American civil war: the first modern war in history (2 Viewers)

Don't think you're wrong. Scott considered Lee the finest officer in the Army because of the qualities you mentioned. In addition, Lee was probably well known to the public at large because of Harpers Ferry.
 
Here are two more lectures hosted by the Gettysburg National Military Park in their winter lecture series, courtesy of Al Mackey in his Student of the Civil War blog.

Ambrose Burnside: The Victorious General
http://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/ambrose-burnside-the-victorious-general/

We Shall Be Wiped Out of Existence: From Calamity to Crisis: Oliver O. Howard Out of Chancellorsville and Into Gettysburg
http://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2013/02/15/we-shall-be-wiped-out-of-existence/
 
Al's post presupposes that Lincoln had the knowledge of the Army in April 1861 that he later had. At the time the war began, he had been dealing with Fort Sumter, a period in which he almost had a nervous breakdown and for which he was not adequately prepared (but then again who could be). He would have been relying on General Winfield Scott for military recommendations. Moreover, Lee was probablly the most distinguished officer after Scott in the Army and it was at Scott's recommendation that Lincoln offered the position to Lee. Later on Lincoln became more adept with the talent available to him but not in April 1861.

Despite a lack of knowledge of the army in the early years of the war, Lincoln still stuck his neck out a few times to save Grant from being canned. During Grant’s victories at Ft’s Henry and Donelson, Grant’s immediate superior (Halleck) was growing frustrated with the idea that Grant was taking too many casualties. Before the battle at Shiloh, Halleck and McClellan were in communication about Grant’s possible removal from command. Demonstrating a sort of natural martial intuition, Lincoln directly intervened in this bureaucratic squabbling. It didn’t end until Halleck was eventually transferred from the Western theatre to Washington to serve as Lincoln’s senior military advisor. This left Grant free to conduct his operations without continued heckling from his superior.

IMO Grant exemplified what Lincoln wanted out of the war before he was fully aware of it. When Grant demanded unconditional and immediate surrender he was summing up the Union’s eventual war aims. I find it interesting that this obscure clerk from the backwater that was the mid-west understood the military objective of the war before any of the politicians in Washington could agree on what the political objectives should be. An instance of the cart before the horse considering the US is a country that insists on civilian oversight of the military.

When examining the Civil War, we have a conflict that in many ways generated its own objectives and took on its own life. By the end, the federal government had prosecuted a war unlike any other in modern memory up to that time. A fine example of how conflicts have a tendency to escalate towards totality.
 
The theory that Lincoln may have relieved McClellan for fear of McClellan political ambitions at that time may have come from (among other places) the relatively new book by Richard Slotkin, The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. The book has come under a bit of fire for its very anti-McClellan focus.

There’s a book called “Lincoln and His Generals” that was originally published in 1952 that postulates McClellan’s political liability with the republican administration. Bruce Catton’s three part series on the Army of the Potomac originally published in 1951 also includes similar analysis. The historical commentary regarding McClellan’s unpopularity with republicans because he was a democrat is not really new.

Any author writing about the Antietam Campaign would be hard pressed not to make some negative comments about McClellan’s generalship. He had a major intelligence advantage which forced Lee to react to him. He also had superior forces massed for a decisive battle against an opponent who didn’t have his entire force concentrated when the two armies came into initial contact. The overall direction he provided during the battle itself was very lackluster and hands-off. Despite the disjointed and uncoordinated federal attacks, Lee’s combat power had been drained away leaving him in a position to be destroyed. McClellan had a whole extra corps that he could have committed to deliver the killer strike, but elected to hold these troops in reserve.

At Antietam, McClellan won an incomplete tactical victory that had some favorable operational, strategic and political results. But, he could have ended the war. On top of all of this, his pursuit of Lee’s army following the battle was sluggish and in Lincoln’s view obstinate. If Lincoln wanted to win the war by conquest, he was going to have to find a man other than McClellan in order to accomplish this.
 
Hello Poppo

Please see my replies in BOLD below. I guess it depends how one might define "Modern". Modern as I understand it is quite different from probably most other toy soldier collectors. Admittedly, I do not know much about the ACW so would be happy to concede if I am wrong.

for the first time were used: rifled guns with their new fire power; Ok. Ill give you that one :p submarines, armored ships; torpedo boats; Were ""armored" ships really decisive in the ACW? I seem to understand they were in their infancy at that time. Either way, Just because a ship is an ironclad, not sure that really changed how ships were used to support land ops or if they were used to any extent in a manner different fromt he time of Alexander. the use of railways for a fast troops transportation. Ill give you this one too.

and new tactics like : the use of trenches as a pivot ( general Lee); Trench warfare is MIA in the modern warfighters lexicon. a new use of cavalry as mounted troops for fast raids in small or big groups (general Forrest) or as a screen to hide the infantry' s movements to the enemy;Is this any different than the times of Alexander as well? the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructures, agricultural production, railways etc. ( general Sherman). Here I think we see some simililarities with actual mdoern 21st century warfighting which would have been light years ahead of the 20th century conflicts. I believe we started to see this again with the bomber campaigns in WW2. Not sure in WW1 the BEF/AEF was in a position to really destroy the infrastructure of the Germans.


