shane, political aspirations aside, a general, especially a general-in-chief, must be judged by success in the field. In that regards McClellan should be judged a failure. Agreed, he "saved" the Union army at least twice after defeat. But saved for what purpose? Did he not contribute to the loss at 2nd Manassas by his dilatory, maybe purposeful, actions? He could have ended the war at Antietam but did not. I have not read that Lincoln relieved him for fear of his designs on the president's office. The public demanded a successful prosecution of the war and Little Mac could not provide that. In the final assessment, would you say the war would have been a victory for the United Sates had he been continued in command? Chris
 
Shane, political aspirations aside, a general, especially a general-in-chief, must be judged by success in the field. In that regards McClellan should be judged a failure. Agreed, he "saved" the Union army at least twice after defeat. But saved for what purpose? Did he not contribute to the loss at 2nd Manassas by his dilatory, maybe purposeful, actions? He could have ended the war at Antietam but did not. I have not read that Lincoln relieved him for fear of his designs on the president's office. The public demanded a successful prosecution of the war and Little Mac could not provide that. In the final assessment, would you say the war would have been a victory for the United Sates had he been continued in command? Chris

Chris

IMO you make some accurate and compelling points. Here is my intial post repsonding to Brad's inquary about McClellan's generalship:

"Following the defeat at 1st Bull Run the Union army was in desperate need of training and re-organization. President Lincoln promoted General McClellan to the top position. He possessed superb organizational and management skills. McClellan did an excellent job of training and organizing the army, but when it came time to utilize it against the enemy he did not possess the necessary attributes to bring victory on the battlefield. Following the lackluster tactical direction of the army at Antietam, Lincoln was eventually compelled to remove McClellan due to his inadequacies in conducting combat operations and continued to search for a fighting general. The Union army experienced many setbacks with multiple commanders until Lincoln decided to promote General Grant to command all federal forces. Grant turned out to be the right man for the job and eventually was able to gain the military victories needed to win the war.

When training and organization were necessary, McClellan was the right man to entrust with the power and responsibility of commanding the army, but when it came time to fight he couldn’t measure up to the task. After removing McClellan, Lincoln continuously gave new individuals an opportunity until he settled on the man who could gain the successes required for the federal government to accomplish its war aims. This example highlights how as situations change, organizations must be willing to shift the power and authority to the individual or group that is most capable of accomplishing the tasks necessary in order for the organization to move closer to its objectives."

As far as the Battle at 2nd Bull Run (note: correct name lol) is concerned, IMO John Pope bears the responsibility for being goaded into throwing some the Union's best troops against Jackson's entrenched veterans. Longstreet's eventual attack that fell on the Union army's left flank was a masterful tactical maneuver. IMO Pope deserved to be relieved of command for his unwillingness to cooperate with other federal commanders in the area and for his continued shameless self-promotion and unrestrained pompous bearing.

Following the disaster at 2nd Manassas (note: incorrect name, again jk) Lincoln had little time to react as Lee and his army had seized the initiative and were rapidly moving towards Maryland. In Lincoln's estimation, McClellan was the only available federal commander who could pull the disorganized and downtrodden Federal forces together fast enough in order for them to effectively respond to Lee's movements. Let's remember that during the entire Maryland campaign McClellan was operating somewhat outside of his scope as his orders were merely to command the forces to be used in the defense of Washington. He was taking a risk by chosing to aggressively pursue Lee after being presented with a copy of the Confederate battle plan, but without obtaining the proper authority. This in some degree can explain his lack of aggression and ability to maintain cohesion of purpose during this campaign. But, he was also let down to some degree by his immediate subordinates who were often times more concerned about jockeying for position with each other instead of successfully directing their troops against the Confederates.

Am I saying he was a great general? Absolutely not, I’m merely suggesting that there existed substantial organizational and policy frictions within the Union high command structure at this period in the war. I think that these issues need to be recognized in order to gain a more accurate picture of why the war followed the course it did. I would say that McClellan was an effective organizer and drillmaster. He had the ability to formulate sound operational and tactical level plans, but when it can time to spill blood he didn’t demonstrate the aptitudes necessary for the federal government to retain him in his post and still accomplish its aims.
 
Shane
Agree with your analysis of McClellan's organizational and planning skills. You are more charitable than most when you state: "Am I saying he was a great general? Absolutely not..." In the end, he didn't possess the "killer instinct" necessary to end the war, as you pointed out.
While Pope, as the commander at Second Bull Run, bears full responsibility for that defeat, there have been accusations McClellan's failure to fully support his fellow commander was conspiratorial. He knew Pope's defeat would boost himself back into the position of most prominent army commander. I cannot see him as victim of army politics, as he himself was a consumate player. Chris
 
Shane
Agree with your analysis of McClellan's organizational and planning skills. You are more charitable than most when you state: "Am I saying he was a great general? Absolutely not..." In the end, he didn't possess the "killer instinct" necessary to end the war, as you pointed out.
While Pope, as the commander at Second Bull Run, bears full responsibility for that defeat, there have been accusations McClellan's failure to fully support his fellow commander was conspiratorial. He knew Pope's defeat would boost himself back into the position of most prominent army commander. I cannot see him as victim of army politics, as he himself was a consumate player. Chris

Chris

I agaree entirely with your assessment regarding the nature of Pope and McClellan's relationship.