But amazingly the silly, stubborn, and blind ww1 generals completely forgot the ACW ' s lessons and sent hundred thousands men to be unusefully massacred in front of machine guns.
Im sure there were lessons in the ACW that should have been heeded by generals in WW1. Still, I look at the technological advances like airplanes which threw the battlefield into a 3D playground.

Good thread!!
 
Were ""armored" ships really decisive in the ACW? I seem to understand they were in their infancy at that time. Either way, Just because a ship is an ironclad, not sure that really changed how ships were used to support land ops or if they were used to any extent in a manner different fromt he time of Alexander.

Armored gunboats on the rivers of the western theater were highly influential in the eventual conquest of the Confederacy. Grant’s campaigns against Ft’s Henry and Donelson involved coordinated joint operations with the navy in order to bring about the reduction of these two Confederate strongholds.

The Battle at Shiloh also involved army-navy cooperation. Admittedly the gun boats served in more of a rapid transport role as they shuttled union reinforcements across the river to the combat zone. But, without Buell’s Army of the Ohio, Grant’s counter-attack on the second day may have lacked the weight necessary to drive the Confederates from the field.

At Vicksburg the gunboats again provided a mobility advantage and fire support for the Union army’s operations against the proverbial “key” to the entire war. Porter’s running of the gauntlet with his Mississippi squadron past the river defenses at Vicksburg enabled the federal army to bypass the strong Confederate defenses to the north by maneuvering below the fortress city and approaching it from the south.

The war in the west was very much a campaign of maneuver that involved successive operations against key strategic strongholds. The armored gunboat was a decisive asset for federal commanders operating in this theatre because of the flexibility gained from the gunboat’s ability to provide greater mobility and heavy fire support.
 
Thank you for the detailed reply. You clearly know your ACW. Still, not sure what you described makes the use of armored ships in the ACW any different than the period of row or sail. The tactics still seem relatively similar.
 
Thank you for the detailed reply. You clearly know your ACW. Still, not sure what you described makes the use of armored ships in the ACW any different than the period of row or sail. The tactics still seem relatively similar.

I suppose you have an argument as pertaining to the tactics, aside from the fact that wooden row and sail vessels would not have been able to execute the complex support operations that were put into effect by the steam powered armored river boats.

The steam powered propulsion system gave the vessels added mobility that enabled them to operate regardless of wind conditions and did not require the diversion of manpower away from combat tasks to man ores. The successful Yankee operation at Mobile Bay was a direct result of the steam powered engine. Had all of Farragut’s ships been reliant on wind for maneuver he would have failed to take the port.

The armored protection allowed the gunboats to engage in close quarters duels with the heavy fixed artillery mounted within the Confederate fortifications. This tactic was only feasible because the gunboats’ armor afforded them the ability to withstand the punishment of artillery strikes that would have wrecked an unprotected wooden vessel.

I suppose one could argue that the tactics employed by tanks on the modern battlefield bear some resemblance to those employed by the mounted knight during the medieval period. Even a paratrooper assault is just a fancy flanking maneuver. I believe the US Army referred to airborne operations as vertical envelopments.

IMO it’s all a matter of perspective and scope when engaging in these types of discussions. What weapons systems, tactics, command structures, strategies, policies, etc… actually deserve to be considered “modern?” It’s kind of like comparing the dog fighting maneuvers capable of being employed by the WWI propeller driven bi-planes with the advanced tactical maneuvers employed by the fighter jets of today. In the end, the fundamental reality of warfare in any age is to figure out some way to destroy your enemy or make him give up. If you do this before your enemy does, you get more of what you want when there is peace.
 
Thank you for the detailed reply. You clearly know your ACW. Still, not sure what you described makes the use of armored ships in the ACW any different than the period of row or sail. The tactics still seem relatively similar.

Having visited the Mariner's museum in Norfolk, VA a few yrs ago I saw models and paintings/prints of British and French armored ships that pre-date the ACW. Major naval powers were beginning to recognize the advantages of armor plating. The US and CSA were the first to use them in "modern" combat. The first recorded use of armored ships, that I know of, were the Koreans. The battle of the Merimac and Monitor was noteworthy as it made all sailing vessels outmoded and changed naval warfare as known at that time. Chris
 

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