Shane
 
The theory that Lincoln may have relieved McClellan for fear of McClellan political ambitions at that time may have come from (among other places) the relatively new book by Richard Slotkin, The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. The book has come under a bit of fire for its very anti-McClellan focus.
 
The theory that Lincoln may have relieved McClellan for fear of McClellan political ambitions at that time may have come from (among other places) the relatively new book by Richard Slotkin, The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. The book has come under a bit of fire for its very anti-McClellan focus.

Shane
Agree with your analysis of McClellan's organizational and planning skills. You are more charitable than most when you state: "Am I saying he was a great general? Absolutely not..." In the end, he didn't possess the "killer instinct" necessary to end the war, as you pointed out.
While Pope, as the commander at Second Bull Run, bears full responsibility for that defeat, there have been accusations McClellan's failure to fully support his fellow commander was conspiratorial. He knew Pope's defeat would boost himself back into the position of most prominent army commander. I cannot see him as victim of army politics, as he himself was a consumate player. Chris

I think that when analyzing McClellan’s battlefield performance it is important to remember that he did enjoy some forms of success on the Peninsula (note: not the Seven Days). I think that when analyzing any of the Federal commanders who were facing off against Robert E. Lee (McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade & Grant) it is essential to keep in mind that they were matching wits with one of the greatest operational and tactical level minds this country has ever produced. One of the reasons behind Lincoln’s continual frustrations in finding a commander for the eastern army was due in no small part to Lee’s performance.

Lee was going to make whoever commanded the Army of the Potomac beat him. He wasn’t prone to handing his opponents advantages because of his own mistakes. Lee also had the advantage of being on (for the most part) the operational defensive. Clausewitz as well as other military theorists suggest that defensive operations are easier to conduct than offensive ones. Lincoln required a commander with the skill, fortitude and aggressiveness that could contend with these frictions and lead the northern army to victory. Again, McClellan and the others were not capable of achieving this, but Grant was.
 
I think that when analyzing McClellan’s battlefield performance it is important to remember that he did enjoy some forms of success on the Peninsula (note: not the Seven Days). I think that when analyzing any of the Federal commanders who were facing off against Robert E. Lee (McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade & Grant) it is essential to keep in mind that they were matching wits with one of the greatest operational and tactical level minds this country has ever produced. One of the reasons behind Lincoln’s continual frustrations in finding a commander for the eastern army was due in no small part to Lee’s performance.

Lee was going to make whoever commanded the Army of the Potomac beat him. He wasn’t prone to handing his opponents advantages because of his own mistakes. Lee also had the advantage of being on (for the most part) the operational defensive. Clausewitz as well as other military theorists suggest that defensive operations are easier to conduct than offensive ones. Lincoln required a commander with the skill, fortitude and aggressiveness that could contend with these frictions and lead the northern army to victory. Again, McClellan and the others were not capable of achieving this, but Grant was.
Remember that Lee was offered command of the Union Army. There must have been some reason for this.:rolleyes2: Lincoln had to be acutely aware of his limited options in regards to command of the Unoin Army. -- Al
 
Remember that Lee was offered command of the Union Army. There must have been some reason for this.:rolleyes2: Lincoln had to be acutely aware of his limited options in regards to command of the Unoin Army. -- Al

Al

This is a good point that IMO goes a long way to explain the initial Confederate successes in the eastern theatre. A large portion of the existing command talent within the US army (i.e. Lee, Jackson, Stuart, etc...) ended up siding with the Confederacy when the war broke out. The federal army basically had to completely reconstruct its command structure. It actually ended up working out quite well since the eventual senior level federal commanders (i.e. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, etc…) were given the opportunity to hone their skills and professional relationships in the western theatre.
 
Al's post presupposes that Lincoln had the knowledge of the Army in April 1861 that he later had. At the time the war began, he had been dealing with Fort Sumter, a period in which he almost had a nervous breakdown and for which he was not adequately prepared (but then again who could be). He would have been relying on General Winfield Scott for military recommendations. Moreover, Lee was probablly the most distinguished officer after Scott in the Army and it was at Scott's recommendation that Lincoln offered the position to Lee. Later on Lincoln became more adept with the talent available to him but not in April 1861.
 
Al's post presupposes that Lincoln had the knowledge of the Army in April 1861 that he later had. At the time the war began, he had been dealing with Fort Sumter, a period in which he almost had a nervous breakdown and for which he was not adequately prepared (but then again who could be). He would have been relying on General Winfield Scott for military recommendations. Moreover, Lee was probablly the most distinguished officer after Scott in the Army and it was at Scott's recommendation that Lincoln offered the position to Lee. Later on Lincoln became more adept with the talent available to him but not in April 1861.
This is a good point, Brad. I haven't really made any kind of study of Lincoln or his relation to the Army, or of the Union high command, for that matter. I was under the impression that Lee had been offered the position because of ability and reputation, not simply because of Scott's recommendation. -- Al
 

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